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ABSTRACT 
This study is an exploration of the nature and formotion of 
moral sentiments concerning , ihat constitutes deviance and how deviants 
should be treated. These sentiments establish the general climaýte of 
moral tolerance or intolerance within which reactions to particular 
instances of deviance take shape. The study is based upon the 
assumption that differences bet--,, een people in terms of such moral sentiments 
reflect further diffferences in other areas of their lives, in the roles 
in wl-, ich they find themselves and the distinctive ideologies to they 
adhere. 
The thesis stairtsfrom an examination of the work undertaken in this 
area b-,, Ranulf in developing his theory of moral indignation. This holds 
that a repressive morality embracing hostility towards hedonism and punitiveness, 
towards deviants is characteristic of the lo,.,,, er middle class as the indirect 
result of the restraints forced upon its members by their position in the 
class structure. The present thesis employs the critical appraisal of 
4 Ranulf's theory ! ---s an opportunity to draw together evidence hich serves 
as a means of elaborating a more comprehensive theory of moral indignation. . IL -L - 
This evidence is culled from the examingtion of a number of studies taken 
from the fields of aociology, social psychologýr and social anthropology. 
A study of three "moral crusades" - the Responsible Society, the Nationwide 
Festival of Light, and the National Viewers' and Listeners' Association --is 
undertaken to investigate the nature of moral indignation in a contemporary 
setting. The study concludes by setting forth an explanation of the nature 
and origin of moral authoritarianism as the product of social constr7ints. 
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ITUCTIOL 
14 .i the effect o' t1le, s-, )ec uu -L others -uhouE; h - -t "-' cle0. ý io 
L-I 
-L I -Gneir activiti-es do not. -,. qan: Lfestly damage our own interests, are 
morally undisci-. 31ined, who give ther. aselves u-ý) to idleness, se 
indulgence, or forbidden vices? lhat e]ffect does the -, )ro-, Incuity 
of the wiclzed have on the -: Deace of mind of the virtuous? " 
i This 
study seeks. -16-o ans'wer these cuestions. It is an emploration of a-- 
how certain social conditions share beliefs concerning -what 
constit, ates crime and immorality and how those who deviate fro; -. a 
such standards should be dealt With. It is -. ýartuicularly concerned 
with the -, roblem of e=Dlainin- why peo- I 6U Die differ from one another 
in terms of a disinterested desire to have the wicked made to pay 
for their sins through punishment. 
I- 
ilhat is meant by spealcing of such a "disinterested" desire 
uo inflict -. punishmerrt? Cohen captures something o. L ý. he notion when 
he refers to those deviants vfhose "activities do not mani: fe st ly 
damage our oirn interests" . Clearly this excludes the direct victi. -: i 
of an offence. This leaves the rest of the cornmunit, -,,,, which might 
lbe thought o. -If as siding with the victi. -, -i against the offender on 
Uhe grou-nds that he is an "enemy of society" History reveals, t 
however, numerous exaniples of societies -ahere those vjho coýmrlit-ted 
acts which are now regarded as the very essence of crime, acts such 
as ra; -pe, murder, abduction, robbery and theft, -uere clearly not held 
to be -: -, ublic enemies, "out enemies only of their victims. As Idaa 
Hadin -, emar-7,, -s on attitudes towards those who committed such acts 
1 
2 
within certain ancient ! -. ýedliterrmaean societies: 
6uch Derso. I -is were taken to be mellely eneiies of the-- 
victir, ', s, against -..., hom these victi, -,, iss must -orotect themselves 
as best IkOhey may with varying amounts of neighborly and 
Iýindred assistance. j? urtherý let us note that neighbors azid 
I- U aI. -en ". 
indred could not be '- in so large a sense as to include 
the whole commu-nity or any considerable -, -, o-., tion of it. The 
victi., -. i had to -rely for assistance on a shar-ply limited grou-p. 
If the -, )ersons i, -iho made it uj were too wealc too ti. -nir--L or 
too indolent, he had no other redress. 3y lettinc, him down, Cý his --,, -ins. -men had done him a wrong, but that, too, and more 
em-Dhatically i; as no onds business but his own. 2 
,, -"e shall later loo-z in so-me det. ,!: -l at the social changes which 
under-pinned the transformation in such beliefs. ; S)uc--', -1 a transformation 
vividly illustrates the -viide differences v,, hich can be found concerning 
the -)lace grou-is allot to punishment as a mea-ais of dealing with 
di. eviance. For a further illustration of such di Lerences, consider 
-f f 
I 'he -"avaho. As Ladd observes: 'he example o. u I. 
The Navahos have no concention o- ., unlshment similar to ours - 
at least in -the retributive sense -, -, hich involves the notion 
o-, f desert. .:, unishment and blame are frowned upon by the 
Tavaho moralist as forms of aggression, although he ad-mits 
that they may be taken into account as inevitable (though -, -, erh,, -. -)s 
unjustifiable) consequences oL one's crimes. L Sanctions, as 
morally approved agg-ression, are not condoned in the I-javaho 
aulture. 3 
e in'ensit-, and di-r-ectio- o--' 'he te f --l' e r, encesinnu L/ Lu ndency 
to 
'hat accounts for such 
-., u-rlish can 
also be found -, jithin societies. "i to L 
i-nternal dif'-ferences? One source can be arrived atl -P-)j"ly q ýC'-J-r UI- . 1. _u- . 6- tj 
through e. zamining more closely the notion of' disini'Lierestued --lunisament. 
Just as those -,. -; ho suf-fer direct loss or injury from an o"fence ja `- 
can be exclucled L om our consideral; ion o.,. ' clisinterested -, )unisment , so "r 
Voo -'U-hc)se -, iho stand to mal: e a direct .. iatjerizal gain -',. -, or,, i 
t-he ,; -ý,, uiisnmento 
'D 
. L. ,. -,. enders ---austj 
be recogniseCL as having a notaltogether undiluted 
disi: ntueresluedness in t. -, ie enforcei. iont of 
just 41 
ce. 
ezeaio-,, ' tLi 2. s _,. a -, t, 1cui cal ro u- n s. uch -b 
terestea i- 
bear in 
. iind the --), --)rt such interests-olay in sha-idng -their actions, 
ho,, v,, ever "disinterested" is the rhetoric in whic'n they see-, -. to 
clothe them. ititchcraft -)rosecutions in continental Zju--o.,. e during 
'Uhe 
-'Henaissancee, for eMample, created amýL sustained the livelihoods 
ol a larige nuniber o. L --- L/ -)eo-, le 
through tile con-fiscation of -ý, ro-'-)erty 
rom bo Ih the accused an' the co., avicted. U LO The absence o. 1" such a 
"ý'J "If --)ro-. erty into the h,, -arids o. -L" those charged L; eCt con-fiscation o. -L C) 
with the -. -j. -osecution and. -, punishment o-L" .,, itchcra-ft J-. -- : "ngland during 
Uhe sa. me -jei-iod- in jart accounts ifor its much lower leve- o-- 
e. --ecutions of' -:. - itches in co. -i-parison with t'ne continent r De. --: lanc-,, s 
ior the e:: -, ansion o--f t-, -ie cricninal la-,., - to acts -Dreviously 
ished, ' by t -an---ý un mayý on occasion, be 'F'uellel' kPhe mate2iall interests 
of those e, -. -i-. -1oyed to i. -i--, lerlen- 1.2,1-e lawg to ir-c-ease the demand --, --or 
their services and the resources made available to the. -. 1. N-ýuch 
-e, 7 involvement -I f'e n, --! e interest - in ýjunishý-- o". - -1 --s can be seen in the 
oj tj e, _7 erau: ý- e au oarcoticsai E-n -f'o rt ! ý- eo h-, on o J-huana 
-i was colu'lucted --artly throuEzlli ,i the . 3-Iiactes, a cam: ý. aign whi cl V _U 
Las-ciring a --lare)e nu-m0er of un-ý-avou--able --ýress a-ticles on the 
. ,. e ,; -i, -. -ieCL --'t arousing and 
harnessanZ disinterested su bjecu-,, i. i i ch T, --er 
indignation amonZst the -jifblic atu larkr5r-ee 
utt *:, i- as' -e such neo-le -v; J 'h a direct J nterest n the ki I LD lu --U-uu- 
u sa, -. -, en-z of o-, --enders ,. -. e cq--n label as "disinteres-ed" any desire 
ci-2.,,, ie aza immorality is to be encour-tered amonss- uo -)umds- id Lj 
4 
the general populatPion. Such desires are not, however, s- 
. 
pread 
equally throughout the -population, but vary in scope and intensity 
between di--'L--1 "'erent individuals and groups. 'i1hy is this so? Several 
lines of thought suggest themselves. One such has been outlined by 
Jacllcson Toby, -who proposes that a start can be made in disentangling 
the various sources of ' the urge to punish by distinguishing between 
a desire which is rooted in an individual' s identification with the 
victim of azi off fence and one which flo-ws from the nature of his 
identification with the offender. 
Considering first the role of identification with the victim 
it may be suggested that those vrho are more vulnera1ble to criminal 
a'ýItacks themselves, are more li..,: ely to identify with actual or 
potential victims and hence ffeel a greater urge to punish criminals 
than those i-,, hose manner of life, such as living in a more crime-free 
and secure environment, renders such identification less vivid and 
immediate. Such an -a-IDI,, roach stresses that the 
"disinterestedness" 
of the zeal for justice encountered amongst the public is a matter 
of degree: some members of the -public have a greater stake in the 
prevention of crime than others and this is reflected in their 
attitudes. Another example off such azi ap-proach would be the 
argument that those whose interests are more tied to the perpetuation 
of the -T)revailing social order are likely to be more punitive than 
those --. ýjithout such commitments. 
A . I- L , tempting to account for variations in punitiveness solely 
by reference to such factors as these is not, ho-wever, without its 
difficulties. Perhaps the very meagreness of the possessions of the L 
5 
. poor, for exam-, 
le, render them more valua-bley ggiving them a go-reater 
stake in their -protection from theft than Deo-ple whose total wealth 
is not so easily removed at one stroke? Research in contemporard, 
. 1merica reve, ---)ls that the -ooor hav6 the greatest fe-ar of crime j-or 
they face the highest risk, of victimization. Concern with crime as 
a political issue, hovTever, is concentrated in the low crime areas 
inhabited by the middle class. 
7 Greater victimization and its 
attendant fear are not the only misfortunes suffered by the -poor 
a-qd op-pressed. Consequently more pressing ýproblems and alternative 
political priorities do not allow concern with law and order to 
thrust itself fon-,, ard as such a dominazit issue as it has amongst 
L-hose living in less deprived circumstances. 
Concentration upon the role of identification with victims 
in conditioning attitudes towards crime also offers little guidance 
when ý, ie come to consider offences such as those discussed by Schur 
as crimes -ý-, ithout victims": drug abuseq homosexu-ality and abortion. 
In the case of abortiong it is true, contemporary o-p-)onents of the 
legalization of abortý-on argue that the foetus, should be accorded 
rights which render it a clear victim of such practices. -,, Ihy some 
are -)re-pared to accert such an argument and- others reject it clearly, 
I however, cannot be accounted ffor by any reference to the similarity 
in caaracteristics or interests between those who are held to be 
the victims and those who take it upon themselves to p-unish those 
seeking and administering abortions. 
To fully understand the nature of the response to such crimes 
we must adopt another approach. Let us start . -jith Toby' s suggestion 
6 
that we consider not only the contribution of identification -. -, iith 
the victim, but also the nature o--L: ' identification -v. -ith the offender. 
ilhat he has in mind here can best be conveyed in his own words-. 
If "the good die young and the wicked flourish as the green 
bay tree, " the moral scruples which enable conformists to 
restrain their own deviant impulses lack social validation. 
The social significance of punishing offenders is that 
deviance is thereby defined as unsuccessful in the eyes of 
conformists, thus making, the inhibition or repression of 
their own deviant impulses seem worth,.., hile. Righteous 
indignation is collectively sanctioned reaction formation. 
The law abiding -, -erson who unconsciously resents restraining 
his desire to steal and murder has an o-Dportunity, by iden-uij`. 'V, 1ng 
with the -police and courts, to aff-ect the precarious balance 
within his o-ým -, ersonality between internal controls -and the 
tem-otation to deviate. 9 
Cohen has in mind much the same idea when, speaking of tile moral 
_n source olt indignation, he remarks: "The dedicated pursuit of 
culturally approved goals, the eschewing of interdicted 'out tantalizing 
goals, the aaherence to normatively sanctioned means - these imply a 
certain self-restraint, effort, discipline, inhibition. '' 
10 
How are we to employ this perspective in understanding variations 
in -the intensity of the disinterested urge to punish? Both Toby and 
Cohen seel: to support this anproach-b the problem o-j'. ` ey. -plaining 
" the Danish disinterested -Dunishment by reference to the work o. L 
sociologisti, Svend Hanulf, entitled Horal Indignation and II'Liddle 
Class lpsycholog7 - 
7. 
The central subject of Hanulf 's i-. jork is what he refers to as 
,,. ae sociology of moral indignation. It is important to bear in mind 
the way in which the term I'mora-1 indignation" is employed by Hazi-alf, 
-or, given 
the centrality of lRanulf's wor',,. -ý to the -, -)resent study, it -. L ly - 
7 
is in the sense which the term will be used here, except -where an 
alternative use of the term by anotaer author is clearly intended. 
It is not -oossible to convey in a few words the precise meaning 
i, fhich this term takes on lodthin the context ol"' Ranulf's theory, as 
will become clear from the discussion in the following cha-,, )ter. 
'7 
Lievertheless, it can be noted here that Hanulf identifies the )resence 
ot moral indignation not only from evidence of a -ounitive reaction 
to immorality, but also from eviCLence of a particular desire to 
joenalize those who stray Irom rigid standards of ascetic restraint 
on the allowable level o-f sensual-ityq self-indulgence zamd bodily 
abancion. Thus conceivedý moral indignation embraces both a punitive 
autitude towards deviants in general and hostility towards a certain to 
type o: L' deviance in -particular. This use of the term s-prings from 
Hanul. -ACI s explana-tbion oC moral indignation, which sees coercive 
asceticism and punitiveness as inextrica: oly interwoven. In this view 
moral indignation is not seen as a passing mood, an isolated response, 
but a chronic condition ever on guard to ensure that thosewho , -ý, --; -ve .. 'J, ay 
to the temptation to indulge their impulses are jorced to , ay the 
price. It is viewed as a means of giving acce-ptable expression to 
. 41 feelings of envy - niddle class by the . ýrovoked 
in members of the lower . 
restraints and deprivations forced irpon them by their position in the 
class structure. 
Embedded in such an ex-planation, I-ianull. " s use of the term morai 
indi gnation , uaýzes on a meaning that diiC-ELers from some of the -., iays in 
vihich it is commonly employeal being in some wa7rs narrower, in others t) 
6 
broader. It excludes, for exam-ple, the indignant condemnation 
II of oppressors Dy the o- 
. ýpressed, even where 
this is couched in terms 
of xppeals to moral princi-ples. 2or Hanulf is concerned above all 
with "disinterested" indimgation - indeed, he often employs the term 
"the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment" to refer to the 
same cliaster of moral sentiments to which he refers . ',, hen s-, -, eaking of 
moral indignation. This term is instr-active, -Cor it also captures 
the enduring quality o-f the sentiments in (juestion through its 
reference to the "tendency" to punish. "Disinterested" also recalls 
the particular direction in which this punishment flows with greatest 
Torce,, towards those victimless offences which overste-p the bounds 
of moCLeration. That it is a tendency to ", )unish" also indicates that 
Hanulf saw as an essential quality of moral indiU-ation the desire to 
-punish and degrade those held responsible for social problems, rather 
lihan seeking other solutions such as -prevention or reconciliation. 
ýTeverthelessq neither title is able to fully capture and convey aall 
Uhat the phenomenon embraces. Given its nature this is not at all 
suz--orising and isq j-, erhaps, inevitable. There are, as we shall see, 
several other ý)ortraits of temperaments which bear a close resemblance 
too that which Ranulf -. -)resents us with in his discussion of moral 
indignation. Some ol these bear titles which may well seem in some 
f traits under res-pects more aýp_-, ropriate to refer to the cluster o. 
consideration, although all accentuate some aspects at the exmense of 
others in a-ccorciazice with their main flocus of interest emcl the nature 
ýropose. 0-If the e. -mlanation they - 
9 
Ranul-i" s work cannot be faulted for lacking boldness. The 
origin and growth o--F' penal sanctions and their a-,: )-)lication to 
victimless crimes, as well as similar developments in respect off 
the severity and scope of more informal sanctions, are to be accounted 
for more or less entirely in terms of the moral indignation harboured 
IJ ddle class. The strength of Uerested tendency by the lower m. the disint 
. ý. 
unish within a community, both in terms of moral sentiments and to - 
social -practicesq varies directly with the extent of the influence of 
this class within it 17-here it is absent, moral 
indignation is a1bsenu; 
where it is weal-,, weaL; where it is strong, strong. Such a, short CD 
-f course , do violence to Hanulf 
Is,. ioriý, as we shall see summary must, o. 
in Chapter 1 below, yet it will serve to convey an initial im-pression 
off the main thrust of his axgument. 
I ?" Hanulf clearly must be credited with demonstrating the e-tent ol 
the im-pact of the lower middle class u-pon a wide ranZe of, ý' moral sentiments 
I"t azid social -practices. His -vTor-k- has, as we shall see, z-dl Uoo o. 11"ten beeen 
.I. LO unc. ri-tically accepted by some, rejected altogetlier in an offhand fashion 
by others, or simply misunderstood. His work has not received the 
c. ritical attention it deserves and sociology, seen as a cumulative 
enterprise, has been the poorer f! O-1 it. In Cha-, ýte- La start is macle 
v rds remedying this situation. towa. 
f" presenting his arg=en- G -J-ven 
Ranulf Is maii-ner o: E) UI what it entails 
can only emerge from a careful analysis ol his work. 
', Iherever it has 
aý, D-peared useful I have introduced comments 
from other writers into the 
discussion to illuminate more fully the nature of the moral sentiments 
and social institutions to which 
Hanulf refers. The discussion does not, 
howeverg confine itsel-cf to uncovering tne content of the theory develo-ped 
10 
in Hanulf Is viork, but begins the tasr. -. o: f' assessing its worth so 
that it may serve as a starting point for the elaboration of a more 
comprehensive theory o. L U Irom assessing the f moral indignation. A-oar' 
difficulties introduced by certain inconsistencies and ambiguities 
to be found in Ranulf Is work, this critical appraisal will principally 
involve the introduction of evidence from other sources, such as the 
investigations of sociologists whose woric touches upon the issues 
" the contentions of the present study involved. -,, 'Or it is one o-. L j 
that our knowledge of the sociology of moral indignation is, potentially, 
I iar more adm-anced than is at first sight aýý--, -., arent. By drawing together 
studies hitherto unrelated from diverse fields within the realm of 
sociology -a realm conceived broadly to embrace -viithin its bo-Luidaries 
both social -psychologj and- social anthro-poloGy - it is ho-ped to realize . fj - 
this potential, consolida-luingg complementing or correcting each 
contribution in the light shed u-pon the suIbject by the others. 
Ihere is, as we shall seeg clear evidence that aanulf ira. s right 
concerning the -proclivity of the lower rmiddle class 
tovTards moral 
indignation. Yet his reliance upon this as the only force capaIle o 'L 
producing moral indignation, and his asstuxotion that it is moral 
u indignation alone which gives rise to and sustains the criminal 1awq 
clearly goes too far. 'ý, ýie shall be concerned with assessing which 
.P factors contribute towards shaýDing 
the social institutions which 
. .1. f moral indig-natior. administer justice, including whether the strength ol . 1. 
js -prominent aniongst them. Greater s-pace7 howeve--7 will 
be devoted to 
b lie-ps ,I values ý,, Thich 'he social conditions and cultural eL examiInIng w -nC 
11 
produce and nourish moral sentiments, rather than tracing the 
impact of such sentiments back, u-. oon the social structure. ilhat 
will be argued here is not- that Ranulf was wrong in identifying 
lower middle class conditions of life as fertile ground for the 
growth of moral indignation, but that, he failed to see -1. -hat those 
as-Pects of lo-, Vlier middle class experience responsible for this 
could be reproduced in other social locations with the s, --, me 
consequences in terms of the formation of moral intolerance. 
Cha-pter 2 introduces azi examination oif* some major sociological 
invest-igations into the sociology of morality in order to further 
consolidate and com-plement what was gleaned from the initial 
a-p-oraisal of Hanulf Is work. Consideration is given to the worIzs 
of . 1estermarak on the origin and development of moral ideas; 
r, 
Scheler on ressentiment; and Durkheim on the social origin of the 
collective conscience. F-rom these some idea can be gained of what 
had been achieved in discovering the origins o-f moral indignation 
-before the a-, --oearance of Ranulf Isv., ork. The chapter concludes ,. iith 
a cons ide rat ion of the work of i'Sorokin on the social m-id cultural 
dynan-ics of morallty and the im--)act of social conflict ix-pon the 
amount of" --)-anishm. ent in society. 
Cha-)ter 
_3 ap-, )roaches 
the e, -? Z`)-I, ---natýon of moral indignation 
from the --erspective of social psychologj. It begins with an 
examination of studies into the mass -osychologj of fascism, such 
as those conducted by --:. Ieich. The authoritariazi personality Dortrayed 
12 
in such studies closely resembles the -j trait of the morally .p0r 
-U 
indignant mentality to be found in I-Ranulf Is wor',:. This resemblance 
extends, in some cases, to the exiDlanation advanced for the develorment 
of this tem-perament in terms of the social psycholoCy of the lower 
middle class. Such similarity is, as will be discussed, not 
surprising given that these wor. 1cs shared a common origin in a time C) - 
place overshadowed by the rise of -, ýIational 'N: ) and -I Socialism. After 
discussing other contributions of social psychology relevant to our 
enquiry, such as the frustratio-n-agression hyz pothesis and the social 
-Dsychology of o-oen-mind-edness,. the chapter moves on to an examination 
of Fiaget's work on the influence of social constraint upon the 
_c- 
. Lormation of morality. 
ýJha-, -)ter Z-1 is -orincipally co'-Ylcerned with the development o-l' 
retributive justice and the evolution of social control in -pre-industrial 
societies. Raziulf thought that he had revealed an e: m. lanation of 
moral indignation cara1ble of eaccounting for its strength within any 
society, whatever, its level of developme-nt. As a result he ap-plied 
:' societies from the his theory to e: --laining as-pects of 
the culture ol 
most primitive 'too the most coaplexq and to both ancient and modern 
civilizations. This chapter is -partly an attemiDt to test ahether his 
4jheory does in fact Dossess such a level of generality. It goes on 
to further develop the theory concerning how the ex-perience o 'L social 
constr, aint fosters particular moral sentiments, which has 'by this 
-L 
, )e from our discussion. 
It does this -primarily stage began, to taLe shq, 
through drawing together the anthro-pological T,, Tork o" Douglas on social 
13 
control and the control of the body with the evidence of Elias on 
LO ýj U he civili ing process and the develo-oment of manners in Europe 
since the Ages. The chapter concludes with a considera-tion 
of the contribution to our understanding of moral indignation to be 
gleaned from some of the studies which have centred upon the 
Dionysian-Apollonian polarity. 
Chapter 
_5 
is an cattem-pt to further develop our understanding 
of the nature and sources of moral indignation through an enqLuiry 
into the growth of moral permissiveness in contemporary Britain. 
. Lfter examining evidence from secondary sources on the nature of 
6his change, and discussing its structural sources, the chapter 
turns to -ýrimaxy sources gathered- f'or the purpose ol' this thesil s E 
.0 -1 
from a study o--'-' three conte=orary moral crusades - the Ilesponsible 
the II So cae by, I t, Tationwide Festival of Light and. the National Viewers' 
azid. Listeners' -, ssociation. This material is intuencled, to show that 
moral indignailion is not the spent force that it is considered to 
be by some. -. '4, hile not in any way intended as an exhaustive test of 
the taeories discussed in the preceding discussion, this evidence 
does demonstrate in concrete terms those configurations of values 
and Deliefs in which moral indignation is enmeshed and -provides 
further i. 11JCO-imation concerning the social sources from which it 
uuui springs. In addition azi attempt is made -, o interpret the C-Luiction 
served by the ideology shared by these groups in the light shed by 
Uhe sociology of moral indim,, ation. 
14 
The final chapter presents the conclusions v; hich can be 
4P 
U dr. -; m from 'he argument unfolded in the precedinS cha; pters. 
both the evidence u-T, )on iihich these conclusions rest and the 
nature of the concepts em]ployed here are to be found in this 
earlier discussion. The final chapter starts with a -portrait of 
the morally indignazat in terms of characteristic values and beliefs. 
It moves on to discuss the relationshi-1) bet0ween repressive 
sentiments and re-oressive institut ions, then -. presents an e=tjlanation 
of the origin and develo-. ipment of moral indiEnation. 
This study, then, is concerned with how social conditions 
shape the general climate ot opinion towards deviance in a 
community, the general level of tolerance or intolerance within 
which reactions to I)articular cases of' crime or immorality take 
sha- is a study of indirect sources of hostility 'Uowa---, ds pe. It 
deviants in general and victimless forms of deviance in ]particular. 
It seeks to trace the develo-oment of such moral intolerance to the 
e=erience of social -, Dressure generated -by certain social 
relationshiD. s. Particular -positions within the class structure 
are -, articularly lil:. ely to e-mloose their occupants to such experiences. 
This study, theng attempts to demonstrate some of the hidden or less 
obvious costs of social inequality in terms of its brutalizing -and 
ormping effect upon human development. But the conclusion cannot 
be drawn that the removal of such inec-uality is in itself sufficient 
to -remove such moral 
intolerance. Ils we shall see, similar 
15 
conse(juences can ,.,. rise from "horizontal" sources o. L:: ' social 
-pressure from within a grou-, ) w1i U erever 'he a1bility of individuals 
to brezzd: and re-maII, -. e social contacts and relationshii)s is held in check. 
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TT-- ' 1,1IDDIE CLASS ICRALITY III i1i 
TO I112LICT 
idoral incliCmaition and. middle class -ý)sycholo, 7- y 
Our study of the nature of moral indiumation starts with 
a return to tile "locus classicus o-j"" the theory ol" moral indignation", 
' 
to a consideration of what has been described as the "brilliantly 
2-ýor 
al developed thesis" unfo 1cled by Svend Ilianulf in his study, L; - 
Indi, m,, ation and i-liddle Cl, --, ss Psyc-l,. o! oQr. 
"ihy, Hanulf asks at the outset of his enquiry, are some -jeýple 
more uis: ýosed than others to p-Luiish deviants who have not directly wl .4 
injured.. them? Variations in such clisinterested. zeal to enforce 
justice can be seen, for example, reflected in the varying degrees of 
the punishment of criminals. enthusiasm with which peo-, ý, le assist in 
The of such involvement cannot be adequately -provided, 
Hanulf insists, in terms of the rational appeal to enlightened self- 
fe and -, -). -IoDerty of others in interest of extending protection to the li. 
II. 3 the e. -c-pecuation that they will reci-)rocate such -protection. In the .L- 
case of crimes without victfimsq Punishable acts which do not directly 
threaten any citizen with injury, such an argument tal-ces the form that 
these acts nevertheless threaten the interests of all, because it would 
-'. 1'eaken the whole 'a; bric o. L society if they aere tolerated. Yet why 
Hanulf asks, should such -,, -)ur--ly intellectual considerations conce-1-ming 
parent to some tile im-portance of -punishment to society be more a-ý), 
commu-nities tham to others? 12or some societies inflict Planishment 
more widely and with greater ferocity and zeal thar. do others. 
16 
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,, ýuestions concerning the scope, severity, and aims of 
punishment are today debated usually in terms of, and aaý)-eals to, 
utilitarian calculations o-, '. ' the cons e(: juence -- for society of 
audio - 
t) - ptin, On closer exar, -,; a given ",, )Olicy. aination, however, it will 
be discovered that the various opinions e. -c: jressed in this idiom are 
not e(: ýually re-! )resen-Ued in all classes or groups. In the 'I ight, of 
-L I 
the lack of conclusive evidence upon which to base such arguments, 
we may suspect that non-rational forces are at work in determining 
their acce7)tance. -ahat is needed is an investigation of the prejudices, 
feelings and passions which predispose people to introduce or ado-)t 
one policy rather than another, irres-oective o. - the rationalizations 
put J"orward by those involved. It is just such a study which Ranulf 
embarIcs upon in I-loral Indignation and i"liddle Class FsycholoýýT vihen he 
4. - the tendency to in' sets about tracing the hidden sources off Llict 
-ounishment. iutting asiCLe attemplias to explaiin disinterested punishment 
by reference to the purely rational arg=ents put forward in its defence, 
he : )--oceeds straight to a series oil cross-cultural and historical 
studies to ex-amine whether the streng-th of this tendency is associated 10 
with the occurrence O-C certain other social facts. 
The. conclusion which he draws from these studies is that the 
L disinterested tendency to inflict -Dunishment is an ex-pression of moral 
indignation associated with an envious disposit. ion rooted in the 
resentment felt by the lower middle class. This resentment is a result 
of the self-restraint and frustration of natural desires forced upon 
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them by the conditiOns under which they live. iýt first glance this 
might seem st-raight-forward enough, but as soon as we atterapt to 
bring evidence to bear upon this solution, the con, -Dlexity of the 
concepts em-ployed becomes apparent. Ranulf is of little assistance 
I here, suIpplying no clear set of defining characteristics for the hey 
terms employed in his argument. The s-pecific meanings which he 
attaches to terms such as "lower middle class", "the disinterested 
tendency to inf'lict punishment", and "envy", can only be gleaned 
from a close examination of the findings he nuts forward in defence 
of his thesis. A survey of this evidence will hel]D us to more clearly 
ascertain the nature and worth of Ranulf Is theory, as well as providing 
an o-p-oortunity to fill out the bare bones of his theory sketched a1bove 
and consider some of the many related hy- . potheses v., 
hich he introduces 
in addition to those which form the central core of the theory. 
Let us start with a consideration of' the disinte-rested tendency 
.L 
L, o inflict punisIrLment, a nhrase which Hanulf employs as syaaonymous with 
the term moral indignation. 'Ne find Ranulf beginning his investigation t 
of this tenclency -, viith a study o-C attitudes towards the criminal ! aw. 
In his o-pening cha-pter he seeks to clemon st rat ea lini: between the 
.LI 
tendency in question and- the lower middle class through their suo, -, ort 
I 
. any on .,. or the Ilational 
Socialists in Germ 'he basis of the criminal law 
I -, olicy o-L: ' that -Darty. ,. s e=pressions of a disinterested tendency to 
in-lict -,, unishmen-U he cites -, )ro, )osals for the introduction of sterner z--- 
-r)enalties-y including t-he greater use of capital and corporal --nimishment-I 
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limiting extenuating circumstances; and the e: ýtension of the criminal 
law to punish acts hitherto unpunished, including penalising acts 
. I- no, s LP pecifically outlavied which aare nevertheless "cormonly felt to 
be criminal" Furthermore, the -'tleimar regime was attacked, for not 
supj)ressing irreligious and unpatriotic art and literature, while its 
su-, -)D, orters were condemned for advocating the legalizatoion ot abortion. 
Before the chapter is completed, howeverg -vie f"ind Ranulf 
contrasting the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment with 
"moral tolerance", a broader, notion extending beyond the realm of 
criminal law. It is this expanded notion of the disinterested 
tendency to in. L L# which Ranulf' takes u-, ) in the ne: zt Clict -junishment 
cha-pter, i.,., here he ecuates it with a"strong clesire to see others 
"'or their immorality" , in his contrast between the Catholic )unished -L 
Church - "hard. -a-ion heretics, 'Out r.,, iild with sinners" in the words off 
I, Ia, -. Weber 
6_ 
and Calvinism. Against the attitude of Catholics towards 
f the kOhe sins o. -f their neighbours stands the uncom-promising stance o--'- 
, alvinist7 a stance which -,,, -, eber describes as not based upon 
"indulgence 
and a willingness to helpq owming to the knowledge that we are all 
bulb it was hatred and contempt, for him as an enemy of God, 
who is the sign oj. re-orobation If . 
1"lot only, however, are -vie to take a ganera-1 inclination to 
punish the immoral as a sign of moral indignation, but also a greater 
emphasis on the importance of a certain set of norms, those aimed at 
su-ppressing the -edonistic enjoyment of life, al-so indicates 
the 
sarne tenclency. Ilanulf, clýrawing heavily LrDon the descri-ption of 
the 
n 
"inner-worldly asceticism" of Calvinism to be found in the wor. --s 
of -, ieber, cites as examples the suppression of all amusements on 
the Sabbath, noting that even at other times play and sport are 
frovi-ned upon exce-ý:; t v., hen employed as means to healthy Lor the 
unstinting industory incumbent u-pon the faithful. Art and literature 
D 
are uo be shunned, elegant dress forbidden, and sex re.,,. -ressed. 
Here, then, we have a further extension of this conce-Dtq 
which begins to aýpýDear as a set of associated traits or attitudes, 
corres-pond-ing more closely i, -, rith the "middle class -, sychologj" 
referred to in the title, to a temperament or -personality ty-pe than 
uo -the more limited connotations ol -L - the name it bears. We shall 
later consider whether the traits -ý-Thich it encompasses do tend to 
-L occur together, but clearly such a com- . ýlexz 
variable is likely to 
generate -. roblems of meas-urement and comparison, problems which are 
never scutarely faced by Ranul"'. 
The ex-, pansionist progress of our concept is, however, soon 
somewha-lb checked. 3'or Ranull makes it -jolain that the a-, peal to 
mo-ral indignation at the transgressions of others is not suf'-ficiently 
"disinterested" to qualify those e=. pressing such sentimen-'k-Os as having 
the tendency in question if it is merely a s-purious niety emý)loyed to 
cloalk self- interest. Such is the case when it is used in the service 
I 
of -,. )ersonal economic enrichment, -ý-)olitical security, or by one class 
against another -viith which it is in conflict. 
9 The presence oi- such 
f' interests casts doubts -upon the sincerity o tihose involking them, 
although we may infer from the very existence olf such an a-Dt)eal 
that they have sincere ad-herents within the community uho are likely 
2r 1 
to be swayed by them. It is not, thereforeq only the direct 
vict, m of an o-Lfence whom we must exclude from the ranks of the 
disinteresled enforcers of justice, but also those who stand to 
make a direct material gain from cham II. 
. 
pioning-I)ar-Gicular moral standards. 
At this -Doint vie must ý-)ause for a moment to talke -xo our aim 
of considering the elaborations which Hanulf introduces into his 
theory. For having described the manifestations o--: -' the disinterested 
tendency to inf"lict -punishment outlined above, and having related these 
to the lower middle class, he next asserts that vie may expect to find 
a great -er harshness toirdrards the poor as an integral part of auch a 
-Detty -bourgeois mentality. As evidence for this assertion he cites 
the attitudes of Calvinists in the sixteenth century2 as well as those 
of their spiritual heirs of the seventeenth century, the ? uritans - 
both identified by Ranulf as essentially movements of the lower middle 
class. Indiscriminate almsgiving was condemned by these movemen-ts, 
and aid- refused to those who did not practice their ascetic way of 
life. The -,, oor were regarded not as victims of circumstance but of 
their own idle, irregular and wicKed courses. 
This link between the lower middle class and the lac. -. of any 
charitable concern for the -ooor is in conflict, however, with the 
evidence that Hanulf -presents from the work of Valdemar Vedel, 
which --)ortrays the medieval burghers of -)re-Reformation Europe as 
ptoi dis-laying characteristic sym ms of the disinterested tendency o 
inflict both in terms of severity towards Of-j"'enders and 
ascetic -)roh-ibitions, at the same time as engaging in charJ table a: ctivities. 
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Ramulf a'6te, -. i--)ts tuo reconcile inconsistency between 
Vedell s testimony and his own conclusions by denying that s-ach 
a charitalle inclination was a true, spontaneous e. -m-ressi-on of 
middle class morality, but one im-posed upon it by the preaching of 
the Catholic Church. 'But the reasons which 'lie -puts forward in 
defence o-2L this inter-ore'tat - 'ion are weak in themselves and inconsistent 
with the methodological assiamptions he employs elsewhere in 
ýj. oral Indignation and 1.! iddle Class ? -sychology as a basis for assessing 
the st-udies he Dresents as evidence. He argues, for exam-ple, that the 
C,, -, -uholic Church only retained its hold over the -, petty bourgeoisie 
where it modified its character to accomodate itself to the recul-iar 
mentality of this class, including "the develolpment of a disinterested 
bend-ency to inflict -punishment almost as strong as that which is 
normal to Calvinism". 
12 But why, theng did it not also accor. miodate 
itself to their disinclination towards treating the poor charitably? 
Hanul-f! "' further states that a disinterested tendency to inflict pimishment 
IIJ-, 'lards tends "to agree better with a rigorous than a charitable att-Lude toV 
the -ýýJoo-r" . 
13 This is essentially the same sort of argument 1; fnich he 
has earlier rejected in dealing with atterffQ-Us to associate moral 
-L. 
tolerance with belieff in -predestination: 
tude o-f moral indifference is alleged to be the inevitable, A. n at -U J- UI- 
conseq. uence of the idea of predestination.... Yet these attem-pt s 
at logical deduction do not alter the fact that Calvinists found 
no -practical di"ficulty in combining belief in -predestination I, -UU 
v -t-h severity against sinners. 
14 
ji U 
.., e cannot assume 
that -, )eo-,,? le will not entertain attitudes vihich, 
7. -, - 1t from one 7, ers-pectiveq appear logically contradictor looked aU I . Len Y 
: [or from another they may well ap. Dear ciuite compatible. --, Tor ca-ri vre 
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assume that everybody will be aware of, or troubled by, such' 
contradict ions as do exist, as vie shall see Hanulf demon st rat J-ng 
in his study of Puritan literature. 
In clealing with the hostile evidence of Vedel, 11anulf has at 
least attempted, however unsuccessfully, to account for the distortion 
f o L' the hypothesized relationshiD between an unwillingness to be charitable 
and the disinterested tendency to in. flict punishment. The evidence he 
thi s hy- a, C-uces in support ol pothesis is taker. f rom 'Ta-,,, mey' s Religion and 
the --,. Iis-- of Ca-citalism. 'Liow Hanulf states in reference to his use of 
secondary sources: 
In the -. receding pz6ges -all the fac-', 4-. s alýeged by the a-u-thors quoted 
ý 7-4 have been ta1cen for grant-ed, and we have been concerned only , _; _th 
. i' -- - ion an(i exVianal",. ion, P their inter-oretat 
This, however, gives no indication of the -, )rocedure he intends to 
" the same situation. I. -I enotes ado-pto when faced with rival de. scriptions ol 
for e. -, -am-ole, evidence that the lruritans were nou as harsh towards the 
-poor as Tairmey maintained, as ,? -ell as referring to other material casting 11 
doubt on the generosity of' medieval Catholicism, but then, without any 
attempt to reconcile these views, simply proclaimsthe one favourable to 
16 
-ion, we ma, his o-v, -n thesis to lbe correct. I. -Li addit -- note that the 
u-p-Der bourgeoisie, who are s-'ecifically stated to have ireed themselves 
from a concern ., xith the ascetic -ýrohibitions 
that are -jart of the 
disinterested '.,, endency to inflict -junishment, are admitted to 'be ssevere 
towards the --oor and to ascribe their -, Doverty to a laclic of foresig4t and 
uuIIv thrift. This -Ranulf does attem-pt to account 'or by stating that such 
sentimen-itos may merely be a justi-fication fLor a reluctance 
to give alms - 
but all groups may be irmputed to possess a similar self-interested concern 
vihen being called uron 
to give -aT) a -, -)ro-z)or-6ion of their income. 
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"fe have needed to devote some attention to this issue because 
. 
if. Ranulf is correct in assuming, as he is eventually led to do, 
that the disinterested tendency to inflict -punishment is a disguised 
form of sadism, then we might indeed e--ý: ---, ect U -P 'hose entertaining such 
an approach towards their fellows to do little or nothing towards 
eliminating 1,, overty. As we have seeng in terms of the standards he 
I se-Gs himself and the evidence he --presents, Ranulf fails to establish 
this -. ooi-nt. 
As Ranulf -points out, there had been a bourgeois class in 
Iýurone for several cent-uries before the rise of Protestantism. 
Evidence concerning the culture o. L the petty bourgeoisie during this 
-, eriod indicates that it embraced a variety of' traits which Hanulf 
evidently regards as expressions of the disinterested- tendency to 
inflict punishment. These include sum. -ituary legislation limiting the 
size and times o: f entertai=ents and gijfts, togetiher with injunctions 
to lead a regular, orderly, -, parsimonious, and industrious life. God 
is believed to fro-vm upon disorder and clisordinate -Dassion in both .: I - 
mone-tary and household affairs. The petty bourgeoisie ,, iere scandalized 
'by LP concifoinage by the u-, pper class, as Tirell as the open disý)lay 0-ý: ' 
cond. erming the literature of chivalrous love-. Their lawgivers foug:, rht 
druz1henness, vice, garabling, and ,, Taste. L"ul luxuries, extending the 
criminal law to cover acts ifnich no one had previously thought of' 
-. -)unýshing or which had previously 'been left to the jurisdiction Of 
t ere undertakzen with less im-portance thaz k. he Church. irosecutions i, ý 
'ached to whether th before being at#, e injured -, o,, -. rty would or would not 
p Lf --)rosecute hii-iiself, while harsher ilanishments were introduced, -,. iith 
the 
17 
etý)proval'of nublic o-pinion. 
n 
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In -, oost-Reformation 1ýuroT)e, as noted a1bove, flanulf claims that 
the CWatholic Church has tended to modify its teachines in those areas 
I where it has sought too retain the adherence of the : )et'Uy bourgeoisie. 
FI 
ihis it attem-ý)ted through an emphasis on the virtues of thrift, industry, 
order and honesty. Jansenism, for example "is nothing but Calvinism so 
disguised as to be tolerated within the Catholic c'hurch" . 
18 Thei-- 
moral rigorism -vras such that extenuating circumstances for sin or 
crime were dismissed, dancing and the theatre were condemned, anCL - idly 
enjoyi-n, -ý watching to-ne world go by was decried as sinful. Further 
examr-ples of a -oetty bourgeois moral rigorism, drawn from a later period 
in 
. 
2rench lhistory, include a characteristic sexual prudery, found, :: o-. 
example, in the shielding of vromen from art and literature touching 
-a-. -)on se---, 
10 
-. L similar mentality is held to have emerged from --t-y bourgeois 
environments outside the circle o--, - Christianity. Drawing u-pon Sombart's 
' the way in which the ethics of judaism were related to the study o JL 
origins of capitalism, Hanulf argues that this reflected the lower middle 
class nature o-L': ' their occirpations. In this lie shares Sombart's o-pinion 
that there is nothing -, articularly Jewish about these beliefs and values. 
On the contrary: 
, L, I-idC'. le class res7, --)ectaýbility 
isq both among Jews and among 
Christiansq simply a --); ý, qduct of life that is lived in the 
crafts and the shops. '"J 
This is held to result in shaping Judaism in directions similar 
to those of other -etty bourgeois religions, such -as Puritanism. Under 
4hese condilions 
the jews come to emphasize the tra-r-sJCormation o'-I' a u 
r pulsive, animalistic e:: istence into a regular, pur- ,, tura, , im poseful, 
I moral 'ife- The highesij -our-,, )ose in lilfe is seen as residing in strict 
lm, ic, uestioniný; observance of the commandis of God. Znthusiasm is to 
be discouraged, as leaclinS -to ina-p- Lf . pro-priate actions, unscrutinized as 
to their righteousness. Similarly, acting frorsi sympathy detracts 
Yrom the virtue ol UI 'a rational im-Plementation o- the "iclea of goodmess". 
-I Eating and drinking are not to be enjoyed in themselves, but 
administereE in a controlled fashion to satisfy bodily needs; while 
sex within marriage is not to be indulged in s-, )ontaneously. 
21 
L-i idea o,, "' the signs which -Hanulf regards as clear instances of' 
the absence of a disinterested tendency to im"lictu -, -Dunishment can 
'be 
gleaned -from his account of the -jsycholoQr of the -Ll:, D-, --, er bour,, -,, eoisie. 
As noUed a1bove, this class has, as a result of its wealth, succeeded 
in freeing itself ' L from the moral rigorism cha. -Aacteristic of the lower 
echelons of the bourgeoisie. This is reflected in their religious 
doctrines by a refusal to believe in a God i,,, ho ý)unishes the innocent, 
rejecting id-eas such as those of the jansenists concerning the eternal 
dan, mation li'L-. ely to befall the majority of mankind. Collective 
res-onsi'bility for sins is denied; and cure, not punishment, -orescribed 
as the a; pproýDriate remedy for those not res-ý-)onsible for their sins. 
God is tholight to be ever inclined to err on the side o-f' raercy in his 
judgements. r-lan is moreover considered good by nature, thus rendering 
Divine interference somewhat su-oerfluous. Lnd there is a decline in 
u 'he belief in 'Hell. 
22 
then, se7-, arate 'hose --Dossesse- of a disinterested tendency , J, e can, UaI 
to inflict -, )unishment from others by the following signs. They aare li. ', -ely 
to conde. mn as immoral a greater number of acts and to judge transgressions 
Uh less willingness to reco ize extEInuatJn--- circ-LLmsta., jjc as more imm. oralg gn ý zz; ) 
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Cul-, -jrits identified as res-Donsible for such miscond-uct should be 
severely --ýunished. It is clear that Ranulf attributes these 
attitudes to a factor underlying and linking them, to a des]-re to 
-lic-'L increase the suffering inL -. ed u-aon clelin(: juents. This --3unitive 
stance is further enhanced through cultivating a belief that CLeviants 
aare fundamentally and inherently different Lrom, the righteous; and f 
reflected in beiiefs concerning the , -)-u-yiitive nature oj. divine justice. 
A further distinctive characteristic of those driven by a 
disinterested teridency to in. 
--flict -. -anishment is that tul-ic-i--- mo: 2ajization 
of the world -Droceeds in certain directions with -)articular rigour. 
Pirst, we may note their su-p-port for the censorshil) of art and literature 
ex-pressinL-> unpat--2iotic a-nd blas- jef-vous zen J- ents, L. ý -L 
, "ýi - o'ensive u 11-. " 1 0- z:,:, iyu__ -n ;. J. -- 
1 -1 , 17 - -I- -- Cý I--ef Ji, nno--, -o-, -- 7 _: - -, -L -, -" uo se--u, --, . -ocLes,.,, c co n itizia tj o tu -', - oc 
to a --c-vere 
asceticism u- pon others, stigmatizing carefree self-indulgence. To have 
one's fellows ex-hibiting gaiety and uninhibited sensuality is hardly 
likely to find favour in the jaundiced eye of "a social class living 
vander conditions which force its members to an extraordinary de, -iree 
-: 1 -- natural of self-restraint and suIbject them to much frustration of 
el 
desires". e 
cl. by Ilan This, at lea- ull to -ie -V 
account for the association between the disinterested tendency to inflict 
-ýDunishri-, ent and the loý,, rer middle class. How do we identify this class? 
f this -:,, roblem which we nex: t, turn. I-', -# is to a consideration o-z 
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Des7Dite the centrality o. -;; 7' this category to his theory, -. -lanulf 
oiiers no e: ---; -, lici-L,, definit-ion of what constitutes the lower middle class 
and we are forced back on the exam--., ýles he -r,, rovides to attem-)t to discern 
what he regards as, the distinguishing characteristics o. -f' this class. 
Fie evidently accepts the contrast which Schumann draws between the 
-oetty 'bourgeoisie a: ad other classes when dealing with the rise o. L f 
National Socialism. This excludes aris-Loocrats, soldiers and 
bou_rýZeoisie o L# -n the one hand; and the proletariat and debt-ridden 
peasants on the other. Hanul. -i" also cites the description of the 
lower middle class advanced by Lassiiell when dealing i,; ith the same 
,' This embraces shorkee-ýDers, preachers, lawjers, doctors, mover, len Lf i. to 
farmers and craftsmen, all occizpying a Dosition intermediate between 
the wor-1king class and the up- 
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. per 
bourgeois-- . Fb , ýj 
ie 
Ranulf's acce-ot-ance of Lass, 41fell's inclusion o. -C a rural element 
i-jithin the -jetty bourgeoisie is somewhat sur-Drising in view oif his 
emphasis ulDon the urban roots of innerworldlyasceticism, - In this it 
seems lik-ely that he was influenced. by -, ýieberl s descri-ption o. C the 
affinity between ethical religions and the urban lower middle class, 
although he -, ressed this lii-L-: - much i"urther tham -Ueber was pre-oared 
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u0. In dealing with cross-influences between the classes, fo,., r, 
f specifically eZoludes farmers, fishermen and peasants ex. ample, Ranul ý 
J, 26 I rom havi ng any a. -ff inity with innerworld-jr asceticism. It another 
)oint he summarizes with apDroval Sombart's conclusion that petty 
.I bourgeois morality "is a -product of the life that is lived in the 
crafts and- in the shops it . 
27 
It is clearly an urban class engaged. Jr- 
29 
trade and industry which is in the forefront of his mind ,.,, hen 
discussi. n-- the petty bourgeois roo-,, ss o. L UC Calvinism and zuritanism. 
28 
,, bove the -petty bourgeoisie is the iý: ----Der middle clas s, wit In 
its ovm distinctive ,,, orld vie, U and style of life touched u-con 
earlier. This class includes 'I. Dros-jerous merchaý-nts"j the "business 
leaders of the commercial -, -, a-, uricia'ue" in contrast will. 1'i u-pwardlly 
mobile artisans develoý)ing into manufac vi turers. 
ý9 The way in which 
r41 . nnerworldly asceticism found, its strongest voice ar. qo--,,, -gs-u -parvenus 
-uhose origins 1. zere often extremely r,, iodest, rather than amongst those 
enjoying inherited commercial wealth, had earlier been reco., c, -, nised by 
ca-, -)italism, 
30 
, Teber in his study o-, " the s-o. irit o. L 
t-herever the -, ýetty bourgeoisie as a ,, ihole or individual members b 
o.:, it attain greater pros-)erity and -ý)restJ-e their characterist'c moral uL-IC 
rigorism is diluted - diluted that is, eventually, as the transition is 
-, anli'-. ely to e In the case of individual -nobility, for 
e---am-Dle, ada-ptation may well be delayed. until the second -; eneration. 
Hanulff concentrates u-: = the traditional --, -. )ett-,, bourgeoisie of J 
inde-pendent artisans and small traders in his contrast between Uhe up-Der 
and lower mida class, of fering no a-scussion of the posi uion of t1he 
-, rofessions and se. mi-Drofessions included by Lass- ell amon., gst the -oettv ý%T u-v 
bourgeiosie: teachers7 -2, reachersq laai-, -jers and doctors. . 1hether the 
mie, mbers o--" these --. rofessions ;. Tho are highly rewarded are to be e:: cluded 
"i-ed as beloning to the lower mid -si-L -l"Ie class, Hanulf does -rom being clas CL 
not S,, yg although such -: -, n e-x. clusion seems consistent -, rith his discussion 
f -, -, 7ealth unon morality. -, Por .,. hat the --,, etty bourgeoisJ e o: f the effect oL 
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lacI: in contrast with the ix-p-oer middle class is discussed by Ranulf u 
rinci )ally in terms of pros-, -jerity. J C) "hile he ac-Imo-viled-es the 
influence of prestige, in actual -)r, -z-ctice di-LJ": erences between the 
two classes are accou-nted for by re. -L ferences -to cliaziZes in class, 
-I 
not statuso 
But i-f it is an inferiority in terms of class and status which 
givesrise to the disinterested tendenc,,, - to inflict -punishnent, i-,, hy 
do we not find it s-oringinc witih still greater force from amongst 
-11 :: urther a Ii -I ,, ho sest 
-ovm the social scale? points Hanul' does 
seeni to follm.., the logic of his ar, -um. en-U by clainning that the lower 
classes do s-ontaneo-usly develo-D, or have an affinity for, the 
disinterested tendency to injlJct punishmentq although even here he 
"y this by adding that it is nevertheless stronger is quic. ý. to qualif 
in the lower middle class. 
32 
In --ene-ral however, his position on this TDointu is dif Lerent, as C; - 
,, le can see Jrom --. Is discussion of cross-influences 
between the classes: 
v "In general it seems that the -peo-ple, i. e. the social strata 11hich rank 
beneath the small 'bourgeoisie, are cii. -., -., -, osed tuo acce-ýýt whatever moral 
standards may be in vogue among---t their bettersil . 
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f-. does. ue _= --hy this should- 'be Hanulf -1o' -)lain. 
The sort o-", 
ex-p-lanation which he raiglrit have -provided, ii -Dressed, can be inferred 
dd IeC1ass sy ho lo g-, %r trom other remar, L-. s iin -i-loral 
Indignation and Lti. 
but it is Jmortant to stress uhat he does not himsel', " fee' the need 
I I- ho in view of u uo justify this stand. This is surl)rising f the weal 
'y and inc-, ination 'o elaborate . J. 3. u rnateri-al indicating that the abili ki 
faced by djstjnctJve subcultural solutions to the different -problems I 
di. -; E'ferent classes does not end at the lowest rungs of the lo,,,. Ier 
Th 
middle class. The case of the very lo, wiest classes in i, uritan 1-. ew 
.1 
.,.:,. nglanC-L -failing to ado-pt the ideology adhered to by the bourgeoisie, 
ý4 whic-11- he cites as an isolated exce-Aion, is clearly not so. -D To 
take but one of the many discussions of this to-, )ic, albeit a V- 
Iýarticularly a--, t one in the 7)resen'u I context Oor its elaboration of 
T tieber's ideas concerning the affinity between certain religions and 
ý, OC4 al classes in the light of" subsecuent research concerning the 
characteristic norms, values and beliefs oL these classes, we may refer 
to the work- of Collins. 
35 Offering a view of -petty bourgeois mentality 
similar to that advanced by Ranulf, he then proceeds further doi,, -n the 
social scale to describe the characteristic cultures of the working 
class and lower class, both (but -riarticularly the lo-,. -., er class) embracing 
views of the world. incom-, patible witn much of lower middle class morality. 
Yet ito is also clear that the subordinate class within society 
is not free from ideological influences emanating from the institutions 
controlled by its dominant class. 
36 This view of the social sources of 
belie. -, -. 's and values is summed up 'by Ranulf as -the ass-w-n-ption - which he 
evidently shares - that "the traditions aclmowledged as normatIve by a 
I human community are always in harmony with the -psychology of the rulin,.,, -, 
class in this comm. 1-mityl - 
37 In an irn-portant e. -. tension of his theory, 
, iade in an attemj)t to account lor the absence of "innerworldly asceticism" 
in the Orient, --3Lanulf argues that although those asnýects of lower middle 
class iice conducive to a disinterested tendency to in-iflict -punishment 
were -. resentq this -"'ailed to emerge. This is attributed to the -, -Jower- 
lessness off this grolal-, -)ý a -oo-werlessness -uhich rreventecl the 'bourgeoisie 
"'rom asserting itsel, fU POli'icallY Oald sl; iritual'y with such vigc)ur 
as to -I)roduce an inde-lendent and genuine bourGeois culture". 
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-L-aa-S I-n its tu--n is eý----)lained by reference to the und-erdevelo-ment of 
a c. --: )italist economy, vrith a corres-, onding uncle rdeve 1 o-praent of the 
lower middle class numerically, economically, socially and politically. 
Clearly this has im-plications for an extremely weak class de-prived of 
-political --power and access to, and infliaence over, its o-un ideological 
Ciculties in -formulating institutions. Such a class faces great difi 
and disseminating any abstract moral ideology inde-pendently from tne 
dominant class. 
Thiss could have been an argument advanced by Hanulf to account for 
f those classes beneath the the ideological , -)assivity and imitativeness oJL 
-ith his remarlCs on the -: -, etty bourgeoisie, ffor it is in agreement v. 
conditions lavouring the spiritual subservience or independence ol 6he 
lower middle class. But clearly this -broad grou-p -beneath the Ti--)e'U'Uy 
I bourgeoiz-, ie is not at all homogenous. It varies not only in terms of 
as ., Te have seen, Ranul urban-rural di"ferences ir; hich7 considers of 
some im-portance but also in terms of its power and influence. This 
"lected in a de, -: -, ree of freedom from ideological dominationý should be re-f 
. 1. UU alIlo-,.; i. -nE; it to develo--) sonne "spiritual indenendence" Similar 
to that 
L-uL enjoyed by the 7)e -I, ty bourgeoisie under simJlar circumstances. Ranul s 
however, adamant that the -]Ijuro-ipean and American -v; or-, -. inE class of the 
inter-war -perdod-, ier . -_- as -: mt as any other s-Lfbordinate class of peasazi-its 
-L or --)role-uariazis throughout Ilistory to -passively imiuate and accept the 
E-I II 
he domi-rianu class within their community. 7oral standards of t.. U- 
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Another solution might lie in em-ploying, a more elaborate notion 
o' class than he uses in his discussion 0j. the distinction between the 
-u-., D, --)er and lower middle class. His distinction, as we have seen, -revolves 
-; rinci-)ally around )rosperity as the crucial distinguishing characteristic, 
-- 'ULO this is a very narro-vi concepluion of the nature o-if' class, e--: ýcludin- 
such im., 'orltoantul factors as security o, -f em-ployment and o-o-ýo U r, U- it-; es or 
individual mo'o kf Clearly the -position of the --)etty bourgeoisie differ: ilitY- 
from the working class in these respects, as it does in various aspects 
of the work situation revolving around 'he nature of' 'he tasir and. the .. L. ko 
ex. eercise of authority. 
,. - I ; Such an investigation would lead into areas left unex-plored 'b-,, 
. Hanul-". -iie are le., ft, theng with a Lheory vihich focuses -rimarily upon 
I ex-). Laining difff"erences beti., -een the morality of the petty bourgeoisie and 
those classes ran!: ed above it. This concern is evident -from his study 
L' the i. 'jnc-, li. h Civil 'iar. of u-Li-Lan morality during the -)--riod 
o. L t 
UsinZ -- selection of' iýuritan doc=ents from the -Deriod of' the 
i 
-ector. 
-.,, or the . English Civil liar, 
includint- such material as the D 
7 Common x-, rayer) rublique jorshi-o of God (the re-placement for the Book of 
e . ýý 
hIt sermons, religious and moral tracts, rolitical -p-am- 's, and a weel--ýly 
pa-Der lanul" J7" ustrat es -,, rhat he sees as dist inctive uritan If-ore ýudices IL -, --L L, li 
These encom-; D,, c,;. ss a clisinta-ested- -ý-. Lnitive-nesss, he and. -, assions" L 
detects ref-Lected in their enterta-Ining-, and feeling edi-fied by, 
bel.; j. e. -L-' in a cruel and ur-just God. 
L 
D 
r-, j 1- Inis God not only punishes men for sins committed ',: nowJngly tj 
and. deliberately, but also aý-)plJ es the -rinci, 
-)le of collective 
res-ponsibillity, pimishing those, otherwise innocent, ,,, iho are 
considered to share some sort of corm. unity with the Eyailty. God 
is also seen as leading the person .. iho is to be punished on to CD -- 
further transgressions before retribution overtakes him. Even 
the innocent may be forced, enticed or tem-pted into si. a. Tet the 
-. -ýuritans evidently lelt some qualms about attributing to God j-& 
res-, Donsibility for bringing 'about the misconduct which He then ý? unished-, 
cualms i,. -hiich -,, -. -ere solved by the simple exlDedient of sellf-contradict ion. 
r1l I 
inus they both affirm and deny that God would do suca a thing, v 
con-F'irmation and rejection of this idea a: -p. -pearing side 
by side in the 
same -, ublication and. even inter,., ioven in the same -, )assaEe without 
acknowledgement or resolution. 
The Luritan God is also generally affirmed to in-fliCt suffering 
on the innocent, though this, too, is occasionally accompanied by the 
same sort of contradiction touched u-pon above, rel"lecting, Hanulf feels, 
a si, -, -iiiar uneasiness about attributing such dubious qualities to God. 
The 'Llýuritans also held that God will cast down men who are -not humble or 
,. ho entertain i.,, mioderate desires. This L: Llanulf inter-Drets as divine 
f jealousy of h-LL.,. ans exceeding the bounds of sel--inclulzences and 
ý:, s aeb-randisementu7 re. -flecting a similar dis-position on the -, art o: 
ollowers. The spirit of this belief is evident in the following eycerlDt 
-'anulf: the )ublications ciiaoted by J. 1 . j..,. om one o-L 
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full body and a full stomac. ',, c would increase the humour. - 
(I , 3o the Lord is a marvelous si-ilfull -, ýýhysitiazj: we have -. ýroud 
heart. s and would have dain-11, des; and if we should have riches as we would, God should lose his honour which now he hath by 
us being kept under hatches; therefore the Lord dyets us. 
would serve some il 'I C the Lord should not dyet then but they would be as proud and as saucie as ever they could: 
Uherefore the Lord is compelled to dyet them. 39 
It is, ofý' course, conceivable that those who feel edified by 
-a belief in a God who displays a disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment may nevertheless feel that such n-. duty is not incumbent, 
u: )on them. That they did accept such an obligation is, hoi-Tever, 
suggested by their belief that God holds it to be a human dutuy to -punish 
sinners, visit-ing retribution upon those who neglect to do so. 
It is clear that some new factors associated viith, rather than 
aý -ereste indicative of-', lihe -isin-lu CL tendency to inflict -,, unishment, have 
emerged here, although all share in common the imposition of suffering 
or deprivation. 2irst, there is the jealousy of God provoked 'by excessive 
human success or self-indulgence; reflecting, Raziulf concludes, an envio-as 
dis-position amengst, His Lloc.... Second, there is the arbitrary and selfish I- 
suffering meted out by God to those i4lo have not done anything to deserve it, 
either through sin or e. ---cess. This Ranulf de-picts as pure sadism, suffering 
imiosed for the sake o--, ' it, reflecting a, similar -passion on the -Dart of the 
I u. -oo strong a ter. m for is often A ritans. Sadism is, hoý, -ieverj --, erha-os tL 
more an indifference to the cost of human suff"ering incurred in the pursuit, 
o. L Divine objectives toiEether with a stress on The -positive benefits 
associated- v-., ith human ha-iclshi-,, rather than -ur-poseless infliction o--" 2- 
s ferilig as an end in itseljf', uI- 
lanulf goes on to claim such sadism as the f"undamenta! iiLarthermore, I J. 7 -Z 
atlu-: Lltude. underlying both a disinterested tendency to in'il--LC. 'u IDimish-ment and 
-% 7' 
. 
)0 
envy. Lults this is a rather gratuitous interpretation placed u-jon the 
facts by Hanulf, on the grounds that all entiail suffering. The fact 
that t. 
aý 
"dis as as a means, not an end is dismissed as a mere Irete--t 
It could., however, equally v9ell be argued. that envy is the basic factor 
underlying the disinterested tendency to inflict Dunishm. ent and a general 
indifference tov., ards, or willingness to see the benefits in, hiz-, lan 
suffering - and this, indeed, is the interpretation rjut for-Vlard in his 
earlier wo--'C-., "The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law at Athens. There 
it is the envy provoked by the self-indulgent overste-p-ping of the bounds-, 
-L set, on human conduct that is identi--, -. ied as the --ýsychological mechanism 
underlying the disinterested tendency to inflict 7junishment uDon deviants. 
Similarly, envj of those enjoying security and freedom from amxiety on 
ýIaced is held to unCLerlie a belie" the -, artu of" those more -precariously --1 L, .L 
in the arb-iturary cruelty of the gods, stressing the dangers from ,, jhich 
not even the virtuous are immme. 
Yet ? Lanul-' in neither case -, ý-Aov-ldes any reasonable grounds f'or 
according causal priority to one rather than another oi. these three 
attitudes: namely, the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment; 
'ference or even delight, in human suf-fering. 'best envy; and. an indif C) 
we can say that they are interrelated. "Ejut the e---act nature of this 
association br-Ings us u--p against a problerri which -vie have hitherto delayed 
confronting, and which must no,.,; be settled. 
illustrated above, the disinterested tende. nc,. r to inflict 
-umber of dim, ensJons. -)und. sh, ment is a com-plex varialble com-ý)osed of anL 
0, F. ' these, -, -)uni-u-ivevness 
for one, and ascetic -: )rohibitions 1"or another, 
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I 
, --, -, -)--)eareo- as two major cori-,. )onents. ILýow, either -lounitiveness and 
asceticism are ti-., o attit-ac-es vihich , -ie may ex-pect to find together or 
they -, -lay well occur separately and it is only ., rhen we . -, -ind 
them together 
that iýle have a disinterested tendency to inflict punishment. In the 
form . er case we have a hynothesis ca-, able of refutation, in the latter 
a de. ['inition. As such the de-finition doesq of course, re-move itself 
-P from the : )ossibility of falsification, but may nonetheless -, )rove valuable 
f' attitudes -ý, Thich, whe-n they do come together, lend for cant-aring a set o-L 
meaning -*Lo one another in such a way as to form a distinctive mentality V 
which is s-; ecific to certain social conditions. 
lianulf, hov,, ever fails to malce clear -v.,, hich -alternative he has in mind. 
This leaves him free to sli-, -) unselffconsciously bac",. -. and forth between the 
two conce-c-tions. Iff he were -to openly opt for the definitional aý-)-proach, 
he -,: oulcL have to -provide evidence that all the aspects of the disinterested 
tendency to inflict -, -unishment are --). -esent in each case he considersq 
Cied ust one or t-,, To, u ereas he is occasionally satisi L 
to cite jI )lying 
t. -.. at the others are lik-ely to be -present also. Lý)ut for this to be at all 
acce---)table 'he would have to establish an em, -ý)irical association between the 
attitudes which together form the disinterested tendency to inflict 
-'anishment. 
Similarly, in dealing -. ýTith -his association between thle dis-interested 
tendency to inflict -punis-ILment, "sadism" and envy it is not at all clear If - 
whether he -Aega--c'Ls these -traits as correlated, or just that 7, -. -. Ilere the 
disinterested tendency to in. -f'lict -, unishment is accompanied 'by -'ijhe latte-r 
C-Peren' G motives than 1-men it -: ts suýO-port is lilceiy to sprin'. from clif Wo ýL 
occ-ars arlongst a rent complex of attitudes and 
interests. 
38 
Li - nul.,. -d u9 I, a 
'Is theory may then, amnount only to saying that where these 
Uraits all occur together we have a distinctive naentalityq together with 
. ýothesis 
that such a mentality is the monor, ýoly ot the hy- - tfie lower midule 
class. Cases i,. -here individual traits a-, D--)ear in isolation or amiongst 
II U Luirelated or incompatible beliefs and values do not -i'alsify Iiis theory, 
as -Iuhe-r taLe on a completely different meaning from 'he -psychological C) V- ko - 
and cultural context in ýý; -hich they occur. 
The general drift of Ranul-f" s .. ior---. is, however, toviards -,,, -I,. at miSht 
be called the "hard" version of" his theory: that is, that there is a 
, ositive correlation between the various dimensions of the disinterested 
tendency to in. -flict punishment, and between these and the traits touched 
upon above. But his o;.. m evidence introduces some difficulties here. In 
I ure of the ,,; -ýýUritans, for exar. Die, Royalist 'iterature 
con 
u. Aasu to the literat LU 
of the same period. ý)ortra; ys a God. -v,, -ho ", viill cause men to suffer only under 
circumstances in which v, -e too may find punishment reasona: oleg and there are 
it 40 no traces of sadism or masochism .' This suggests that the God of the 
Royalists also di-. --)lays a disinterested tendency to inflict --Dunishment, in 
u the "hard. " version of J- which case we might expect, given hJs theory, that 
sadism and er-, rj would accom-pany it. 'This, as we shall see, is the approach 
ado-oted by --Eaanul f i. a his earlier work, The Jealousy of the Gods and ýJriminal 
Aý 
Law at ýthens. ,I Possibly Ranulf might have sought to -Jescue his 
argument co-.,,, lcerni-ng the moral indignation of the -1ýýuritans by asserting that 
a more rigid and stern im-position of Denalties by the ? uritan God clis7layed 
a stronger disinterested tendency to inflict ý)unishment than is reflected 
in tu. Oe more : flexillole and forbearing attitude attributed to their God by 
the ý--e does not, however, leaving this possiblity unexý-)lored 
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and the problem raised by evidence of a disinterested tendency to 
punish on the -part o., L the -Royalis-Ics God is left unresolved. 
Des-pite such difficulties, hoviever, llanulf's study of the 
moral indignation of the j? uritans as revealed through their religious 
beliefs and sentiments remains the outstanding study amongst those 
oresented n Loral Indignation. 
i -r, 1,7 This is not sim-oly because he is not 
here dependent u-3on secondary sources, as in those other studies. It 
is, rather, due to the striking -,, arallels he is able to demonstrate 
'bet,. -Teen the religious outlook and moral sentiments of the ýýuritans ana 
. I- I 
bhose which he had previously revealed in The Jealousy of the Gods to 
be common amongst the citizens of ancient slithens. In o-rder to examine 
these t parallels more closely, -,, ie need to introduce some consideratIon of 
ilanulf Is earlier worlik at this stage. Accordingly, the -. L"ollowing section. 
introduces the arEument unfolded in The Jealousy of the Gods. 
Tae jealousy of the ---ocl 
The Jealousy of the Gods is concerned with caartuing and e--,, T31aining 
"'lict -, unishment in a the emergence of the disinterested tendency to in. L 6- 
uDIJ. community where it had not --reviously e:,: isted. Eefore the time of D-zi-con 
the ,,. thenian community seems to have assumed a perfectly neutral attitude 
towards at-,, jacks upon -rivate citizens. EXerybody had to defend ninisellf 
to the best of his ability with the hel-D of his kinsmen. 1,11obody came 
to his assistance ilf he and his fa, -, -iily co-uld not manage 'by themselves. E 
Ifter Solon' s reforms the state was to iinter: tfere and punish at first, a 
few and later on a great number of such encroachments at the request of 
.I -Ll 
any citizen, even i: the suflerer neither de. 'Cended Illimself nor coin--plained 
of the wrong he had suffered. 
A 
F1 
or an e: cam, -ole of a societ3, in which the disinterested tendency 
to in-L' 7'lict -ounishmentg if present at all, was rauch weaker than it was 
to become in the Athenian community, we need only turn bac, C-- the )ages 
of Gree"- history to examine what can be learnt about life in Homeric 
times from the Iliad axid the Odyssey. -1,41o -)assage in these -, )oems cori-, -. Dels 
us to assume the exis-tence of judges other than those to whom the parties 
freely subject themselves. To exQlain why the community did nothing to 
protect the inaividual through punishment o" of-fenders Jt has been argued .111 -1 - 
that it was not yet realiZed that such assaults on the individual are also 
contrary to the fundamental requirements of the comm-Lurlity as a whole. 
II 3ut why was it not, yetu realized? 144ýhy were tile Greeks of Homer's time 
less ca-pable of realizing this than those o-[' Solon' s Athens? Hanulf insists 
that we loo'c: elsewhere for ex-planations of social institutions than to 
those which -refer their orir-, -in and 
develo-oment to the imnanent unfolding 
of human reason. 
There is, hol, -ieverg some indication of, an as yet still v. reak disintereste( 
,, endency to inflict -punishment in the Odyssey. At Ithaca some -ublic 
disa-p-proval is ex-pressed at encroachments ol the s-aitor-s on the rights 
of Telemachus. But such public disa; -, )-)roval was not sufficiently forceful 
Tor society to interfere and 1. )unish the suitors. It is more difficult, if 
not imloossi-bleg to find traces of even such a wealrz e--ripression of moral 
indignation in the IliaL,, where not only do men not feel impelled to 
nimish those I-Jirio have wron-ed others, but also the gods fail to dis-play 
any disinterested activity on behalf O. L the maintenance of justice. 
11 
'The Gods are only believed to punish -nisconcLuct in cases i, ihere they 
have suf-Lered a -oersonal oJi": f'ence, such as the breach of an oath to 
which they had been called as witnesses. 
-'Ihen the state tua-. Ices sides in any quarrel between rjrivate citizens, 
declares one of the contending -.. parties to be in the right and with its 
whole aut--hority ta: kes his -part against his adversary, prohibiting the U 
--, arties from ta. L, -, ing the law into their own hands, ' necessarily this is noU 
the outcome o--f' a disinterested tendency to inflict 
--)unishin. ent. 
Dracon's 
laws might be conceived to be dictated by an understandable wish to -, -)revent 
private warfare between the noble ftamilies o---' the "heniam community. The I --i U 
lower classes might .. iell feel induced to -follovi such a course whenever they 
had the -power 'Loo compel the nobles. This e-x---, lIanation is -plausible, although 
as yet unestablished and is not in itself, Ranulf argues, SU-4L. ficient to 
exm I, III thenian coramuanJtyj from the time of "olon, introduce' a I ain T, -., ny the ý. -I bD CL 
new institution by virtue of which any citizen haCL the right, to co. ra-11pain to 
the courts of crimes committed against citizens who were perfect strangers 
I have induced thenian citizens thus regularly without uo hiim. ,. 'hat can Zý &. 14 
benefit to themselves7 to invoice the law to punish others ,, iho had not 
oflendeu them directly? One ex )lanation is that thJs innovation 
introduced because o., "' the emergence of a belle. -L. ' in the rel lgious ý)Ollutio, " 
be. -, falling a conraunity ý,,, hich allo-vied the -per-rýetrators of certain crinaes to 
"' dismisses such an e. =olanation as not solving the go un-punished. Ranul-L 
-7)roblem, but merely Lresenting it in a new form, for why were these crimes 
regarded as incurring s-uch )ollution after a certain date? 'Besides which, 
he notues, homicide was snpeci-fically excluded from the crimes which could 
., -,,, ijained of under 
Solon' s innovation in widening the complainant be co,, - I 
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co-zis-11jituencyg the right of : )rosecution being limited to 1: 1n, even though 
hoi-, iicide -, jas thought of as involving dangerous 
--ollution. 
, nother -)ossible ex--)l. -: -nation is thato S-oolon bro-. ý: e , -iith the -, Drinci-ole 
t'llat only the injured -party can in order to W. nsure laws layin6- 
do, i-, -n that a debtor cannot be sold as a slave by his creditorsq and that 
fathers must not sell their children or brothers their sisters, would 
become more than mere idle words -proclaiming -, jious ideals. But this, 
Hanulf argues, taLes for granted what needs to be explained, for what is 
the use of" giving every citizen the right to comý)lain to the courts about 
crimes committed against others if there is no certainty that anybody will 
avail himself 01 t - 'his right? '. -Thy should Athenian citizens interfere with 
greater eagerness than Homeric -rinces in the cuarrels of their fellows? :1- 
Perhaps Solon's laws were class war laws, enacUed for the protection 
off the -poor? The hatred against the rich may have been so strong that 
among the --)oor, there would always be found menwho7 out of a feeling of 
solidarity wit-h t2rieir -fellows engendered by their sharing a common enemy, 
would a-, D-, eal to the la, a courts for the pleasure o-f seeing a rich man 
-Drevented by lav,, from benefitting from encroaching on the rights of the 
less privileged. But, REanulf holds, such an ex-planation of' the 
introduction, use and extension o' the legal innovation introduced by UI 
licable in the light of clear evidence of unusually Solon would only be a; p-jo L 
intense class warfare and that it was em-ployed solely as a wea-pon in this 
st-ruggle . 
-C. 3etwee-n the years 600 alld- 400 3-C. the right of citizens other than 
u the victim or his -: -n uo conrPlain 
to the courts grew, the majority of crimes 
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being covered by this -procedure by the latter date -probably being 
brought within its sco-pe about the raiddle of the 5th century. 3efore 
-iroceeding to investigate why the disinterested tend-ency to inflict 
-c-unishment flourished in 5th century Athens we should note one other way 
in which it manil LF ested ilk-Oself in the criminal law of - 'his -oeriod. As 
already noted, at . 1thens homicide was not a, -. iongsu the offences indictable 
by those other tlian the victim' s Icin. niurders T; -Jthin the family, 
the normal course was -tf'or tlie offender to 'be e----, elleci fro. m. their mýdst 
without the interference ol the authorities. But if this did not ha-, j-jen 
it -,.; as --, ossible to instigate an action against those ref t) - -Using to act 
against the aomicide. Also, i-f a woman was convicted off ad-altery her 
husband was olbliged to divorce her. In these two cases, then, people 
incurred --, unisl-jjnent at Athens not because they had committed wrongs 
against othersq but 'because they had neglected their ovm honour and that 
Of their Jfamily. 
. ihy did the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment flourish U -L 
0 
in -the 5th century Athens? From what source can we discover the thoughts 
and feelings ý)revalent at the time which might account for it? One place 
in which these iiere given ex--, ression is in the literature of the earlier 
-Darlws of the 5th century, in the Taorl, ý-. s of Aeschylus, oo---iiocles and 
-3, 
ierodotus. 
How, then, can one emloy these sources in the search Ifor the 
origin of t-he newlY acc-., uired zeal for enforcing justice? One -, possible 
a--, -, )roach w ich suggests itsel-f arises -from t. C-le observation, noted above, 
.. wlý 
h C, 
I 'hat in the Iliad not only men, but also the gods are --)ort-, a7. recL as 
-he 'jillen we turn t -o the indi-P. Lerent to li urongs 
inflicted on others. 
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literature Of' 5t11 century however, we find a disinterested 
involvement in the execution of jas-luice attributed to the same Gods an 
involvement which parallels that which men have now taLen u-con themselves. 
Ilerhalps an ey-a. -nination o-. L' other new characteristics i,. -., qich came to be 
attributed to t-he gods by the Athenians will furnish clues to the solution 
o-"' the oroblem. This is the -oath which Ranulf sets out to e. -. -)lore. 
In the ir. =1ý--s of Aeschylusq Sophocles and Herodotus, all the gods are 
-)res u -u-med to be animated by a desire to -punish immorality amongst men. 
-runishment may be meted out not only to the guilty individual, but also to 
his son, his ': indired or his whole 7)eo, -Ile. -, -'arthermore, the - _, 
ods often 
force or entice a criminal to coramit fresh crimes be-, '-ore --)unishment overtaLes 
him. This the gods do without any regard for the great damage done to honest 
citizens by these nei,; crimes. It seems --L-Phat it is less a regard for 
protecting the communit- that stirs the gods than a wish to inflict 
. Dunishment on wronEdoers, even Toihen this is thought to necess-'U,, -te maLing, 
the criminal still rnore cul-caýble -than he is alreadý- 
Indeed, so strong is their desire to find crimes to -punish that, in 
the T, .; o r"I -. so lierodotus andScphocles, -vie find the gods -. 'rovokingg or ma.?. ins 
u. navoidable tra-ris -re s- ions by previously guJltless -ýersons belonging to .. 6 A. ZZ) --J. -- 
'----in. Sonhocies' Oedi--7)las Re. ': is -)erha, )s one of the best I'Mollil 
e. -,. a, m-, les of unintentional guilt brouE; ht about by the gods ancIl. cu-1rainating., 
in the -ruin o-j" those involved. 3u-L it is clear ffrom 
the comments and 
I. t al eso -f H r3hocles --ýUts cautionary v ierodotus and from 
the coi-, uments which So- 
-'-' his actors that both regard- such activities on the Dart into the mouths oL. 
i le. 'he 
I-Dods 
as al-together morally un-', meachab- Z, tj Ll 
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, -. en could also -r)rovol--. e divine ariger and Lo suffer be made t 
by the e- , od. s throug-1-1 exciting their jealousy as a cons ec-, ue:, ic e. of G-reatu 
riches, ý)ower, fa.. ý,, ie or ha-p-Aness. To be, or to boast of being 
e--,,:, --e-, Dtionally ha-,, )-)y arouses the jealousy of' the gods or may, t1irough 
breed-ing hubri , lead one into sin -a belief similar to more recent 
ideas concerning the association o. -f-' affluence and moral decay. . 1ccording 
to Herodotus not only the gods, but men too7 and- eaDecially the Hellenes 
wer 'i 11 e c-L I . Le f with envy towards others. Iff Herodotus is right in his 
characterisation of the Hellenes it becomes intelligible that they should 
feel edified by -belief in jealous gods, -. ', 'or if envy -forms so large a -, art 
of one' s character that the thought of the stable ha; ppiness of others 
seems -intolerable, what could be more comforting thazi the belief" that 
there e. ---ist Sods ,,,, ho are just so inclined themselves and -uho consequently 
-P -7)rovide a -Dromise that there is a force -, owert-al ax-d- iiilling enough to 
destroy any such )rovocative , r,, ood 
fortune? 
The gods, theng are portrayed as brin, ý,, Jn- ruin u-pon men for th. -Jee 6- 
-ýY-2es o-- reason: Ty- -Trongs against other pe I is 72unish-menLf fO. L cOrlmitti-yl,, -, - I 
pe II is misfortune brought about 'or no -particular reason; and- , eoT--, le; Ty- U 
is -mis-fort-ane resulting I-Lom divi. -ne jealousy. Ty-ýe 111 -1 
in the Iliad there is no wo-mistakeable example o.,,; 2' jealousy governing 
the gods, nor any blat of disa-, -). roval 0 the conduct oi u by gods or men 
arrogant boasting. 'dihile the gocis do not dis-plz., y the traits they are C) -0 
later tuo acc-uire -rvihich were la: beled. Types I and III above, in Homer we 
already --Find the gods dis--laying a comTirehensive involve. ment in bringi. -Lig 
doim ruin upon men as the result o-L -, ure canrice or for their own convenience 
', at I a.; (, Ul L 
ds 7 Jý' f in new in the wol-11--s Of Hý"ercdotuus and 12)o-ý)hocles is their 1ý 
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ieculiar a-p-7ýroval of the aiý'bitrary cruelty of the gods. Hlomer, for 
instance, h, --. s hardly anything corresponding to the ff'ear e:: -)ressed by 
So-)hocles' chorus concerning the possibility of Oedi, 
. pus 
evad-ing his 
cruel late, nor any hint of edification at the unscru-_-julous destruction 
of huraan happiness by the divine --)owers. 
To the mod-ern, sense of justice it mal--es the greatest -, -, ossible 
difference . -ýhether the gods -,, -)unish men for urongs they have com. -itted, 
or vihether tjhey ruia innocent -, erso-qs merely from capriciousness or 
jealousy. In the latter case their conduct ýrovolces the accusation of 
cruelty and injustice, and the division of the three ty-ý)es of divinely 
Eanul. f' in accordance with ordained misfortune outulined above was made by la 
the differing evaluations ,., rhich they were li-"-. ely to -. -provo'c: e in his 
'he contem-poraries. In 5th century -'ithens, ho-vrever, the intervention of U 
. Lj J. Iu 
gods for any of -',, he thhree tu'-/-es o" reason was regarded as eq, -ually 
just 
and edifying. This is reflected in the literature by it evidently being 
U $4 fo-and. unnecessary to dislbinguish betivieen the ty-:, )es in any coherent and 
consistent fashion. Divinely ordained destruction having been attributed 
to one cause, such as the -vjish to -punish a criminal,, -reflection on the 
activities of the god-s in that case -very often become intermingled with 
commients which .,, ould only be ap-ýro-., riate 
if they ,,, rere made concerninE one 
of the other motives being the source off" the gods actions, such as envy or 
caT, -riciousness. Once one ty-pe has entered. 4.1"Ile aut. 1-lorl s minc! it is usually 
accom-panied by, and ineXtricably interwoven , ý: ituhq --e-i'lect 
ions -uhich also 
relate the misf'ortume concerned to one or both of tae other 'U-v,, o t-, -, es. 
10u the "s --- result he -, roceeas to viancler unconcernedly 
'bac' and forth e 
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types, as if any comment appropriate to one ty--ý, e is appropriate to any 
o-. 'L"' the others. 
There is, however, one exception to this general 'endencyg to one 
situation -,, ihere the authors under consideration do become alive to the 
conce-Dt-aal and moral differences between the ty-. pes. This is -,, -. -n'en they 
-allow those characters who have fallen foul of the malice of the gods to 
assert that their misfortune is no fault of their oim and that they there- 
fore have a right to T)ity a: ad forbearance. But; other characters who are 
s7-)ectators to the tragedy of, the victim of the gods do not condone foi-lbe. arapwý 
for to leave sins un-ounished is unthinkable, would endanger the comr. -lunity, 
and display that the power of the gods was waning, undermining faith. 
Ranulf L-r,, --ues that a further link between the dif. Cerent motives 
behind divine intervention in human affairs is discernible in the way in 
T imich the three ., --iters use the Greek -. hrase meaning 
ll-ý, rovocative ol- envyll 
not only 1-iteralLyg but also to mean "morally objectionable" . Similarly, 
trle -)hrase meaning "sa. Le-gu. --,. rded against envy" is sometimes used to stand 
, +2 2)r "morally uni=peachalble" The o-p-ý-, osite usage, the use of terms 
1 
pplicable to immorality in clescribing envy and the jealousy o---Lý the gods, a- 
does not occur. This Ranulf inter-orets as suggesting that the idea of the C; 
-- the gods ý)receded. tulhe idea of the justice of the gods. As the jealousy ol 
god. s increasingly came to be thought of as jealous, reflecting the growing 
env, y o 'L 14heir -followersq thei-- clisT)leasure vias likely to e. --tend itself to 
those vino souE,;. qt to evade the moral 'boundaries under iihich their virtuous 
neighbours ja--boured* 
LO 
those who committed lnulbris,, who v; ere de--fiant, i, -c'---ed 
restraint , and ý-jerle --,, )roud were the lieroes of the Gree'-,, -. s, heroes ,.,, hop. 
tlaey adimired, sym-pathised with and enthusiast i c, -;.! ly a-pplauded, they 
nevertheless never tired of hearing of their eventual aoi. m. Call. To be 
able to deffy the gods and men as -the heroes of 'eschylus and Sophocies 
often do was no doubt the secret wish o. L " tcleir audience =, -- ,, -et they 
1 
lme-u that mis. -fortune was their inevitable lot should they try to step 
outside the narrow boundaries enforced u--)on tunem by their way of lil U"e 
-hat a -nan -most fervently desires and most bitterly -feels the i, *, ant 0, 
he cannot -out begrudge others. 
It, 
-a-D-pears, theng that the new conce-ption-of the -ods elmerged as CD 
a -crojection of, and tuo -provide comfort to an u:, -iusaally strong :,, ro- u 7 pensity 
I ý, o env,, r. Given the close association of the nevily acc-, uired rnoral 
indignation of Uhe 3ods with their jealousyq the rising tide o- envy amongsto 
Athenians can also . be seen as the source of" the newly acquired rig. lit o IL 
citi. -.. ens to -)rosecute of'fenders in cases where neither they nor tfleir ll: in, 
I have been ;. Tronged and even, in certain cases, againSLo the -Derson wronE; ed 
if he does not retaliate against the offender. Hanulf sees such institutions 
as being introduced to cater to envious elements . -Tithin the community who 
-tunities -' -,: 'e 1 lo T, s were ever req-. ay to see'. - o-. 2o, ý tio d--a.,, - cloina their ý 
B e7o-Ce nroceedin. - to examine the social cli,: iate which nourished 
such an envious diis-, Dositi=7 are there any --'-"U---uher changes in "itullienian 
society ,. -, hich were associated witl-i 
its grovrth and valich might in some 
. 
pro-vide a fur-her ou-ji-let ffor its e: r--pression? z-. 'ýuch an way be held -'L-, o - L, 
inter-pretation can be -Dlaced 11--)on O'stracisni. -ý-, j'very year tuhe 'Lssembly votued. w 
wilether Ostracism should be -put into --)ractice that ýrear. if as to in 
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ansi-,, er was in t7ae affirmative, a poil of the j,, hole --Deo-, -)le was taken 
to decide which citizen was to be condemned to go into e. xile for ten 
years. Lt anu 1 --L 
I L' comme-n-itis that, considered in the light of later ideas 
concerning the nature of justice, the law of Ostracism aýr)pears indefensible, 
-for it allows -- conde, =, at-io. q to exile without any crime having been 
co nm i -U- -U ed3, ut it doec seem to harmonize e: ccellently with tile mentality u 
o. E' the ýthenian rjeo--)le in the first half of the 5th century. 2-or the 
edification o. L 7* men, the gods, impelled by ca-price or envy, bring dourn 
only u-pon offenders but also u-c . n. -iisfortime not )on the innocent. The 
citizens in their turn, lilý--e the gods they follow, can be seen as 
occasionally venting their envy or s-pite upon the innocent and e., n-)loying 
Os'kjr-acis, --,, i as an official form in uhich envy and malice could find e. =pression. 
honour of a -fellow cit4zen assumed too Jhen the -. Dower, .. iealth and I. -L 
orovarl. ing 7, -Lorortions men were ever ready to come unbidden to the aid 
o ff the gods by seeing to 
it that the overstep-)ing of the mean involved 
in such scandaious -ore-eminence was countuer-balanced.. (This interpretat ion 
oL to , --)s finding its best expression in f Ostracism has a long hist ry, perhai 
: -lutarch' s anecdote concerning a -peasant aho could not irrite. This 
u9 coming across "., I ! mow by sight , as, , easan. I -'steides, whom he did. not ed 
"aim, loo write the name of" ýristeides on the -potsherd. 'ý'6risteides cornplied -a I 
-j- but e-x7-) ressed curio-sity ý about what this statesman had clone uo deserve 
IIo which the -peasant re-ýDlied: "I do not -ý: now 
him, but it such a : a-,. e,, 
annoys E,, ie to hear him cried up everywhere for his righteousness". 
) 
", s further evidence of envy, it might be recalled that Herodotus 
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re, -. iar'.. s not only on the envious nature of the gods, but 
also attributes the trait to his fellow Hellenes. ? erha-ps the e: -, 
'Uayit 
wor. -s of Iiis contem-poraries should be searched to see ý. -hether they agree 
with him in those of his remar'-: s which -. -)ur-port to ggive an accurate 
descr4L-,, tion o. -L' the Gree-,,, -. character of the -, eriod?. The tro-L: Cble ; ji-; tj-h 
ado-ting such an al-p-, roach is that men's judgments of themselves stand 
. por 
in need of correction and sulp- to by criteria other than reliance solely 
-a-on they will lay clair. ri to, or to others. It is -partly for 
this reason that Hanul L moL -es such extensive use of the indirect evidence 
on sentizients to 'be gleaned from literary sources. 
iý Uhe conditions which created such intense envy that -hat, then, are ' 
it coloured. so much of Athenian life in the 5th century'? Har-ulf sees it 
as embedded in the . ecoziomic 
hardship endured by the bal-': of Athenians, 
. parison 
of their fate with conditions exacerbated by the unfavourable coml 
v- -- that enjoyed by the -, -Tealthy aristocracy of 
'ý. ttica. The env-T -)-Aovo-l-ecl by 
these conditions -f. 'inc-is e:: --Dression in the reflections wi-th which they see-. 
to comfort themselves. Behind ZLerodotus' s tales in i,. ý, hich inevitable 
doi,, -nfal'L and destruction accompanies such fabulous wealth as Ti. ras possessed 
by the Lyd-ian king Croesus, there lur. l.,, -s the des-. -, erate, laboriously 
s-x, D-, ressed recognition that the li-ýi'e o, --" a ýoor A. -Ilhe-nian c1tizen -, i4as 
em-pty and joyless in co, -n-: -, arison. 
2f 5th century "thens There is, however, a oint in the develo-ment 0u 
when the disintoerested tendency to yanish and envy can 
be seen to I-Yiave 
di eared simultaneously in a definite social ý-ý, rou-,. That grouý) is the 
-2 
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u-; -, -,,, er clzzl-ss at Athens in the second hall"' of the 5th century. ia"ore 
-ýreciselyq Ranulf 1) -L argues, the change occurred in that -)ar', 4 of the 
1 L' , z-, -)er class which i,.., as Ol . --Oble descent and , possessed of i. atellectual 
culuu-rej amd. which had. talcen advan6c-: -! ge of the chances of enrichment 
o ""erec-L by the gro,,, rth of the Athenian ' I -L Zjm-, )ire. It was in this social 
g--rou--, ) that the So-: ýhists J-oj-n,. I their public and which left its marl-: 
u7on the L ý'es, EuripiCLes and dristo -s of Thucydik. -phanes. 
,, the cou--se of the 5th century the Delian League, 
During L -Pormed as 
E' e(: iuals against the ? ers- a defensive alliance of Jans, became transfor. med 
into an "thenian e., -. i--, ire. -ýIt --ý6'hens the exercise of J. -rDerial -,, -)oi.,, e r had 
a --,,. -ofounc-L in-fluence on the -; rivileges and - .,, )resti,,,, Y*e enjoyec-,. 
by the 
-ýthenian cit-iZens. U7) to t. he year L8, j no "Lo -Ua any 
"henian cJtizen receive- 
pay, ment for wor";: c in the service of the state. Gradually, however, the 
. 4.. suatee introduced , -,, ': -i-r-. aent for all -ý, ublic service, including jurors and U- 
ro,,, Ters in the -fleet, jhus -providins- an im. -, )ortant sou--ce o" incorne to 
many LO . poor 
Lthenian cit lizens. ',., lien the . ýersian -., ar ca. ae -ýý, o an end in the 
year 4Lo' the number o-f' -rowers needed declined, but -ericies -rocured 
com-7ýensau 41 'ion the citý-ens who thus lost an ým--, o-tant )art o' 'heir 
ncorne by startin public -., ior-,: s at ýthens - the builclinýz of the -C--,, -r'Uhe-nor- i61 
being a case in --, oint. "ll this ex-ýenditure by the state vias sustained 
"by the tribute off-fered o. -j f'orced froni the r-, e,, -ibers o. -, ' the Delian League, 
. 44hdle fluarther --naterial advantages -.,: ere obtained at t,. 'L--, eJr en:: -'ýense throuc-'o 
the -, a---, -en-'u o_- 1F--, i court -, 'eesg -', -t. ", iens mono-polising the right to hear certai-ri li - 
- -- II cases, ana -, roi-. 1 the colonies established 
by t': L-thenians on land taýzen --artly 
I -ý- o, -- 11 1 11 I. - a the "llies , 
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The poorer citizens, whose chief source of hope of inc6me 
was paid service for the state, constituted the dominant democratic 
party at Athens. Not only did these citizens derive material 
advantage from the Empire, they also gained prestige. Allies forced 
to come to Athens for a law suit, for example, were wise to accord 
their jurymen respect. To many of the upper class it also offered 
new opportunities for enrichment by trade and industry, and this 
part of the Athenian aristocracy now became very wealthy. However, 
that part of the aristocracy which had not taken advantage of such 
opportunities constituted, together with the peasants of Attica, 
a conservative party opposed to Athenian imperialism, as to them it 
only meant burdens and trouble. 
It might be conjectured that the improved conditions of life 
were bound to weaken the tendency to envy. Yet from the evidence 
we have of the mentality of the poorer citizens it seems that the 
traditionaloutlook asserted itself with unimpaired vigour in these 
circles. And yet there is also evidence from the later part of the 
5th century that the trad2ional Athenian view of life no longer 
commanded the consensus it once enjoyed. 
Thucydidesq for exampleg is critical of the mass of Athenians 
during the Peloponnesian War for adopting disastrous policies under 
the influence of prejudices and passions such as envy, suspiciousness, 
cruelty and anti-intellectualism which were part of the traditional 
Athenian view of life reflected in the literature of the earlier 
writers considered above. There is, however, a new development 
insofar as the Athenians as described by Thucydides no longer seem to 
regard mere envy as sufficient justification for bringing down ruin 
upon man. 
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There is now at least a desire to pretend to the belief that the 
person overtaken by misfortune has been guilty of some objectionable 
act. But so little is demanded in the way of proof, and so great is 
the credulity accorded to every suspiciong that in practice the result 
hardly differs from the old arbitrary cruelty. Thit modification 
in the traditional morality may well have been the result of a need 
felt by its adherents to justify their position faced with the rise 
of individualism. 
One other thing that emerges from Thucydides' work is that a 
warring Greek state would attempt to involve neutral states in its 
struggle by depicting itself as the innocent victim of its enemy. CD 
In this way third parties were appealed to as disinterested guardians 
of justice. Such appeals, Ranulf contends, testify to a very rudimentary 
disinterested tendency to inflict punishment in the realm of foreign 
affairs, which was, however, only indulged when it coincided with 
interests of state. Disinterested punishment is far less likely to 
find expression against states than against individuals for, while 
within the boundaries of the state the disinterested onlookers 
constitute the vast majority in proportion to the offender, when a 
state offends their number is relatively much smaller. It is therefore 
more dangerous, difficult and expensive to punish the offender. 
While there is some doubt that Euripides had any faith in 
the existence of godsq their actions and intervention in human affairs 
feature pronrizientlyin his dramaq serving as vehicles for the expression 
of his opinions concerning traditional Athenian beliefs and values. 
These he opposed in two waysq either depicting the gods as less 
arbitraryg cruel and jealous than 
do Herodotus and Sophocles, or 
portraying them as indeed possessing their traditional characteristics, 
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but then condemning them for possessing them, denying that such gods 
are worthy of adoration and respect. 
It would appear, then, that Euripides was free from moral 
indignation. But what, in that case, inspired him to his indefatigable 
attacks on the gods of traditional Athenian religion? Was it not 
indignation at what he regarded as their immorality? Clearly not in 
the sense of this term as used by Ranulf, for whom moral indignation 
is primarily a desire tb inflict upon others suffering which they are 
considered to have deserved. Euripides' clearly cannot have been 
inspired by any such disinterested desire to invoke punishment upon 
gods in whose existence he doubted, nor upon the people who felt 
comforted by their belief in such gods. The whole trend of his 
writings is that men should be exposdd to less, not moreq suffering. 
Another sign that he was free from the disinterested desire to cause 
harm to others which was characteristic of the traditional Athenian 
mentality is provided by evidence of his humane attitude towards those 
classes of human beings that his contemporaries refused to acknowledge 
and treat as the equal s of citizens, such as women, illegitimate 
children and barbarians. 
When we come to the comedies of Aristophanas we find ceptain 
attacks on individuals and institutions which at first sight appear 
as expressions of disinterested indignation, but on closer examination 
it becomes clear that his is but a spurious piety, for he only appeals 
to the prejudices of the traditional Athenian mentality still 
prevailing amongst most of his audience when he wishes to undermine 
support for the democratic party. 
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Similar practices indulged in by those who were not his 
political enemies pass unremarked. Besides aspersions cast upon the 
morals of well-knovn democrats, Aristophanes also makes use of 
malicious remarks deriding them for unmerited misfortunes and 
infirmities. The delight of his audience at remarks of this kind can 
only have have been a maliciousness akin to that which made it 
find the undeserved suffering meted out by theiT gods so satisfying. 
The sentiment which lay behind the traditional belief in the jealousy 
of the gods is also appealed to by Aristophanes. This belief originated 
in human envy feeding a desire to see those who enjoyed great prosperity 
or success cast dovin by the gods. But such envy can be equally 
satisfied by 'believing wealth and self-indulgence have a 
demoralizing effect of their own accord. And it is to this feeling that 
Aristophanes appeals in depicting a strict upbringing as necessary to 
produce virtue and heroism, and warning that a permissive attitude 
towards the young, leaving them to enjoy life, will foster cowardice 
and immorality. 
Further evidence for the case that the tradition4l views were 
not as firmly rooted as they had been earlier in the 5th century 
caM also be gleaned from an examination of the later w=ks of C) 
Sophocles. In these Ranulf detects evidence that Sophocles had 
moved away from the views he'lheld in his earlier years towards a 
position closer to Euripides, for he, too, comes eventually to disapprove 
of or to deny the tendency of the gods to persecute the innocent or 
tho: §e led to sin unwittingly. 
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A very early sign of the weakening of the traditional Athenian 
view of life occurs in another case involving a change of heartý this 
time on the part of Aescyhlus. In the Eumenides, Orestes, forced by 
Apollo to murder his mother to avenge his father's death at her hands, 
is saved from divine wrath and destruction. This acquittal of 
Orestes seems to be a disavowal of all that Aeschylus had previously 
taught concerning the relations between gods and men. This pTay was 
produced towards the end of his life and it seems clear that he must 
have come to regard the divine persecution of Orestes as unjustified, 
reflecting an incipient individualism which could not sanction -the 
unscrupulous sporting with the lives and fortunes of men. 
But if the Eumenides, dating from the year 458, is our first 
indication of an emerging disagreement concerning the use of 
punishment by the gods and the community, it also contains evidence 
of a defensive response to this growing uncertainty by appeals to an 
idea which was previously of little or no importance. This entailed 
the attempt to justify punishment in terms of general prevention: 
criminals should be punished in order to discourage others from doing 
likewiseq for only thus can the life and property of honest men- be 
protected. The theory of general prevention, Ranulf argues, only 
develops where the need arises of defending an existing penal 
institution which is being questioned. This is true both in 
antiquity and in our own time. But for the origin and first development 
of the institution of punishment, the idea of general prevention 
seems to have been entirely without importance. 
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For additional material concerning the changing moral climate 
at Athens, a change which constituted part of what was to become 
known as the Athenian Enlightenment, Ranulf also makes reference to 
the writings of the Sophists. While only fragments of these are now 
available to us, several reveal a scepticism with regard to moral 
principles which is psychologically incompatible with moral indignation. 
The fragmentary nature of the evidence makes it impossible to decide 
in the case of some of these whether the opinions expressed are those 
of the author, but the fact that these views are discussed at all would 
seem to indicate that they were taken seriously somewhere in the 
author's environment. 
The works of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Herodotus seem to give 
expression to a view of life which was common to the whole Athenian 
citizenry. At any rate it is incontestable that their works come 
much nearer to being an expression of the views of the average 
Athenian than do the works of Euripides and Thucydides. For both 
Euripides and Thucydides are continually aiming their attacks at 
a mentality which differs radically from their own and which they 
evidently found to be common amongst their countrymen. No trace 
0 
is to be found of a similar polemical attitude before their time. 
The mentality which they challenged was, as we have seeng composed 
of sentiments celebrs, ted in the works of Aeschylusq Sophocles and 
Herodotus. 
But in which sections of the Athenian public had the feelings 
which underlay the traditional morality disappeared? There is 
evidence that the poorer citizens, who were the main source of support 
for the democratic party, continued to be dominated by the traditional 
outlook. 
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This can be seen, for example, in the demagogic methods which are 
described by both Thucydides and Aristophanes as being employed by 
Cleon. These consisted mainly of appeals to an easily excitable 
moral indignation which was not overscrupulous as to whether the accused 
had actually offended or not. In addition to the democratic citizens 
in Athens itself, the Athenian people comprised the farmers in 
Attica. and'the aristocrats. Aristophanes evidently found a symPatheti6 
audience in both, and this is perhaps one reason why his attitude 
towards moral problems was so ambiguous, for the aristocrats of the 
oligarchic party had to appear as champions of the traditional religion 
and morality so as not to offend the old-fashioned farmers whose 
political support they required. The new aloofness from moral 
indignation must, Ranulf concludes, have been cultivated primarily 
within the Athenian upper class. 
III. The jealousy of the gods (ii) 
The kernel of Ranulf's argument in The Jealousy of the Gods 
is then, much the same as we have encountered in discussing Moral 
Indignationý and Middle Class Psychology: public condemnation and 
punishment of both predatory crimes against private individuals 
and victimless crimes, are part of a broader mentality and pattern 
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of conduct rooted in lower middle class conditions of life . Itq 
also, begins with a rejection of arguments which attempt to explain 
the growth of the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment to the 
immanent unfolding of human reason and awareness; and, indeed, one 
has only to look at the vitiating effect of such an approach on the 
work of a writer such as Westermarck to grant that there are some 
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grounds for such a e: riticism. 
59 
Instead, as we have seen, Ranulf turns his attention to other 
aspects of Greek life which can be seen reflected in their religious 
beliefs. But care is needed here. Whatever the human motives, the 
hopes and anxieties, which may find themselves projected onto the 
stage of divine action, it cannot be assumed that when it comes to 
human practices such as punishment th-3t human and divine justice 
closely resemble one another in terms of what is punished and the 
relative seVerity with which various offences are dealt with. As 
Mary Douglas notes, it is precisely at those points where human 
sanctions are 'weak that activity by supernatural forces is likely to 
be invoked to remedy, not duplicate, the deficiency. 
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This is supported by Julia Brown's cross-cultural study of 
human and supernatural penalties for sexual offencesq when she 
suggests that one of the distinguishing characteristics of those 
offences which were met only with supernatural punishment, was simply 
the difficulty of detecting violations. (Her explanation suggests 
interesting parallels within our own society, where the notoriously 
difficult to detect victimless crimes are often surrounded by beliefs 
concerning the illness likely to accompany them, unlike the predatory 
crimes. ) Her results show that in 73.6% of the sexual offences 
she surveyed, punishment was undertaken by humans alone with no 
parallel activity on the part of the supernaturAl. In only 13.8% 
of the cases was punishment meted out by both supernatural and human 
interventiong while in 12.6% of the cases supernatural sanctions 
operated alone. 
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Ranulf's claim to have tapped the temperament and conduct of 
the citizens of Classical Athens through an analysis of the actions 
they attributed to their gods must, therefore, be treated with some 
caution. 
Turning to the treatment of the disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment in The Jealousy of the Gods, we find Ranulf grading it in 
terms of intensity, contrasting the very weak form manifest in the 
expression of public disapproval unsupported by further action to 
punish the offender, with the situation in which it asserts itself 
more forcefully in the punishment of offenders by the community or 
its representatives. As he notes, however, the insistence upon, and 
monopoly of, adjudication by the state may have been attributable to 
the desire of weaker members of the community to protect t'remselves 
from the more powerful elements within it. He sees a somewhat less 
ambiguous indicator of the disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment in the provision of opportunities for any citizen, not 
merely the injured party or his relatives, to prosecute offenders. 
In choosing to emphasize this feature of the law, 2anulf touches upon 
a factor of special importance in legdl development, an innovation 
identified by Calhoun as marking the emergence of "true" criminal 
law: 
The decisive step in the transition to true criminal 
law seems to have been taken in Athens at the beginning 
of the sixth century. At that time Solon, we are told, 
gave to every citizen a right of action in the prosecution 
of certain offencesq including attacks upon J-ndividuals 
as well as upon the state. 
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The essential characteristic of criminal law can be seen as 
residing in the provision for prosecution to occur without the request 
or implied permission of an interested party. 
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In making this link between private sentiment and public policy, 
it is clear that Ranulf's theory allows for the fact that the state 
will not always reflect the views of the community as a whole, although 
it is true that he does not enter into any detailed discussion of 
this matter. The influence of the community on the state is seen as 
depending upon the power of different groups within its territory, 
so that in a democracy giving greater weight to the lower classes than 
they enjoy under more aristocratic regimes - and especially in a 
democracy dominated by a petty bourgeois classq as in fifth century 
Athens - we may expect to find the state adopting policies catering 
to the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment. 
Such a policy was adopted by S, olon and substantially extended 
in the fifth century. Ranulf assumes that such measures must 
inevitably reflect a widespread public desire and readiness to 
prosecute criminals. But this assumption neglects that the law is 
sometimes called upon to fulfill a principally symbolic role. As 
Rock notes: 
Not all law is enacted in the expect, 2tion that rigorous 
enforcement will ensue. Some legislation is designed 
primarily to affirm va ues, and it is a largely expressive 
or symbolic display. 
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Nevertheless, despite the questionable nature of the assumption 
upon which Ranulf rests his opinion, there is evidence that in 
Classical Athens there was a widespread - and approve: d - willingness 
to prosecute offenders. 
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As noted by Bonner and Smith: 
Solon believed that the best governed state was that in 
which those who suffered no wrong were asý d: aigent in 
their prosecution of the wrongdoers as those who had 
suffered no wrong. In a large measure Solon's hopes 
were justified.... There were apparently no lack of 
prosecutors.... Public opinion approved of those who 
served the city zealously So 
Further on they add: "More substantial encouragement was offered 
volunteers by granting them a liberal share of the fines, confiscations, 
and moneys recovered for the treasury by prosection in certain types 
of action". 
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These included the contravention of commercial 
regulations, guardians' mismanagement of their wards' propertyq and 
prosecution for the usurpation of citizenship. Bonner and Smith 
remark: 
Such motives on the part of voTuntary prosecutors as public 
spirit and the expectation of legitimate financial gain are 
highly praiseworthy. But, strangely enough, Athenian public 
opinion not only tolerated bm approved political and personal 
motives as well. Prosecution in the courts was a well- 
recognized means of vengeance on one's enemies.... It was only 
when men made a profession oflproSýcution for financial gain 
that public opinion was hosti a. , 
In these remarks can be discerned a number of possible sources 
for the tendency to inflict punishment other than those proposed by 
Ranulf; such as the growth of loyalty to the Polis, with the 
accompanying decline of tribalism; individual economic advantage; 
and the possibility for employing litigation in class conflict. 
The period to which Ranulf assigns the major expansion of what Calhoun 
defines as "true" criminal law, is also the peziod of expanding, 
revenues form the Athenian Empire. This meant, for citizens, that 
"the state was able to offer abundant and varied means of adding to 
their income". 
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Through, for exampleg colonization, official posts, 
I 
and jury service, juries being staffed mainly by the poorer classes 
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attracted by the pay. It is clear that these classes are not at 
all disinterested in using their Political power to encourage the 
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expansion of prosecutions. The use of criminal justice as a source 
of revenue for the state is a well-attested occurrence throughout 
history, although the huge juries and democratic nature of Athenian 
society gave a broader section of the population than is usually 
the case a direct interest in this area. 
Amongst the Ashanti, for example, it was the chiefs and elders 
who benefited from criminal litigation who were hostile to the 
peaceful arbitration of disputes, preferring legal adjudication 
because o. 1' the revenue to which it gave rise. It is, incidentallyg 
interesting to note in reference to Ranulf's views on the relationship 
between gods and men, that the Ashanti who benefitted from these trials 
invoked their gods "not as of old to keep-people from breaking the law 
and custom, but to encourage them to do so"to provide additional 
cas6s. 
55 Here we have the element of divine temptation or infatuation 
(ate) associated with a tendency to inflict punishment, but one that 
was in no sense disinterested. Further illustrations of the influence 
of mate±ial interests in this area can be found in Punishment and Social 
Structure by Rusche and Kirchheimer, where the development of fines 
in the history of European criminal law from the Middle Ages is related 
to their value as sources of revenue. 
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For the member of the Athenian courts of justice such considerations 
grew in importance towards the end of the fifth century, and 
litigiousness was further exacerbated by class conflict. Referring 
to the situation following upon the restoration of democracy, to 
Athens in 410, Ferguson notes that: 
So widespread was the feeling that "aristocrats" were at heart 
traitorsq and so manifest the inability of the treasury to 
furnish jurors' allowances unless it was replenished by 
confiscations, that these tribunals gave ear to all kinds of 
charges against men of prominence and property. 57 
64 
As noted above in discussing Moral Indignation and Middle Class 
Psychology,, the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment as it 
is there portrayed, can be seen as consisting primarily of two 
major dimensionsg punitiveness and asceticism. Tn The Jealousy of 
the Gods however, the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment 
tends to be confined to punitiveness, excluding offences against an 
ascetic morality. Some forms of asceticism make their appearance 
as part of a separate, though associatedg variable in the jealousy 
of the gods and its human equivalents, giving rise to warnings against 
too much happiness and self-indulgence and the perils of hubris. 
As for the dimension of punitiveness , Ranulf, unlike the position 
he adopts in his later work, ignores severity of penalties, confining 
himself to a consideration of factors enhancing the probability of 
conviction as a measure of the disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment. It must, however, be noted in relation to these two factors, 
the severity and probability of punishment, that we cannot necessarily 
expect that those who desire to increase the latter will at the same 
time support an increase in the former. Quite the opposite can occur 
through attempting to compensate for diminishing the severity of 
sentences b. %, at the same time increasing the probability of punishment, 
in order to achieve or maintain a certain overall level of punishment. 
With this in mindq it should be recalled that Solon's strengthening 
of the likelihood of prosecution was matched by a reduction of the 
severity of penalties for "Solon, with full popular support, 
repealed all the laws of Draco except the homicide laws, because they 
lNere written in blood". 
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The history of penal reform in England during the early decades of 
the last century is also instructive in this respect, for influential 
support for the abolition of the death penalty for certain crimes 
came from those who, while very keen to have those responsible punishedg 
feared that the severity of the law at the time made prosecution and 
conviction less likely. 
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In dealing with the two other Athenian attitudes which Ranulf 
detects from the activities which they attributed to their gods, envy 
and a disposition to involve others in unmerited misfortune, a number 
of comments need to be made. 
Consider first the way in which the gods mete out unmerited 
misfortune, inflicting what the authors of another study of the 
origin of beliefs about punitive rather than nurturant gods refer 
to an "noncontingent punishmentit, 
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It is clear that the 
preordained disasters which the gods engineer from mere caprice or 
for their own convenience are already to be found in the world of the 
Iliad. What Ranulf identifies as novel in this situation is a change 
in the tone in which these activities are described. Just what this 
change in tone is meant to consist of is left rather uncle2r by 
Ranulf, but it does appear to involve a new found ability to derive 
edification from these activities by the gods and an emphasis on 
the dangers inherent in attempting to offset them. This finds 
expression in warnings on the unpleasant consequences likely to be 
incurred from associating with those whom the gods are bent upon 
destroyingg such as the danger of pollution. 
66 
While the concept of pollution appears in the Homeric literature it 
is, as Dodds emphasizes, neither infectious nor hereditary as it is 
to become by the fifth century, nor does it assume such importance. 
It is, as he states, a long step 
from Telemachus' casual acceptance of a self-confessed 
murderer as a shipmate to the assumptions w1hich enabled 
the defendant in a late fifth century murder trial to draw 
presumptive proof of his innocence from the fact that the 
ship on which he travelled had reached port in safety. 
We get a further measure of the gap if we compare Homer's 
version of Oedipus saga with that familiar to us from 
Sophocles. In the latter, Oedipus becomes a polluted 
outcast, crushed under the burden of guilt.... But in the 
story Homer knew he continues to reign in Thebes after his 
guilt is discovered, and is eventually killed in battle 
and buried with royal honours. 61 
Dodds also, identifies a change in religious feeling from the 
Homeric literature to that of the Archaic and early Classical Age, 
one which clearly has affinities with the change in tone which Ranulf 
attempts to capture. Describing this change Dodds states.: "The 
doctrine of man Is helpless dependence on an arbitrary power is not 
new but there is a new accent of despair, a new and bitter emphasis 
on the futility of human purposes" in the face of capricious gods, 
a pessimistic fatalism. 
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And, according to Pfister, there is 
"an undeniable growth of anxiety and dread in the evolution of Greek 
religionfl. 
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This complacent, unprotesting submission to the 
arbitrary imposition of suffering meted out by the gods may, perhaps, 
be as readily be interpreted as reflecting the masochistic self- 
denial and submission of devotees described by Berger in his discussion 
Off theodicyg as it can be interpreted in Ranulf's fashion as a simple 
projection of the sadistic desire to see others suffer. 
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To the warrior-heroes of Homer, who "bestride their world boldly" 
in the face of such divine meddling, and to his aristocratic 
audience, such uncourageous humility is likelyq on the basis of 
Weber's characterization of the religious affinities of such classes, 
to have appeared utterly alien to their sense of honour. 
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Turning now to the role attributed to envy by Ranulf, it is 
clear that he considers it can assume, under appropriate circumstances, 
a key role in social life in general and, of course, on the 
disinterested tendency to inflict punishment in particular. The first 
thing that needs to be noted is th-at Ranulf frequently employs the 
terms "envy" and "jealousy" interchangeably, obscuring the 
existence of different emotions attached to different types of 
relationships which can be illuminated by developing the different 
connotations for these two terms. The conceptual utility of 
pressing for such a distinction in this case will, I hope, be made 
clear frem the following discussion of the nature of envy and jealousy. 
In writing of the sociology of jealousy, Davis notes that 4 
"Descartes defined jealousy as a kind of fear related to a drsire 
to preserve a possession". 
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Here, then we see the self-interested 
anxiety of an owner threatened with the loss of his property. 
Schoeck, in his study of the nature, causes and consequences 
of envy, adopts a similar view of the attributes of jealousy. Envy, 
on the other hand, is "to feel displeasure and ill-will at the superiority 
of another person in happiness, successq reputation, or the Possession 
of anything desirablell. - 
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He goes on to discuss and illustrate the way in which the ill-will 
to which this displeasure gives rise manifests itself in a desire to 
see the envied person deprived of his enviable place or possessionsg 
irrespective of whether these then pass to the envious. It is with 
just such gratuitous involvement in the lives of others that Ranulf 
is concerned. 
Now, reflections on the influence of enIvy on social affairs 
has a long history, a history which includes Aristotle, Bacon, Kant, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Their observations have provided us with 
some of our best insights into the less rational aspects of social 
action, and yet both term and topic are sadly neglected in contemporary 
sociology. Schoeck, one of the exceptions to this rule, suggests 
with ill-concealed malice that this blind spot amongst his 
colleagues is attributable to the disproportionate number of envious 
individuals drawn to sociology as providing an opportunity to 
to exercise this trait, individuals who are subsequently unwilling 
to pursue an enquiry which might come too close to home. 
Probably more acceptable is the explanation that the term 
it envy" is avoided because of its value-laden connotations and that 
sociologists continue to study the same phenomenon while ýsrnpaoying 
different terms. Runcimang for example, advocated the adoption of 
the term "relative deprivation" on the grounds that it "retains the 
merit of being value-neutral as between a feeling of envy and a 
injustice". 
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perception of - But it is important to notice that envy 
in the sense outlined above, is not relative deprivation, and that 
0 
although the two are no 
doubt connected, this relationship is 
69 
contingent, not logical. Of relative deprivation, Runciman says: 
ItIf A,, who does not have something but wants it, compares himself 
to B, who does have it, then A is 'relatively deprived' with 
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reference to B". 
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But such a sense of deprivation may not give 
rise to envy, but to attempts to obtain what is desired by work,, 
purchase, force or theft. Possibly it is only when such avenues to 
emulation are closed and attempts to obtain the coveted possession 
are frustrated that envy arises. Whether or not this proves to be so, 
there are alternative outlets to relative deprivation other than either 
emulation or a direct transfer of resources, and interesting and 
important questions concerning their interrelationship are obscured 
if the notions of envy and r6lative deprivation are fused. 
One other probable reason why the study of the role of envy 
in social life has been neglected is that it has come to be 
considered such a disreputable motive or emotion that people are 
most unwilling to admit to entertaining it. It is, however, not 
everywhere equally difficult to unearth. As Gouldner notes: 
Of all the sentiments that moderns may discern in 
the Greeks, perhaps the most seemingly alien is their 
unabashEd envy; and eniýy all the more notable to us... 
because envy in our own culture tends to be repressed. 
To the Greeksq howeverg envy is a sentiment natural 
to men; if they have reservations about it, it is not 
on moral grounds but simply because envy made a man unhappy. 
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Against this settingt Gouldner takes the opportunity to elaborate 
a conception of envy which has much in common with mainstream 
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sociological thinking on subjective reactiom to inequality. 
There are, he notesý two basic ways in which men can appraise their 
rewards and position in societyq One of which 
is in terms of their own 
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previous experience or of some set of general notions of propriety 
concerning what they deserve. Here it makes no difference what 
happens to others. The other way, howeverg is for men's satisfaction 
to be shaped by what happens to others in relation to themselves. 
When men evaluate their position in this manner they can rise relative 
to others either by raising their own absolute position and leaving 
others behind them; or by maintaining their own absolute position and 
pulling others down. It is in this latter response that Gouldner 
comes closest to the conception of envy adopted abbve - others are 
held back or pulled down with no direct material advantage passing to 
those responsible. Given a choice between the two, which tactic 
an individual adopts will depend upon his available resources and his 
assessment of these. As Claire and William: Russell point out, "envy 
means a competitive attitude connected with an utter disbelief in 
onets capacity to succeed, and hence a complete concentration 
on bringing about the failure of 6thers ". 
72 What of downward 
mobility? Following through the logic of the above argument it is 
clear that an individual's position may deteriorate not only 
materially, but also relative to others if his position remains 
unaltered while others move ahead. Indeed - and this iý a point 
taken up by Bensman and Vidich in their study of the relationship 
of economic fluctuations to the psychology of social class - he 
may still decline relatively even if he advances materially in 
absolute termsq if his progress 
is outstripped by others. 73 
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In all these cases there is the possibility of relative advance or 
'recovery not only through objective improvement, but 41so through 
keeping others in their place. 
There is, however, another response to relative deprivation 
which Gouldner does not include in his account of envy, although it 
occurs in his earlier discussion of the Greek contest system. Given 
barriers to the acquisition of what is considered desirable through 
the exercise of force on the one hand or productive activity on 
the other, men. are, Gouldner hints, likely to make a virtue of 
necessity and alter their "value system, that is, their way of 
reckoning asse ts so that the kinds of things they value are not 
of the sort that are pre-empted by others and are of the sort that 
they do have means of achieving". 
74 The approach suggested in these 
lines shares much in common with the classic sociological account of the 
"sour grapes" reaction in shaping beliefs and values advanced by 
Scheler. 75 In dealing, with ressentiment,. the transvaluation of 
values, which he sees as born of a union of envy and impotence, 
Scheler elaborates a theory which., Ranulf acknowledges as coming 
close to hi's own theory at many points. 
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LOU . Even without such elaboration, however, the interpretation 
of envy which Gouldner advances has much to recommend it, offering 
the possibility of linking the issues dealt with by Ranulf to 
c(=temporary investigations of the role of status deprivation in 
shaping social action, such as Gusfield's account of status 
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politics and the Temperance issue. 
In Athens as in England of the Commonwealth, Ranulf holds that the 
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tt social class that dominated the community... during the periods in 
question was the lower middle class" 
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a class in both cases heavily 
imbued with the moral outlook associated with the disinterested tendency 
to inflict Punishment. 
Was Athens dominated by the class in question, and what were 
the characteristics whidh entitle it to be designated as lower,; 
middle class? Ranulf does not elaborate, although the material for 
such an elaboration is available in the literary sources he employs. 
This can be illustrated, Ranulf's interpretation examined and the 
situations to which he refers clarified, by reference to the work - 
based principally upon writing of Aristophanes, but also employing 
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other sources from the same period - of Victor Ehrenberg. 
The first thing to be gleaned from the evidence presented by 
'MI__ h enberg is that the once-popular belief in a division of labour 
between citizens engaged in state service and agriculture on the one 
hand and metics monopolizing trade and industry on the other, is 
clearly untenable. Similarlyq Weber's contrast between the 
political man of the ancient Polis with the economic man of later 
European urban history, cannot easily be applied to Athens in the 
period under consideration without disturting the fact that the 
bulk of the citizen body were employed in economic production,, 
and exchange of one form or another. Nor did the exis, tence of slaves 
render the majority of the po, pulation into a leisure class divorced 
from direct engagement in such productive employment - Whilst widespread 
and important in their impact on the standard of 
living enjoyed by 
the citizensi most employed their personal slaves as 
domestic servants, 
and although use was also made of 
them in assisting the master in 
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workshop or ýield, their complement-ry role is captured in the words 
of Xenophon: "Those who can afford it buy slaves in order to have 
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fellow-workers". Slave labour was generally preferred in the large- 
scale workshops, but the conditions - notably the absence of any 
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but the simplest machinery -- which favoured the survival of 
small scale- , craft production, limited the economic importance of 
such establishments and sustained the size and import-, -ýnce of the petty 
bourgeoisie. 
Turning our attention to the citizens, it is clear that there 
was, at the apex of the Athenian class structure, a wealthy landed 
gentry. This class formed, however, only a small section of those 
enjoying citizen rightsq the bulk of whom Ehrenberg depicts as having 
to live by the work of their hands, producing and selling as traders, 
craftsmen and farmers. As he expresses it at one point: "It was the 
type of petit bourgeois whom we have recognized as peasants, tradesman 
or artisan, that predominated in the assembly. " 
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This passage is of 
interest for two reasons: first, the use of the term petit bourgeois, 
which recurs throughout The People of Aristophanes,, to identify the 
dominant class within the Athenian democracy; and second, the inclusion 
0 
of the Attic farmers within this class. 
The borders of the petit bourgeois class are left vague in 
r"- - ElLrenbe. ig's account of itq although its main members are identified 
clearly enough - the craftsmen, traders and small-scale farmer. s. 
What is interesting to note is the similarity with Ranulf in the 
negative connotations which this term evidently holds f or both, as 
does the barely implicit condemnation of the class to which it 
refers. Speaking of the emergence of the study of 
Greek social and 
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economic history from the 1870's Ehrenberg notes: 
The outst. --nding importance of economics in the political 
and social life of their ovin day made historianssuppose 
that economics had a 1-ike importance in antiquity. 
The details of economics in the ancient 1f,, orld were 
interpreted, and the general conception of its history 
was expounded, in the spirit and terms of contemporary 
circumstances. 83 
It would not do justice to this insight into historiography, 
if we were, not to pay Ehrenberg the compliment of applying it to his 
own workq for this, like Ranulf's is no less a child of its time 
reading back into Greek hist -ory the contemporary situation with its 
prevailing concerns and beliefs. Nowhere is this clearer thEýn in the 
final lines and concluding note (here in brackets) to The Pe6ple 
of Aristophanes: 
But no democracy, and no State whatsoever, it ý 'it to live in if the ruling class is formed by the petit bourgeois, still less 
if these men are guided by misleading and demogogic propaganda. 
This also was not more truetwo thousand years ago than it is 
today. (I have left the last sentences as they stood in the 
Lirst edition, although they have been open to misunderstanding. f C Therefore I better add that when in 1942 1 ývrote of. the 
petit bourgeois misguided by propa anda I wqs naturally thinking 
of the Nazis and their followers). 
q4 
Ranulf, writing during the 1930's in a country bordering upon 
Germany is similarly both concerned with, and hostile towards, 
National Socialism, as is clear from an article in which he condemns 
those aspects of the , vork of T5nnies, Comte and Dur-kheim which he 
considers as providing unfounded beliefs favourable to such movements' 
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A further indication of his dislike of the National Socialist position 
is discernible in his comments on the political abuse of racial theories, 
8.6 
while the location of his treatment of the Nazis as Chapter One of 
Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psycholop-79 hints at its importance 
in shaping the interpretations of other periods to be found in the other C) 
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chapters. Here was a movement, widely interpreted . at the time as 
petit bourgeois, which mixed a record of brutality and intolerance 
with appeals for liw and order and the praise of discipline, which 
clearly offended Ranulf's individualism, and could not but help 
influence him when he came to examine the appearance of these traits 
in other contexts. Nor were the related demagogic appeals and methods 
likely to commend themselves to the elitist sympathies of either 
Ranulf or Ehrenberg. In Ranulf, writing in the shadow cast by 
a contemporary Cleon, the disdain for populist demagogy which finds 
expression in the work of Thucydides and Aristophanes, received a 
sympathetic reception. 
In turning to the second point raised by Ehrenbercllsremark, C, 
'we return to a matter touched upon earlier in discussing Moral 
Indignation and Middle Class Ps, ychology: whether the petty bourgeoisie 
encompasses a rural element. Certainly the urban connotations of 
this term, unlike "lower middle class", render it somewhat out of 
place in a rural setting. 
87But 
Ranulf employs both terms interchangeably, 
and makes it plain in The Jealousy of the Gods that he considers 
the Athenian peasantry to have been firmly attached to the traditional 
morality. Given his theory, this must have been attributable to the 
lower middle class conditions under which they were living. But he 
leaves the class situation of this group unexplored. Possibly he 
thought of it as unimportant in the political and cultural life of 
Athens. Such an interpretation has an element of truth. As Tod 
notes, 
In the determination of public policy the urban 
population often exercised a preponderating influence 
...... 
In the later years of the century this inflqence 
is mirrored in the increasing political prominence of 
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representatives of the urban and industrial element - Eucrates, the tow-merchant, Lysiq;,: ps the sheep-dealer 
Cleon the tanner, and the like. uu 
But this should not be exaggeratediand Ranulf himself 
obviously credits them with some importance through his interpretation 
of the "spurious piety" of Aristophanes as the result of those opposing 
the democracy seeking peasant support through pretending allegiance 
to an outlook consonant with traditional mo: ýality and beliefs. 
Did the Attic farmers share a similar position to that 
occupied by the bulk of the urban population? Or were there radical 
differences between the two groups? Ehrenberg considers that the 
"ordinary, that is the small, Attic farmer was a petit bourgeois". 
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Although this group was subject to a gradual deterioration in its 
standard of living, proletarianization of the peasants did not get 
really under way until the fourth century, and most owned and worked 
their own land. Small scale production predominated in the countryside 
no less than in the towns. 
There were some wealthy men whose estates were cultivated 
by sla-. 7es or tenants; but the large estates, in fact 
never very large, were not of decisive economic importance. 
The characteristic feature of Attic agriculture was a 
far-going partition of the soil rather than the reverse. 
The small peasant, though not oppressed by big landowners, 
was opTessed by poverty and the growing difficulty of 
I iving on the yield of his piece of land. 
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In respect of their gradual economic decline, the peasant class 
of Atticaq threatened with proletarianization, can be seen facing 
a fate more similar to that of the traditional petty 
bourgeois under 
industrial capitalismg than that encountered by-the traders and 
craftsmen in the expanding urban economy of 
Athens. 
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The rural population was not engaged in mere subsistence farmingg 
but was integrated into a market economy through their specialization 
on the cultivation of vine, olive and fig trees. And, like their urban 
contemporaries, even poor farmers were likely to have at least one 
slave. 
There were, of course, differences between the lives led by 
the urban and rural lower middle class. Rural life was, as ever 
dominated by seasonal bursts of activity, punctuated by slack periods - 
which, as Hill argues, is not the most favourable conditions for the 
development of what have come to be thought of as the typical bourgeois 
virtues. 
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The decimation of the Attic countryside led the peasants 
to support a policy of peace which found less favour amongst the 
urban population. And while it won praise for its freedom from the 
immorality of city life, it also received ridicule for its inarticulate- 
ness, lack of education and unrefined manners in comparison with the 
townspeople. 
Despite differences between the-s2there are evidently some 
grounds for describing the farmers along with the traders and 
craftsmen as a middle class, placed between the wealthy aristocracy 
above and a servile class b6low. Even the term "bourgeoisie", with 
its historical associations of membership in a political community, 
seems not altogether inappropriate when the common privileges and 
identity bestowed by citizenship are brought to mind. 
Yet for all their conservative attachment' to tradition and 
membership of the lower middle class, there is evidence in 
Aristophanes, indicated by Ehrenberg and overlooked by 
Ranulf, of 
the existence of mutual antipathy between countrymen and those who 
frequent the courts as jurymen or litigants. 
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But given Ranulf Is association of traditional values and membership 
of the lower middle class with just that disinterested zeal for 
justice which he sees as animating such involvementq this hostility 
is strange. If, however, we remember the more self-interested motives 
which could promote a concern with participating in the administration 
of justice, then the farmers'resentment might be interpreted as -. 
resentment typical of the bourgeoisie towards those pursuing employment 
which they view as parasitical and unproductive in comparison with 
their own. 
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IV. Aspects of Puritanism 
The evident similarities between beliefs and values prevalent 
in the fifth century Athens and the Puritan movement is attributed 
by Ranulf to the domination of both by the lower middle class. 
In dealing with the Puritans, however, he offers very little in the way 
of evidence tosubstantiate this view. Certainly, however, his ideas 
on the social composition of Puritanism appear to be not without 
foundation. Christopher Hillý for example, speaking of the main source 
of support for Puritanismq describes its followers as drawn from 
the industrious sort of people ... yeomeng artisans and small 
--ancl middling merchants... 
the economically independent 
men, householdersq to the exclusion both of the propertyless 
and of the privileged classes. The latter might be landed 
aristocrats or members of the ruling oligarchies of the big 
cities, great financial magnatesj. monopolists, customs 
farmers, who would expect to be called 'gentlemen. ' and who 
might aspire to knighthood. They took no direct part in 
productive activity... and their interests lay with the 
rentier class into which they were rising, rather than 
with the industrious sort of people from whom they sometimes 
originated. 
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The mainstay of Puritanism was, theng those "employing a 
handful of journeymen and apprentices, who were struggling 
(often with the aid of the Puritan virtues of thrift and industry) 
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to enrich themselves, to lift themselves above the mass of the 
population".. 
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Hill clearly shares Ranulf's view that the value 
placed on such self-discipline springs from making a virtue of 
necessi y: ItProtestantism, then, and more specifically Puritanismq 
appealed especially to those small employers and self-employed 
men, whether in town or country, for whom frugality and hard work 
might make 9-11 the difference between pr, osperity and failure to 
survive in the world of growing competition". 
35 
Hill's account of the structural sources of Puritanism in 
pre-revolutionary England lays stress on the cleavage in conditions 
and outlook between the lower middle class and the lowvr class. 
The fate of the latter was harsh and the possibility of upward 
mobility faint. In sixteenth century Exeter, for example, more than 
half of the population were suffering from poverty and were unable 
to either save for themselves or establish their thildren in a 
trisde. 
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Such conditions give added point to the anxiety driving the 
petty bourgeoisie to secure their position and support the difference 
in outlook between its members and those of the lower class. 
The religious affinities of the lower class, for example, 
are portrayed by Hill as standing in sharp contrast with the narrow 
predestinationism preached by the Puritan lecturers of the middle 
class. Now Ranulf points out that "some of the most conspicuous 
Puritan peculiarities observable in our documents are obýfiously 
derived fromý if not identical with the doctrine of predestination". 
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As for the lower classq however, Hill claims that its members were, 
given freedom of choice, more 
inclined towards sectarieir- preaching 
schemesof "univerdal salvation much more acceptable 
for mass consurilotiorr., 98 
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One incident recorded by Hill is particularly instructite 
in relation to a number of Ranulf Is points: "In New England in 
the sixteen-twenties, when the servants of one settlement revolted 
against their masters and maintained (as it were) a school of atheism, 
on May Day they erected ("with the help of savages" with whom they ivere 
On friendly terms) a goodly pine tree 80 feet long as a maypole"* 99 
This revolt was broken by the rulers of the neighbouring settlement 
for fear they should be unable to retain their servants and the 
maypole cut down. 
Clearly this does not fit well with Ranulf's treatment of the 
lower classes as passive imitators of the manners of their masters. 
As we noted above, and Hill remarks in his discussion of predestination, 
it is largely a matter of the extent to which they are accorded or 
have won freedom of choice whether or not their own culture finds 
expression; and in the above case the masters subjugation of their 
servants is accompanied by the denial of that freedom, with the 
suppression of their revival of boisterous pagan festivals. 
4 
The strict enforcement of Sunday observance by the Puritans 
is evidently regarded by Ranulf as simply an expression of their 
envious displeasure at witnessing the enjoyment of others, or, 
conversely, pleasure at rendering their lives uncomfortable. There 
were, however, diverse forces at work in shaping Puritan Sabbatarianism, 
to which it is difficult to accord priority. Having noted that all 
but the lowest and highest classes supported Sabbatarianism, Hill 
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surveys the sources from which this support flowed. He points, 
for example, to a more direct link between Sunday observance and the 
economic situation of the petty bourgeoisie thalft that posited by 
Ranulf. With the breakdown of guild regulation, competition 
increased. There was, under such circumstances, every inducement fdr 
the small producer and retailer to work long hours like "the small 
shopkeepers today who have the maximum of temptation and the 
maximum of opportunity to stay open on Sundays and aarýy closing days", 
a situation necessitating the imposition of collective restricti6ns 
applying equally to all if one is not to steal the edge on his rivals. 100 
Ranulf might - and Schoeck undoubtedly would - attribute this to envy 
of their neighbour's earnings, but Hill evidently has in mind more 
material considerations, such as fear of losing customer loyalty and 
being left with a diminished share of a finite market. 
The new found empbasis upon austere Sunday observances was 
accompanied by the persecution of witches on a larger scale than 
hitherto. It is somewhat surprising that Ranulf did not embrace 
witch-hunting, with its aura of scapegoating and persecution, into 
his theory. This is, perhaps, because of the element of heresy 
involved, which is punished for self-interested reasons on the part 
of church authorites. Such a reason for its omission would be consistent 
with his treatment of the persecution of heretics by the Catholic 
Church, but fails to account for popular support and participation in 
witch-huntsg quite apart from the problem of why 
the zeal of the 
Puritans in this sphere exceeded that of the Catholics. The answer 
might well lie in 
Hill's interpretation of Sabbatarianism, with its 
assault on pagan 
festivities, as part of a broader Puritan attack 
on magic and pagan survivals; an, 
attack stemming in part from the clash 
between urban and rur, -:: 1 ways of life and thoughtq reinforced by 
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divisions between the middle and lower classes. 101 
As for the middle class Calvinist view of the necessity of 
subjecting the unregenerate to discipline -a view reflecting the 
longing of employers for a disciplined labour force - "There is no 
evidence that the lower orders had ever shared their betters 
enthusiasm for the Calvinist discipline". 102 Instead we have the 
lower class sectarian view that one must separate from the unregenerate 
when spiritual censure fails, rather than resort to force. In the 
voluntary communities of the sects "the emphasis moved away from 
discipline to social services and communal self-help, just as the 
theological emphasis shifted from the eternal decrees to the 
perfectability of man". 
1,03 Ranulf depicts similar optimistic notions 
about human nature as alien to the mentality of the morally indi, ý-nant, 
who are likely to dismiss such beli9fs as absurd. 
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In concluding his study of the Puritans, Ranulf utilizes Puritan 
war propag! ---nda 
to extend his theory to encompass the sociology of 
moral inconsistency. This involves him in an exploration of why 
some people are more prone than others to indignantly denounce in 
others the very behaviour that they themsCalves are prepared to 
indulge in with a good conscience. Before looking more closely at 
this part of Ranulf"S"i workq however, it will be necessary to distinguish 
between such moral inconsistency on the one hand and hypocrisy on the 
other, for it is for want of such a distinction that hia is led into 
drawing some conclusions which are not warranted by the evidence he 
presents. 
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V. G- 
Hypocrisy we may take as meaning the public praise of virtue 
mingled with the surreptitious practice of vice. Moral inconeistency 
on the other hand, involves people openly condoning in themselVes 
conduct which they condemn in others as beyond the bounds of decency. 
The former is revealed by comparing a person's behaviour with his 
expressions of opinion; the latter by comparing one opinion with 
another to uncover moral inconsistencies. 
Turning to Ranulf's findings we find that one interesting 
association is suggested - and, given the paucity of Royalist 
documents which Ranulf had available as a basis for comparison, 
a less tentative status cannot be claimed. What emerges from the 
documents is that. the Royalists' accuse their adversaries of 
numerous crimes and atrocities but they do not, to any considerable 
extent, boast of having committed similar acts themselves. The 
Puritans not only, however, condemn such deeds in their opponents, 
but also celebrate them when they are inflicted by their own side 
upon the enemy. Here, then, is evidence of double-standards 
indicative of moral inconsistency on the part of the Puritans, a case 
of the indignant denunciation of others for committing acts which 
those denouncing them complacehtly or boastfully admit to havin# 
undertaken themselves. Ranulf holds that the difference between the 
Royalists and Puritans is attributable to such moral inconsistency 
being particularly characteristic of those prone to intense moral 
indignation. 
Ranulfq however, goes on to press conclusions about hypocrisy 
from these findings which they in no way warrant. He states, for 
example: "So 'it appears that the Puritans as a group, in 
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contradistinction to the Cavaliers, were charatterized by a strong 
disposition to indulge in a number of those kinds of sin which they 
indignantly denounce in others". 
105 But such a conclusion is not 
at all apparent from the findings he presents. While the Royalists 
were less likely to display double-standards in their writingsq they 
may well have committed the atrocities with which they charge their 
opponents, but had the good sense to keep quiet about it - to have been, 
in a work, hypocrites. The evidence which Ranulf has extracted from 
the literature of the period offers no grounds for a decision on 
this matter. 
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Yet clearly the difference between Royalists and Puritans 
to which his findings point on the issue of double-standards do 
stand in need of explanation. It is obviously not attributable to 
their belief in the tighteousness of their cause, nor, probably, 
to the justification of retaliation for former atrocities, which they 
sometimes advanced. The former belief was naturally common to both 
sides, so cannot be held to account for differences between them. 
As for the latter possibility it is likely, given the human 
tendency to "punctuate" a series of interactions in ways favourable 
to themselvesq that one side's "atrocity" would be the others 
197 
"revenge'19 whether Puritan or Royalist. . 
Besides which, there 
is, Ranulf concludes, little evidence to indicate that the Puritans 
fblt any great need to explain Or excuse their inconsistencies, of 
which they were quite probably unaware. 
108 
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Finally, before leaving the subject of Puritan moralityq the 
problem of the typical attitude of Puritanism to charity, touched upon 
at an earlier stage in this discussiong stands in need of resoltition. 
Ranulf, it will be recalled, considers that the lower middle class 
are not only characterized by an inordinate desire to see that the 
sinner suffers, but also by being ill-disposed towards those in 
need. These tendencies exhibit their affinity with one anotherg 
and with the petty bourgeoisie, through both being encompassed 
within the doctrines and practices of Calvinism and its spiritual 
he&r, Puritanism. While such an association may-exist, the arguments 
which Ranulf advances on its behalf are, as we observed, inconclusive. 
Fortunately, since Ranulf completed his work, Jordan has provided us 
with an excellent study of the relationship between Puritanism and 
other religious persuasions to charity in England between 1480 and 
1660, together with material displaying the class composition of those 
donating to the various charitable causes. 
From this it is evident that Puritanism did not manifest the 
hard-heartedness towards those in need which Ranulf sees in it. 
The period 1480-1660 produced "an enormous literature, principally 
comprised of sermons, in which the clergy and the moralists laid 
before men with ever-mounting emphasis and conviction the Christian 
obligation of charity... Most of these sermons were preached by 
clergymen of stalwart Puritan persuasion". 
'()9 While the Protestant 
clergy, being Calvinistq could not argue that good works were 
necessary to grace, nevertheless. "they did hold with a most 
persuasive and sustained vehemence that good works were an authentic 
and a necessary fruit of grace categorically demanded of His saints 
by God". 110 The Puritan clergy tended to overcome orthodox qualms 
in their zeal to promote charity, coming close to enunciating a 
doctrine of the merit of works. Thus it became possible for one 
Presbyterian divine to argue, in terms redolent of the counting- 
house, that "charity to the poor Itis your bill of exchange; 
pay down your money here, and you will receive, it again in glory". 
111 
In short, "the great strength of the charitable impulse, at least in 
its social aspect, was to be found in the Puritan partyll. 
1.12 
It appears, then, that Puritanism, contrary to Ranulf's views 
on the matter, managed to embrace not only its own peculiar emphasis 
upon the enforcement of morality, but also a concern to alleviate 
the suffering of others. More generally, Jordon classified the 
Protestant Ethic as one of the great moving impulses behind the 
growth in measures to i-elieve poverty, misery and ignorance. 
It might, howeverg be possible to refine Ranulf's theory on 
this point to enable it to accommodate such evidence. In a passing 
reference to the Puritans' dislike for those regarded as the 
01 unworthy" poor, Jordon suggests that this dislike was stronger than 
the general prejudice against those regarded as "idlers" and the 
"professional poor". 
113 Exhibiting similarities to two tendencies 
which we have seen as central to Ranulf Is notion of the 
tendency to inflict punishmentg harshness towards, or readiness to 
classify people as belonging to, the undeserving poor, might well 
be a Puritan trait. 
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This would be compatible with the replacement of the casual and 
indiscriminate distribution of alms cha7acteristic of medieval 
Catholicism by the more systematic approach one would expect of 
those imbued with the Protestant Ethic. While Jordan demonstrates 
that this latter approach, paying more rational attention to the 
present need and future fate of recipients, was more effectivet 
such concerns inevitably promote impersonal administration of resources 
and classification of cases. Today, attitudes of hostility towards 
the "undeserving" poor can be found in expressions of indignation 
at the numbers believed to be receiving unmerited social security 
benefits. 
As it stands, however, Ranulf's crude association of Puritanism 
with tardiness in devoting resources to charity is evidently untenable. C) 
If, then, Puritanism is to be accepted as embracing the praise and 
practice of moral rigorism, this is clearly not incompatible with,,. 
a charitable impulse, however much the theory advanced by Ranulf 
might incline one to expect it. As for the relationship of 
philanthropy to social class, Jordan offers direct evidence which 
removes the necessity of resorting to the rather unsatisfactory 
expedient of deducing the attitudes of social classes on this issue 
from the statements of movements which only partieLlly covered the 
class in questiong while also embracing and appealing to members from 
other levels of society. With no neat superimposition of class upon 
religious affiliation, the advocacy of charity within Puritanism 
may have sprung frOmq or been directed towards, groups other than 
the lower middle class. 
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From Jordan's account of the class background of donors, it 
emerges that the peerage, the class which Ranulf sees as not at all 
disposed toward moral indignation, in the period 1480-166o left 
little of their wealth to charitable purposes. 114 In connection 
with the role of the urban-rural division, it may be noted that the 
urban classes of merchants and tradesmen (corresponding respectively 
to Ranulf's division between the upper - and lower - middle class) 
bequeathed considerably larger proportions of their estates to 
charitable uses than the rural classes of the upper and lower gentry, 
yeomen, and husbandmen. Amongst these rural groups only the upper 
gentry exceeded the contribution, in such percentage terms, of the 
urban artisans, despite the latter's modest means. For all these 
classes, "broadly speaking , as we descend in the social scale for 
both urban and rural groups, concern for the needs of the poor 
increases in a most marked fashion". 
115 The bourgeoisie was also in 
the forefront of efforts to relieve the plight of prisoners, although 
interest in their fate was directed mainly towards those imprisoned 
for debt -a condition evoking ready identification amongst merchants 
and traders accustomed to speculative undertakings and the potential 
threat of creditors. 
V. The absence of moral indignation 
The second part of Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology 
is given over to an examination of social and cultural contexts 
alien to moral indignation. Ranulf starts by arguing that the 
disinterested tendency to inflict punishment did not exist in the 
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European aristocracy of the Middle Ages, nor in the nobility of 
later centuries while they continued to enjoy their traditional 
economic and social privileges. 
116 This much is to be expected from 
his emphasis on the privileges and prestige of upper classes being 
inimical to the development of moral indignation. 
Similar effects of power and privilege can be traced in the 
changing policies of the medieval Catholic Church. 
117 From the 
eleventh century, contemporaneously with the emergence of an 0 
indifference towards moral laxity, there occurred a substantial rise 
in the political independence, influence and prestige of the Church. 
Together with this came greater centralization, so that the policies 
of the Church towards the repression of immorality came to reflect 
the values and dispositions of its higher dignitaries. It is, Ranulf 
holds, by virtue of the power and privilege enjoyed by this group 
that the general drift of the Church away from A pristine punitiveness 
in dealing with moral lapses towards a greater tolerance, took place. 
Clearly this attempt to account for the changing policy of the Church 
by reference to changes in social structure has more to recommend 
it than casual references to fear of scandal concerning the hypocrisy 
of the clergy or love of money to be gained from the sale of 
indulgences, for there is no evidence that scandals were less in- 
convenient or the clergy less covetous before the growth in leniency 
and tolerance. 
There wereq it is true, a number of factors which at first 
sight appear to run counter to the claim that moral indignation was 
not characteristic of the 
Catholic Church in the later Middle Ages. 
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Utterances of indignation at the immorality of the times can be found, 
together with the advocacy of, or belief in, the visitation of severe 
sanctions upon offenders. Apart from the more genuine - and 
unrepresentative - of these attacks, a frequent motive was simply to 
strengthen the fear of damnation for financial exploitation by the 
Church. 
Within the Roman Catholic Church the insistence on clericql 
celibacy grew stronger at the same time as the Church relaxed its 
severity towards the laity. Is this not a transfer of moral indignation 
from one target to another, rather than an indicator of its disappearance ? 
It seems, however, that within the Church the desire to monopolize 
the lives and allegiance of the clergy was at work - those pontiffs 
most forward in enforcing celibacy were also those most noted for their 
assertion of papal supremacy. There was also strong support for 
maintaining the celibacy of the priesthood amongst the laity, although 
Ranulf is at some pains to point out that this is not attributable 
to any disinterested tendency to impose qscetecism upon others, but 
to a self-interested concern to safeguard the ritual efficacy of 
sacraments. 
The severity of the early Church was not, moreover, altogether 
lost. The Church, its God, its saints, and the Virgin Mary could, 
while becoming more lenient with sins committed against others, 
nevertheless display a pristine harshness when they were themselves 
victims? being quick to defend their dignity when this was directly 
impugned. The foremost expression of such an interested tendency 
to inflict punishmentq including a disregnrd for the rights of suspects, 
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can be found in the resources devoted to the Inquisition. The energies 
of the Church were bent upon enforcing uniformity of faith, once the 
threat of heresy began to grow, while sin and crime were regarded 
as relatively insignificant except as sources of revenue through the 
sale of absolution. Those suspected of heresy were not saved by being 
models of virtue, while those who did not challenge the authority of 
the Church could purchase immunity from the consequences of their 
immorality at a cheap rate. 
The culture of the Teutons, constitutes the next sociocultural 
context in which Ranulf seeks to establish the absence of moral 
indignation. 118 He notes that the German tribes took no initiative 
in punishing offenders, although a chief when called upon for assistance 
was likely to involve himself if he felt it necessary to protect his 
honour or to avoid raising doubts about his power. 
There existed, amongst the leutons, public pressure on the offended 
party to retaliate against those deemed responsible. Ranulf, following 
119 
Gronbech, interprets this public interest as not reflecting any 
common concern to see the guilty suffer, but with weighing the worth 
of the injured party according to his ability to rehabilitate 
himself. It should be noted, however, that other interpretations of 
such public concern are possible, and that it cannot be assumed without 
enquiry that no element of a desire to see the offender suffer is 
present. Westermarck's views on this matter, for example, agree with 
those of Ranulf only up to a point. In discussing such public pressure 
under a system of private revenge, he stýates that: "It is of course 
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the man on whom the duty of revenge is incumbent that is the immediate 
object of blame, when this duty is omitted; and the blame may partly 
be due to contempt, especially when there is a suspicion of 
cowardice". Yet he goes on immediately to qualify this by adding: 
"But behind the public censure there is obviously a desire to see 
theiýurer suffer it. 
120 This argument he supports by reference to cases 
where the community assists the avenger in exacting revenge. He is 
thus led to formulate the relationship between the institutions of 
revenge and punishment in a very different fashion from tl-At encountered 
in the argument advanced by Ranulf: 
Thus public indignation displays itself not only in 
punishment, but, to a certain extent, in the custom 
of revenge. In both cases the society qpires that 
the offender shall suffer for his deed. 
After considering the culture of the Teutons, Ranulf turns next 
to the Orient for further examples of environments hostile to the 
development of moral indignation. That only a few rudiments of a 
bourgeois-Puritan ideology were ever developed in India is attributed 
by Ranulf to the insignificance of the Vaisyas relative to the 
It 
Brahmans and the Kshatriyas. 
122 Hence the disinterested tendency to 
punish did not normally exist within Indian civilization. The 
doctrine of karma, for example, is associated with the attribution 
of suffering to the deeds done by an individual in this or a previous 
existence, and not with any attempt to locate the blame for evil in 
the malice or folly of others. At first sight this might seem to 
have something in common with the self-effacing masochistic 
subservience to divine 
fate enjoined by Sophocles. It mustq however, 
be recalled thatq while 
the general community insisted upon their 
93 
cruel fate being fulfilled, the victim-heroes of these dramas were 
allowed to voice their hurt bewilderment at the injustice of their lot. 
There have, however, been periodsin Indian history when ideas 
concerning the importn-nce and necessity of punishment have arisen. 
These Ranulf accounts for by reference to the g-growing intensity of 
class exploitation at the time, so that the dominant class was not 
at all disinterested in seeking to protect its interests. This variable 
however, introduces one of the strongest alternative explanations of 
variations in punitiveness into the heart of Ranulf's theory - the 
assumption that these may be accounted for by reference to the search 
for security against predation for oneself and those with whom one 
identifies, in the light of changing social circumstances. Admitting C) 
the notion that punishments can be introduced and changed in the 
interests of a class introduces a whole new dimension into the discussion, 
a dimension which is, as a source of punitivesness, left unexplored 
by Ranulf for whom the power of classes vis-a-vis each other onl.. v enters 
into his explanation in accounting for the extent to which this 
tendency will find expression. 
The attitude prevalent in the Occident in which disgust for the 
sinner can find no peace until he has been forced to share in holy 
ire against his weakness, is completely foreign to Buddhism as 
passion and infatuation incompatible 74ith the understanding and 
goodwill of one who has mastered himself. This stands in contrast, 
for example, to the Christian attitude described by 'Westermarck: 
"Christian writers have laid much stress upon the circumstance that 
Jesus enjoined men to forgive their own enemies, but not to abstain 
from resenting injuries done to others". 
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94 
Westermarck, howeverg interprets some references in Taoism, Brahmanism 
and Buddhism to transcedental retributive justice as reflecting 
essentially the same demand that wrong should be resented in an 
impartial manner. 124 
It is true, as Ranulf indicates, that modern Buddhismq like 
Puritanismq contains contradictory reactions and beliefs towards the 
fate of transgressors. There is, for example, a belief in Hell, which, 
as we saw considering Ranulf Is treatment of the Jansenists and the 
subsequent reaction to thleir'beliefs by the upper bourgeoisie, 
he takes as an indic. ator of the disinterested tendency to punish. 
Unlike the Puritans, however, where expressions of belief in the love 
and mercy of the Lord are outweighed by references dwelling upon the 
wrath of God , Ranulf claims that the general tenor of Buddhist doctines C) 
runs counter to any aggressive imposition of morality. 
As Ranulf notes, however, there were also cities and a bourgeois 
class in India, and the makings of a petty bourgeois ideolog. can 7 
be seen within Jainism. 
125 
The Jains, like the Puritans, combined 
views favourable to the acquisition of wealth with an ascetic compulsion 
to save. There was insistence on business probity, and emphasis upon 
the dangers of cheerful attachment to the pleasures of this world. 
Their ascetic outlook was not confined to those who cared to adopt 
it, but was to be enforced. 
In China there is little trace of any idea of a god. who would 
protect morality and punish sin. Nor does the asceticism of 
Taoism 
or the etiquette of Confucianism 
find expression in unconditional 
126 
ethical commands. 
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Taoism, Ranulf holds, is primarily concerned with the pursuit of 
personal advantage through the avoidance of the unclean, whereas the 
only 'sin' known to the Confucianist is failure to conform to the 
rules of pious deference appropriate to his position and the preservation 
of his good conscience as a gentleman. 
Japan, bereft of apowerful bourgeois classý also did not develop 
iti 127 any conspicuous disinterested zeal for pun ve justice. There existed 
no posthumous retaliation, and in place of a concern with ethical 
sin, great importance was accorded to strict prescriptions for the 
avoidance of ritual polldtion. 
Such an interpretation of the role of ritual impurity is most 
interesting in the light of Ranulf's earlier discussion of this matter. 
As can be seen from his dismissal of the expansion of the activities 
t'. 11ought to entail pollution as an explanation of the growth in community 
involvement in punishing criminals in ancient Athens,, what he refers 
to as superstitious beliefs in the dangers of pollution are relegated 
to the status of mere epiphenomena. In Pareto's phraseology they are 
derivations, fanciful embellishments woven to justify basic emotional 
predispositions. Ranulf does feel, however, that the imagination does 
not have complete free-play in constructing such rationalizations, but 
is guided by the zultural heritage in which it can rummage for such 0 
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excuees. 
Yet Ranulf is quite prepared to appeal to such beliefs in an 
attempt to exclude evidence which suggests the presence of moral ZZ) 
indignation in situations unfavourable to his case. This is particulary 
evidento in his treatment of primitive societies and 
the evidence 
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of ethnolo&7. Here evidence of communal social sanctions applied to 
remove the source of pollution from an individual or group are 
interpreted as expressing genuine egoistic fear on the part of those 
who carry them into effect, rather than any disinterested desire to see 
others suffer as a result of their misdeeds. The evidence which he 
adduces in support of this interpretation is worth some consideration. 
His first step is to claim that "there is generally in 
primitive societies no organized punishment for such acts as murder and 
theft, but only for crimes which are considered to be sacrilegiousq 
such as sorcery or breach of sexual taboo ". 
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In such cases 
"It is expected that... disasters will primarily overtake those who 
are guilty of having violated the taboo but if this does not happen, 
the entire people will feel threatened, and men will substitute 
themselves for the supernatural powers in carrying out the expected 
punishment, hoping thus to avert disaster". 
IN 
Hence, no fear of 
contagious pollution should matched by no community action against 
offenders. 
The next step in his argument is to note that in primitive 
societies misfortune is regarded as proof of guilt and consequently 
deserved. Furthermoreg no distinction is made between intentional 
a-nd unintentional guilt -" the doer suffers". And the divine powers 
themselves may ensnare men into sin. The explanation that this is 
attributable to the wish to avoid any imputation of impious criticism 
of the supernatural powersq which Ranulf advances in defence of his 
case, is incompatible with his earlier argument in which the absence 
of the disinterested tendency 
to inflict punishment in Euripides is 
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deduced from his rejection of such beliefs or criticism of those 
I-N 
deities depicted as indulging in such practices. He does, howeverg 
provide evidence that such community action involves passive and 
sad withdrawal from interaction rather than the aggressive persecution 
of culprits. 
We come now to consider two cases where moral indignation, once 
absent, later developed in response to specific social changes. 
Consider first the case of the Israelites, a culture 
which, unlike those considered in the cases of India ar China was la-gely, 
following the foundation of the kingdom, the product of an "oppressed 
and exploited" class. 
1,31 
Consequently it displayed marked symptons 
of moral indignation absent from an earlier period when there were 
no class divisions amongst the Israelites. Note that here there 
is no emphasis upon the middle, albeit lower-middle, class as the 
bearer of moral indignation, but a simpler division between a 
dominant and subordinate class, with the latter class displaying the 
tendency in question. 
Before their political and social degradation under the royal 
houses of Israel and Judah the religious beliefs and social practices 
of the Israelites concerning immorality paralleled those of the Homeric 
Greeks. With the growth of class divisions a new attitude towards 
the sins of others emerged in a process described by Pederson as 
the supercession of the principle of restoration by that of retaliation. 
The latter 
does not place the point of gravity in the offended 
and his claim to have a breach healed. 
The point 
of gravity lies outside or, rather, above the parties 
in a power maintaining justice for its own sake. 
Every action which deviates from the right must 
be balanced; it is just as necessary for the sake 
of justice that hewho commits injustice should suffer 
a loss, as thaý he who suffers an unjust loss should receive 
satisfaction. 
I 
-" 
2 
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There is, then, a new insistence that the sinner suffersq whether or 
not it does any good to the wronged. It is, as Pedersen remarks, 
a kind of negative restoration for the injured. The 
offender has lessened the other, and now himeelf is 
to be made just as small. Instead of the positive 
object of the old law, i. e. that the righteous is 
to be made whole, stress is laid on the opp. ite, 
i. e. that the unright-eous is to be broken-M 
Under these new conditions, as Ranulf points out, Yahweh was 
seen as visiting suffering upon men not merely as retribution, 
but also in a quite groundless fashion or simply for the 
glorification of his own majesty. But the imposition of unmerited 
misfortune is also perpetrated by the old god of war with the 
inconstant heart of the earlier epoch. Similarly it was a trait 
common to the gods of Homeric Greece as well as fifth century Athens. 
What Ranulf needs to establish but fails to consider is whether there 
was a change in attitude towards such activity in Israel similar 
to that encountered amongst the Greeks. In other beliefs, however, 
parallel changes to those traced in The ýealousy of the Gods did 
occur, with God becoming the neutral guardian of justice and the 
extension of the dangers of pollution, which came to adhere to moral 
offences as well as ritual faults. 
reflection in the jealousy of God. 
And the envy of the people found 
In 'Neber's words "The pride 
and arrogance and the boasting of their own power, in which kings and 
wqrriors indulged, was an abomination and the sin above all others to 
the god of those plebians who were under the spiritual guardianship 
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of the teachers of the torah and of the prophetic circles". 
The final c? se considered by Ranulf is the emergence of the 
135 
disinterested tendency to inflict punishment , ýiithin 
Russia. 
During the first decade of Bolshevist administration this tendency 
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was noticeably absent. Barring political offences, crime was considered 
the outcome of faulty social organization and bad environment, with the 
criminal being regarded not as wicked, but as unfortunate, suffering 
from a sickness which needed to be remedied. Sentences were short, 
with automatic suspension of those less than one year, and no 
stigma hindered the readmission of criminals into the community. 
Corporal punishment of cmiminals was condemned, as was its use by 
parents and teachers. There was no punishment for incest or 
homosexuality. Abortion was legal, and there was no public disapproval 
of the use or advocacy of contraceptives. Sexual intercourse was 
regarded as a matter of personal choice, taken within a climate of 
general permissiveness. 
After this ini-bal period, however, puritanical restrictions 
on the form and freedom of sexual relations began to emerge. 
Public opinion is said increasingly to emphasize the 
importance of stability of marital relationships. At 
least in the Communist Party and among the Consomols, 
sexual promiscuityq like all forms of self-indulgence, 
has come to be definitely thought contrary to communist 
ethics, on the grounds that it is a frequent cause of 
disease, that it impairs the productivity of labour 
and that it is disturbing to accurate judgement and 
inimical to intellectual acquisition and scientific: 
discovery, besides freguently involving cruelty to 
individual sufferers. 156- 
Concerning the consumption of alcohol and tobacco, temper--ýnce, 
and even complete abstinence, is enjoined; while lavish expenditure 
is decried. Homosexuality and abortion were made punishable offences. 
Divorce was made subject to more stringent regulations. 
Given the general tenor or Ranulf's argument, one might, as 
he admitsq expect such a leaning towards moral indignation to 
be more likely to arise 
from the general misery endured in the fi-st . 7ears 
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of the revolution, rather than in the subsequent period of economic 
improvement. "Furthermore, at the time when the disinterested tendency 
to inflict punishment wqs conspicuously absent there was for some 
years a class of small bourgeoisie in Russia, and now, after this class 
of Nepmen has been entirely suppressed, the tendency in question is 
emergingit. 
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Where, then, does it spring from? 
In answer to this question, Ranulf locates the source of moral 
indignation in the conditions of life of the dominant social class in 
the Soviet Union, conditions which imbue them with the mentality 
elsewI-Lere observed in the petty bourgeoisie. The dominant class in 
question he identifies with the membership of the Communist Party. 
In general, they enjoyed some extra privileges, although their 
prosperity was not striking. Members were subJectto' severe surveillance 
; ýnd control. Expulsion was a constant threat to those who failed 
to live up to the exacting standards demanded of them including 
those relating to asceticism. As with the conditions experienced by 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie, these pressures impelled those 
subject to them to be industrious and self-restrained. 
Yet the question remains as to why the expected tendency did not 
emerge at an earlier date. Ranulf Is conclusion, which introduces one 
final amendment to his theory, is that this can be accounted for by 
the attitude of indifference and tolerance towards sin -and crime 
produced by the social disturbances arising out of wars and 
revolutions. Under such circumstances the association of moral 
indignation with the presence of a petty bourgeois milieu may be 
suppressed, except in the case of revolutions conducted by and for 
the lower middle class. 
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VI. Reactions to Ranulf 
The above discussion, as indicated at the outset, has been 
primarily intended to clarify Ranulf's theory and the concepts 
employed in its construction, a task made necessary by its complexity, 
as well as by the vagueness with which it is expressed and the 
contradictions it encompasses. Given these features, it is not, 
perhaps, surprising that subsequent commentators have misunderstood 
and misrepresented various aspects of his work, although th6ir slips 
appear on occasion to be more the result of a lack of familiarity with 
the texts than purely as the consequence of Ranulf's ambiguity. This 
has occurred even amongst those writers who have sought recognition for 
his work. 
To illustrate this point, Ne may turn first to the work of 
Robert Merton. Merton, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
I recommends Mora-LIndignation and Middle Class Psychology as the locus 
classicus in the field, as well as referring his readers to The 
Jealousy of the Gods. Yet Ranulf does not, as Merton contends, make 
it "abundantly plain" that "his own work derives, in direct sociological 
descent, from the fundamental theory about the workings of moral 
1 138 indignation advanced... by Emile Durkheim". On the contrary, despite 
praising the methods advocated by Durkheim, Ranulf ignores Durkheim's 
explicit treatment of variations in punitiveness and moral outrage. 
Indeed, on certain key points their theories stand in direct 
opposition to one anotherg as -will become evident when -ne come to 
consider Durkheim's work in this area. 
Other Nritersg equally fulsome in their praise of Ranulf, have 
nevertheless ignored the 
importance attributed by him to his dichotomy 
of the middle class 
into an upper and a lower bouTgeoisie, with the 
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former being free of the moral indignation character istic of the latter. 0 
Duster, for example, in his summary of Moral Indignaticn and Middle 
Class Psycholo 
, speaks of an undifferentiated "middle class" as the 
bearer of the disinterested tendency to inflict punishmentg and ignores 
such internal divisions within the bourgeoisie in his subsequent 
elaboration of Ranulf's thesis in relation to changing attitudes 
towards drug abuse. 
139 Froan in Fear of Freedom, cites the same work 
by Ranulf as "an important contribution to the thesis that moral 
indignation is a trqit typical of the middle class, especially the 
lower middle class". 
140 The emphasis placed upon the lower middle 
vlass is clearly in accord with Ranulf, but the suggestion that it 
merely exhibits in exagger-nted form qualities common to the middle C) 
class as a whole, is dubious. 
Paul Rock, in his account of Ranulf's work, similarly neglects 
his distinction between the upper and lower middle class. 
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Furthermore, Rock's discussion of the "disinterested" nature of the 
tendency to inflict punishment takes place in the context of his 
treatment of how "the coercive face of power is masked or partially 
replaced by a set of legitimations which exact a more or less willing 
compliance from the ruled". 
142 Claims to disinterestedness, as well 4 
as to moral superiority and representativeness, are represented as the 
principal means employed in industrial societies to justify what are 
in reality sectional interests and to disarm opposition. "Disinterestedness" 
becomes a quality of ideological gambits attempting, to justify an 
activity, and not at all of the activity itself. But in Ranulf's 
hands, "disinterestedness" is applied to denote those who desire to 
see offenders punished even 
though they themselves are not the vic tims 
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of the offence, nor stand to gain income from any penalties inflicted 
upon offenders. Claims to disinterestedness are not the criteria 
to be employed in designating behaviour by this term. 
Such treatment of the disinterested nature of moral indi, -ýtnation 
as is presented in the works of Gusfield and Ranulf, is criticised 
by Stanley Cohen on the grounds that their distinction between 
interested and disinterested reactions to deviance is not viable. 
This attack, howeverg resolves itself into a rather unprofitable 
terminological quibble about the "much too narrow a conception of 
interest and threat"9143 and does not challenge the possibility of 
distinguishing between the two tendencies, nor the explanatory value 
of such classification in the works of Gusfield or Ranulf. It might 
be equally well argued that to employ too broad a conception of 
"interests" and "interestedness", renders these terms somewhat valueless, 
with people invariably -being discovered to be defending or advancing 
their interests by dint of definition. 
References to The Jealousy of the Gods are somewhat less 
frequently encountered. Dodds, whose work on the irrational aspect of 
Greek culture we have already had reason to mention, refers to this 
work Nhen cites "the elaborate but monomaniac book of Ranulf" as an 
example of the interpretation of divine jealousy as a reflection of 
the resentment felt by the unsuccessful towards the eminent. 
144 
Further reference to The 
Jealousy of the Gods can be found in Sorokin's 
study of changes in morality and the criminal lawq where he commends 
Ranulf Is analysis of the social background and content of the Greek 
I iterary sourcesq but questions his explanatory hypothesis. 
145 
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Sorokin dismisses the importance which Ranulf attaches to the role of 
envy "because this theory is purely psychological, it does not explain 
why jealousy and envy appeared just in the sixth and f if th centuries". 146 
Yet this is not true, for Ranulf relates the source of envy and 
belief in the jealousy of the gods to the changing social structure of 
Greek society, and not to the emotions of individuals isolated from 
their social context. 
More sympathetic treatment of The Jealousy of the Gods can be 
found in Joan Rockwell's investigation of the use of literary sources 
in sociological research. 
147 In Fact in Fiction she takes up and 
elaborates Ranulf's reference to the popular nature of Greek drama, 
and discusses the important religious and moral role it occupied in 
Athenian life. In support, for example, of the argument that the plays 
were composed with the Athenian public at larc-e in view, rather than Z) 
an esoteric minority, she notes the irfluence oil audiences upon the 
distribution of awards to playwrights. Furthermore: 
The tilea. tre itself was... paid for from the public funds... 
a subsidy of two obols was paid to the poorer citizens 
from a special fundy the Itheoric fund', said to have 
been established by Pericles in the fifth century. Any 
attempt to use this fund for any other purpose, even in 
time of warg met furious resistance: such was the 
importance of the theatre to the city... There seems to 
have been something approaching 100 per cent attendf--nce, 
including women and children: a surviving fragment 
complains that the Furies in the Eumenides of Aeschylus 
were so horrific in appearance that women miscarried 
and children were frightened into fits... And the 
experience of the drama was not confined to the cities: 
after three days of playing at the city fe-stivals plays 
were taken on a tour of the provinces. 
T'; Z5 
Some commentatorsq such as Harold Lasswell, have questioned 
the relevance of Ranulf's theory to contemporary conditions. In his 
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preface to the 1964 edition of Moral Indignation and Middle Class 
Psychology 
,q 
Lasswell suggests that moral indignation is "slovily 
vanishing as a source oil support for public order". 149 A less 
sanguine view is offered in the review of Ylral Indignation, by 
Manfred Rehbinder who, citing German penal policy and attitudes 
towards it, dismisses Lasswell's opinion on this point as utopian. 
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No attempt has been made to make this account exhaustive, the 
works referred to above having been chosen partly to illustrate 
the diverse range of reactions-b Ranulf's theory and to coA-. rect some 
errors in its interpretation. Perhaps the most generous of these 
occurs when Scott attributes to Ranulf's theory a refinement from 
which it would doubtless benefit, but does not possess. Speaking 
of Ranulf's "fascinating theory of moral posture", with its 
"truly Weberian spread of comparative evidence", Scott claims that: 
"Ranulf argues that the lower middle classes are morally repressive 
toward others, pursuing a policy of 'disinterested punishment' which 
offers them no direct gain, because their precarious status permits 
them no chance to indulge in the 'institutionalized evasicns' of 
4 
institutionalized norms available to those of secure status, that is, 
the aristocrats and the disreputable poor". 
1 ý, 
Such an explanation of diffences in moral righteousness accords 
well with Scott's own theory of moral commitment, for "the disreputable 
poor have no status to lose and enjoy their vice because its 
consequences are not punishing to them; and theýmiddle classest for 
whom the consequences of vice would be status-degrading and therefore 
it 
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punishing, remain indignantq sanctimoniousq and committedr. 
It also helps to make sense of the different moral outlooks of the 
middle and lower classes 
in Puritan Eno-land touched upon above. C) 
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It is not, holmeverg accurate to credit Ranulf ,, vith having set forth 
such an interpretation of his findings. 
In his conclusion to Internalization of NoEE. D Scott, in 
touching upon the sources of variatibns in what he refers to as the 
"propensit. -T to sanction'19 suggests that: "Ranulf5'vievjs about the deter- CD 
minants o-, -^ the 'disinterested tendency to inflict punishment' are 
probahly not enti-. Eýy zatisfactory to present-day social scientistsq 
but his question remains an interesting and pre-eminently 
socio! o--rical one". 
153 Just ho,, -i satisfac., ý: D tory it proves to be in 
cc7n-, -=-scn with the ýlork of other socioloc7ists in this area is the 
task addressed in the next clinapter. 
0 
NOTES 
, 
I. ý: r 
-erton 
(1ý68)9 pp. 209-210, n-40 
2. Dust--r (1970)9 P-viii 
3. Ranulf (1964)9 P-1 
4. Ibid. 9 P-11 
) 
4, Ibid., p. 12, n.. 1 
6. Quoted in Ranulf (1964), p. 12 
7. Quo-ted in Ranulf (1964)9 P-13 
f Ranul. (1964)9 P-13f 
C). Ibid. 9 pp- 15 and 
32 
1 0. Ibid-9 p-14 
11. Ibid-9 pp. 18-20 
12. Ibid., p. 18 
13- Tb id -9 p. 20 
14. Ibid-9 -j. 16 
15- Ibid., pp. 59-60 
1ý1'. Ranulf (1964), p-14f 
17. Ibid. 9 p. 18f 
18. Ibid. 9 p. 
21 
19. Ibid., p. 23fo 
20. ibid. 9 p. 26 
21. Ibid-liop. 24ff 
22. Ibid., P-30 
23- ! 'oid-9 P. 198 
21r, Ibid., p. 8 
25. 
26. 
27. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34s 
35. 
76. 
37. 
38* 
79, 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44s 
', 5. 
46. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
S4. 
55. 
56. 
To 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
0?. 
09. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
Cf. ', 7eber (1965), particularly chapters 6 and 7 Ranulf (1064), P-40 
Ibid., p. 96 
Ibid., p-16f 
Ibid. 9 pp. 27-29 'Neber (1958), p-65 
The conception of class and status intended here is that developed 
by '. ', eber, although Ranulf is in practice rather insensi t Ave to 
the comýplexities of class thus conceived. 
Ranulf (1964), P-46 
Ibid. 9 P-37 Ibid. 9 pp. 35-36 Collins (1975), pp. 69ff 
See the discussion of this issue in Parkin (1ý72), pp. 79ff 
Ranulf (11)64) P-40 
Ibid. 9 p- 157' Ibid., pp. 67-68 
ibid. 9 P-76 
'q C 77- -1 Ranulf ( IýJ-/ 934) 
Ibiý. q vol. 1, p. 106 The term "Predatory crime" is applied by 'rlaser to those acts 
that "we rmost commonly thing of as crime. They are acts in 
-h4ch a person delibe-ratel-i- tal-es or injures somecne elQgits v 17) 71, on 11-victi-nless person o- zer (,. 'Tlaser, 1, 
or imes" , see -)c- la --- 196) 
'iestermarck (1906) See for further discussion of this -!: ork Chapter 
be1o,,, v 
7 o --ýi ý-'- as 70 P- 15, 
3roT,, ýn 
Calhoun ', 1972), p-6 
ýf. I-L- --sc, ýzssion of t. e =Lminal 
ILa-., v C 
Rock (1973), P-134 
Bonner and Smith (107c)), vol. 2, p. 39 
i7cid., vo'-. 2, pp. 40-41 
Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 41-42 
Tod. (1964)9 P-5 
TbL-'. 9 
Hoebel (1968), PP- P-33-274 
Ru s ch e and ý"4--chhei-mer (1.939)9 
Ferguson (1964), P. 349 
Bonner and Edmith 
(107"ý, 
vol. 2, p. 30ý1 
Hibbert, (10,63), p. 80 
SDiro and D'Andrade (1958), 
Dodds 
A, 956)9 p. 36 
-,,, l-, oted 
b-, T Dodds (19,56)9 P-44 
(1973)9 pp. 63ff 
? IT 
voe-ber 
(1965)9 Ps 85 
Davis (1949), P-176 
": ýchoeck (1969) pp. 12-13 
Runciri-, an (1972ý9 p-10 
, "'ciý-Idner ý1967)9 P- 43 IZ ý -0 Ibid. , pp. 55 -1- 
Russell and Russell (1961), p. 
J- ' .x ibb s q, 
6 6) 
107 
73. Bensman and Vidich (1971), Relative decline in the economic sphere, they argue, gives rise to status defensiveness. This f finds expression in ernphasisinc, a ne, vly discovered superiority of breeding, taste, dress and morality. (Ibid., pp. 68ff) 74. Gouldner (1967), P-50 
15. Scheler (1961), This work is discussed in more detail in Cha 
7 
pter 2 below. 
76. Ranulf (1964), pp. 199Lf 
77- Gusfield (1966), 
7'-- Ranulf, (1964), p- 76 
79- Ehrenberg i . 
(195") 
ýO. Quoted in Ehrenbero- (1951), P- 181 ý1. Tod (1964)9 P-15 
82. Ehrenberg ý1951), P-149 83- Ibi-d. 9 p. 2 84- Ibid. 9 ý-373 `5- Ranulf 1939 
? 6. Ranulf (1964ý, P-54 
87. On this point, see Cole (1955), pp. 78ff 88. Tod (1964)9 P- L Cf. Ehrenberg (1`/151)q P. '4 Q0 ý14 Ehrenberg (1951), p. 92 
90. Ibid., p. 89 
91. -Hill 
(1964)9 PP- 11/1-132 
92. Similar bourgeois resentment recurs in the Reform! ýý-tuionq -,,, ihere: 
"Idleness, unproductive consumption, is the count against 
monks, retainers and beggears alike". (Ibid. 9 p. 273) C, 93. Ibid-9 pp. 133-134 
94. Ibid. 9 p. 235 95- Ibid. 9 P-134 96. Ibid-9 p. 274 
97. Ranu"Lf (1964)9 P-76 
98.1H -L 11 ( 19 64 p. -1,22 
I 99. Ibld-9 -, -,, 185 
100. Ibid. 9 P-152 
101. ! bid., pp. 145"- See also Hill (1967)9 P-89f 
102. Hill (1-964), po-2251 
1,03 . 7': ) i -q .9 -p. 249 
104. Ranulf (1964)9 P-131 
105. Ibi-J-9 -o-94 
106. On one issueg that of mendacity, the findings presented by 
thaat the -Puritans ,, iere hypocrites. idnen it a nu 11 -, -r' do suggest 7alse reports. There isihowevery no same to spreading t 
evidence -cresented on Ro, 7alist practices to enable co=arison- 
I- tuation it seems ýjuite likely that they too . riven the war sit 
, ýiould be inclined to embellish the truth and invent news 
favoura`ýle to their cause while at the same time denouncing f 
the practice of spreading false propaganda. 
197. For a discussion of such egocentric 
"punctuation" of social 
__ .0 Ct4 IjVatz7awick, etj al. (1967), PP-54--i- intera . on, see 
108. , R! a nuIf ý1964)9 P-91f 
i 11'1ý? "Tp. 
215 
-) Jordan 
(! 959)9 
I". id-9 P-152 
Ibid-9 p. 201 
112. Ibid-9 p-197 
113- Ibid-9 P. 198f 
108 
114. Jordan (195"), p. 332 
115. Ibid. q P-344 110. Ranulf 0964), pp. ý16ff 
117. Ibid. 9 Pp-101ff 118. Ibid. 9 pp. 145ff 119. Gronbech (1931). 
120. 'O'estermarck (1906), vol. 1, P-176 
121. Ib i "iý 177 
122. Ranulf 1,064), pp. 147ff 
123. Westermarck (1906), vol. 1, P-77 
124. Ibid. 9 P-78 
125- Ranulf, (1964), pp. 152ff 
126. Ibid. 9 pp. 155ff 
127- Ib*d. 9 p. 1D-8-, 
128.7.11-is, at least, is his position in The Jealousy of the '-Tods 
one somewhat at odds with his atta U cks on 'he poverty of appeals 
to cultural loans and historical influence to explain social 
facts in ý., Ioral Indignation. 
129. Ranulf (10.64), p. 160 
130- Ibid. 9 p-161 
131- Ibid., P-174 
132. Pederson 0926), pp. 392-393 
133- Ibid-9 P-395 
134. Quoted in Ranulf (1964), P-184 
135- Ranulf (1964), pp. 186ff 
1 -z6. ib-Ld. 9 P. 189 
137. Tbids . 192 
13.1 ,. -e-ton' 
ý1968)9 
p-111, i6, n. 105 
139. Duster(1970)9 PP- viii-ix 
140* Fromm (1960), p. 82 
141. Rock (1973), p. 148 
142. Ibid. 9 p-144 
143. Colhen (1972)9 P-197 
144. Dodds (1956)9 p. 62, n. 408 
145- Sorokin (1937)9 vol, 2, P-490 n-7 
1 -, ý- 6. -Ibid. 9 p., 
618, n-70, 
147. Rock-,, ýell (1974)9 pp. 48 and 142 -143 
148. Ibid-9 P-55 
149. Pref--mce to Ranulf (1964)9 by H. D. Lasswell, p-xiii- 
See also the comments on Ranulff by Salvador Ginerg who 
points to the possible weakening of moral indignation 
amongst the lov,, er middle class as the result of their 
part icipa tion i, -I. a general rise in st, 9ndards of living. 
(Giner, 19729 P-157) 
1DU. Iftehbinder 
(1065)9 C'f. the review by SJLmon (1965-1966) 
151- Scott ý1971)9 p. 112, n. 10 
jD2. Ibid. 9 pp. 111-112 4 153- Ib-A-d. 9 p. 216 
log 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORAL INDIGNATION 
I The Origin and development of moral ideas 
Ranulf was not, of course, the first to seek to locate the origin 
of moral ideas in shared emotions, nor the first to link their 
development with social change. Both themes can be found in earlier 
works, some of which Ranulf was acquainted , -ith, such as Edward 
`-Vestermarck's exlJoration of the nature and causes of moral indignation. 
1 
Nestermarck's point of departure is that acts are not good or bad 
in themselves, but only in relation to the public response they elicit. 
Such an understanding that deviance is not a quality inherent in an 
action, but one conferred upon it by others, is an observation to be 
frequently encountered in much contemporary sociological reflection 
on the matter. 
2 
Yet the adopti on of such relativistic view of morality 
is not at all common, the usual tendency of groups being to objectify 
their moral standards into absolute verities. This tendency Westermarck 
attributes in part to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral 
consciousness, particularly prominent in primitive societies, and in 
part to the centrality and import! ýnce assumed by morality in the 
life of the "moral enthusiast". 
3 The recognition and acceptance of 
moral relativism is clearly Ioreign to the "moral enthusiast" portrayed 
by Ranulf, although he identifies such immunity to relativism with 
particular positions within the class structure, and does not direct his 
attention to the influence of a widespread and unchallenged concensus 
4 
as the basis for moral absolutism. 
For Westermarckg the moral emotions are of two kinds: moral 
disapprovalg or indignation, and moral approval. Both are "retributive" 
110 
ill 
emotions: moral indignation forming a sub-species of resentment, of an 
agggr e EEive attitude of mind towards a cause of suffering. Such resentment 
can also manifest itself in non-moral forms, in straightforward anger 
or calculating revenge. Moral resentment, on the other hand, expresses 
itself in the practice of punishment. By punishment 'Westermarck 
means not "every suffering inflicted upon an offender in consequence 
of his offence, but only such suffering as is inflicted upon him in 
a definite way by, or in the name of, the society of which he is a 
5 permanent or temporary member". 
But what lies behind such a disinterested public concern to condemn 
i. mmorality and to punish wrongdoing? First, Westermarck claims, there 
is the disinterested resentment felt on account of an injury inflicted 
upon a person with whom we sympathize and in whose cause we take a 
kindly interest. Second, moral indignation is contagious: punishment or 
expressions of moral condemnation are likely to arouse and instil 
similar emotions in others towards their object. This is particulaf; y 
important in the case of "disinterested antipathies" tow-rds those whose 
offence resides in their differing tastes, habits and opinions: r) 
71hen a certain act, though harmless by itself (apart 
from the painful impression it makes upon the spectator), 
fills us with disgust or horror, we may feel no less 
inclined to inflict harm upon the agent, than if he had 
committed an offence against person, property, or good 
name. And here, again, our resentment is sympathetically 
increased by our observing a similar disgust in others. 
We are easily agfected by the aversions and likings of 
our neighbours. 
Societyq howeverg does not only diffuse moral sentiments - 
it can also be said to havecreated them. 
It is this social origin, 
Westermarck claimsq which -give moral sentiments characteristics which 
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distinguish them from opinions based upon the non-moral retributive 
emotions. Westermarck discusses three such distinguishing characteristics. 
The fi-rst of these is disinterestedness: there is the implied admission 
on the pFrt of the person passing judgement that the rule is equally 
binding upon himself, or would be if he were to find himself in the 
same circumstances. The second c, haracteristic of moral judgements 
is a claim to impartiality: moral praise or condemnation is claimed 
to be roused purely by the act in question without referencetO the 
particular relationship between the judge and the actor in question. 
Lastly, moral judgements have an air of generality, they are associated 
with a feeling that they are, or should be, shared by others. 
The source of these characteristics "lies in the fact that 
society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness; that the first 
moral judgements expressed, not the private emotions of imlated 
individuals, but emotions which were felt by the society at large; the 
tribal custom was the earliest rule of duty". 
7 Public indignation 
at the infringement of custom, is, then, the origin or moral disapproval. 
Not isolated individual Consciencesq but public codes and sanctions 
give rise to morality. With the weakening of consensus individual 
challenges to traditional morality arise, but these are couched in the 
language of morality, often seeking to demonstrate that rules and rulers 
are not as disinterested or impartial as they purport to be. Futhermore: 
Though, perhapsg persecuted by his own people as an 
outcast, the moral dissenter does not regard himself 
as the advocate of a mere personal opinion. Even when 
standing alone, he feels that his conviction is shared 
at least by an ideal society, by all those who see the 
matter as clearly as does himeelf, and who are animated 
with eq8ally wide sympathies, an equally broad sense of 
j-istice. 
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Thus the moral sentiments retain their air of generality, 
their supra-individual quality in the consciousness of those experiencing 
them. While seemingly out of step, such moral dissenters are marching 
to the sound of a more dis-tant drum,,. to the call of a different 
reference group. 
9 
Non-conformists, held by Merton to be those led into 
deviance through moral dissent, clearly differ from such deviants as 
most criminals. In contrast to the latter they do not seek to hide their 
departures from the norm, but proclaim them. Furthermore, they challenge 
the legitimacy of rejected norms, going far beyond the expedient 
rule-breaking of most crimes, and seek to replace them with their own. 
Such conformity is lar, ý-ely disinterested, with nonconformists being 
ready to sac-rifice their own immediate comfort or advantage for the 
sake of principle. Merton, like Westermarck, sees in such moral dissent 
an air of generality in that, unlike much crime, there is the prospect, 
however remote, of obtaining the assent of others. "His nonconformity 
is not a private dereliction but a thrust towards a new morality (or 
a restoration of an old and almost forgotten m0rality)11010 
Despite many similarities -which exist between the moral ideas 
of mankind, radical differences can also be encountered. "A mode of 
conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is among another 
people viewed with indifference or regarded as prqisevvorthy or enjoined 
as a dutyll,, 
11 How does 'Yestermarck - who expresses himself discontent 
-,, iith mere analysis, seeing in the attempt "to find an answer to the 
question, Why? - fhe ultimate aim of all scientific research" 
12 
- account for these variations? 
Differences between groups in terms of 
their prosperity and differing means of securing their livelihood account 
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for some differences in moral values. For example, in discussing the 
influence of economic factors in societies where infanticide is permitted 
or even enjoined by customg Westermarck notes: "Urgent want is frequently 
represented by our authorities as the main cause of infanticide; and their 
statements are corroborated by the conspicuous prevalence of this custom 
among the poor tribes and in islands-whose inhabit ants. are confined to 
a narrow terrritory with limited resourceslt,, 
13 The long and arduous 
treks associated with the economic activities of some tribes is also 
cited as a contributory factor. Such an interpretationvas also voiced 
by Westermarck's contemporary, Hobhouse, who adds that in primitive 
societies, infanticide, being an act committed within the family circle, 
would not necessaiýly attract attention from any authority outside the 
family group. 
14 
Westermarck also claims that hardship plays a role in the 
acceptance of practices such as the abandonment of the aged and 
cannibalism, while economic conditions have also influenced moral ideas 
in such areas as attitudes towards labour and personal cleanliness. 
Together with such economic factors, West ermarc,,, -.. groups, under the title 
of "external conditions", a demographic factor: "the form of marriage and 
the opinions concerning it have been largely determined by such a factor 
as the numerical proportion between the sexes". 
15 
Such external circumstances are, however, not the most important 
force at work in shaping morality as a whole. While prepared to allow 
that they contribute to shaping some beliefs more than others, and in 
a few exercise a dominant 
influence, 'Restermarck is quite clear in 
attributing the dominant role 
to what he refers to as influences of a 
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"psychical" origin. 
Several such psychical factors can be found in his work. First, 
there are variations in beliefs concerning the supernatural consequences 
of action, in ideas about the interference of human spirits in human 
affairs and the operation of magical forces. Second, there is the C) 
development of intellectual enlightenment to be seen in the growth of 
more penetrating reflection. The development of such intellechial CD 
penetration inevitably leads, Westermarck holds, to two results: there 
is an increase in the importance attributed to subjective motives and 
intentions in the allocation of responsibility for offences; and there 
is a decline in penalizing victimless offences. 
Some degree of reflection -easily leads to the notion that 
sentimental antipathies are no sufficient ground for 
interfering with other invidviduals' liberty of action 
either by punishing them or by subjecting them to mental 
censure, provided of course that they do not in an indelicate 
manner shock their neighbours' feelings. Hence many 
persons have recourseto utilitarian pretexts to support 
moral opinions or legal enactments which have originated 
in mere aversions; thus making futile attempts to reconcile 
old ideas with the requirements of a moFgl consciousness 
which is duly influenced by rEffection . 
No,, jyg Westermarck's remarks on the resort to utilitarian 
4 
arguments to defend disinterested antipathies in a climate which has 
grown hostile to their moral condemnation is interesting and partly 
borne out by the recent study by Davias of shifting reactions to 
premissivesness, 
17 
as well as coinciding with Ranulf's comments on the 
social origins of the appeal to deterrence as a justific2tion for 
punishment. But Iffestermarck's resort to the growth of 
intellectual 
insight as an explanation of changes in the allocation of responsibility 
and the growth of individual 
liberty is, as it stands, of little value. 
- refer to greater It remainsq in his hands, 
too ambiguous - does it 
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intellp, ctual ability or to growth in a rational stance towards the world 
in general in contrast to the passive acceptance of traditional practices 
or to to a greater willingness to check the direct implementation of 
emotional responses by "the pauser reasonli, 
18 Resort to variations in 
intellectual penetration as an explanatory principle is sociologically 
sterile without careful definition of this factor independently of the 
phenomena it is invoked to explain, together with an outline of the 
socio-cultural conditions conducive to the employment of such reflection. 
This 'Nestermarck does not provide. 
The third psychical factor is the expansion of the sentiment of 
altruism. Altruism is held to lie behind the broadening circle of persons 
within which the infliction of injuries is prohibitedg from the tribe 
to the nation andq to a certain degree, even beyond. At first sight, 
this might appear as sociologically unprofitable in accounting for 
variations in morality between groups as Westermarck's references to the 
growth of intellectual insight. In his chapter on the origin and 
development of the altruistic sentiment, however, Westermarck clos--ly 
links the development of altruism to changes in social structure. 
The intensity of social affection depends, Westermarck believes, 
upon the coherence and size of the social group. This is partly determined 
by local proximity and p-opulation density, both heavily dependent upon 
economic conditions. For example, 
a pastoral community is never large, and, though 
cohesive so long as it exists, it is liable to 
break up into sections. The reason for-his is 
that a certain spot can pasture only a limited 
stock of cattle... The case is different with 
people subsisting on agriculture. A certain piece 
of land can support a much larger number of persons 
when it is cultivated than when it consists of merely 
pasture ground... It is a kind of property which, unlike 
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cattle, is immovable; hence even where individual 
ownership ixi land prevaiýý, the heirs of an estý: ite have to remain together. 
Prom such economic roots of thesize and ties of social groups, 
Westermarck passes on to a consideration of familialties and beliefs 
in common descent. 'When unsupported by local proximity and frequent 
communication, however, these are seen as losing much of their strength. 
Similarly, a sense of social unity and subsequent willingness to protect 
the rights of those encompassed by such a feeling, may be reinforced 
by common worship; although religious unity unrelated to, and 
building upon, other ties, is regarded as ineffective in shaping such 
sentiments. 
Turning to a consideration of brogder unity on a national scale, 
Westermarck concludes that whether the state is successful, as a result 
of its hostility to separatism, in breaking down local, clan, and tribal 
loyalties and thus clearing the path for the emergence of a wider unity, 
depends upon its strength and justice in protecting its members. Like 
increasing political coherence within, hostility to communities outside 
the state increases solidarity - and hence mutual consideration - within 
it. But nationalism and ethnocetricism, while strong, are themselves 
weakened by increasing intercourse which lessens divisive differences 
between groups. 
There is much that could be said about this eminently sociological 
analysis of the sources of social solidarity - the association of 
increasing interaction with the obliteration of differences and 
increasing social affection between previously hostile groups, for 
example, clearly only holds good under certain circumstances, such as 
the emergence of co-operation between them. Otherwise it may simply 
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provide occasion for the expression of hostility. 
20 
Turning to the question of the disinterested urge to chastise 
the wayvard, the notion that people are prepared to recognize the 
rights of those with whom they identify, and are readier to take offence 
at attacks upon those with whom they feel a sense of solidarity, is 
clearly most plausible, Conversely, it may be added that people are 
readier to condemn, and slower to aid, those with whom they feel 
no sense of community. 
21 
Chambliss and Seidman, for example, see in the transformation 
from an emphasis upon reconciliation to rule-enforcement in dispute 
settlement , -, hich takes place with growing social inequality and 
dif-ferentiation, a reflection of the dissolution of communal ties. 
22 
Sutherland and Cressey also emphazise that the social distance between 
the respective groups from which punishers and punished tend to be drawn 
is positively correlated with severity of punishment. 
23 
Although they share as a central aim the investigation of the 
social and psychological determinants of moral indignation, 
Westeýmarck differs from Ranulf in a number of respects. Westermarck, 
for example offers an extended discussion of the nature of moral 
indignation and punishment. The necessity for such clarificatory work 
wqs, as has been notedq sadly neglected by Ranulf. Furthermoreq 
I although both deal with variations in the intensity and targets of 
moral indignation in a wide variety of historical and cultural 
settings 9 Ranulf 
Is attention is throughout directed by the relevance of 
such variations to a number of interrelatead hypotheses. Westermarck, 
on the other hand, selects examples of variations in moral codes and 
lig 
their enforcement not according to their relevance for testing a CD 0 
Cgiven 
hypothesis, but to illustrate the range of ýde? s to be 
encountered 4, n six major -ar-ýas of conduct. The areas themselves 
a-e chosen not on the basis of theoretical relevance, but according 
to "! esterm. arck's assessmen': off their moral and -practical importance. 
Ivr ariations in mor. 2-1 ity that emerge in t1he course of this task are C) 
exýý! --ained in an ad hoc fashion, so that hJ-s theory outlined above 
I- U L. 41 sý--: )'-T a su=ar-, o' those factors which he cites most frequently 
in fcr-ý-, u: ating such- explanations. io atte-n-pt is =de to -'--, rmu-la+, e 
e CC)n-. 
'44--'. -L(: )ns under ývhich cne factor rather than another is likely to 
Cr- 4- te. ope--;. -ate or ý,; red 
F4nally, inso: c, ar as a tlneory oll the -growth of mor---, l 4 tion 
does e-erEe "Iesteer-rarck. 's it is ': )ased i. ýPon the influence off 
soc 4-al so! -_darity r? t'---er '. '---an class psycholo6ýy. To _f'ýmd intellectural 
-redecessors to Ranulf Nho not on!, -. - explored the same field, but also 
7ie must extend our enquiry advanced so'-utions -o--e in line ýifthll --is own, U- 
-zsche and Scheler. to encompass the ý. ýork of 
-r » -. -en' I-L RessentJr-. u 
In an appendix to -'lloral Indi, 5rantion, 
RP-nulf compares his own 
lax - work on moral Lndigna-,, -, ion --)--th t-hat. of '.. )che7-er on ressent--ment 
'He evident', -T sets little store on Scheler's in -f. '-, is area, basin, ý7 
-1 -1 his cc, ýýdemnation on re-goards as +. ct-- inaý--7, uacy of 
Scheller's method. This 4-s dismissed as yet another example -: )f ., ih----t 
he 
"IY as "the method of plausible guesses" - the refers to dleprec2tir- 
24 
elabora'. i---n of ex-olanations untested 'by adequate -4nves'Li_T-, -ntJL-n- 
'NT 
-levertheless, as 
Ranulf admits, a number of Scheler's ide-cs concerning 
0 
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the psychology and sociology of morality anticipate those which he 
advances to account for the development of moral indignation. 
Scheler took over the term ressentiment from the study of the 
genealogy of morals undertaken byNjýýtzsche. 
25 
He also incoroorated 
many of NietzsýýIiel. s ideas concerning the operation of ressentiment, 
although Scheler's Catholic faith made it impossi, -Ile for him to agree 
entirely with Nietzs--. --e who had seen Christianity as heavily imbued 
with ressentiment. 
26 
For Nietzsche the morality of the powerless - "slave morality"- 
is based upon continually making a virtue of necessity. The equation CD 
of timidity with humility, the elevation of obedience and patience into 
moral virtues, expresses the timorous subservience of the impotent 
unable to retaliate directly against those responsible for their 
condition. As Nietzsche expresses it in the Genealop, 7 of 'Morals: 
The inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the cowardice 
of which he has so much, his lingering at the door, his 
being ineluctably compelled to wait, here acquire 
flattering namesq such as "patience", and are even called 
for revenge is called virtue itself; his inability . 
unwillingness to revenge, perhaps even forgiveness ("for 
they know not what they do - we alone know what they do" ). 
27 
Men of ressentimentlintolerably miserable, employ morality 
to sour enjoyment of life by those happier than themselves and to sweeten 
their own impoverishment. 
These ideas form the starting point of Scheler's essay on 
ressentiment. R--ssentimentg for Scheler, is the emotional bitterness 
which arises from a certain sense of reelative deprivation, a bitterness 
,,, ihich shapes the sentiments 
in a specific manner. Deprivation or 
disadvantage relative to others which does not give rise to a sense of 
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injustice, does not fuel such rancour and hence does not lead to the 
adoption of those values which Scheler deals with as manifestations of 
the resentful personality. One of the preconditions to the embrgence 
o-f ressentiment occurs when a man is forced by others or by. circumstances 
to remain in a situation which he dislikes and feels to be incommesurate 
rith his self-evaluation. This alone, horever, is not sufficient. Not 
a2l such experiences of injustice find expression in res--! entirr. ent, 
for they may find an outlet through the expression of other hostile 
emotions and sentiments, such as revenge, envy, the impulse to detract, 
Schadenfreude, and malice. Ressentiment only arises when, as a result of 
impotence, inadequate expression is allowed to such aggre77sive feelings. 
Scheler also expresses the opinion the ressentiment will, not 
arise if a "moral self-conquest" takes place, such as in "genuine" 
forgiveness in place of revenge, although how genuine forgiveness is to 
be distinguished from the spurious variety so characteristic of 
-a 
ressentiment is left unclear. 
28 
A similarly vague distinction is drawn 
between true and false modesty. 
29 Cases are allocated to one class 
or the other on an intuitive basis, which for Scheler has the 
satisfying result of enabling him to damn the morality of his opponents as 
a cloak for ulterior and less laudahle motives while saving traditional 
Catholicism from similar accusations directed by Nietzsche against'. 
lie 
Chr is -11 tian deitY- 
Barring the expression of such hostile emotions touched upon 
above - revenge, ervy, malice and such, 
like - the resulting, 
tension can be alleviated by devaluing the distinctive qualities of those 
who are the source of dissatisfaction, thus undermining their position 
and reducing their stature-9 
through stressing the Virtues of characteristics 
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they do not possess or monopolize. 
hateful, and worthy of revenge. 
30 
In this way they cease to be enviable, 
Before turning to consider the social situation which Scheler 
regards as favourable to the emergence of ressentiment - laden attitudes 
and emotions, it is as well to note that he is quite definite in acoording 
the dominant role in shaping the history of rossentiment to biological 
7 
degeneration. -Ii This is in accord with the profoundly elitist stance 
permeating his work, with its sharp contrast between the culture of the 
common man and that of the aristocrat. The former he pprtrays as slavish, 
servile, calculating, self-seeking, filled with anxiety, greedy, distrustful, 
constantly seeking security and regularity for the morrow. The latter, 
on the other hand, is heroic, loving uncertainty and danger, 
spontaneously sensing his own worth, trusting in life, generous, joyful, 
ready to sacrifice, and valuing men in themselves rather than for their 
contribution to the common good. Unfortunately, the harmony of medieval 
society in which the peasants joyfully submitted to their divinely 
ordained and naturally superior aristouratic masters was shattered by 
the rise of the bourgeoisie, which Scheler sees as tainting and diluting 
. 
'Stocratic morality, 'vith the morality of ressentiment. the ar, 
Leaving aside genetic factors, which social circumstance does 
Scheler regard as favourable to the growth of the hostile emotions to 
which he refers, and to their diversion into ressentiment? Firstly, 
such emotions are particularly likely to occur when unequal treatment 
arises alongside expectations of equality. As Scheler puts it: "A 0 
slave who has a slatish nature and accepts his status does not desire 
revenge when he is injured 
by his master; nor does a servile servant who 
is reprimanded or a child that 
is slapped". 
32 
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When, however, a discrepancy emerges between factual inequalities and 
the consttutional or traditional rights recognized as due to a group, the 
reaction is different: 
Social ressentiment, at least, would be slight in a democracy 
--hich is not only political, but also social and tends 
toward equality of property. But the same would be the case 
- and was the case - in a caste society such as that of India, 
or in a society with sharply divided classes. Ressentiment 
must therefore be strongest in a society like ours, when 
approximately equal rights (political and otherwise) or formal 
social equality go hand in hand wit ý3w ide factual differences 
in power, propmrty and education. 
Hostility, then, is nourished by egalitarian ideologies. Not 
all hostile emotions, however, lead to the adoption of those values 
characteristic of ressentiment. Some societies, for example, are 
better equipped with institutions which function as safety valves 
for the release of such emotions. Parliamentary institutions can operate 
to perform this task, and criminal justice can facilitate revenge. C) 
Similarly, occupations which allow the opportunity to discharge 
aggression, such as those of criminals and soldiers, are not prone to 
what Scheler sees as the mental self-poisoning of ressentiment. 
Conversely, some roles are charged with the likelihood of 
ressentiment through the impotence of their occupants to remedy the 
injustice or deprivation they have to bear. Scheler holds, for 
example, that the behaviour of those who obsessively ferret out all 
sexually significant events in their surroundings in order to coiqdemn 
them harshly is merely a cloak to disguise their inability to enjoy 
fulfilling sexual relationshipsg while at the same time deriving some 
prurient satisfaction from cblving into the sex lives of others. 
Similarly he sees aiticism of the pursuits of the younger generation 
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by their elders as stemming from a growing inability to compete in such 
pursuits, such criticism being all the greater the lesser the deference 
accorded to their elders by the younger generation. C1 
One further comment by Scheler on the social roles prone to 
ress, entiment is of particular interest. He vvri-tes: "In present day 
society, ressentiment is by no means most active in the industrial 
proletariat ... but rather in the disqppearing class of artisans, in the 
petty bourgeoisie and among small officials". 
34 This conclusion 
about the distinctive morality of the lower middle class resembles 
Ranulf's, although it must be said that Scheler, unlike Ranulf, provides 
no evidence to substantiate this point. Nor does he even speculate as 
to why this should be so, although it is in accord with his general 
antir. athy towards the bourgeoisie and its culture. 
Sexual prudery and the criticism of the conduct and values of 
the young constitute only two of the attitudes which Scheler sees as 
expressing ressentiment. Another is a belief in ethical relativism, 
a denial of the existence of any absolute standards oil-' morality. This 
is prompted, Scheler believes, by the impotence of its adherents to 
peform favourably when measured in terms of a traditional morality which 
Scheler holds to be true and immutable. 
In addition to ethical relativzrn Scheler holds ressentiment 
to be the root of the universal love of mankind embraced by modern 
humanists which is critical ofq and devoid of piety towards, the divine 
and the dead. In its place humanism puts a concern with the welfare 
of humanity in generalq critical of 
discrimination in terms of local 
or national distinctions or 
blood ties. It also embarks upon 
protest against 
institutions and customs which are considered obstacles 
to sensual fulfillment. 
By contrast, Christian love is aimed notat mutual 
welfareq but the salvation of souls andq 
indeed, is antithetical to 
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the ressentiment insý)ired values of humanism, such 3s belief in liberty 
and equality, 
Further inst---nces of the morality of ressentiment according to 
CI- 
Scheler can be seen in the denial of hereditary virtue or guilt and the 
argument that moral evaluation sho,, -, Id ta'-, ýe : Dlace solely in terms cf an 
-nd'- L -L 
viduals performance relative to 1-is resources. Insistence on 4nnate 
qua -Iu 
-1 Jty, mo-l or intell-ec-ual, is Scheler asserts. a delusion in'o 
,! ih--ch- those 'blinded by ressen-U4-, -ent -.,., culd be dra%, in . 
Scheler, then, sees depri CD -1. --u -7ation as C4 v-ng rise -tc a sense of 
in, justice -. -! here such depriva t4 on Is not balanced lb, 7 the enjoymment of 
ccmpensatory rewards or accepted as i-or-, Ily appropriate. ', 'IheT, e such beliefs 
are shaken or com; )ensation inadequate, deprivation results in frustration 
and aggression. If this aggression is denied expression it , vil-l embitter 0 
the outlook of those experiencing it, leading to a pervasive grudge 
ao-ainst those able to --'. -. dulo-e in activities frcm .,.? hich they are excluded. a r: -- 
Such ressenti-entu finds exýý. ression in the elaboration of a moral code which 
enables those expe-riencing it to condemn such activities and to restcre 
u -e4--- o,, -m sel-C-esteem, of moral superiority rep'-, ac--In, 7 painful 
thf 
CD 
a-, vareness of impotence. 
It ;s clearly not -ocssd-ble to extract from Scheler Is --, vork- the. 
4 ty 4-ment . --s an-oroach rather suvo-est an in--, n-'te of resser (CD 
4 4, reSt- 
var et. 7 of mcral standards deDend--"-ng upon the particul -ar des thal, --e 
f. -'. "Ithough Scheler himself makes no mentJon of this matter, rustrated. U-- u 
4t-4f 
_ is clear 
that there may even by some incompatibility belu-., een diL-, e--ent 
for ressentiment. Sexual values inspired by grounds IL 
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prudery, for example, is regarded by Scheler as the product of ressentimentq 
but so also are a whole set of related attitudes antithetical to such 
a morality which he deals with in his account of the ressentiment - 
laden values of modern humanism. 
It is this morality of modern humanism to which Scheler devotes 
most of his attention. Its vglues include ethical relativism, ' atheism, 
cosmopolitanism disdaining the supremacy claimed by na-tional allegiances 
and blood ties, denial of any hereditary basis for moral or intellectual 
distinctions, and the pursuit of liberty and equality. All are denigrated 
as the products of men unwilling to accept their poor performance in 
terms of the traditional values to which these stand opposed. The rise 
of the bourgeoisie thrust ever increasing numbers of such men onto the CD 
scene. Unable to be successful enough in terms of the old hierarchy 
of values when competing with traditional elites and unwilling to submit 
to an inferior position, they rejecttraditional beliefs. In their place 
they foster beliefs in equality in those areas where they do not excel, 
so that if they do not lead at least none shall be above them. 
In the list of the characteristic values of humanism presented 
by Scheler are several which Ranulf sees as indicators of the absence 
of moral indignation. These include ethical relativism, atheism, 
cosmopolitanism? denial of hereditary guilt and rejection of the need for 
human conduct to be ordered by strong social and moral constraints. 
Despite, ! t-imilarities in seeking to locate the source of certain moral. 
reactions in deprivation and despair, this clearly means that Ranulf's 
claim that Scheler's argument is "identical" with his own goes too CD 
far. 35 For, as Ranulf sees it, humanists are free to cultivate such 
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beliefs because they live a fulfilling existence, free from the sufferings 
of those prone to envy and righteous indignation. 
For Scheler, acceptance of traditional standards, standards he 
regards as the God-given immutable verities of moral life, is 
unproblematic. This is so whether such acceptance occurs on the part of 
those innately endowed with the gifts capable of realizing such values 
or by the rest of an admiring and loyal populace. What does trouble 
him-- is why anyone should be so blind as to be unable to perceive 
the self-evident nature of the truths promulgated by the Catholic church. 
If Scheler's basic assumption here is not accepted, attempts to explain 
indifference or hostility to traditional values as the result of innate 
moral myopia make little sense. There are, of course, a number of 
propositions in Scheler's essay more amenable to empirical investig-. tion, 
but, overall, his essay is more concerned with condemning practices by 
imputing squalid motives to their practitioners on the basis of 
speculative psychology and religious f-ith. 
Ranulf was well avare of the ease with which approaches to the 
study of morality such as his own could be employed for the purpose of 
denigrating the values to which they were applied. Implicit in the 
Neitzschean approach to the origin of morality is the condemnation of 
those holding moral sentiments which are rooted in such unworthy emotional 
dispositions as envy. Ranulf notes that this use of the theory was still 
very much alive in the work of his contemporaries, such as 3ertrand 
,. Y,. Joad, and 
H. L. Mencken. Together with others they employed Russell, C. 7, 
this argument to discredit the "network of moral prejudices and prohibitions 
by which trýaditional Puritanism has endeavoured to make life cheerless 
and tiresome in England and America 
1, . 
36 
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Yet he not only insisted that such evaluations were irrelevant to 
the scientific validity of the hypothesis to which they appealed, but 
also that a strong case could be made out for the social value of moral 
indignation, despite the questionable nature of its origin. To accomplish 
this Mandevillean exercise Ranulf relies upon the work of another 
of his predecessors in the study of the sociology of moral indignation, 
Emile Durkheim. 
III; Juxkheim on restitution and repression 
DuridiBim's first major work, De la division du tr2vail social 
tackled many of the problems which were to be taken up again by Ranulf, 
as part of DJur. `,,:. heirýs aim to establish a science of ethics. In the preface 
to the first edition: -)i=khei, --, starts by defining a moral fact, the subject C) 
matter of such a science, as consisting of "a rule of sanctioned conduct". 
37 
Such a definition places the scientific study of morality squarely 
within the province of sociology, for "every sanction is primarily a 
social thing". 
38 Allobligatory rules of conduct can be identified 
by the sanctions which are attached to them. These may be either 
restitutive or repressive. Restitutive sanctions consist-of the 
re-establishment of troubled relations to their normal state through 
such measures of compensation and annulment. These need imply no 
suffering for the agent. Repressive sanctions, on the other hand, 
consist essentially in suffering, or at least a lossq inflicted upon 
those deemed guilty of crime or immorality. "They make demandson his 
fortune, or on his honor, or on his life, or on his liberty, and deprive 
him of something he enjoys". 
39 
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For Durkheim, the imposition of repressive sanctions against 
offenders, both through formal punishment and more informal and diffuse 
moral condemnation, rests upon moral consensus. Crime is defined in 
terms of punishment - crime is "every act which, in any degree whatsoever, 
invokes against its author the characteristic reaction which we term 
punishment ". 
40 
Punishment, in its turn, is defined by a number of important 
characteristics. 
It differs from purely moral sanctions in being applied in an 
organized rather than in a diffuse manner. Suffering, that is, is meted 
out on the basis of a decision taken by a tribunal instead of being 
judged and reacted to by each on an individual basis. This is so 
whether the tribunal is composed of all the people or only a select 
number and whether or not it follows a regular procedure. Adopting 
a definition of punishment based upon the penal law of contemporary 
society With its definite punishments attached to equally definite 
crimes would be too narrow for comparative purposes, excluding, 
for example, the case of early Rome, where crime was prosecuted before 
the assembly of the people who fixed the penalty by virtue of their 
41 
soverign authority. 
Nor is punishment simply an extension of individual revenge for 
personal injury. That the tendency to inflict punishment stems from 
society and not the individual is demonstrated by the penalty 
being 
remissible only by the government in the name of society. 
In primitive 
societies those activities which elicit punishment are 
those which 
relate to public affairs: offences against religion and 
traditional 
patterns of conduct, 
those against the group as a whole such as treason 
-0 
and desertion. 
In the case of religion, punishment clearly partakes oL 
1-10 5 
the disinterested nature o' the obligations it enforces. 
42 Att-Tks -L - 
upon the individual constitute only a fraction of the offences which 
primitive societies see fit to punish. These, indeed, are often left 
on the threshhold of penal law, being left to the offended party to seek 
satisfadtion through the legitimate pursuit of the vendetta. 
Durkheim also insists that punishment is fundamentally a passionate 
reaction rather than the result of utilitarian and unemotional calculation. 
The retributive character of punishment, the practice of making those 
deemed culpable suffer for the sake of suffering without further 
iCt4 
advantage accruing to those infl ing the punishment, is particularly 
evident in primitive societies. Durkheim acknowledges that in contemporary 
societies it is often argued that punishment has changed its character. 
It is claimed that: 
it punishes, not because chastisement offers it any 
satisfaction for itself, but so that the fear of 
punishment may paralyze those who contemplate evil, 
This is no longer choler, but a reflected provision 
which determines repression. 
ý4 
Yet Durkheim is alive to the p6ssibilities of self-deception, 
when he counters this daim with the observation that: "The nature 
of a practice does not necessarily ch2nge because the conscious intentions 
o -hose who apply it are modified '. 
45 An underlying concern with f -V 
expiation -for 
the past is still evident in the trouble that is taken 
to proportion punishment as precisely as possible to the severity of 
the crime in courts which continue to be arenas for emotional appeals 
to moral indignation. 
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What is common to all rules that are sanctioned by punishment7 
All crimes, Durkheim argues, shock sentiments which are f ound in all 
psychologically nortnal members cf society. Penal practices which do 
not have ',, he basis of their support firmly rooted in the moral consensus 
of the community cannotlong endure. 
46 Such sentiments are not hesitant 
and passing opinionsq but deeply held convictibns which are not easily 
abandoned. This is reflected in the conservative nature of criminallaw 
in comparison with civil law. 
While sentiments protected by purely moral sanctions are 
4 
generally less intense than those which penal sanctions surround, 
nevertheless there are some exceptions. To result in those offending 
against them being punished, sentiments must not only be strong, they 
. J. musu also be precise, giving rise to rules relating to a definite 
practice rather than expressions of vaguejdeals to be aimed at. 
Futhermore, Durkheim acknowledges that there are some crimes whJ-ch 
are punished more severely than the indignation that they arouse in C) 
the general public might lead one to expect. Nevertheless, punishment 
still rests upon the common conscience, if less directly, as the 
state exercises its authority on the basis of the loyalty and devotion 
it receives as the protector of the way of life of the group. 
If the scope of the criminal law and the severity of its penalti-es 
depend upon intense and shared moral sentiments, what are the factors 
which determine the content of these moral attitudes and their 
importance in the social life of a community? All repressive 
sanctions, Durhkeim holds, stem from and are determined 
by, the collective 
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conscience, the moral sentiments shared by all members of the community. 
This collective conscience varies in a num-. er of wa, -vs which affect 
the enforcement of repressive sanctions against offenders 
It is the keypoint of Durkheim's thesis that as societies advanceg 
the co2lective conscience becomes enfeebled, exercising a less powerful 
hold over the individual. It also becomes vaguer, leaving room for 
individual divergences based upon different interpretations of general 
principles. No longer does consensus hold sway and all consciences 
react in unison. On the contrary, if moral indignation is awakened, 
upheavals are likely to result from differing views on the importance 
and meaning of moral standards. 
47 
There are a number of social forces bringing about this change. 
Firstly, there is the growth of rationality. While the whole tribe 
faces the same concrete situations the cbservations to which they give 
rise, the problems they raise and the collective solutions provided, 
can all be framed in equally concrete terms. With the growth in the 
size and complexity of societies, however, such notiorB inevitably take 
on a more abstract nature in order to encompass a greater diversity of 
experience. But abstract rules require the intervention of the intellect 
before they can be applied. "But", as DurkheimremarkEd"once reflection 
is awakened, it is not easy to restrain it,,. 
48 It will eventually 
be extended to and undermine. articles of faith originally put beyond 
the bounds of discussion. 
A more important factor leading to the decline in collective 
conscience is the diminishing authority of tradition. 
Behind this 
lies the fact that individuals are no longer tied to the locality of 
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their birth by family ties and territorial restrictions. Obstacles 
to innovation exist wherever the influence of those older persons who 
have been responsible for rearing the child is prolonged beyond 
infancy. Migration, by breaking these ties, removes these obstacles. 
While a migrant will encounter other old people he does not and never 
has depended upon them and hence has less respect for their wishes. 
Deference towards the elderly is nowadays based more upon pity 
than fear. Between adults, age differences decline, leaving those 
embodying ancestral customs with no special standing in the community. 
People become freer in their approach to customs as they become freer 
in their approach to those -who embody them. 
Due to these processes it is in those areas of the country 
where the population is drawn largely from the immigTation of young 
people that the power of the collective conscience is weakest. It is 
this Durkheim holds, that partly accounts for the strength of 0 
innovatory tendencies in cities. There young adult immigrants, freed 
from the moderating influence of their elders at home and, furthermore, 
finding themselves in an environment where the number of old people is 
relatively small, create a situation in which little heed is paid to 
tradition. Geographical mobility is matched by temperamental mobility 
and innovations come to enjoy the prestige formerly associated with 
tradition as everything that comes from the past becomes somewhat 
suspect. 
Not only do large cities undermine the collective conscience 
through freeing individuals from the bonds of tradition. Urban 
anonymity also provides city residents with freedom from social 
control. The greater the number of people embraced by a society and the 
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greater the number and variety of contacts between themg the less 
surveillance that can be constantly focused upon their conduct by the 
communitY. 
It has to consider too many points at once to be 
able to concentrate on any. The watch is less 
piercing because there arýqtoo many people and 
too many things to watch. 
Furthermore, interest, the principle source of attention, 
is more or less absent. In general, the less intimate relations 
between individuals, the less the desire to know what they are doing. 
The continuous and frequent contacts which nourish such intimacy 
diminish as each individual is in contact with a gret-: --. ter number of 
persons. 
Even neighbours and members of the same family are 
less often and less regularly in contact, separated 
as they are by the mass of affairs and inter-current 
persons... As this mutual indifference results in 
loosing collective survei'ilance, the sphere of free 
action of each individual is extended in fa and, 
little by little, the fact becomes a right. 
Everywhere loval opinion weighs less heavily as an individuals 
preoccupations no longer centre so completely upon the place where he 
lives. Widening vistas as the result of being drawn into affairs outside 
the locality lead to a declining interest in neighbours who play a 
smaller part in his life. 
With the growth of social differentiation as societies develop 
from primitive to more complex forms, factas such as the growth of 
general principles and the birth of critical reason, the 
declining 
social control and surveillance exercised 
by family and neighbourhood, 0 
develop so as to reduce the power of the collective conscience and 
to 
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reduce the offensiveness of many acts which had previously provoked 
moral indignation. Little by little this changing morality works its 
way through to the criminal law. There it is evidencedby the progressive 
withdrawal of the law from spheres where it was once heavily involved. 
Penal sanctions are employed to a lesser extent, if at all, in the 
regulation of familial duties and sexual activitiesq in sumptuary 
regulations and the protection of religious j: xactices and beliefs. 
In addition attacks against national sentiments o14 national 
institutions cease to be repressed so severely and the crime of lese 
m-aieste'L formerly widely employed, tends to disappear. 
51 
I 
Against this general trend there is, however, a growth in the 
strength of sentiments protective of the individual. Durkheim 
emphasises, however, that this is exceptional and that the general 
trend of the collective conscience is to diminish in strength and 
decisiveness. His thoughts on the changing character of the duties 
owed to individuals irrespective of familial or territorial ties are, 
nevertheless, worth pursuing for tae light they shed on the nature of 
the collective conscience. Of particular interest in this respect-is 
a lecture dealing with the causes of variations in the respect attached 
to the rule prohibiting murder. 
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I The changing nature of the ideals which constitute the collective 
conscience can be seen in the changing response to hoinicide. 
Both 
the incidence of homicide and the steps taken by the law to punish 
it reflect the collective estimate of the heinousness. of this offence. 
Durkheim detects a tendency for homicide to decline with the advance 
of civilization, whileg at the same time, growing public disapproval 
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of this offence is demonstrated by it being drawn from the threshold of 
ethics to the position of one of the most binding duties enforced by CD 
public sanction. The former indifference of society to these offences 
is rEflected in various practices whereby an offender could evade 
punishment through compensating the relatives of his victim, or by 
the protection of the law being withheld from foreigners. Now, however, 
Ourder has become prohibited by the most severe penalties society 
exercises. This has come about partly because the human person is now 
the object of the sacred respect formerly directed towards the 
collectivity and its symbols. 
The power of moral individualism should not, however, be 
exaggerated. While the growth of individualism is associated with 
a declining rate of homicide and increasing public indignation at its C) 
occurrence, it does not in itself account for them. For other attacks 
upon the individual, such as theft and fraud, and even some physical 
attacks against the person, tend to rise with social development. 
If horpicide is decreasing it is rather because the mystic cults 
of familial cr' political collectivities are diminishing rather than 
the cult of the individual is increasing. Such group loýralties, 
because of their strength, are in themselves stimulants to murder. 
Not only do offences against these sentiments incite murderous response, 
but -such sentiments also create a general climate in which people become 
less sensitive to individual suffering, attaching little value to 
individual lives and used to the idea that they c7n and should be 
sacrificed to all sorts of things. Man has remained for long ages harsh 
to his fellows not because of his animal nature, but as the result 
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of a well-developed moral culture. The strong collective conscience 
of traditional societies which requires and'approves the imposition 
of suffering in its pursuit of aims foreign to individual interests, 
is, Durkheim argues, fertile soil for the growth of a disposition 
to cause suffering. 
Whatever increases group solidarity through strenghtening 
likemindedness and loyalty to the group is thus also likely to stimulnte 
the homicide rate. Wars and political crises, thrusting aside all 
concern for the individual as collective sentiments are roused, have 
this affect. The Protestant religion, being more individualistic than 
the Catholic, allows more freedom to the individual to interpret his 
own faith, and surrounds him with a smaller number of strong 
collective sentiments to hold sway over his mind, is characterised by 
a lower homicide rate. And, according to Durkheim, even public 
festivities, intensifying collective life and causing over-excitement, 
raise the homicide rate. 
From the perspective of this sbudy, the most important point 
to note is that Durhkeim clearly identifies the conditions which lead 
to the anger of moral indignation as the same as those which stimulate 
homicide. The collective conscience is the source of impulsive, 
unreflecting violence in both cases. The nature of morality and 
immorality in any Period are inextricably bound up together. 
Drukheim. saw this as demonstrated in his own day by the way in which 
morality was becoming increasingly cold, reflective and rational at the 
same time as immorality becomes more notable for its astuteness than I 
its violence. 
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The transformation of the content of criminal law is accompanied 
by a change in the severity of the sanctions it employs, a change 
discussed by Durkheim in an article on the evolution of penal 
sanctions where he formulates the following law: 
The intensity of punishment is greater the more 
closely societies approximate to a less developed 
t, 
, Tpe - and 
the more the central power assumes an 
absolute character. 
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Absolute power, the treatment of the individual as merely 
the property of the State, can vary independently of societal 
complexity. Thus while ancient Israel was not more advanced than ancient 
Egypt, nevertheless capital and corporal punishment were less intense 
in the former and applied to fewer offences. This was due to its 
more democratic nature, never developing absolute government such as 
the Egyptian theocracy centring upon the divinity of the monarch. As 
the result of the more advanced level of development reached by the 
Roman Republic, punishments there were less severe, and(capital 
punishments fewer, than in the preceeding Athenian city-states. Under 
the growth of the empire, however, growth in absolutism accompanied 
growing harshness iq penal law. The succeeding feudal society 
in Europe shows an amelioration in the penal law in comparison with other 
societies at a similar level of development. With the rise of strong 
centralized monarchiesq however, this trend was reversed as corporal 
and capital crimes increase in number and intensity, religious crimes 
increaseand crimes of lese majest6., unknown in the early feudal period, 
grow in number. Not until the waning of the power of absolute 
monarchies in the -eighteenth century does a significant amelioration 
of the criminal law occur. 
This suggest an alternative - or additional - 
explanation to Ranulf's explanation of 
the growing tendency to inflict 
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punishment displayed by both the regimes of Hitler and 3talin when 
contrasted with their predecessors. 
In Durkheim's account of changes in t-he severity of punishmentq 
forces similar to those which were noted earlier in considering 
the transformation of the content of the collective conscience can be 
seen to operate. Compassion for the condemned can only begin to emerge 
when the offended party is no longer so much more powerful and 
prestigious than the offender. 
Althoughý. Ularkheimls work on the nature of crime and punishment 
is clearly not without its faults, some critics of his work on the nature 
of crime and punishment have liled to do justice to the suOtlety of his 
thoughts on this matter, oversimplyfying his position andwerlooking 
the relevance of certain aspects of his work to their own. Joseph 
Gusfield, for example, in his discussion of moral indignation, attributes 
to Durkheim the assumption that "the response to norm violation is always 
a punishing attitude". 
55 This a'ssumption, Gusfield demonstr-tes, is 
rendered unsound by the common occurrence of assimilative reform directed 
towards re-educating those who do not live up to society's standards. 
This is no doubt true, but to attribute to Durkheim the notion that all 
rule-breaking provokes a punitive response is cleazrly false. His discussion 
of the role of restitutive sanctions and the growing diversity of responses 
to acts previously considered immoral or criminal by the whole community 
testify to this. Gusfield is no less unfair when he states in reference 
to modern societies: "Rather than the unanimity which Durkheim thought 
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essential, norms of tolerance appear functionally necessary to modern 
society". 
56 
Durkheim plainly states his opinion that a return to the 
unanimity of opinions characteristic of the traditional collective 
conscience is impossible under contemporary conditions and that the only 
appropriate form of agreement that can be hoped for is a moral 
individualism which embraces the norms of tolerance to which Gusfield 
refers. 
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Ranulf was clearly familiar with Durkheim's major works and 
refers with approval to Durkheim's description of punishment as a passionate 
and disinterested reaction. 
56 He does not, however, go on to deal with 
the important differences between Durkheim's explanation of variations 
in the tendency to inflict punishment and his own. He turns, instead, 
to Durkheim to provide himself with an argument to counter those who 
condemn the operation of moral indignation as the unworthy indulgence 
of frustrated desires. 
Ranulf's point is that, by concentrating upon the base motives 
which give rise to moral indig-mationg its opponents amongst his 
contemporaries had neglected to pay sufficient attention to the functions 
which it serves. Such critics, based their opposition to moral 
indignation on the argument, in part derived from psychoanalysis, that 
a large number of people suffer from sexual frustration and un: ýalfiliing 
sexual relationshipsg experiences wh-Lch have important consequences for 
the sentiments and conduct of those suffering from them. 
Such 
CO 
, rustration and its attendant repression of 
desire feeds envy, for it is 
difficult for one who leads an unhappy life as the result of such deprivation 
to see others possessing what 
he lacks or even enjoying greater general 
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happiness and contentment than himself. Repressed impulses will seek 
such outlets even if an individual succeeds in deluding himself and 
others into believing that he leads a contented life, and will issue 
forth in moral indignation aimed at suppressing the indulgence of 
such appetites in others. Artificial barriers erected by moral 
indignation further hinder sexual fulfillment and produce further misery 
to fuel crusades against sexual immorality. 
59 
The message is clear. Moral indignation at sexual impropriety C, 
is the result of such discreditable emotions as envy and should therefore 
be repudiated. 
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In reply to such a position, Ranulf argues that the 
repression of moral indighation might have harmful consequences at 
least as great as those imputed to the repression of sex. That such 
harmful consequences are likely to occur can be seen from a consideration 
of certain social facts revealed by Durkheim's sociology, particularly 
those referred to as le mal de l'infini in Durkheim's book on the 
SOCiOlOgY Of suicide. According to Ranulf's interpretation of this work, 
"the evil of infinite possibilities" is only to be averted by persecutions 
similar to those decried by Russell as the gratification of envy. Only 
by an unreflecting veneration of the traditional standards which bid 
mento be content with a modest share of human happiness can le mal de 
llinfini be warded off. For this phenomenon 
makes its appearance with the dissolution of the 
belief that attempts to arrange life in accordance 
with mens wishes and impulses are impossible, 
illegitimate and monstrous. In order to sustain 
this belief it is necessary to see that wh_5t is in 
fact impossible for oneself is made morally impossible 
forcthers. Hence the necessity of a moral reaction 
whenever the standards have been transgressed. 
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Otherwise, as soon as the veneration for the moral standards begins to wane 'the evil of the infinite possibilities' 
makes its appearance, with despair and suicide in store for those who are not in a positig? to reap any benefits from the increased Pioral freedo-m. 
This idea is clearly interesting in its own righý although it 
somewhat misrepresents Durk4eim's position. The "disease of the infinite"q 
for example, is common to both despair caused by the pointlessness of 
life devoid of strong social attachments, as well as the vxasperated 
weariness resulting from the pursuit of the unobtainable by passions 
released from social supervision. 
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Yet it is clearly only the latter 
which Ranulf has in mind in his references to le mal de l'infini. 
Furthermore, Durkheim makes no distinction between those who are in 
a position to benefit from increased moral freedom and those who are 
not, but points out that it is impossible for men to benefit where they 
frustrate themselves pursuing inherently unobtainable, desires. 
Ranulf is clearly in agreement with Durkheim, however, in 
claiming that failure to retaliate against offenders will vitiate the 
collective conscience. 
63- 
Both see that permissiveness is bought at 
a price, being the effect of the same social causes which also generate 
such undesired sonsequences as suicide. If, however, Durkheim is also 
correct in arguing that social advance is also inextricably bound up 
with such things as a decrease in homicide, then the balance sheet is 
ob4iously no easy affair to draw up. 
64 
IV., ' The social and cultural dynamics of morality 
To conclude this chapter on the efforts of other sociologists 
who have attempted to answer those questions rqised by Ranulf concerning 
the social forces underlying variations in the disinterested tendency 
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to inflict punishment, some consideration of the work of Pitrim 
Sorokin is essential. Sorokin's work shares with that of Westermarckq 
Durkheim and Ranulf a concern to test his theories by bringing to bear 
upon them evidence from a very wide range of societies and periods. 
Unlike the major works of Westermarck and Du: rkheim, howeverg Sorokin's 
magnum opusSocial and Cultural Dynamics was unavailable to Ranulf 
at the time of the appearance of the The Jealousy of the Gods in the 
years 1933-1934. The line of influence, indeed, lies in the opposite 
direction, for it is evident that Sorokin relied heavily upon The 
Jealousy of the Gods for his analysis of Greek morality up to the end 
of the fifth century. 
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Sorokin has also much to say about those theories advanced by 
Durkheim to account for fluctuations in the severity of punishment 
and the scope of criminal law which we have just considered. He is, 
in fact, quite blunt in dismissing them as "a mere 'derivation' or 
'rationalization' of the wishes and biases of the liberal and radical 
humanitarianism of the nineteenth century of which he (Durkheim) 
was a typical representative". 
66 
This opinion arises out of Sorokin's 
study of the fluctuation of the extent and severity of punishment 
in social life. 
Sorokin begins this study by observing that, while penal codes 
give some idea of the severity of penalties employed against offenders, 
they do not indicate to how many persons it is applied. "The punishment 
in a certain code may be milder than another, but it may be applied, 
say, to 20 per cent of the Population, while the severer punishment may 
be imposed on 2 per cent of the population only , 
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Furthermore, actual punishment may increase enormously in amount and 
severity by such means as special decrees or mere physical force while 
the code continues to exist unchanged. Alternative evidence concerning 
the actual fluctuation in the quantity and severity of punishment is, 
howeverg sparse for large periods of time. Nevertheless there are 
sufficient sources to establish one law which Sorokin expresses as 
follows: 
Each time when in a given social group, the 
ethicojuridical heterogeneity and antagonism 
of its members increases - whatever may be the 
reasons for such an increase - the amount as well 
as the severity of punishment imposed by one part 
of the group upon the other tends to increase; and, 
other conditions being equal, the greater the 
heterogengýty and antagonism, the greater is the 
increase. 
By ethicojuridical homogeneity is meant the similarity of the 
cohvictions shared bT members of society, whether these are imperative- 
attributive or merely attributive. The former are two sided, ascribing 
a right to one party and a duty to another. In any group these constitute 
f 
what Sorokin refers to as their law, the rules sanctioned by the state 
constituting only one subclass of the general class of law. Morality 
is distinguished from law by being merely attributive: urging and 
recommending actions without ascribing to anyone the right to demand 
en 
them. Q'ý' 
This law leads Sorokin to dismiss as one of Durkheim's "big 
blunders" the notion that under conditions of ethico-juridical homogeneity 
in primitive societies, punishment will be merciless. 
70 Not only, 
Sorokin holdsq is punishment in a great many of such primitive societies 
mild, but there is no trend for the severity of punishment to decrease 
with social development. 
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Comparison of the criminal law of Fr2nce, Italy, Austria, Germany, and 
Russia in the early Middle Ages with subsequent development, for exampleg 
shows them to have been milder in the earlier period. No tendency 
towards an ever more lenient penal code emerges from this survey. 
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Marshalling his evidence to refute the popular notion that the evolution 
of criminal law shows a perpetual trend toward more and more humane 
and milder treatment of offenders, Sorokin states: 
Instead, we see that as far as the normal punishments 
are concerned, the Barbaric times were mildest then 
the severity of punishment begins to grow in the 
medieval period and still more (with the exception 
of France) in the period of growth of the national 
monarchies, at the close of the late Middle Ages and at the 
beginning of the modern period, in the fourteenth 
fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. 
The end of the seventeenth century, the period of the 
Enlightened Absolutism, marks the downward turn of 
the severity of punishment. This trend continues, 
with a short time rise at the very end of the eighteenth 
and the beginning of the nineteenth century (the peiiod 
of the 'Restoration') up to the end of the nineteenth 
century. The postwar period (in Russia, Germany and 
Austria) shows signs of a ýIw turn - towards a growth 
of severity of punishment. 
Sorokin argues that Durkheim's claim that the unlimitedness 
of the central power is one of the major determinants of the severity 
of punishment is also incorrect. Evidence to refute this view can 
be found, he points outq in mildness which marked the codes of the 
"enlightened" despots of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
in comparison with both those of the kings of feudal Europe, who 
were often only primus inter-gires, and the codes of the republics and 
limited monarchies of the first part of the nineteenth century. Similwiy, 
the codes of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century were, 
despite tl.! e unlimited absolutism of the Czars, if anything, milder 
than the codes of France, Italy and Austria with their republican 
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regimes or limited monarchies . 
73 
In considering the relevance of Sorokin's work to that of 
Ranulf, some discussion of the basic theme running throughout 
Social and Cultural Dynamics is necessary. As noted earlier, Ranulf's 
concept of moral indignation and the disinterested tendency to inflict 
puniskm, ent amounts to a portrait of a particular personality type and 
his concern with social factors is primarily an attempt to determine 
which milieu is most favourable to the configuration of attitudes 
wAich constitute this type. Sorokin is also concerned with investigating 
the social sources of two fundamentally different temperaments, one 
of which encompasses certain of the tendencies which Ranulf regards as 
indicators of moral indignation. 
The major dimension which Sorokin employs runs between two 
polar types of mentality which he labels ideational and sensate or, 
respectivelyq Stoic and Epicurean. Starting from the major premises 
upon which such mentalities are based, Sorokin distinguishes between them 
in the following manner. 
74 Concerning the nature of reality to which 
one has to adapt, sensate consciousness regards this as limited to what 
is immediately available to the senses. Ideational cultures regard 
such phenomena as illusory org at besý superficial, and seek to adapt 
themselves to an ultimateg supernatural reality beyond the senses. 
Corresponding with this division of belief concerning the nature 
of reality is disagreement concerning the nature of needs and ends to 
be satisfied. The goals and values of 
Epicureans are sensual; amongst 
Stoics they are spiritual. Answers to the problem of how to satisfy these 
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needs also differ, with sensate solutions focusing upon the modifications 
of the environment, and ideational solutions upom the modification of self. 
The domination of one or other of these mentalities in any 
given individualq group or period will influence the form and content 
of all that they produce. Every sphere of culture will be pe-meated 
by the major premises of the dominant mentality. Art produced in an 
era dominated by an ideational mentality will., for example, differ in 
radical ways from art of sensate periods. In the former, topics will 
be predominately religious and revolve around the activities of spirits; 
whereas the latter focuses upon the secular activities of ordinary 
mortals engaged in the day to day business of life. Ideational art is 
ascetic and elevates unquestioning faith; sensate art is sceptical, 
sensual and erotic. Attuned to the supernatural realm, ideational art 
pays sc. cnt attention to sensate preoccupations with paysage, to scenes 
from ordinary life or the individual portrayal of real persons. It 
is also unlike sensate art in1iling to develop or appreciatesatire, 
caricature and comedy. In sensate eyes art is an evenue to greater 
pleasure rather than being inseparable from and subservient to religion. 
Even the favoured styles moves in line with what one might 
expect from the basic assumptions of each mentality. Ideational art 
is found to be symbolic; sensate art naturalistic. The art of ideational 
periods is also resistant 
tO, change in sharp contrast with the prog--essive 
accelerating tempo of innovation in sensate art. 
Ideational periods also 
prefer to empl6Y simple means and 
techniques, as opposed to the preference 
of sensate periods for grand and complex ones. 
Censorship of art 
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in the service of religion also takes the place occupIed- by the cultivation 
of critical appreciation in terms of Epicurean values to be found in 
sensate cultures. 
The dominant mentality also has far reaching consequences in CD 
all the other compartments of culture. Concerning differences in 
their system of knowledge, for example, Epicureans favour deterministic 
interpretations of man and nature, and tend to interpret biological and 
social prccesses in terms oflinear development. Stoics, on the other 
hand, emphasize the importance of divine intervention and tend to employ 
cyclical theories of biological and social development. In terms of their 
ethical theories, ideationalistsdiffer from sensates in adopting an 
absolutist rather than relativist conception of morality. The nature 
of liberty also differs. The freedom of the individual rests upon the 
relationship between his wishes and the means available for satisfying 
them. Consequently there are two ways to increase freedom: 
first, the individual may minimize his wishes until 
they are vqual or are less than the available means 
of their gratification; or he may increase the 
available means of their satisfaction. The first 
is the Ideational way of being free; th 75 second 
is the external Sensate way to be free. 
In analyzing the social relations characteristic of both types 
of cultures, Sorokin argues that Epicureans tend to be related by 
contractual ties more than Stoics, who f-vour bonds similar to those 
to be found within families -a distinction reflecting that drawn earlier 
by Tönnies between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. 
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In the sp)ae3s of social inequality, the dominance of ideational 
cultures is associ-ated with political and economic dominance by priests 
and landed gentry; while the cultural hegemony of sensate culture is 
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associated with "the caPitalist - commercial bourgeoisie, the secular 
bureaucrac. y-, 
., 
and the secular independent, free-thinking, 'scientific', 
artisticq political - intelligentsým and the profeý; sional classes''. 
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It is clear, however, that Sorokin does not regard the political 
and economic dominance of classes as the basis of their cultural hegemony, 
and of how their ideology has come to leave its mark upon history as the 
spirit of the age. It is, rather, the dominant beliefs and values, 
unfolding according to their own inner logic, which determinathe fate 
of classes and elites. 
Sorokin bases his study of this development principally upon the 
history of Graeco-Roman and Western civilization over the past twenty 
six centuries. - What emerges is a cycle, played out twice during this 
period, of ideational dominance giving way to sensate cultures through CD 
an intermediate stage which Sorokin terms idealistic. This is a 
balanced combination of elements from both systems which is, however, 
short-lived relative to both sensate and ideational cultures. Sensate 
culture, in its turn, contains the seeds of it-) own destruction and gives 
way to a revival of ideationalism. 
We are now, Sorokin portends, livinýr amidst the death acgonies 
of an over-ripe and decadent sensate culture. Sensate mentality has 
been brought to its logical conclusion, progressively throwing off more 
and more restraints until man has become incapable and unwilling to 
tame his impulses. The recklessness this induces invokes ever greater 
penalties, leading to the collapse of Epicureanism and retreat in to 
ideationallism. Here we are back once again -with a vision of the 
calamities awaiting man's 
hubris worthy of Herodotus. 
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Sorokin regards Ranulf's analysis of the culture of ancient Greece as 
good, but regards the latter's explanatory hypothesis as questionable. 
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The undoubting and unquestioning acceptance of divine intervention 
in enforcing morality which Ranulf takes as evidence of moral indignation 
rooted in social deprivation, Sorokin identifies as part of a wider 
movement, as just one facet of an ideational culture harmonizing with 
others . 
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The decline of tnis mentality, heralded by the works of Euripides, 
Aristophanes and Thucydides, is also part of an integrated movement of 
the whole culture towards more sensate values and concerns, a movement 
propelled by its own inner logic of development. 
Sorokin clearly sees those anti-hedonistic attitudes which Ranulf 
regards as part of the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment as 
the product of an ideational culture. Does he find these anti- 
hedonistic attitudes to occur together with a tendency to inflict punishment, CD 
as Ranulf predicts? 
The most important relationship between the tv, o types of mentality 
and the amount and severity of punishment is, Sorokin believes, determined 
not so much by which one, ideational or sensate, is dominant at any particular 
moment, but upon how firmly established they are. When either is deeply 
rooted, punishment tends to be moderate. It is in the periods of 
transition from one to another that penalties rise. 
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This much one 
would expect from Sorokin's principle of ethicojur. idical heterogeneity 
discussed above. 
Nevertheless, ideational criminal 'Law does tend to be more severe 
than sensate 1ýlw under normal conditions. There are several reasons 
for this: 
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first the requirements of Ideational cultureq and its laws as 
to man's conduct, are generally more exacting and less 
loose and lenient than those of the . 35-ensate law. The first aspires to a higher level of moral conduct, admits 
less opportunism, inhibits a greater numher of the 
natural proclivities of sensate man than the opportunistic- 
utilitarian law... Second, Ideational culture and law come 
usually after the disintegration of over-ripe sensate 
culture and man, with appetites let loose, with hedonism, 
skepticism, sensualism rampant; with the human personality 
deeply demoralized and disorderly. Under such circumstances, 
in order to discipline such a man and such a society; 
in order to successfully to bridle the rampant sensual 
appetLtes and passions, and engraft new forms of conduct 
inhibiting these tendencies, a culture and law cannot 
be too soft.. For these reasons, the average level of 
the Ideational penal system is likely to be more severe than 
that of the Sensate. This we see in the great expansion 
of punishable actions, as well as in an increase of penalty 
of the medieval codes in comparison with barbaric; of the 
penal system of Rornae in the centuries begi H ing with the 
third9 with that of the pre-ceeding eras". 
There is, then, some agrreement between Sorokin and Ranulf, 
although Sorokin proposes an alternative explanation of the rise and fall 
of such reforming zeal as part of the imanent unfolding of integrated 
cultures. Is this theory convincing? Not altogether. Sorokin's 
use of secondary sources such as articles in the Encyclopaedia 
Pritannica, for example, raises the extent to which the consolidnItion 
of conceptions of thespirit of an age may have influenced the degree 
of integration Sorokin is able to attribu-b to it, as well as thecbpth 
of change from one era to another. 
But even if these descriptions and interpretations are qccepted 
as reliable, the particular order of development which Sorokin predicts 
has only been repeated once - hardly grounds for taking it ma pattern 
of history to be expected in the future. Sorokin puts for-ward some 
interesting speculations concerning why such cycles recur, but does not 
/ 
establish that they in fact do so. Despite Sorokin's disdain for the 
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evolutionarytheories to which he adhered in his youth, he has not really 
disproved explanations of the resurgence in the Middle Ages of marY 
earlier social and cultural phenomena in terms of a temporqry 
regression to long term evolutionary trends brought about by a society 
being destroyed by technologically less advanced peoples. His pessimistic C-- 
foreboding that sensate culture is collapsing are based upon certain 
reversals to sensate trends which he detected in the first two or three 
decades of this century. Yet this period is far too short in relation 
to the centuries over which such trends take place to enable any such 
prediction to be made with confidence, although such pessimism is perhaps 
understandable given Sorokin's personal experience of the Russian 
Revolution and the context of the period of world economic depression 
and the rise of fascism within which SoCial and Cultural D7, rnamics 
was produced. 
Sorokin's own comments upon the history of other civilizations 
throw further doubt upon his theory of social change. The long history 
of ancient EUpt, for example, exhibits a stable tendency to value 
a certain mixture of sensate and ideational cultural elements, a 
mr 
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nixture somwwhat closer to the former mentality than the latte - 
The unfolding of the ideational - idealistic-sensate sequence does not 
occurs 
Due to Sorokin's stress on cultural integration, societies tend 
to be portrayed in Social and Cultural Dynamics as being either sensate 
or ideational without consideration of the distribution of these 
characteristics amongst their membert. Yet Sorokin clearly feelsthat 
certain social positions are conducive to the adoption, of particular 
v-rieties of sensate of ideational mentalities, reg:, qrdless of -nhich 
is most widespread or influential in a society at the time. 
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"Passive" sensates, for example, can be distinguished from the "active" 
variety b7- their disinclination to reconstruct the external world to 
provide for their sensate desires, preferring a "parasitic exploitation" 
of the world. 
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Such passive sensates are "concentrated in the class 
of the lazy posterity of rich fathers". 
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Within any society both 
vcrieties of Epicureanism occupy a more prominent position in the 
adaptation of the privileged classes than they do in the adaptation 
of the under privileged as the result of the former's greater pol, -jer 
to modify their environment and satisfy their needs 
ý6 
The poor and 
subjugated groups are forced to adopt a "pseudo-ideationalism" 
as a mode of adapting to their lack of power and privilege. This, 
however, is likely to be quickly thrust aside whenever the opportunity 
arises. 
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Sorokin does not explore these ideas in any depth, but his ideas 
concerning the influence of inherited wealth upon the morality of the 
privileged classes accords well with Ranulf's observations and suggests 
the possibility that his work may have provided us with an important 
diagnostic tool in investigating the influence of different social 
experiences upon a wide range of attitudes and activities. A start 
in this direction has already been made by Galtung who finds that such 
characteristics as ageg education and occupation are associated with 
commitmenttD ideational or sensate outlooks. Galtung suggests that 
sensate mentalities tend to be associated with greater involvement with 
the outside world than with the immediate locality. This is clearly 
in accord with Durkheim's observations on the influence of 
cosmopolitanism upon the character of the collective conscience. How 
far Galtung's findings about the distribution of sensate and ideational 
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orientations can be generalized beyond their specific Sicilian setting 
remains, however, to be established. 
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1. The authoritarian -ý)ersonalitl 
The wor'. - of the sociologists revieije(i in the last chaj)ter 
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of a body of concerning this jhenomenon that is more advanced 
than nnight at first *sight see, -, i a--, -, -)arent. To strengtll-en this foLuldation 
we turn now to consider what cam be gathered concerning the social. 
-'sycholoEy of moral in-tolerance from investii; ations within the field 
o. L social -, sycholoý-,. -ye 
. Ls we indicated in the discussion of Itanull" s 
JU-heory, co-Tite. -imorary 
fI'--1 Socialism over s. -. ac-; -o 1-. 7, social events -4, r- tae for-2 o. -,, " the rise 0L-,., -. uiona 
his , jor. '-,,: -an(:! sha--je his -)icture of those prone to moral indiLpation, as 
viell -as guiding his thouý,, its concerning the nsycholo-Jcal =-d- social C, I-L; I- 
roots of this phenomenon. The attitude syndrome -,. -Thich encom-passes -'(Jhe 
various elements off--ý -, oral indignation, the additional "beliefs and 
values which tend to surround therrig and the lo-,. -. -er midale class 
conditions of life which he liolds res---)onsible for tuh-Js resentument-laden 
-world -, all reflect the state of contem: =a-ry 
Imowledge and O-Dinion 
concerning the social psychology of fascism. 11ot, however, that 
agreement , 7as comjDlete. 
Even where accord on the nature of the 
, ";, ttitudes underý)inriing 
fascism and the e: -. te. n-u of their covariation -.,, as 
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dif'--jerences -re. n-ained as to , iol,., r these were to be accountea 
. r. 
for, 
The ý-di-aZý in which certain F-s-2ects of' conduct and morality could V- 
be condemned by intlier-reting them as e: --ý s 0- w ko - -ression - the malevolent 
envy of the innately inferior classes oJ" huzaar-ity -.. ias evident in the 
L ,, ior, - of Scheler. 'fet i. -iter-)ret. -. t ions of similar Dhenome-na , Ihich had 
more radical --n-, ýlications were o-, en tuo those ;, iho, did not care tuo rest 
content with si-r-., a--, ly shiftin, ý; res-- 
. ponsibility 
--: L: or 1)hilistiniism, anc- 
crue", ty onto the iire. media: ble wealmess of hoi ., olloi. 
--", ) .II 
Aleich, -,. or ex-am-i-DIle, shares with Illanulf an interD. retation o-IE' the 
conditions o-f' 1-i--F'e of the Lower middle classes in Germany -as being at 
" t. -arian, re-pressive and brutal programme ado-ted the heart of he authori'LO 
by the Nazi rnoveme-.,.,.. Heich believes, however, that the fear of 
f this class only ex-iresses at their Treedom and the authoritariazlism o. L 
I itudes cornmion arnongstthe ,. qasses. It is u, -on such most intense ati. 
,.,,,:. cLes-!, Dread. sentiments that the estaIlished order relies for its 
'-hey leave the masses devoid of sel. ". -confidence and stalbility, or -U 
critical Jfaculties. 
Heich sees the inabilit-fy tto -achieve full se: ý-zuall -tul-fill ment as 
' 'he I c- authoritarianism, an outlool: thatj erabraces sadism a LO u root of Sa -9 
submissiveness to authority and a desire to im-pose submissiveness and 
se al u--, On o-thers. is J- na bis-, Droduced by reuression in LL L. - --L 
Iy I- 
fe, reiii-forced- by the continued denial -ou- to -cýve years o-L ii-L uae first I J. I- Li 
sexul'a-lity amongsto adolescents tihrough the of the -f 71 develOPment. o--, L to 
-I combined ei-Lorts 0,. Lamily, school and religion. 'The denJal o-f 
U- se, -:, aala. uy has vricler ramifica--Jons 
than the denial of other basic needs: 
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q-1 Ine su-, -cression of one's -, primitive -needs com-passes a dif. -Lerent 
result than the su-, )-ýression o-: 7* one's sexual needs. The former 
incites to rebelliong i-, hereas the latter - inasmuch as it 
causes sexual needs to be repressec-., them fror. 9 
conscdwsness and anchors itself as a moral defence - -ý--)revents 
rebellion a-aJnst both for, --, is of repression. U-, -L 
The result, as -ýeich notes elsewriere, is that: 
'I The se: r-ual sun-1-)ression dominating the masses, which finds its 
J- it e:,. -, --, ressa. on in su-perst, uioný mysticism o-IL" all 111-. inds, inhibition 
o--L thini-: ing, -L"ear o-f authority, blind obedience, reau-ness to J 
make sacrifices for the o-. ): )ressors, etc., is the most -oo-L%-er--, 'Ul 
wea-ýon of tyranny. The se:: Ual a,., iL, ýening oi -U the masses, 
, --! so zives rise to their awareness of their economic -jli6n'u7 
ýzjny. 
3 s7ýells the end of ty-jn 
s such awa], -zening to be achieved? ýýmongst Reichl s iDroposals 
ýs izor'-- to L-. ree -adolescents from the limitations 7, laced- u-,, )on their sexual 
I iulfillment by theýrestrictions imposed unon them by adults and by their 
wvin inhibiVions and ign. oraaace. . 'Leich contended that his ovin vrorlc in 
th. Ls area arnongst -, -. -or-, --ing class youth led to more elfective worl: on the 
-part of those already radicalised and the rac-Licalizzation of many who 
_: % 
4 
i-. Tere -, orT-. ierlv -a---Dolitical. is we shall see when we come to consider w- 
contemorary cam-aigns azainst se--, -u---al --, ermissiveness, contem-oorary 
conservative o-)-, -o-nents to the vie,,, Ts e:, -ýý--ý--, essed b, r deeich sh, --.. -e his .L -- -u 
o-ý-, inion thc--t the of adolescent se--, -ual 
Imowledge and conduct is a 
crucial, arena in wider issues w-; Il be settled. 
-man soci the .,. -, eich was not alone amongst 
Ger a, scientists oý_ 
-; -'Jbuting ini-Portance to the family in the forri. at-; o-n o, - - eriod in at u- 
fascist attitudes. The co'Llective enternrise of the 
rch 19 -' 
01s-. 1s-s -G -ady jr-stiu iDocial 2. esea. - uhe I tut e "o r 
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0-'L" the Dolitical significance of the family, I)ublished as 
.5 art zýtudien uber -',. utorita6 un, %--;, 2amilie 2his wor, olayed 'he 
-: 1 6 of a -,, re-paratory st-udy for The Autlioritarian ersonalLu. 1,71 the 
classic analysis of the -, Dsychologj- of authoritarianism. The notion 
of the authoritarian personality developed, in this bool: bears 
stri. "ing resemblance to the tem-perament oi Uhose )rone U f' to moral 
i. rridigmat ion that isto be 'L ound de-. 3 i c-, V- ed in Hanulf Is wo r,.: . Doth 
were born fromOthe ex. -perience of the rise ol -l" fascism and shared, 
together -. -iith -Heich, the conviction that such tem-)eraments were 
rooted in frustration and inaibition af., ': ecting large sections of 
the -ýO--Dulation. 
,, -iith the historical background in mind it is not sur-)rdsing "o 
find. the authors beginning their investigation by focusing a-, oo: q 
-fine as a set 'he ideology of anti-Semitiszi they de. L anti-Semitism. ýl 
of "stereoty-ý)ed negative o-cdnions describing the Je. 1s as threatening, 
"roni non-Jews and o' hos' immoral, and categorically different IL Uile 
, attitudes urging various -Iforms olf restriction, e-... -clusion, and 
su-ppression as a means of solvinZ Ithe Jewish problem 1 11 07 3-ach 
attitudes and o-pinions are resonant -viith those er-1countered arnongst the 
morally indiEnant . indeed, the alathors --)roceed 
to confirm the 
belie-I Uhat hos-'Ljility -, -, Ol, jards one minoritty is very 1Lý-ely to occur 
iti f together -, -dith hostili-; u--, 7 uowards others. -ý. nt i -S e r-, -s, -, i ý. ias -1 ound to 
be associalted iiiith etuhnocenturicism7 a term first introduced -by Sumner 
, ays -oov L, o signify tile elevation o-f one Is oi-m grouýp an(i its e all 
others, usizig it as a standard of coni'lparison against -vihicch all others 
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are measured. mid found. wanting. "'. L-: j'ach grou-p thiný: s its o-, vra 
fol', --. -vja, -ys are the only ri ht ones, and if it observes that other 
ps -ave other fol-z-, -T, -aysg these e--: cite its scorn" 3ot1h 
S=, merl s amthro---, ol-ogical evidence and everyday e. -., -)eraence attest to 
the gene-rall-ty of outgrouD rejection in social life, but the authors 
of The ; ',. uthoritarian A '-ersonaljjZ refined the conce--,, Ju by constructing 
an attitude scale -vihich taý, )-ped differences in the strength of, the need 
for outgrouDs to blame and denig-ra . uee 2aced with any social situation 
the ethnocentric individual exhibits a tendency to divide those 
involved into two -)arties, identifying uncritically with one side 
and rejecting the other out of' hand. All the blame for grow) conflict 
is laid u-, )or- outgroups without attempting to accounu II I --"o- why such groirps 
are as they are, other than by apý)eals to hereditary factors. Also, the 
-Drejudiced individual is -)re-,, ared to reject grouýDs with , Ijhich he has 
never -, )-Ievious--iy "been in cont act I a-ý-, _, ro aching new and strange -, Dersons 
and cultures not in a s--irit of interest and rece-ý-. t-. J-vity, but in one 
-ýoint o' of' doubt and rejection. 0- Darticular interest from the _L 
view oL the study o. -: L-" -, -, oral indignation is the manner in which hostil't, -,, 
I towards what the authors refer to as "imoral -ininorities", such as 
cri, -minais, tuý-)e insane "undesir-abie alements", tends tuo rnanifest 
ituse'Ll alongside such other e: ý--pressions of' e-uh-qo centri city as racialism 
I10 
a. nd nationalisnie I 
In see-i-cing to dra,,., i closer to the sycho logicall well-sý)rings of' 
'I ,I -j- 
. 
um-iocenuric ideologies, 
the authors 7., rent on to develo-! D ,,, hat they 
I If- f sm scale". 12- s scale is o" -, -,. articular termed he _, otentuialitY 
for fasci II L. I 
interest "because olf the m, ---, r-ner in -, -ihich it was used -Lor both correlational 
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and. ii Cý, -L 
-iter-. )retive by the authors. '--)art fro. m holding that 
t-Ile attitudes it encorl-,, asse, ": tend to be found toget'ner, the autlaors 
intoer--)retu the ps', rcho logical rneanýn- ol II "' individual attitudes according- m. .a-L. ) 
to -L; he con--, L. igu-ration in ,, ihich they occur. Thus q--uestions revealing 
a-, -. aC-herence -, '., o conventional middle class values tended to show a 
I ,, os, -uave relattion uuh irias not -1. shi--) . -iith ethnic -)-ejudice, but one whic' -vei-j 
strons. ý'ý, Ithough unconventional -rjre judd ce _,. )eo, )le 
tended to be free o 
some conventional -, )eo-,, -)le were -)rejudiced i-, Lilst others were not. ', I'-",. at 
a prejudicecl res-pondents- who a-pears to distuiný; uish --,. rejudiced frorn u-rl- 
.o 'L t , -, -lso adhere to conventional moral standards is the tendenc, 
7' the 
- -i- id ad-herence - jrejuLice(-, to derive such -, loi all jud-erien-Us from, a rig- Lf o 
'he standards o--F' -ý)resent 6 khe collective Uith which LOhey are at 
" internalized Cied, rather than by the critical a:. )-)lica'Uion o-J. identi JL 
values. "The i, -J-ay in i-, -hicoh such authorities are follo-vTed blindly and 
ý the are regarded. as beyond reT)roach emerges -Crom other sections ol 
attitude scale than -'ý. hose dealing ý, Jituh conventionallism, as does evidence 
concerning reactions to the unconventional: 
For exam--)le, e: --treme conventionalism going with a strong 
incli-riati-on .o --,, unish those vxho violate conventional values 
-i'. a is a differe-,: it thing from conventional values associated iW ul 
" live and let live. a -1hilloso-, hy of 
-4s is s i, -, i -o the manner in which "anul-L J! early 'vý! -, 
ilar tL" uses the 
various elements o. -f moral indig-riationg such as -punitiveness and. 
coercive asceticism, as well as evidence of envy aaicl a relative indifference 
uo h-LLman suflering as a rnetuhod of uncovering the -particular meaming which 
1064 
uhese have lor the individuals concerned, in acL IJI t. ) 
'di--on to claimin, - 
that such phenomenan, tuend to be d4s-playe- by the sanne Jndividuals. -1. -a 
In addition 4V to -ý. uestlons subsumed under the rubric of 
convent ionali sra, coverin6-- such areas as adherence to virtues associated 
with the rrotestant work ethic, are to be found others revealing 
authoritarian submission, a submissive, uncritical attitude towards 
the moral authorities of" the group. Such an attitude "would be evol"'I'lzed 
in relation to a variety of authority -. Ifigures - -Parents, older -eo-le, 
leaders, su-., ernatural -11ower, and so forth" . 
12 
-1 
ý, ou-. Iled -uith authoritarian siýComission we tend to 1-11"ind authoritarian 
aggression, a ''tendency to be on the lool,: out for, and to condemn, rejectq 
and --unish --)eo-, -, le who violate conventional values". 
13 This is clearly 
close to the essence of the disinterested tendency to infilict punish. ment. 
indeed, the -)ro-. osecl e. -, ---, ýlanation is similar: ind 9U-J 
The individual who has been forced to give in basic -)leasures 
and to live under a system of rigid restraints, and -,,, -ho therefore 
eels---)uu u-ponq is li-, -. ely not only to see-z an object u-pon which he 
It - can tL--. e it out" but -also to be 7-)articularly annoyed at the idea 
that another --Derson is "getting away ir4ith so, -. -iethinn, ". 
14 
"uthoritarianism is a sado-masochistic 7jhenomenor-, with 
au'u. qori'uari, -: -n aggression re-5resenting 
the sadistic elemen'U7 and 
authoritarian sifiomission the masochistic. Concerning those individuals 
characterised by authoritarian 7-,, S, 6-ression the autul-iors conclude: 
. -i. s the emotional -11i'Le ý, -Iqich 
this -; erson regards -as --ro-,,, er ar,. L 
U -L. --aru of himseli" is li`: elly to be very '. L,. iited, so the Jqýulses, 
se-, -. Ual and aggressive ones ,1 
17l 
'I 
Ich remain unconscious 
azid ego-alieen ---re li-,. -ýely to be strong and turbulent. Since in 
this circumstance a wide variety o-F' stimuli can tempt -'U. ',, ie individual 
J: 1 ; - and so arouse ý-is an. -, rziety 
(fear o-'L" -, -)-anishmenlio), the list of urai-lu-s, 
- -ýaterns, individuals, and he must condemn behaviour ,'V , roup s 
thali, 
gro-7, -s very long indeed. 
15 
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ý. Such a mechanism feeds ethnocentric aggression -,,., -, hich7 in 
this res- t, is. - 
., 
)ec-i 
but -, --, art o. -f a more general tendency to --)unish violators o1f' 
-C, conven'tional values: homosexuals, sex, ohendersq --)eo-,,, -)le 1,1, ith 
bad manners, etc. Unce the individual has convinced himself" 
,, hat there are -)eo-( he is -provided ple who ought to be 
, 6, iith a channel through i.., hich his dee-pest aSgressive in, -)ulses 
may be e. --. -: )-Aessed, even -ý: Iiile he thinks ol f hin-iself, as thoroughly 
-. ioral 
A. clorno and his associates inter-Dret authoritarian agb=ession as 
an instance of dis-,, lacerient whereby aE, -, ression aroused by in-grou-i 
au, thorities is dis-)-laced on to ouu-E; roizps. The authors, consonant 
-Ith their o'rei,,, dian su-o-ýositionsq evidently have in mind -the consequences 
in adult li. -Ee of childhood e: coeriences, but theLe is clearly a ossibility 
that dis7, lacemeznt coiild result from the contemporary experiences 
of adults. The authors of The Authorita-ian -ersonalLity -are, however, at 
ains tu o cl ist in juil S-"q 0-1 is1acementfrom"sc a-D e go ai ns -,, 'Tnere frustration, 
usually of an economic variety, finds an outlet uý-jon those not res-ponsible U-- 
as a result o-P inte-7lectual confusion concerning its causes. Authoritarian 
agg-ression arises .., -here there is a need to vent aggression aroused at 
the same time as a , )sychological inhibition against retaliation is 
created. 
J_ wL-U ro jection also -)lays a --art Jn outbrea's of moral indJ Snat on, 
oz, not onI the authoritarian conderm the moral I-a. ----ess- that he 
sees in othersq -out he is actually driven to see imr. -io--a-l attributes .L- 
in them whether this has a 'oasis in fact or not. -T'his is a further device 
-1 
-LO. -L counter--ing 
his inhibited tende:, ic-4L--S; he says to hiraself, as it 
were: 
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'I an not bad and deserving of -ý)unish. mentj lie is. ' In other 
words the individual's o-,, n unacce-, ýtable i, -, 1-, -, ulses are --)rojected 
-L on,, o other individuals and grou-ps who are then rejected. 17 
"learly here there is much of close concern tuo the sociolo, ý- I. _ý 
of 
moralitv mad the SI LUCLY 01' the disinterested tendency to Dunish: v 
Jonventionalisr-ig autuhoritariý-m submission, and authoritarian aGgression 
all have to do t. 1le moral as-, ect of iiiCe - with standards o. L conduct, 
ý, itll the a-athorities, o. -i-fenders against them who deserve to be 
lit 
pu. nlsn. ec. 
The other elements of authoritarianism v,, hich Adorno a--ld his 
co-i, jo--': ers delineate are: anti-intrace-)tion; su-c,, erstition and stereo-,, y--, )y; 
-ower and "touc; limess"; destructiveness and cynicism; -crojectivity; azid se- u -L - -4 
Ant i-in'v-r-ace--, t ion 'bears close resemblance to the aunti-intellectualissm .2U 
sociated with moral indignation in -olaces as f found to be ass which : "lanU'--L- to 
does nolu diverse as --fiftil-L century Lthens and Iýuritan England. llanul.: 
delve too dee-oly into tjhe meaning of this associat-ion, but the wathors 
o ", he --uthoritarian i. --erso-nalL: ýZ suggest that it -)lays the following role: fLýh 
The extremely anti-intrace-ptive individual is afraid of thinking 
about hLLTnazi --ýhenomena because he might, as it -v; ere, thin!,, the 
-L. ,, -Trong thoughus; he is afraid of genuine feeling because his 
0 touch with large areas emotions might get out of control. Out of 
of his own innErliffe, he is afraid of what might be revealed i" he, 
or others, should lool---. closely atu hinnselff. He is therefore against 
r ying' , agains-tw- concern with -,, That --)eople 
thinic and feel, against 
unnecessary I talIc' ; instead ýhe would '.. -ee-p busy, devote 
himself to 
-rac' and instead of e, -: amining an inner con, - lict bical -pursuitsq 9 
turn his thou, -,,, h'us to something cheerful. -In 
imrortant feature o 1- 
:, a L. Ij Uhe -iazi rprogram , it will be recalled, -vias 
the def mation o- 
-e 
the individual aware of himself everything that tended to niL. 
and his problems; not only was "Je,, -iish" -:, sychoan, --lysis quic1lý-ly 
e'liminated but every '-, -. ind of --, sycholoj7j e. -: ce-,. )'Ij aý--, titude testing 
came under attacIz. - 
19 
'7*ord as "the 'tereoluy-., Dy is defined in the contribution by Sazi-L 
1,20 
vendency to imechanicallY s-absLu. qe 
things lunder rigid categories . 
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. Ltulma. c groupsý -Lor e. -zam-cle, a. L u e regarded as homogenou enities, 
over-, generaliwinE; un-favourable traits with little mention made of 
e--'-. ce-ations ; 3tereoty-_py is mar'. "-.. ed by an inability to e-., ---Deraence 
members of the ou'k; b, --rou-, D as individuals. Each is seen and reacted to 
as a sort o. -L! ' sam- " the Die s-, -ecimen of the stereotyIDeclg reified inage of 
ý3-acla inca-acity for individuated ea: 7, erience renders the w -L -u 
reduction o-IC -irejudice through greater contact an uncertain enter-, rise. 
"'ll mei-abers o-l" the outuýý3; rou7-,, are regardled, in unfavourable termsq as t) 
alil: e. Lnd yetu ion of the s-)eci. L- 'i c characteristics cormprising 
the imager-,, - "reveals a basic contradiction in that no single i-riclividual 41 
teris-IL, 
2 
or grou7: D as a -6, diole could have all these charact -ics" . 
On studyin. -- the cluster off attitudes which constitute anti-Semitism 
it v,, aas found, for that e:.. --Dressioiis of lbelie: "' that most - Jews 
are extremely ex-clusive and aloo ff tended to be made by the same respondents 
who also held, that mosto Jews are too intrusive and -prying. 
22 Other 
., jower-see'-ing 
and isistencies can also be f'ound. "'. 1hatu is called ncor 
clannishness in the outgroup is transformed into moral righteousness, 
23 - C and loyalty in the ing 4,2he association o-O self-de: ense, ro u -3 "I 
such obliviousness to sel-f-con-uraclic-11; ion and hýýocrisy with other traits f' 
conumon to au-luho. -, j-Li rianism and the outlool,, -. o. -f the morally indignant had 1- a 
already been hinted at by 1--lanul., " in his study o--f j-:, uritan 1-deoloar. qj 
-j- 'herm 2anulf" s discussion o-i" the tendency of irotestantism to -, 'ar-U , Ore, IL I 
regard sinners as -ILundamentally dif--i"erent from the morally uDrlight 
rs o-f the community as being a manifestation of their greater membe... U 
2rol)ensity to --, lora" 
indiglation, in contrast j.., -ith the lv'atho! 4; _c 
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interpretation that all are weak and liable to err- appears to indicate 
that moral indignation is associated with greater stereotypy in reacting 
to moral outgroups. 
As Jay notes of Fromm's account of sado-masochism in Autoritat und 
Familie , masochism "manifested itself in the passive acceptance of 
'fate', the force of Tacts'. 'duty', rGods will', and so on" 4,24 This 
expression of masochism is a theme taken up again in the The Authoritarian 
Personality in the discussion of superstition, a tendency to shift 
responsibility from within the ind'ividual onto outside forces of a 
supernatural order. 
Power and "toughness" refers to a disposition to view all relations 
among people in terms of strong-weak, dominant-submissive, leader-follower 
dimensionsg combined with a desire to submit to authority and to 
exercise power over others. This plays a part in shaping reactions 
toebhnic and "moral" minorities as an individual who thinks of most 
human relations in such terms is likely to apply these categories to his- 
-l' t.,. e thinking about the nature of ingroups and outgroups to t1he detrinent o I- 
4 
latter, fearing, for example, that the outgroup is inevitably itself 
attempting to gain the upper hand. 
Destructiveness and cynicism are displayed in a generalized hostility 
to others and a vilification of human nature. The authoritarian individual, 
because he has had to accept many externally imposed restrictions upon 
I 
the satisfaction of his needsq harbours strong aggressive impulses. 
As the authors note: 
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One outlet for this aggression is through displacement 
onto out-groups leading to moral indignation and 
authoritarian aggression. Undoubtedly this is a very 
servicable device for the individual; yet, the strong 
underlying aggression seems at the same time to 
expýýss itself in some other way - in a _non"n0r. alized way 
Such hostility gives rise to rationalizations for aggression 
such as expressions of contempt for mankind and a justifactory belief 
that aggression is common to everyone. 
Projectivity encompasses the disposition to believe that wild 
and dangerous things go on in the world, a disposition which the 
authors interpret as the projection outwards of unconscious 
emotiona impulses. A preoccupation with evil forces in the worldq 
as shown by a readiness to think about and to believe in the existence 
of such phenomena as wild erotic excesses, plots and conspiracies, and 
danger from natural catastrophes, reflects strong unconscious urges to 
both sexuality and destructiveness. 
Finally, an e=ggerated concern with sexual deviance and excesses, C: DC'- 
stimulated by repressed sexual desires in danger of getting out of hand, 
completes the protrait of the authoritarian which emerges from the 
potentiality for fascism questionnaire. Further depth is given to this 
portrait by data obtained from clinical interviews and projective 
material. Additional evidence is produced which reveals authoritarians 
to be extrapunitive, to display a tendency to blame other people for 
any difficulties which arise. Non-authoritarians, on the other hand, tend 
to be either impunitiveg refraining from blaming altogether, or to 
be intrapunitiveg exposing themselves to exagerated self-blame. 
26 
\ 
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Suspicion and distrust, found by Ranulf to be associated with 
punitiveness, can also be seen in the authoritarisn's view of the world 
as a dangerous and hostile jungle. 
27 Poverty is met with indifference 
or taken as a further opportunity to exercise the desire to humiliate 
and attack those outgroups which display evidence of weakness. 
Love,, admiration, and readiness for submission are 
automatically aroused by power of persons or 
institutions, while comtempt is equally areused by 
powerless persons or institutions. The very sight 
of a powerless person may llgd to the urge to attack, 
dominate, or humilitte him 
What are the forces which bring together and underpin this 
particular configuration of attitudes? Like Reich, the authors see 
the root of the problem as resting in repressive family relationships. 
Prejudiced individuals come from homes where discipline was harsh and 
arbitrary, exercised within a relationship of clearly defined dominance 
and submission. 
29 
The goals of their parents child-rearing practices 
reflected a preoccupation with social hierarchy and success. Such 
parents, concerned with protecting and advancing their own status 
and that of their of their offspringg are likely to be intolerant 
of any sign of impulses detrimental to such aims. Strict parental 
discipline provokes aggression which is put down with a firm hand. 
This aggression, denied an outlet in retaliation, finds eventual release 
through displacement onto others through moral indignation and other 
outlets. 
While substantial agreem6nt exists between Ranulf and Adorno 
et al. concerning the covariation of the attitudes considered above, 
the explanation of authoritarianism which the latter propose clearly 
echoes Scheler's discussion of ressentiment. 
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Authoritarians display a tendency to make a virtue out of the necessity 
of their self-negating submissiveness through idealization of those in 
authority. Nevertheless, the underlying repressed resentment that fuels 
such idealization occasionally slips out in interviews and finds 
expression in projective tests. Generally, however, idealization 
prevails and failures and weaknesses are projected outwards onto 
minorities. While the mechanism at work is similar, however, both 
evidence and argument encountered in The Authoritarian Personality 
constitute a great advance upon Sche-ler's speculations. 
The evidence for the genesis of authoritarianism in childhood was 
drawn from adult recollections, the accuracy of which may obviously 
be open to question. However, in a subsequent study one of the original 
contributors to The Authoritarian Personality, Prenkel-Brunswick, 
reported confirmation of most of the original findings from a direct 
study of prejudice in childhood and adolescence. She found that, at 
" ten, the personalties of some children tended to least after the age o-A 
fall into patterns similar to those of adult authoritarians. The homes 
cl 
30 of such children were strict, rigid and punitive. 
We have seen above that both the constituent elements of 
authoritarianiam and the interpretation of the psychological mechanisms 
underpinning and linking these elements are strikingly similar, and 
offer further corroboration to Ranulf's ideas concerning the values and 
outlbok off the morally indignant. Such similarity is not at all surprising 
given the social and political context in which both theories were 
formulated. 
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Adorno and his colleagues extended notions developed in an attempt-bD 
understand the psychological roots nourishing the rise of European 
fascism to the study of prejudice in post-war America. Ranulf drew 
similar conclusions from the same circumstances and proceeded to 'use 
4 these ideas to account for the strength of moral indLgnation amongst 
groups far more widely separated in time and space. How far have 
subsequent psychological and sociological developments confirmed 
or modified the interpretation of moral indignation tb be found in these 
accounts? Stu(ýýs of every facet of authoritprianiam are legion and 
I shall confine my attention to those which are particularly helpful 
in clarifying the sources of moral indignation and its continuing 
influence in contemporary society. The latter point is particularly 
necessary in view of Harold LessivLall's contention, made in 1964, that moral 
indignation has been swept away in contýamporary complex societies 
because of their cultivation of disciplined calculation as a result 
of their dependence on scientific knowledge. 
With the advent of contextuality and expediency - the "big 
picture" and the "working arrangement" - moral indignation 
slowly vanishes as a source of support for public order. 
In fact its erratic course under rapidly changing 
reality conditions can undermin 11 public and civic order. 
Society learns to play it cool. 
First, however, I shall consider how the interpret? tion of the 
origins of authoritarianism has grown somewhat closer to Ranulf's own 
ideas on the foundation of these attitudes and then proceed to examine 
how the light shed on the nature of moral indignation in the study of 
17.3 
authoritarianism can be suppletýented by other stucLes o: I the 
psychology of moral behaviour. 
Locating the genesis of authoritarian attitudes such as sado- 
masochism and extrapunitiveness in childhood clearly differs from 
Ranulf's contention that relative deprivation in adulthood is the 
source of such attitudes. Some reconciliation of the two approaches 
is, however, possible if the family is viewed as mediating the influence 
of such deprivation which the parents experience in the wider society. 
In the study by Frenkel-Brunswick referred to above, for example, 
-P the parents of authoritarian it was found that the punitiveness o.., 
children was associated with feelings of relative deprivation arising 
from the gap between their actual socio-economic status and that to 
which they aspire. 
Further litik. s between authoritarian attitudes and the mcial 
structure have been pointed to by subsequent research. Contrary, 
however, to the belief that the lower middle class are the bearers 
of these attitudes, a belief which informed may interpretations of 
the psychology of fascism in the 1930's, there is evidence thEit 
authoritarianism continues to increase as one moves further down the 
social scale into the working class. 
32 
Several explanations have been advanced for the negative 
correlation of authoritarian attitudes with social class. Partly, 
consistently with the stress laid on the importance of childhood 
in The Authoritarian Personality, this may be accounted for by class 
f 
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differences in child-rearing practices. Physical punishment, for 
example, ý, ihich tends to foster authoritarian and ethnocentric attitudes, 
is resorted to more frequently by ,, jorking class parents as a means 
'3 of social control. " This is not at all surprising, given that ot'ner C) 
resources oil control are less available to the underprý-vildged, 
quite apart from the tensions stimulated by deý)rivation and the 
p6ssibil-ities of redirected aggression that this opens up. Other CD 
techniques of social control, such as love deprivation require a 
DTeat dealcf free time to devote to individual attention to children 0 
if they are to be successful 
Relatlionships nurturing authoritarianism are not, however, 
ccn. fined to the family. Authoritarianism displays a consistent 
decline as the number of years of education an. individual has had 
34 
increases. This is often interpreted as due to the beneficial 
effects of increcSJL. -., -', ' sophistication dispelling simplistic notions. CD 
There is probahly an element of truth in this claim, particularly as 
it applies to exposure to alternative perspectives. One point often 
overlooked, however, is that education itself establishes a form 
of pseudo-ethnic-Ltyq a basis for status claims and distinctions 
irrespective of any practical or intellectual advantages 7, ýihich the rD 
7 
process off eedlLuca-ttion is -2ur-orted to achieve. -. /5 Formal education 
constitutes a resource in the struggle for ps: lc-'-ologica'L and social C: )CD 
4 The iatter, sec + ur--. y and advantage unavailable to those thol-)t it. 
with strategies open to them, are therefore to be found more 
often resort to the narrower range of attributes available tz) 0Lu- 
them as a ", )as-, -s 
for invidious comparison, such as membership of a 
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category of hunamity deemed racially superior. 
II. Alienation and moral-conformity 
Education is also seen by Kohn as one of the most powerful 
forces shaping the distribution of conformist attitudes and 
associated beliefs. He draws this conclusion from studies undertaken 
in Italy and the United States, reported in Class and Conformity, 
a work based upon the assumption that hierarchical position is the 
most important determinant of man's fate and beliefs. The further one 
moves down the social hierarchy, the greater is the likelihood of 
encountering conformity, a view of life which stresses "following 
the dictates of authority, focusing on external consequences to the 
exclusion of internal processes, being intolerant of nonconformity 
and dissent, being distrustful of others, having moral standards that 
strongly emphasize obedience to the letter of the law. 436 Futthermore, 
a conformist orientation irdudes an unwillingness to 
permit others to st-ep out of narrowly defined limits 
of what is proper and acceptable. Thus, a conformist 
orientation implies not only intolerance of deviant 
political belief, but also intolerance of any ' beliefs thought to be threatening to the social order - 
religious beliefs, ethnic and racial identificaýýonsq 
even beliefs about proper dress and deportment. 
Which are the particular facets of social inequality that 
account for these differences? Partly, as noted above, it is 
attributable to differences in length of education, an association 
which Kohn attributes to education providing the intellectual 
flexibility and breadth of perspective necessary to break away from 
38 
conformity into a self-directed way of ii--, Le. 
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Those more favourably situated in the hierarchical ordet of 
society are not only blessed With a better education, however. Their 
occupations also afford. them other privileges, including one, the 
amount of self-direction which a job allows and requires, which 
Kohn found to be the most important of several aspects of occupational 
differences accounting for the extent of conformist values. The 
greater the degree of occupational self-direction, the smaller the 
hold of conformist attitudes. Middle class occupations tend to be 
more self-directed for a number of reasons, such as the absence of 
closempervision, the nature of dealing with people or data rather than 
things, and the necessity of having to deal with a variety of tasks 
and decisions. Kohn's findings concerning the influence of 
bureaucratic employment upon values is of particular interest as it 
has been held that bureaucracies rewards and foster conformist 
personalties in contrast with theBlf-reliance of the capitalist 
entrepreneurial spirit. Against this claim Kohn argues: 
These criticisms of bureaucracy may misinterpret the 
conditions of life faced by the inhabitants both 
of the entrepreneurial and of the bureaucratic worlds. 
We often fail to recognize just how little the small - 
or medium - sized entrepreneur controls the conditions 
of his own existence and just how much Ie is subject 
to the authority of customers, sources of credit 
and capital, insurance companies, and officialdom. 
And we often fail to recognize that monolithic- seeming 
bureaucracies allow free play for -in-fact, may require 
initiative of new sorts: in the creation of ideas, in 
the building of empires, and in the competition for 
advancement. 
39 
And his findings suPPOrt this contention, indicating that 0 
authoritarian attitudes and conformist values diminish according to 
the size and complexity of the organizations in which individuals 
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are employed. From this it would appear that Ranulf's division between 
the upper and lower middle class can encompass contemporary conditions 
arising out of the decline of the traditional petty bourgeoisie of 
self-employed traders and artisand and the growth of a new middle 
class of salaried employees. But differences in conformism within 
the new middle class appear to be only moderately influenced by income 
differencesq the principal criterion in Ranulf's treatment, being 
determined to a far greater extent by the degree of occupational 
self-direction. 
40 
Concerning historical trends in conformism, Kohn sees 
industrialization, both historically and in the developing nations, 
as leading to a decline in the strength of such values as a result 
of the growth of education and the increase, on balance, of jobs 
requiring judgement, thought and initiative. His optimism concerning 
the role of automation in consolidating and extending this trend is, 
however, probably misplaced. Amongst lower white collar workersq 
for example, the nature of many jobs in offices following automation 
becomes less, not more, challenging, with tasks becoming more simplified 
and repetitious. 
41 
Working class parents seek to imbue their children with the 
values of conformity which spring from their educational and 
occupational experience, reinforcing the class associations of such 
-hat one is at the mercy values. Conformist values and the belief -t 
of forces and people beyond one's control or even understanding are 
the product of conditions of life which allow little freedom of 
thought or action and provide little reason to feel in controT 
of fate. The working class tend to see theAorld in terms which 
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make conformity seem necessary and appropriate. 
Self-direction is a central value for men of higher 
class position, who see themselves as competent members 
of an essentially benign society. Conformity is a central 
value for men of lower class position, who see themselves 
as less competent members of an essentially indifferent 
or threatening society. Self-direction, in short, is 
consonant with an orientational system premised on the 
poasibilities of accomplishing what one sets out to do; 
conformity, with an orientational system premised on the 
dangers of stepping out of line. 42 0 
Is the conformist perpective, while a handicap to those seeking 
access to the middle class, an accurate reflection of themrld 
in which the working class finds itself and an adequate meqns 
of accommodating to it? Kohn is somewhat ambivalent on this point. 
While the general tenor of his argument is that such a perspective 
is understandable tiven the circumstances in which they find themselves, 
he does hint that he considers it a more inaccurate reflection of the 
world than the beliefs of the middle class. Such an interpretation 
of authoritarian beliefs certainly appears in The Authoritarian 
Personality where the inaccuracy ascribed to the beliefs entertained , 
by authoritarians is used as evidence that they must be the result 
of projected fantasies distorting perception of the world. 
Nettler has pointed out, however, how such pelf-congratulatory 
equations of goodness with accurate perception and mental maturity 
made by middle class observers tend to be class biased and 
ethnocentric, failing to comprehend the rougher nature of the world 
which many others find themselves confronting with more limited 
resources. Nettler also cites evidence that such obeervers are also 
quite ready to regard their own views on matters concerning which there 
is no clear evidence availaBe as self-evidently sane and correct 
in comparison with the bias they attribute to their subjects. The 
crudity of racist ideologies is manifestq but the belief that the 
world is a jungle may well reflect the greater likelihood of those 
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in the lower class being exposed to a hostile eiavironment. 
43 
Hebb and Thompson's theory of human society in relation to 
emotion is relevant here, They emphasize that man is, contrary to 
surface impressions, the most emotionally vulnerable qnimal. 
Civilization shelters men from this threat, providing an environment 
which reduces provocation to fear, anger, disgust and jealousy and 
other emotions. 
44 Extending their analysis, it could be argued 
that middle class conditions and institutions shield members from 
many of the more disturbing features of sbciety, quelling their aggressive 
passions at the price of ignorance. Indeed, on the theory of Hebb 
and Thompson it is precisely those who are trained and required 
to develop complex modes of thought who are most likely to be 
vulnerable to emotional upset and need to be more securely insulated 
from reality. Part of the association of education with less authoritarian 
beliefs may well arise from a longer exposure to over-optimistic 
ideologies about the nature of man and society. This takes place 
under favourable conditions of isolation from contact with the 
imperfections of the adult world, longer exposure producingg7eater 
commitment to such views. Such commitment and the sheltered conditions 
of their lives leave many in the middle class with beliefs about the 
nature of society belied in the experiences of the less fortunate. 
45 
Kohn is not alone in producing results which support the 
notion that the association of class with conformity and 
authoritarian attitudes is in large part the result of the degree of 
self-direction, involved in different occupations. Lipsitz, for 
example, found assembly line workers to be more punitive and fatalistic 
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in their approach to life than workers of comparable income 
and education in the same plant who enjoyed greater control over their 
work. 
46 Such a finding fits well with Kohn's interpretation of the 
importance of the degree of freedom entailed by certain tasks and 
relationships. Alienation underpins conformism. 
There areq however, clearly other factors at work in accounting 
for differences in the effects of occupations upon values and beliefs. 
Differences between working class and middle calss attitudes towards 
toughness and violence, for example, have implic, -! tions for the ideas 
and practices adopted for dealing with disobedience and misconduct. 
As Collins remarks in discussing occupational class and cultures: 
"The more physical exertion and danger involved in thework (whether 
manual labor or fighting), the more one values toughness, courage, and 
action... situations of physical activity lead to a high value on 
toughness and hence a considerable use of coercion in backing up 
orders,,. 
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III. The breastplate of righteousness 
Studies of the authoritarian personality such as those 
conducted by Reich and Adorno interpret moral indignation as in 
part the product of repressed impulses. The morally indignant 
long to taste the forbidden fruit, but dare not. Laud Humphreys 
has produced a fascinating study which goes further, indicating that 0 
many of those who stand out from their neighbours as pillars of 
virtue are led to such a position not so much by repressed desire 
as by surreptitious practice of vice. 
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Humphreysinterviewed a number of men concerning their social 
and political outlooks. Although they were unaware of the fact, 
he had also established that they were involved in otherwise 
undiscovered homosexual encounters in public conveniences. Amongst 
this group of secret deviants there were a number who had donned 
what Humphreysrefers to as the "breastplate of righteousness": 
In donning the breastplate of righteousness, the covert 
deviant assumes a protective shield of superpropriety. 
His armor has a particularly shiny quality, a refulgence, 
which tends to blind the audience to certain of his 
practices. 
' 
To others in his everyday world, he is not 
only normal but righteous - an exemplar of good behaviour 
and rightthinking... The secret offender may well believe 
he is more righteous than the next man - hence his shock 
and outrage, his disbelieving indignation, when he is 
discovered and discredited. 49 
The breastplate of righteousness is evident in social and 
political attitudes. These Humphreys found to be conservative on 
issues such as economic reform and involvement in the Vietnam 
war, as well as opposition to civil right5and - surprisingly enough 
given the fate awaiting these deviants if discovered - support for the 
forces of law and order. One of the covert deviants, a mini'ster, 
felt that the police should not give as much regard as they 
do to the rights of citizens. Vicesquad activity, he insisted, 
should be increased: "This moral corruption must be 
stopped". One young closet queen had this to say about 
vice squad activity: "They should be more strict. I can 
think of a lot of places they ought to raid". 
So consistent were the replies. -in encouraging more 
vice squad activity that a portrait emerges of these 
men as moral crusaders. This at least suggest5the 
ironic possibility of a type of moral entrepreneur 
who contributes to his own stigmatization. ý Homosexual 
folklore insists that "there is a witch behind every witch 
hunt"... It is not necesspry to adopt a psychoanal, -)rtic 
view point in order to discern the self-hatred behind 
such a punishment process. 
49 
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The secret offender's . 
breastplate of righteousness is not 
limited to right-wing social and political attitudesq Humphreys 
noted that they were also remarkably neat in their personal attire 
and grooming. Their cars were kept spotless and their homes stood 
out from those surrounding them as better-kept with well-trimmed 
gardens. Their religious orientations tended towards the more 
authoritarian religious bodies and resentment of the liberalization 
of the churches. Two of those interviewed volunteered the information 
that they were members of the John Birch Society. From his interviews, 
Humphreys remarks that "the researcher gains the impression that 
'the Bible on the table, and the flag upon the wall' may be signs 
of secret deviance more than of 'right thinking' ,. 
50 
It is interesting to note the characteristics which distinguish 
those who put on the brem-tplate of righteousness from those who do 
not amongst Humphreys' sample of homosexuals. The sex life of the 
former is more limited. Sexual relations between husband and wife 
areinre and unfulfillingg often the result of religious teachingg 
such as Roman Catholic views on contraception. Sex becomes confined 
almost exclusively to frightened, furtive and isolated acts of 
impersonal sex with --other men. 
51 In this they differ from those 
who openly participate in the gay community and who seek other more 
personal and lasting sexual relations with men. 
Another distinguishing characteristic is occupation, those 
involved in the brief homosexual encounters studied by Humphreys 
whovere less likely to put on the breastplate of righteousness tended 
to be employed in more independent occupations, that is, occupations 
which allow them freedom of movement and greater security of 
employment, 
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Dependent occupations, those without such freedom and security, 
tend to be associated with lower educational levels and annual 
family income. All these factors combine to leave those in dependent 
occupations with fewer resources with which to conceal their deviance 
and defend challenges to their reputation, and so they cling all the 
more tenaciously to the reassurance and safety offered by the 
breastplate. Marriage, too, leaving men with more to lose as the CD 
result of their clandestine activity being exposed, also leads to 
such a clareful concern with moral propriety. 
Humphreys recollections from his involvement with undercover 
deviants from ten -Tears experience in the pastoral ministry 
are noteworthy("tearooms" is the expression used to refer to public 
conveniences used for homosexuality by those involved): 
I recall years of puzzlement over the striking 
respectability of the visible lives of so many of those 
who came to my pastoral attention; the countless 
alcoholics with exdeptionally neat apartments and 
tidy houses; the highly respected businessmen 
arrested in tearooms; the hyperorthodox clergymen 
with extracurricular sex lives. In one pastorate, 
three of my Laymen were active in the John Birch 
Society. One of these was a secret alcoholic who 
beat his wife, another was a tearoom habitue, 
and the third stole from his employer with regularity... 
the secret alcoholic, the embezzler, the +, earoom 
customer, may appear to his neighbours as the 
paradigm of propriety, the finest of citizens. 
It is not at all unlikely that he will be a moral 
entrepreneurgserving on the vice squad or heading the 
local'League for Decent Literature. 52 
IV. Repression and prosocial aggg-ression 
Maria Ossowska, in her study of the social determinants of 
moral ideas, notes: 
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Svend Ranulf... tries to prove that, whenever the 
middle class comes into power, one can observe a 
growing severity in the penal la,.,,,, a growing severity 
of blame in the press and literature. This severity 
is the result of renunciation. Today we would use 
the word "frustration". 53 
If, indeed, we were to use this word, it would in large part 
be due to the ; C--uitfulness of what has come to be known as 
"the frustration-aggression hypothesis"54 It is clear that much 
that is central to Ranulf's theory can be translated into 
terms which reveal its consistency with this hypothesis. More 
specifically, it is one particular response to frustration which 
is involved here: displacement. This involves a frustrated 
individual who, being unable to vent his hostility against the actual 
source of his frustration (because the latter is not apparent or is 
too intimidating), finds a scapegoat to attack. Such a reaction to 
frustration is so fundamental that it is not limited to human 
societies but can readily be seen operating amongst monkeys and other 
animals&55 
It is not difficult to find evidence of this Dractice in 
human affairs, including the allocation of responsibility qnd the 
punishment of offenders. Apart from all the instances cited by 
Ranulf, for example, it is possible to interpret fluctuations in the 
practice of lynching in the Southern States of the United States 
as displaced hostility. Lynchings in the South have tended to 
occur in those counties whichg relative to the average level of CD 
" their 
states, were more economically deprived, being "lower in per capita 
bank depositsq per capita farm and factory income, and automobile 
and farm ownership". 
56 
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There is also evidence indicating that relatively severe and 
unexpected declines in income and security brought about by falls in 
the value of cotton were responsible for raising the level of lynching 
between 1882 and 1930.57 
Berkowitz, in his appraisal of the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, sees in such findings evidence of displaced aggression 
arising from economic frustrations finding an outlet under the guise 
of the -enforcement of justice. 
58 
While such an analysis is clearly 
consistent with Ranulf's findings concerning the "disinterested" 
nature of much of the willingness to assist in the punishment of 
offenders, it could also be argued that lynching was also tied 
more directly to economic fluctuations, reflecting the intensity of 
competition for scarce --oods and resources and serving as an instrument r-- 
in the struggle to retain or enhance control over these. This is 
one of the inferences which may be drawn from Raper's research 
which reveals that, between 1900 and 1930, the lynching rate 
varied directly with the white-black ratio of inhabitants in a county. 
The larger the size of the white-black ratio in favour of the former, 
the higher tended to be the rate of lynching. 
59 Since the counties 
-, )here blacIz were more numerous were run on plantation systems, black 
tenants and workers were basically indispensable. In the impoverished 
counties where blacks were a small minorityg howeverg they were also 
economic competitors with the Poor !; hites who formed the bulk of lynching 
mob. s. 
There is much else in the r9search generated by the frustration- 
aggression hypothesis to illuminate the psychologic-1 diechanisms 
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which mediate between social conditions and outbursts of moral rage. 
Research in this tradition has tended, for example, to support 
the conclusion that where disapproved forms of aggression are stifled C. ) 
and denied expression, hostility willmanifest itself in the 
establishment of a temperamental inclination to, ýv-ards prosoical 
aggression - that is, in the desire to employ hostility in lavq CD 
enforcement and inflicting punishment for rule breaking. 
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This 
accords well with Ranulf's interpretation off the hostility generated 0 
in the lower middle class as a result of their thwarted desires finding 
an outlet in punitiveness. The upper classes, being more ? ble to satisfy 
their desires and vent their aggression more openly, escape the 
resentment - laden mentality which such pent-up hostility generates. 
Punishment provides an outlet for such hostility, for the stereotype 
of the criminal, like thalt of the Jew, is built into our literatureq 
our lanuage and our myths, providing an aroury of excuses for 
inddl. ging in persecution and cruelty. 
V. The open society and the_open mind 
EX-o]-orations of displacement undertaken within the frustration- 
aggression hypothesis tradition have tended to concentrate upon 
irrational emotional mechanisms as the psychological source of 
hostility. Piaget, to whom we shall turn in a moment, displays 
the much more cognitive-oriented approach in analysing the lixiks 
Of SOC4 bet, ýljeen involvement in certain 
types 
-Lal relationship and 
responses to deviance which one would expect of him from his other 
studies. Insights into the cognitive style associated with 
punitiveness are, however, also present in The Authoritarian 
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Personality and the idea that authoritarianism is part of a more general 
pattern oL C encoding experience has been further developed by Rokeach. 
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The cognitive style of the authoritarian as revealed'by . 
the work of Adorno and his colleapues is marked by rigidity and 
avoidance of ambiguity. Such a style displays little of the 
readiness to accept and enjoy differences and diversities which 
is pa. -t oil the tolerant personality. Instead there is a need to 
set off clear demarcation lines and establish relative strengths. 
Such avoidance of amibguity is not limited to social relationships, 
but is extended to apprehending theworld in general, with prejudiced 
individuals being only prepared to see the world in terms of well C) 
worn traditional categories. 
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In general, tolerant individuals show 
a willingness to expose themselves to a broader rangge of experience 
even at the risk of having to alter their preconceived notions of the 
world or to sustain conflicts. 
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The basis of such an approach to the world is insecurity and 
fearg whether these are implanted deep in the personality or arise 
from the failure of traditional solutions in the face of threatening 
soý; ial changes. 
64 
Tb-+s, interpretation is basically similar to 
Rokeach's interpretation of differences in belief systems in terms 
of dogmatism. Dogmatism, or closed-mindedness, is charqcterised, 
relative to open-mindedness, by the coexistence of logically 
contradictory beliefs-, relatively little difference seen between 
the systems of beliefs which are rejected and ignorance concerning 
their content; a g7eater intensity with which opposing beliefs 
are rejected; an underlying belief that the world one lives in is a V 
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threatening one; a belief that authority is absolute and that people 
are to be evaluAted in accordance'with their agreement with such 
authority; and a narrow time perspective which overemphasizes or 
fixates upon the past, or the present or, particularly, the future. 
In this last orientation the present is held as of no account in its 
own right. To the future oriented: 
The present is but a vestibule to the future, 
unimportant in its own right, full of injustice 
and human suffering... Such a person, guided 
by his belief-disbelief system, typically 
expresses overtly a greater confidence of what 
the future holds in store, and a grea er readiness 
to make predictions about the future. 
5 
Such commitment reflects the major function of closed belief 
systems, which is defend the self or group against anxiety, for the 
central feature of anxiety, as opposed to fear, is a dread of the 
future, that "most ambigous and unknowable medium in man's cognitive 
world". 
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There is, furthermore, the selective avoidance of exposure 
to contrary opinions and experiences which might prove incongruous 
with one's beliefs. Since a dogmatic system of belief functions 
as a kind of defensive carapace holding the personality together, 
the existence of other people who think differently is threatening to 
personal stability. When they do come face to face with the 
unconventional their reaction is more likely to be hostile rejection 
than cool appraisal. 
Belief systems 
represent Iveryman's theory for understanding the 
the world he lives in. On the other hand, they 
represent Everyman's defense network through 
which information is filtered, in order to render 
harmless that which threatens the ego. 
67 
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Amongst dogmatists the latter function Tpredominates whether as the 
result of threat-induced anxiety being built into the personality 
on the basis of formative childhood experiences or emanating from the 
contemporary situation in which they find themselves. Individuals 
become disposed to accept or to form closed systems of belief to the 
extent that they are made to feel isolated and helpless and thus 
anxious about what the future holds in store for them. 
Rokeach does not go into the social sources of dogmatism in 
any depthq other than in his study of the trend for dogmatism to 
increase within the Catholic Church whenever the threats to its 
strengh,. and security were gaining ground. It has become clear, 
however, that, like authoritarianism, dogmatism is reduced by education. 
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And, of course, the title of Rokeach's bookq The Open and dcsed Mindq 
is reminiscent of Popper's use of the terms "open" and "closed" 
societies in The Open Society and Its Enemies suggesting links 
between closed societies and closed mindsO 
Popper saw many of the major dimensions of dogmatic systems 
of belief as rooted in specific social structures. Although being 
ready to admit that all primitive societies are not identicalg but 
embrace a diverse set of cultural configurations, he neverthelss 
feels that, in generalq most display a "magical or irrational attitude 
towards the customs of social lifeit. 
70 The main characteristic of 
t. his rpentality is the lack of distinction between customary 
regularities of social life and the regularities found in nature, 
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a mode of thought which is often accompanied by the belief that both 
are kept within their prescribed course by supernatural sanctions. 
Popper regards such beliefs as expressing deep personal fears of changing 
a routine. 
In open societies, on the other hand, men enter into the realm 
of freedom. People are not longer bound to a set social iole with 
set social responses dictated by sacrosanct codesof conduct. But 
such freedom, despite its manifest advantages, is bought at a price. 
As the result of living in a society in which traditional bonds have 
been broken and beliefs shattered, many come to experience what 
Popper refers to as the strain of civilization: 
This strain, this uneasiness, is a consequence of the 
breakdown of the closed society. It is still felt 
even in our day, especially in times of social change. 
It is the strain created by the effort which life in 
an open and partially abstract society continually 
-o-be rational, to demands from us - by -the endeexoi= 4. 
forgo at least some of our emotional social needs, tj 
look after ourselves, and to accept responsibilities 
It is against such demands that the dogmatist closes his 
mind, creating a sympathetic audience for the attacks launched 
upon the open society by traditional authorities and vested interests 
whi ch find their former pre-eminence challenged. In the writing of 
Plato, for example. Popper finds ample evidence of such appeals to 
dogmatism as the desire for the ultimate repression of critical 
opposition- to authority and the practices it establishes or 
protects, and absolute confidence about being in possession of the 
laws of history. It even pervades such abstract areas of thought 
72 
as Plato's theory of Forms. 
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On the wholeg Popper's argument is sound, 'thoug, li 
. 
in equating 
mysticism with irrationality, and treating both this mysticism and 
critiques of contemporary institutions in comparison vlrith. those. of. tribal 
society as doctrines hostile to the values of the open society, he 
goes too far. To take just one example of a movement which not only 
called for a return to the virtues of primitive society and embraced 
a mystical philosophy, but was also hostile to anti-democratic and 
obscurantist forces, Taoism might be cited. The literature of 
Taoism is redolent with the condemnation of social inequality and 
exploitation and calls for a return to the freer and more 
egalitarian society believed to have existed in the past of China 
and which its creators quite probably observed amongst some of the 
tribes bordering Chinese society. Taoism is also notable for 
providing conditions favourable to an empirical interest in the ways of 
the natural world and the development of science. 
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In considering Popper's analysis of authoritarianism in ancient 
Athens, it is well worth recalling Plat ds comments upon the need 
- with the outside world in to isolate the ideal city from contact 
order to stifle social change and the emergence of individualism, CD 
as providing early evidence that the enemies of the open society were 
well aware of the social sources which nourished it. In the Laws 
for example, we hear that 
had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support 
on other countriesq no human power could have preserved 
you from corruption... 
Por the seaq although an agreeable, 
is a dangerous companion and a highway of strange morals and 
manners as well as commerce. 
74 
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It is also stipulated thattraders shall be kept beyond the city 
boundary, forbidden to introduce any innovation and that those 
appointed to deal with them shall "hold the intercourse with him which 
75 is necessary and this shall be as little as possible . 
Popper recognises that the upper class were not all drawn to 
the authoritarian programme of the oligarchs - Pericles is perhaps the 
most outstanding example. What was it that accounted for the differences 
within the ranks of the upper classes in anciert Athens? Popper 
provides no convincing explanation, but Gouldner, in his discussion 
of Plato and the origins of social theory in Classical Greece, does 
provid-e an interpretation of this division which is in line with 
Popper's ideas and which bears directly upon the concerns of the present 
work. 
76 This interpretation centres upon the distinction between 
"Locals" and "CosmoPolitans" which Gouldner had originally elaborated 
in a study of differing value orientations amongst contemporary 
scholars. 
77 Cosmopolitans can be distinguished from locals by 
their tendency to be more highly committed to their particular 
occupational activity and less so tQ, the particular community or 
establishment in which they work. In Classical Greece Cosmopol. itans 
are typified by the itinerant Sophists, plying their craft in different 
cities with manifestly different customs, constitutions and beliefs. 
Locals, on the other hand, because of their birth or longer tenure 
in a community, are more likely than Cosmopolitans to be attached to 
its traditional val'ues. For the same reasons, Locals are more likely 
to be deeply enmeshed in a lasting network of informal relationships 
with other Locals who can exert influence on their belýeds. G'ouldner's 
r,, 3marks are so apposite to any discussion of intra-class differences 
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in morality that they are worth citing in some det2ril: 
Further, one of the clearest findings about 
contemporary Local scholars is that they - much 
more than Cosmopolitans - m, anifest a tende: incy to,, ýiard 'Irule 
tropism", that is, a disposition to believe that 
community rules and formal regulations are too 
lenient and in need of strengthening. This, 
it is notaworthy, is all the more true of Locals 
whose influence in their group is low rather 
than those whose influence is high. 
There is an almost point-by-point correspondence 
between the social ideology of this ideal type 
of-Local and certain aspects of Batonic social 
theory, especially with respect to their common 
stress on values rather than morally neutral 
technical skills, their emphasis on consensus 
and unity in the group, and their common stress, 
notably in Plato's Laws, on the use of formal 
rules and legal procedure as order maintaining 
devices. It may be that Plato's emphasis on 
formal laws, especially pronounced in his later 
work, is expressive of a social outlook ý- 
particularly characteristic of powerless Locals, 
for, as I have noted, his reference groups were 
probably experiencing an increasing sense of 
powerlessness due to the defeat of the domestic 
oligarchical groups with which they were closely 
connected, as well as their own growing alienation 
from politics in general. 78 
VI. Constraint and co-o2eration in the development of moral judgment 
Returning now from this brief digression into the field of 
comparative sociology to matters falling well within the boundaries 
of what in conventionally understood by social psychology, I wish 
to introduce Piaget's contribution to our understanding of the nature 
of moral judgment. Needless to say, however, as with so much that 
is most valuable in social psychologyq Piaget's own theorizing and 
his discussion of Durkheim's sociology of morality will soon lead 
us back to considering questions of a more broadly sociological nature. 
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Although of much value in its own right, the contrasts which Piaget 0 
draws between moral consciousness in younger and older children 
are particularly interesting because the same configurations of 
values and beliefs can be observed amongst adults. The moral 
beliefs of the younger child may be paralleled amongst adults both 
as the result of arrested development towards more "mature" moral 
sentiments by unpropitious social circumstances and tIB continuing 
presence and potency of similar social conditions in the lives of 
adults. It should be borne in mind, however, that the moral insight 
displayed by any individual is not completely composed of one 
or other of the orientations which Piaget distinguishes, but that 
one or other of them tends to per-vade a greater r3nge of their 
moral consciousness, to the extent that the circumstances favouring 
them prevail in their environment. 
The child's consciousness of rules, as Piaget demonstrates, 
involves a progression from a period When rules are regarded as 
sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults or divine authority 
figures, and lasting forever, At that stage every suggested alteration 
0 
strikes the child as a transgression, even if it were to be accepted 
-age; which Piaget refers to as heteronomy, by general opinion. This st 
tends to give way more and more before the advance of autonomy, 
To the autonomous moral consciousness a rule is looked upon', 
as a law due to mutual consent, which you must respect if you want 
to be loyal but which it is germissible to alter on the condition 
of enlisting general opiziion on youir side: 
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Thus democracy follows on theocracy and 
gerontocracy: there are no more crimes of 
opinion, but only breachev in procedures. 
All opinions are tolerated so long as their 
protaganists urge their acceptance by legal 
methods ... He no longer relies, as do the little 
ones, upon an all-wise tradition. He no 
longer thinks that everything has been arranged 
for the best in the past and that the only 
way of avoiding trouble is by religiously 
respecting theEstablished order. He believes 
in the value of experiment in so fa. 1- as it is 
sanctioned by collective opinion. 79 
The sources of these two different moralities can by 
traced to differences in the type of social relationship within 
which they develop and flourish. Social relations can b-e located 
along a continuum stretching fron constraint to co-operation, 
the former involving the handing down of reqdy-made rules, the latter 
offering a method for the elaboration of rules. To the extent to 
which children find themselves free from the authority of older 
children and adults to participate in more egalitarian relations with 
others, consciousness of the rules governing social relations 
takes on a more autonomous tone: 
In the past, customhad always prevailed over right. 
Only, as in all cases where a human being is 
enslaved to a custom that is not part of his inn, er 
life, the child regarded this Custom imposed by 
his elders as a sort of Decalogue revealed by 
divine beings (i. e. 9 adults, including God, who 
is, according to Fal, (one of the younger children) 
the oldest gentleman in Neuchatel after his own 
father). With the result that, in the eyes of a 
little childq no alteration of usage will dispenBe 
the individual from remaining faithful to theeterneLl 
law... The child therefore distinguishes between 
a rule that is true in itself and mere custom, 
present or future. And yet he is all the time 
enslaved to custom and not to any juridico-moral 
reason or reality distinct from this custom and 
superior to it. Nor indeed is this way of thinking 
very different from that of many conservative 
adults who delude themselves into thinking that they 
are assisting the triumph of eternal reason over 
present fashiong when they are really the slaves of 
past custom at the exp nse of the permanent laws of 
rational co-operation. 
go 
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As a result of the child's growing involvement in democracy 
there is a corresponding change in his "philosophy of hist oryll. 
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This can be obeerved, for example, in the child's approach to the rules 
governing the game of marbles. Before children reach the age at 0 
which this game is usually -Tiven up they enter into a phase during C) C-I 
which they are in the happy position of participating in the operation 
of an institution in which they have no seniors. Previous beliefs 
about the divine or adult origin of the rules are, under the influence 
of this experience, abandoned in favour of the belief that these are 
the creation of children who modified the rules as they vished. The 
consciousness of being free to make the law, of autonomy, dispels 
the myth of revelation. 
Heteronomy results from the inequality between the child and 
the adult surrounding which presses upon him, asituation 
which may recur in adult life, especially in the 
strictly conformist and gerontocratic societies 
designated as primitive. Conversely in certain 
circumstances where he experiments in new types 
of conduct by co-operating with 'hisequals, the 
child is already an adult 2 
In many respect, as Piaget acknowleqges, the explanatory 
factors appealed to by Durkheim in his analysis of the development 
and disappearance of obligatory conformity within communities are 
similar to those which operate with similar results in children's 
societies. Just as the collective conscience of adults is changed 
by the development of new types of social intercourse, so it is 
within the biography of the child, especially in contemporary 
societies where adolescence is a time of increasing freedom 
from adult constraint rather than initiation into an adult role 
characterised by rigid expectations and continuing domination by 
one's elders. Children, as 
they grow older, become aware of, 
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and involved with, those practising other usages besides those to 
which they are accustomed, The growing child also detaches himself 
more and more from his family circle. Heteronomous moral 
consciousness and the collective conscience are alike in both 
their content and origin. Both are weakened by the gradual 
dimiutioncf the supervision exercised over individuals. 
Despite this similarity in their ideas, Piaget takes 
Durkheim to task for disregarding social constraint springing from 
the influence exercised by one generation upon the next. Such 
criticism is however, clearly misplaced. The way in which Durkheim 
did incorporate the changing nature of the power of elders into his 
explanation of the decline of the collective conscience was indicated 
in the previous chapter. Neveith eless, it is true to say that Piaget 
places far greater emphasis upon inequality based upon age as the most 
important source of social constraint accounting for variations in moral 
ideas. To illustrate: 
We have only to make the impossibe supposition 
of a society where everyone would be of the 
same age, of a society formed by a single 
generation indefinitely prolonged'- to realisethe 
immense significance attaching to age relations 
and especially to the relations between adults 
and children. Would such a society -ever have 
known anything of obligatory conformity? 
Would it be acquakited with religion or at any 
rate with the religions that taught transcendence? 
Would unilateral respect with all its repercussions 
upon the moral consciousness be obser-%ed in 
such a group as this-F) 
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It may be argued, as I hope to demonstrate in the ne-, zt chapter., 
that Durkheim's ideas concerning the relationships between types of social 
*fic moral sentiments are fundamentally correct, but that bond and speci 
his knowledge of the relationships prevailing in different types Of primitive 
societies was inadequateg 
leading him into faulty predictions 
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concerning te nature of the collective conscience which he thought 
could be found throughout the primitive world. Indeed, in many 
ways his portrait of the nature of the social bonds enveloping 
primitive man appears to be at least as representative of the 
condition of children in contemporary societies. It is therefore 
not surprising that we find the characteristic features of the 
collective conscience there, together with a tendency for it to 
be transformed with the changing nature of the social relationships 
in which they participate. These show tendency to develop towards 
"organic" solidarity. 
Two main types of morality may be observed in children. The 
one which at first predominates is the one which encompasses heteronomy 
and arises from the dominant role played by the respect felt for 
elders. This EErlier morality, whrever truly co-operative relations 
assume -D--rowing importance, diminishes in strength with the increasing 
±ole of standards of morality motivated by a feeling of sympathy 
with one's eqqals. The former, the morality of authority, like the 
latter, the morality of mutual respect, embraces a whole set of 
complementary moral ideas. Heteronomy, for example, arises together 
with moral rGglism. This is the tendency "to regard duty and the 
value attaching to it as self-subsistentand independent of the mind, 
as imposing itself regardless of the circumstancesin which the 
individual may find himself". 
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While the younger child can 
discriminate between intentional and unintentional actions, for 
exampleg he takes little account of intention in his moral 
judgmentsq These are centred upon the sheer amount of damage done 
by the actiong so that the accidental breaking of a numberof cups 
was judged worse than the breaking of one in the course of stealing. 
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The older child, on the other hand, gives precedence to intention 
in his moral judgments. When he comes to consider lying, for 
example, he differs from the younger child in considering a falsehood 
intended to deceive as "obviously" worse than one due to ignorance 
or a mistake. Lying to people in authority is no longer necessarily 
worse than lying to equals, and the reason why lying is wrong is 
that it betrays the trust without which worthwile social interaction 
based upon mutual respect if impossible. Without the development 
of co-operattie relations to mould mutual respect, the younger child 
just knows that lies are i"orbidden, without quite knowing why. 
The proof that they are wrong is that you get punished for it by 
external authorities. If it were not punished it would not be 
wrong. Demands which are imposed from outside, without mutual 
agreement and underst-ndingg by an authority which nevertheless enjoys 
considerable legitimacy, fosters a sense of moral real-ism, In the 
case of children the great prestige enjoyed by parents leads to 
the development of such views. The hold of such ideas over the 
mind of the child can, however, be attenuated b-, T parents placing 
themselves on a moreEqual level with their children, stressing 
their own obligations and freely admitting their own ability to 
blunder in conversations with the child. But usually relations 
between adults and children are such that the latter only laegin 
to escape from moral reý, Iism in spite of and in opposition to the 
former. From our earlier discussion of the family background 
of authoritarians it appears that these tend to be particularly 
inimic--ble to the open and egalitarian relations between parents 
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and children advocated by Piaget. That moral and real-ism and many 
other features of the morality of authority and constraint can 
be readily observed in the ideas expressed by authoritarians lends 
support to Piaget's attempt to link this morality with the importance 
of relationships of unilateral respect in childhood and beyond. 
It is evident that much of Piaget's thinking concerning the origins 
of moral realism and the morality of constraint anticipates points 
later to be made by Adorno and his colleagues in their attempts 
to account for similar configurations of values and beliefs. 
Piaget considers, for example, that it is where the child is rendered 
incapable of criticizing his parents that moral realism is strengthened, 
as it is also by the pleasure taken by many adults in meting out 
punishment, exercising authority and attempting to break the child's 
wil, 
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Moral realism is part of a more general tendency on the part 
of the child towards r., ealism in general, towards the reification 
of the products or instruments of their owli thought: 
Dreams, for example, even when the child really 
knows that they are deceptive as to their contents, 
are, till about 7-8, systematically considered 
as an objective reality, as a sort of ethereal, 
rarefied picture floating in the air and fixed 
before bur eyes. Names (comparable to moral rules 
in that they are transmitted and imposed by the 
adult surrounding) constitute an aspect of the 
objects themselves: each object has a name, co- 
substantial with its own nature, hqving always 
existed and been localized in the object. Finally, 
thought itselfq instead of consisting in an internal 
activityq is conceived as a sort of material power 86 
in direct communication with the external universe. 
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Seeing that he is a realist in so many areas it is not 
surprising that the child should reify the moral code which he obeys. 
This is connected to the failure to differentiate between moral and 
physical laws: 
If the moon shines only by night and sun only by day, 
it is not merely because of the material arrangements 
ensuring this regularity; it is primarily because 
the sun 'is not allowed' to walk about at night, 
because the heavenly bodies are not masters of their 
destiny but are subject ike all living beings to rules 
binding upon their will . 
ý7 
This lack of differentiation reflects back upon the moral rule, 
so that it retains something physical about it: 
I 
Like names, it is a part of things, a characteristic 
feature, and even a necessary condition of the universe. 
What, then, do intentions matter? The problem of 
responsibilities is simply to know whether a law has 
been respected or violated. Just as if we trip, 
independently of any carelessness, we fall on to the 
ground in virtue of the law of gravity, so tampering 
with the truth, even unwittingly, will be called a lie 
and incur punishment. If the fault remains unnotic 
things themselves will take charge of punishing us. 
Such patterns of beliefs and values have, of course, often been 
noted in adult societies and it is Piaget's contention that where 
sucli cultural patterns are'to be found it is as tl7ie the result 
of the bonds of social constrcint and tradition extending unbroken 
- or even strengthened - into adulthood. 
Heteronomy and moral realism in large measure. reflect egocentrism, 
a condition which Piaget refers to as "the confusion of the self 
0^ 
with the not-self", 
0 The egocentric individual sees and thinks about 
the world from his own point of view without realizing the existence of 
other perspectives. He assum-ias.. that his understanding of the situation 
is the understanding of it. He therefore lacks awareness that he has 
.. a, 
distictive point of view of his own so that once he comes to see 
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things in a certain way, then that is the way they must be. 
As the result of this egocentrism there is often a difficulty, 
encountered in particular by very young children, in distinguishing 
between what has been invented by oneself and what has been imposed 
from outside by contagion or constraint. Such circumstances give rise 
to the experience of the mind's content 
both as very familiar and as superpersonal, permanent and 
in a sense revealed. Nothing is more charqcteristic of 
childhood memories than this complex sensation of 
gainina access to one's most intimate possessions and D0 
at the same time of being dominated by something 
greater than oneself which seems like a source of 
inspiration. 90 
For children, qs for Plato, intellectual creation merges 
into reminiscence. 91 
The extent to which egocentrism is effaced depends upon the 
presence of favourable social circumstances. These involve contact 
wLth, and appreciation of, alternative perspectives, a situation 
which is most fully realized by full and frank discussion and 
co-operation amongst equals. In order to appreciate the variety 
of perspectives in the world it is necessary to perceive the relativity 
and unique aspects of one's own Yiews. This can only arise when one 
has achieved a degree of liber, -: Aion from submission to the thought 
and will of those in authority. To those whose thinking remains 
dominated by their involvement in authoritarian relationships, society 
is not Eao much a successful co-operation amongst equals as a feeling 
of continuous communion between the ego and the word of authority. 
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There are a number of other elements of the two moralities 
distinguished by Piaget which are of interest from the point of view 
of the present study, notably attitudes towards punishment: 
Two types of reaction are to be found with regard 
to punishment. Some think that punishment is just and 
necessary; the sterner it is, the justerg and it 
is efficacious in the sense that the chLild who has 
been duly chastized will in the future do his duty 
better than others. Others do not regard expiation 
as a moral necessity; among possible punishments 
those only are just that entail putting things 
right, a restoration of the status quo ante, 
or which make the guilty one endure the consequences 
of his deed; or again, those which consist in a 
purely reciprocal treatment. Indeed, apart from such 
non-expiatory penalties, punishment, as such, is 
reo-arded as useless, reproach and explanation being 
deemed more profitable than chastizement. On the 
average, this second r. -, ode of reaction is found more frequently 
-- 
among the older children, while thefirst is 
oftener to be found among the little ones. But the 
fim I t, favoured as it is by certain types of family 
life and social relationshipsg survives at all ages 
and is even to be -found in many adults-92 
One philosophy of punishment holds that one must compensate for 
the offence by a proportionate suffering, the other that one must make 
the offender realize by the measures taken the consequences of his 
act for hi-mself or others and serve as a direct expression of the way 
in which he has breached the bonds of social exhan--7e. The passage from C, C) 
the former to the latter is related to the change in the ndure of the 
social bonds which have been broken, from constraint to co-operation. 
Another element of the morality of constraint is the belief 
in immanent justice, the belief that nature takes a hand in making sure 
that punishment and misfortune are visited upon offenders. This, it 
will be recalled, played a central part in the traditional morality of 
ancient Athens and continues to be found in our own day with those whose 
first inclination in explaining the misfortune of another is to assume 
some hidden fault. 
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Only when psychological barriers to the objective criticism and C. ý 
evaluation of authority and the social order are lifted will the 
belief in universal and automatic Justice begin to decline. Here again, Ij 0 
as with many other aspects of Piaget's moral realist, such as his 
support for severe sanctions, a similarity with the villain of 
The Authoritarian Personality can readily be seen, for he too is 
displayed as clinging to the kind of superstition which sees the 
hand of f-nte in chance events. 
As for the practical implications of his theory, Piaget 
is keen to emphasize that these favour the introduction of schooling 
based upon self-government by the pupils. He therefore finds hi-self CD 
at odds with Durkheim's authoritarian conception of education: 
We therefore do not at all agree with Durkheim in 
thinking that it is the master's business to impose 
or even "reveal" rules to the child. A "Priest" 
is the last thing a schoolmaster should be: he should 
be an elder collaborator, and, if he has it in him, 
a simple- comrade to the children. Then only will 
true discipline come into being - discipline that the 
children themselves have willed and consented to. 
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As for discipline in schools, Piaget notes self-government 
required that teachers relinquish the right to punish in favour of 
justice exercised by the children themselves. 
When he wrote The Týoral Judgment of the Child, Piaget felt 
that his theory of moral and intellectual development were receiving 
0 
clear confirmation from the aclýevements made by the democratic practices 
of progressive schools. One has only to look at the achievements of 
A. S. Neill to see what Piaget meant, for Neill's experience of giving 
children freedom from adult constraint and enabling them 
to order 
their own lives provides a , vealth of evidence 
favouring Piaget Is 
position concerning the contrary effects of constraint and co- 
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operation. The interpretation which '. Neill offers for the way in which 
the child's thought and conduct is transformed by such measures bears 
much in common with Piaget's. To take but one example: 
In Summerhill, if a child steals and is tried by 
a jury of his fellows, he is never punished for 
the theft. All that happens is that he is made to 
pay back the debt. Children unconsciously realize 
that stealing is sickness. They are little realists, 
and are far too sensible to postulate an angry 
God and a tempting devil. Enslaved man made God 
in his own image, but free children who face. life 
eagerly and bravely have no need to make any God 
at a1194 
The close resemblance between the character types 
Piaget distinguishes to -1. -hose drqwn by the other authors 
4 whose contribution to our understanding of moral indgnation was 
discussed above, is too striking to need further elaboration. Piaget's 
analysis of how the attitudes which constitute these configurations 
support and sustain one another is particularly enlightening, as is 
his emphasis upon the importance of different systems of age 
stratification as determinants of morality. He tends, however, 
to emphqsize the importance of this particular form of social power 
and inequality to the exclusion of other dimensions of social stratification. 
Kohn, for example, hasdamonstrated that class inequality has far- 
reaching consequences for adult values. For adults no less than 
children, occupational self-direction weakens adherence to the morality 
of constraint. 
But the individual's freedom is not only limited by the nature 
of his place within the system of social stratification prevailing 
in his society. Even groups composed of those who are relatively 
equal differ in thEýr. hold over the conduct of their members and the 
amount of freedom which their way of life promotes. '. 'Ioral judgments 
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are shaped by the constraints experienced in the lives of those making 
them, but constraint may emanate not only from the inequalities of 
power, privilege and prestige, but also from the social pressure 
bearing upon an individual from the intensity of the mutual 
surveillance exercised within his community and the acdess of its 
members to alternative sources off social exchange and allegiance. 
The necessity of taking both sources of social control into account 
when explaining the emergence of moral indignation !: ill become clear 
from a consideration of the development of attitudes towards deviance 
in primitive and pre-industrial societies. And it is to this task to 
which we shall now turn. 
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CHAPTER 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
I. The comparative anthropolop, 7 of -public- justice 
What is the scope of the theories with which we have been dealing? 
As was indicated in the previous chapter, similarities between such 
theories as Ranulf's account of moral indignation, the explanation of 
authoritarianism which arose from the work of the Frankfurt Institute, 
and Reich's analysis of mass psychology, can be traced to their common 
origin in a period which saw the rise of fascism as a mass movement. 
Can similar. -configurations of attitudes to those they identify be fouhd 
in other period and places and are similar social and cultural forces 
at work in producing them? 
Ranulf, for example, claimed such importancefor the presence of 
0 
an important section of the population living under lower middle class 
conditions of life as the source of the disinterested tendency to 
punish that he was quite ready to argue that such a tendency does not 
manifest itself in so(ýieties of simple technology due to the absence 
of such conditions. This clearly presents two problems. Do primitive 
societies manifest a disinterested tendency to inflict punishment, 
contrary to Rahulf's contention? And, if so, can this nevertheless 
be accounted for by forces similar to those which Ranulf reveals 
as responsible for moral indignation in other societies? 
Ranulf's ovin review of the evidence provides grounds for doubting 
his claim that manifes-tations of moral indignation are absent from 
primitive societies. 
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Taking his lead from Levy-Bruhl, he describes attitudes to 
misfortune in primitive societies as follows: 
Misfortune is regarded, even by the victims themselves, 
as a proof of guilt. Or rather, unintentional guilt 
is, if anything, more severely sanctioned than 
intentional, because it is felt to be a more grievous 
sympton of wrath on the part of the invisible powers, 
and consequently a more serious danger to the community. 
It is even supposed that men may be induced by the 
spirits to sin, for instance to break a taboo, which 
does not in any way imply that they should be punished 
less cruelly for it. The last idea is known to us 
from the israelites, the Greeks, and the Puritans, and 
the identification of misfortune and guilt is reminiscent 
of Sophokles'Oedipus and of the Calvinistic doctrine 
of predestination. There may well be reason to ask 
whether this whole attitude on the part of the 
primitive is not inspired by a fundamental disposition 
to sadism similar to that which we were led to assume 
in the other cases mentioned. 1 
And, indeed, despite Ranulf's endeavours, he does not really 
succeed in resolving such conflicting evidence with his contention that 
moral indignation is absent from pre-literate societies. Unfortunately 
he fails to acknowledge that primitive societies cannot be treated as 
an homogenous group when dealing with the issues he arises. Some such 
societies do indeed display few signs of any disinterested tendency 
to inflict-punishment, and these few only weakly. But this is by no 
means true of all. 
In examining sanctions in pre-literate society, Ranulf makes use 
of Radcliffe-Brown's description of the penal sanction. Of this 
Radcliffe-Brown says: 
In any society a deed is a public delict if its 
occurrence normally leads to an organized and re-, ular 
procedure by the whole community or by the constituted 
representatives of social authority which results 
in the fixing of responsibility upon some person within 
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the community and the infliction by the community or 
by its represent: ýtives of some hurt or punishment 
upon the responsible person. This procedure, which 
may be called the penal sanction, is in its basic 
form a rea 
' 
ction by the community against an action of 
one of its own members which offends some strong and 
definite moral sentiments and thus produces a condition 
of moral dysphoria. The immediate function of the 
reaction is to give expression to a collective feeling 
of moral indignation and so to restore the social 
euphoria. 
2 
Ranulf regards the appearance of such a sanction as cle? rly 
indicating the presence of a disinterested tendency to inflict 
punishment, although Ranulf's interpretation of its origin differs 
somewhat from the approach of Radcliffe-Brown. For Ranulf's argument 
implies that it is not the delict-alone that creates the dysphoriai but 
that moral dysphoria is a chronic condition which seizes upon the delict 
as an outlet or finds the self-indulgence the delict proclaims the 
final straw. 
The role played by penal sanctions is also of interest in 
analysing Durkheim's ideas concerning the punitive character of 
primitive justice. What, then, is the evidence? Do pre-literate 
societies employ penal sanctions to any marked extent? 
Such societies seem, in fact, to differ widely amongst themselves 
in this respect. The problem is complicated by the wide variety of 
sanctions employed in handling offenders. At one extreme there are 
communities where attacks upon property or person are treated as 
private affairs, to be redressed by the individual affected on his own 
L Wheeler orwith the aid of his fr4ends and relatives. As Hobhouse, 
and Ginsberg noteg such private justice may take a variety of forms: 
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Redress may be sought by retaliation in like manner to 
the wrong done or simply by killing or 'Oeating the 
aggressor. Or it may take the form of a demand for 
compensation in goods. Or there may be a regular 
fight under conditions prescribed by cust Uom; or, lastly, 
without fighting, the aggressor may 'nle required to stcnd 
a cut or thrust. Custom and sentiment may Cupport 
the injured party, but unless the neutral party would 
ac -1. I tually come to his help at need we should 
regard this as ýý case of private redress. Similarly, 
in the Reg-ulated fight, custom certainly imposes 
limits as to methods of redress, but redress itself 
is left to the strength and skill of the parties.. 
Either retaliation or composition may be collective or 
vicarious, i. e. may attach to the whole family of 
the agggressor or to any one of it -s members... But 
this is not universal. It is 4, ust as likely to be 
sought at the expense of the wrongdoer alone. 3 
Between such communities and those in which public justice 
and penal sanctions predominate, there exist numerous intermediate stages. 
Firstly, there are communities in Nliich penal sanctions only operate in 
connection with offences which threaten t-he community as a whole. 
Many societies which treat an individual who robs or attacks another 
not as an enemy of society, but merely as an enemy of their victim, 
nevertheless do recognize the existence of others in their midst who 
are viewed very definitely as enemies of society. As such they call 
forth a communal response. 
4 The Crow, to take one example, were 
normally vithout any public enforcement of justice. In the period bef ore 
and during huntsihowever, such justice was exercised by t1ae "police 
society", a body whose function was to punish disorderly conduct which 
5 
might imperil the hunt . 
Apart from offences which directly endanger the community or 
its collective undertakings, such as indiscipline on military ventures, 
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treason, cowardice and violation of the rules of the huntq individuals 
may render themselves a menace to communities which do not usually t2ke 
collective action against offenders by repeated attacks upon 
their fellows. Expulsion or execution may be invited by such behaviour, 
which is summed up by Radcliffe-Brown as the "crime of being a bad lot,,. 
6 
In addition, societies which do t-lot punish those who oflend against the 
rights oi. individuals may nevertheless take it upon themselves to punish 
sins against the sacred order. Incest and witchcraft may be liable to 
punishment for this reason. 
7 
Secondly, a community may intervene to punish offenders in an 
ad hoc fashion, punishing specific incidents such as the murder of a 
chief or popular person without the existence of any recognized rules 
assigning a definite punishment to a specific offence. 
Thirdly, sanctions may be attached to some attaci-cs-upon the rights 
of in-dividuals, but not others. Homicide may be punishedg but not theft, 
or theft but not hoMicide. 
9 
Finally, private justice may be assisted or controlled by 
public intervention: 
the injured party may, for instance, get the chief ot some 
officer to help him, to find the stolen goods, or to arrest 
and confine the murderer of his brother. But he initiates 
the proceedings. He decides whether he will forgive or C) 
accept compensation or exact life for life, and he 
executes the sentence. Possibly there is even a regular 
trial, but sentence is left to the accuser to execute, 
if he cannot enforce it there is no further means of 
redress. Again, it may be :, I, rong for him to exercise 
revenge until he has obtained a judgement in his favour 
which states what the revenge ought to be. Or it may 
be that he can avenge himself on the spot, but if time 
has elapsed he ought to go to court. In all these cases 
there is a blending of opposite principals. 
10 
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Despite the difficulties arising from t'-, Ie existence of such 
inte-mediate cases a definite trend can be discerned amongst 
pre-literate societies. As one moves further away from hunting 
and gathering societies in terms of technological advance, throuch' 
horticulture and the various levels of pastoral or agricultural development, 
one finds an increasing preponderance of public over 13ri--v, -, te justice. 
11 
Self rediess gives way to the regular punishment of wrongdoers by society CD 
as a whole or by those representing it as increasingly advanced methods 
of production are adopted. 
12 
Before going on to consider the reasons for this associ2tion, CD 
it is as well to notice at once that the evidence upon which it is 
based does not accord with Durkheim's assertion that societies shift 
from repressive to restitutive sanctions as they become more complex. 
That Durkheim should have been led to such a conclusion seems 
in part to have been the result of having focused too heavily upon 
drawing comparisons between the law codes of modern societies and those 
literate archaic communities such as the states of ancient India, 
Egypt, Israel, Athens and Rome. Such a selection of evidence obscures 
the way in which the evolution of punishment in terms of the amount of 
suffering inflicted upon offenders is more accurately, albeit still 
very loosely, ch-! nracterised as curvilinear rather than unilinear. Instead 
of a gradual amelior? tion from the pristine severity of the e? rliest and 
simplest communities accompanying economic advance, we have a growth 
in severity up to a certain stage of development, and then a gradual 
decline. The highpoint would appear to be found amongst advanced 
agricultural societies. 
In this the evolution of punishment parallels 
the growth of social inequalitýrý which starts at a negligible CD 
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level in hunting and gathering societies and gradually increases with 
the growth of the economic surplus occasioned by new methods of 
t4 production un .la peak 
is reached in advanced agricultural societies. 
With the full development of industrialization, however, the extent of 
social inequality declinessomeiNhat. 
13 Parallel curvilinear developments 
occur in other areas of social life, such as the amot-int of cruelty 
char? cterising intra-group relations, for, as Lenski has argued, as 
class differences i; itl-iin sociEties became more 
pronounced, immorality in intragroup relations increaL-d. 
The history of every agrarian society is replete with 
instances of exploitative and brutal treatment of the 
lower classes. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the punishments exacted for minor offenses. 14 
Further evidence which casts doubt upon Durkheim's association 
of social development with decreases in punitive severity 
comes from Spitzer's study of punishment and social organization. 
15 
Comparing simple societies -Nith those which have achieved a measure of 
development (indicated by one or more of the following: educational 
specialization, bureancracry, written language), Spitzer demonstrates 
that simpler societies are more likely to employ lenient penalties than 
are more complex societies. 
16 The trend for penal severity to increase 
with social complexity is,, however, reversed. by the conditions which 
arise in modern societies. Emergent states are led to employ more 
violent sanctions than simpler societLes and the established nation-state 
for they have to impose their sway over previously autonomous groups. 
Furthermore, the ruling class which controll-ed early states in agrarian 
societies had to resort to severe phýysical sanctions in order to support 
4 
the concentration of wealth in the Lr hands in the absence of the market 
217 
mechanisms available to modern societies as means of institutionalizing 
inequality. 
The relationship between the rise of the state and the administration 
of public justice is complex. Clearly, as was indicated earlier, some 
primitive societies do punish certain offenders without the existence 
of any regular state apparatus, through collective action to expel or 
penalize wrongdoers. Nevertheless, the development of the state opens 
up new opportunities for the exercise of penal sanctions. As R addlýffe- 
BroTr, n remarks: 
upon the establishment of a political or executive 
authority even of the simplest kind, disobedience of 
that authorit-y'scommands may be subject to penal sanctions 
and tmated as a public delict, moreover, direct offences 
against the constituted authority or against the pe-Lsons 
in whom that authority rests may be subject to penal 
sanctions. Thus when the social autho2ýty rests in 
chiefs, an offence which would be a private delict if 
committed against a commoner may be treat-ýd as a public 
delict when committed against a chief. 17 
Nevertheless, while there--is undoubtedly a trend for the growing 
power of chieftains to be associ3ted with the suppression of private 
by public justiceg there are some cases where private vengeance is 
left to flourish by powerful chiefs. 
18 
0 
The origins of government involvement in punishing wrongdoers CD 
are diverse and cannot simply be treated as no more than the reflection 
of intensified moral indignation amongst members of a community. However, 
the sentiments of the people are not without importance in accounting 
for the origin and growth of penal sanctionsin pre-literate societies. 
Indeed, in some cases the ease with which government spreads can be 
seen to spring from the desire of people to escape from the dangers 
and uncertainties of private justice. Thus the desire to have some 
authority to enforce justice and -bolish the fighting that took place in 
218 
its absence was instrumental in getting chiefless Bantu tribes neighbouring 
the Alur to ask for members of the Alur ruling clan to come and govern 
them. 19 Elizabeth Colson remarks: 
The ease with which colonial administrations established 
themselves in some parts of Africa and New Guinea, 
with minimal deployment of force, may well be due 
to a comparable desire for an overriding authority to 
ensure the public peace and provide a better mechanism 
for settling dis8utes than one based on threat and 
counter-threat. 2 
One may take the Fore of Highland New Guinea as an example. 
Sorrenson reports that they regarded the fighting in which their 
disputes embroiled them as a calamity, but one which they were powerless 
to avert. With the arrival of the first Australians the fighting 
ceased. "The warfare was not liked, and the distant presence of but 
a single patrol officer and a handful of native police was grasped as 
It2i T an excuse to cease . --any Fore groups 
did not wait to be told to stop 
fighting, but "stopped of their own - almost as if they had only been 
, waiting an excuse to give it up... The Fore said among themselves that 
the ... government officer... was coming so it was time to stop the 
fighting. They looked to his arrival as the beginning of a new era 
rather than as an invasion f122 
Clearly one reason why governments may be accepted is that they 
are seen as providing services to groups which they find difficulty in 
fulfill ing for themselves. People may wish for an end to armed strife, 
but wishing does not make it so in the absence of the capacity to institute 
qnd sustain the necessary social organization. As Colson argues: 
219 
We cannot understand the history of the colonial 
period, or indeed the history of our own time, if 
we do not understand that people may be prepared 
to accept authority, even though they find it both 
threatening and frustrating, because they see it 
as the guarantor of an overarching security which they 
value or as providing a security that is lacking. 
Those who challenged the colonial governments in a 
search for more local control and then for independence 
were not seeking a return to the pre-colonial system 
of diffuse controls 23 
The existence of courts can provide an opportunity to escape from 
some forms of dependence on one's fellows. New areas are opened up 
in which travel is possible without the presence of kinsmenz or 
supporters. In their home communities people become freer from the 
demands of local opinion, escaping anxiety over the need to secure 
future support in thesient of a dispute. 
And yet this point must not be pressed too far. It is clearly 
erroneous to regard all societies without states as cockpits of endemic 
violence. Wrongs are kept in check, and redress for wrongs sought, amidst 
a whole set of pressures and mechanisms functioning to maintain the 
peace. 
24 It is the fear of feud rather than the feud itself which 
dominates such societies. Relations and others who fear becoming 
involved in violent disputes exercise a restraining influence and 
individuals have to impose self-restraint upon themselves lest their 
repeated or uncalled for endangering of their group leads to a 
withdrawal of their protection. 
25 There is an interesting paradox here 
insofar as the generosity and forebearance so often displayed in relations 
within such communities can often be found to be underpinned by very 
pessimistic views about human nature as needing little to provolle it 
into murderous violence. Colson sums this up succinctly when she notes 
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of such communities that "some people live in what appeýDrs to be a 
Rousseauian paradise because they take a Hobbesian view of their situation: 
they walk softly because they believe it necessary not to offend others 
whom they regard as dangerous". 
26 
But there are more positive sources of harmony in simple societies, 
such as reciprocity and the absence of marked social inequality and 
exploitation. Furthermore, the mode of life of the simplestsocieties 
enables them to rely upon mechanisms for peacefully avoiding and 
resolving conflicts less available to those whose mode of production 
forces them to live in more settled communities. The Chenchus, for 
exampleg share with many other small societies which rely upon food- 
gathering a reliance upon settling disputes and preserving social harmony F-0 - C, 
by the parties involved separating and avoiding one another. This is 
made possible by the amount of mobility pxovided by their way of 
life. This was dramatically illustrated when, earlier this century, 
the Chenchus of Madras Presidency were forcibly concentrated in settlements. 
Although materially their conditions were much improved, they rapidly 
lost their peaceful and amiable ways. Ylurder, assault and rape grew 
4 
considerably as traditional means of avoiding violence ceased to be 
available. 
27 
The order which simple societies achieve is often surrendered rather 
than enhanced by the growth of states which employ law as a means of 
domination and exploitation. Not only is this true for states which 
developed from within communities but also for many peoples the role 
of representatives of colonizing powers has all too often been that of 
agents and allies of those attempting to seize their lands, rather than 
providers of social order. This, for example, wes clearly ýihat the arrival 
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of Europeans meant to Amerindians. Even in cases where people thought 
they were obtaining a source of security in exchange for a little of their 
independence, the ultimate cost proved dear. The need for vigilance 
against one's neighbours was replaced by the need to defend oneself ýýgainst r: ) 
the state. It is on the basis thýýt law has been the instrument whereby 
the state, overthrowing custom, has enforced economic and political 
injustices thatDiamond argues, in his survey of such African proto- 
states as Dahomey, that: 
Law arises in the breach of a prior customary order and 
increases in f=e with the conflicts that divide 
political societies internally and among themselves, 
Law and order is the historical i lusion; law versus 
order is the historical reality. 2ý 
When states intervene in situations where their aid was originally 
uncalled for in an attempt to widen their sphere of influence, 
a self-fulfilling prophecy can be created with the intervention of 
r4 the st: -te itself being a powerful force in b J-nging about the decline 
of informal controls, creating a subsequent demand for its protection. 
Speaking once again with the example of Africa in mind, Diamond says: 
One may even state that the substantial rationale for 
law developed after the fact of its emergence. 
For example, civil protection of the market place Dr 
highway was certainly not necessary to the degree 
implied in the archaic edicts at the time they 
were issued. Joint-family markets and village 
trails were not ordinarily dangerous places, if 
we are to believe the reports of the earliest 
chroniclers, as well as those of more contemporary 
observers. Moreover, if trouble had developed 
the family, clan, or village was capable of 
dealing with it... As the integrity of the local 
groups declined, a process which, in the autochthonous 
stateg must have taken generations or even 
centuriesq conditions doubtless developed wlich 
served as an ex post facto rationalization for edicts 
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already in effect.. Crime and the laws which served 
it were, then covariants of the evolving states29 
While Durkheim. 's hypothesis that the most severe punishments will 
be encountered in the simplest and most undifferentiated societies 
appears to be mistaken, support is -4vailable from the findings of 
subsequent cross-cultural studies for the second half of his first law 
of penal evolution. This it will be recalled, states th? t the intensity 
of punishment increases to the extent to which the central power 
assumes a more absolute character. In Spitzer's sample all except 
one of the eight societies that employed the most severe penalties 
(those which used capital punishment, mutilation, torture and severe 
corporal punishmentg for a wide range of offences) e, xhioit a relatively 
high degree of political integration and absolute power is exercised 
-Z 0 
by a single ruler or venerated elite. ' Nagel's comparison of the 
judicial systems of democratic societies with those of dictatorial 
societies shows a parallel tendency with regý-rd to the adjudication 
of criminal matters. Societies in his sample which had dictatorial 
regimes tend to be prosecution orientedg placing fewer obstacles 
in the way of finding an accused person gu--: Ity, than do democratIc 
societies, where more defence oriented procedures tend to prevail, 
71 
Howeverg despite the nEEd to allow for a degree of independence 
between societal complexity and theýxtent of political dominptiont 
for much of human history these have tended to march hand in hand 
., far more o-17ten 
than Durkheim's argument ? ý, ould allow. 
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What are the implications for Ranulf's theorycf the nature of 
justice and morality in primitive societies? While many pre-literate 
societies are free from many symptons of the disinterested tendency 
to punish, others can be found which cultivate outlooks clearly 
resembling those configurations of beliefs and values which Ranulf 
saw as bound up with moral indignation. The -111anus, for example, 
tend to be stern and unbending in their response to those who have 
slipped from the path of honesty and virtue, and regard their spirits 
as displaying the same response to wrongdoing. Margaret Yead 0 
characterises the Mlanu notion of sin as akin to the historic Puritan 
conception, including a constant fear of sexual transgressions, even 
33 of the most minor sort. ' As Goode writes: "In -1,11anus society, 
inefficiency, laainess, procrastination, or shiftlessness are never 
condoned"34 Public condemnation of such conduct is reinforced 
t4 by supernatural sanc J-onsf Similarly waste or extravangance for 
individual or hedonistic ends are frowned upon. ]7iýirthermote, 
these aspects of Yanu culture can be found alongside tradýng activities 0 
and preoccupations which share something in common with those of the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie in commercial communities amongst whom CD 
Ranulf loc; ý3tes the structural source of such conerns. The Manu are a 
Melanesian group living at : I, Ate a low level of technological development, 
engaged in fishing and trading. "Basically middlemen in a monetary 
economy... their daily lives are enmeshed in business, exchahge and 
it ", 5 contract 0" As a result they live a life in which economic calculation. 
is importantg the pa77ment of debts a constant preoccupation and 
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litigiousness a well developed trait. 
Despite the existence of such cases, howeverg Ranulf's emphasis 
upon the inportance of the presence of a petty bourgeoisie as the source 
of the disinterested tendency to punish offers little opportunity 
to account for significant differences between the moral codes of 
pre-literate societies. Nevertheless, the conditions of life forced 
upon the petty bourgeoisie as the result of the mode of production in 
which it finds itself engaged is a complex one and it seems not at all 
impossible that those conditions favour-ILng the development of the 
attitudes characteristic of moral indgnation can te reproduced 
by other economic and political forces. This, indeed, is the position 
into which Ranulf is forced in attempting to account for the development 
of moral indignation in Russia, when he takes the experience of close 
surveillance and tight social control over conduct, springing in this 
case from the position of office holders and prospective office holders 
under the totalitarian regime, as the murce of industriousness, 
self-restraint and moral indignation. 
If we concentrate upon this common dimension of social 
pressure, of the experience of having no option but to yield to 
the demands of other-ýeopleq as the source of important differences in 
moral outlooks the way becomes clear for forging a fruitful link 
between the vrorlcof Ranulf and Durkheim's views on the sources of the 
strengh*., of the collective conscience. That such a link is possible 
will become clear from a consideration Mary Douglas's explorations in 
cosmology. 
225 
II. Social control and control of the body 
From the anthropological evidence at present available it is 
clear that pre-literate societies cannot be treated as an homogenous 
cate, -ory with regard to theirideas concerning the nature of deviance 
and the remedies appropriate for it as Ranulf asserts. Nor can they all 
be regarded as governed by a strict, rigid and all-embracing collective 
conscience in the manner of Dur-kheim. The nature of moral beliefs 
vary greatly between primitive societies, often in response to the s-me 
forces which contribute to similar differences in morality within 
industrialized societies. Prominent amongst such forces is the extent 
to which individual freedom is circumscribed by social and cultural 
constraints. 
One source of such constraint is the limitation or elimination 
of alternative forms of action open to individuals as the result of the 
force of culturally--der. ived standards and expectations relaiing. to'the 
social roles which they occupy. Societies differ in terms of the ease 
or difficulty with which roles are assumed or thrown off and in the range 
of conduct they embrace. This is the dimension which Douglas refers, to 
,I as `-grid 
36 A society in which much of an individuaTs daily life 
i-ft dominated by his status in terms of inescapable ascribed social roles 
based upon age, sex and kinship is high on crrid. Where high grid prevails 
we h, 7ve a situation where there is no ambiguity about who is entitled 
to occupy specific roles and where the conduct expected of the occupants 
of such roles is clearly structuredg leaving little room for personal 
initiative. The Tallensi, for example, are high on grid: "Here C> 
the public system of rights and duties equips each man with a full 
identity. prescribing for him what and when he eats, how he grooms 
his hairg ho-v he is buried or born"37 By way of contrast, for a 
primitive society low on gridq we can turn to the pygmies: 
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"Neither sex, age, nor kinship order their behaviour in strictly ordained 
1138 categories . 
Douglas sees the expectations which constitute high grid as part 
of a culture which rigidly structures experience. The world is divided 
up in terms of fixed categories which admit no alternative interpretation 
of events. Strong grid rests upon assumptions unchallenged by 
contradictions arising within the system It is an integrated culture in 0 
the sense discussed by Sorokin wherein beliefs do not conflict with 
each other but harmonize in mutual support. Nor is strong grid disrupted 
by exposure to the blandishments of other systems of ordering the universe. 
At the other extreme, where cultural definitions are suspended, where the 
grid has been removed, we have anomie, a situation which may be sought 
by the mystic of fled in despair by the suicide. 
Douglas distinguishes grid from another source of social constraint 
which she labels "group". Group is "the experience of havin# no 
option but to consent to the overhwelming demands of other people. "39 
This results from being committed to continuing membership of 
well-defined groups. Low"group occurs when indi-vaduals feel free to 
break off local group allegiances and start afresh quite easily, where 
groups are fluid and m6bility high. 
0 
From our earlier discussion of Ranulf Is vork it will be recalled 
that the various traits which together constitute the disinterested 
tendency to inflict punishment fall within two broad c7tegories: 
punitiveness, and a hostility towards self-abandonment and sensual 
indulgence. Douglas has something to say about both categories, 
including the indentification of the social situations in which they 
arise together. 
Concerning origins of a stern sexual morality, she sees this 
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as imbedded, together with vigilant controls on bodily boundaries, in 
social conditions through the mechanism of symbolic replication of 
a social state. 
40 
Relaxing the hold of grid and group leads to concomitant 
relaxation of bodily control. 
41 
How individuals relate to their bodies 
and the nature of the control they exercise over then r-cftects 
their relationships with others and teir experience of social control. 
Well preserved md defended social boundaries, for example, will find 
reflection in a preoccupation with bodily apertures, with bodily exits 
and entrances. 
The experience of slack grid and group can come about as the restýlt 
of a variety of factors such as social peripherality, an itinerant mode 
of production favouring a mobile socK system and temporary ties, or 
natural disasters which disrupt social relationships. Steady 
allegiances and permanent attachments in work and residence are at a 
minimum. Professions of comment and criticism also slacken group and 
grid through weakening commitment to society. Tight group and grid can 
come about through the increased solidarity and commitment which arises. 
out of conflict with an out-group. Using the printiple of the symbolic 
replication of a social. state to defend the ancient Israelites against 
critici2n of their adherence to rule, the legalism of their priests and their 0 
rejection of the Dionysian mystery cults, Douglas argues that the option 
of worshipping God through wine, ý, song and dance was simply not open to tnem 
so long as they were set upon resisting occupation: 
It would be impossible for the leaders of an occupied 
but still resisting nation to adopt an effervescent 
form of religion. To expect them to stop preaching a 
ste--rn sexual morality, vigilant control of bodily 
boundaries, and corresponding religious cult would be 
asking them to give up the political struggle. 
42 
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Tight gid and group are, also felt more strongly by those 
with only slender resources with which to face up to the forceful 
demands of others. Beliefs concerning changing population 
size in relation to population can contribute to the experience 
of having no choice but to submit to social pressure. Wbere it 
is believed that resources are static, -- or growing more slowly than 
population, social control is felt more keenly. ConveraEy, where 
people see themselves as living in an expanding economy, the possibility 
of starting afresh renders present relationships less constraining. 
The experience of weak grid and group finds bodily expression 
through a number of channels. A positive delight in the joys of . iine, 
women and song is more likely to be found amongst those low in terms 
of grid and group. Here we -are more likely to find disdain for the 
restraints of formal etiquette and the-adoption of a more informal 
manner and appearance, with beards and hair shaggier and unkempt. 
Rules about whom it will be permissible to have sexual intercourse 
with will be less stringent and far reaching. States of self- 
abandonment such as trance will be pursued as valuable experiences, 
whereas those tightly bound by grid and group will regard such states 
as dangerous and be wary of releasing conscious control. High grid 
and group even pervades such areas off bodily control as concern not 
to give way to unrestrained mirth. 
Strong social control, then, calls forth strong bodily control. 
Furthermore, as social pressure increases, so does the demand that 
organic processes should be screened out of social intercourse. 
"The more complex the system of classification and the stronger 
the pressure to maintain it, the more social intercourse pretends 
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to take place between disembodied spirits,,. 
43 The casting off of 
waste products - defecation, urination, vomiting and their products - 
have to be incr-ýasingly concealed, as do such other physiological 
processes as sneezes, sniffs and coughs. More refinement is demanded, 
less smacking of the lips when eating, less sound when 'Walking and 
breathing, greater control over the expression of emotions such as 
anger. 
High grid and group provide the social source of reification and 
dogmatism: 
With strong grid and group, there is the tendency to take 
the intellectual categories which the fixed social c-itegories 
require as if they were God-given eternal truths. The mind 
is tiedband and foot, so to speak, bound by the socially 
generated categories of culture. No other alternative 
view of reality seems possible. A-small shift in the 
definitions is anathema and wor-&-Drotecting with bloodshed. 
Anomaly is abhorrant. 
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And turning to attitudes towards authority and deviance we 
find: "Strong grid and strong &oup 'will tend to routinized 
piety towards authority and its s77mbols; beliefs in a punishing, moral 
17 rejects-" 
45 Any hierarchy insulated universe and a c9tegory of 
from criticism and change will tend to develop such beliefs, whether 
'bhey be bureaucratic, monasticq military or traditional. It can be seen 
most clearly in those African tribal systems stabilized by the action of 
colonial regimes. 
The universe experienced under high grid and group is a moral C) 
universe in the senss that all misfortune is believed 
to be deserved 
as the result of sin and immor! ýlity and 
does not simply befall someone as 
theiesult of bad luck. 
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The general outlook on humanity and its f-ýte at the hands of a stern 
deity is pessimistic. In dealing with misdeeds little or no heed is 
paid to the question of intent. The tighter grid and group, the more 
punishing does the cosmos appear, the lower grid and group the more 
benign. The former finds expression in a religion of control, the 
latter in a religion of ecstasy, of joy rather than fear. Population 
density can shape such constraints, for where 
there are very few people on the ground and they meet eacli other 
.I infrequently and irregularly and their possibilities 
of evading one another's company are good, there is 
a lessening of control... Decreasing human contact tends 
to give the same result. Hence any form of dropping out 
which is a dropping away from other people's categories 
and pressures gives a rosier tinge to the world. T: ie 
deeper the retreat, the greater the faith in theinner 
purity and goodness of the human heat -1 
the need for 
ritual forms isNeakened, also the sense of sin. 
46 
So far we have been contrasting situat-Lons in which group and 
grid increase or diminish in inteiasity in step with one another. 
But these different forms of social constraint can vary independently 
and it is instructive to look more closely at each dimension in turn 
to discover its particular contribution to moulding ideologies and the 
new patterns of belief which emerge from certain oth-er comhinations of 
grid and group. 
Diminishing grid leads to increasingly ascetic behavJ-our- 
Strong grid leads to high value being placed upon material things. 
No guilt is f elt about spending or displays of wealth and pomp. 
With 
decreasing grid, howeverg one of two types of asceticism will emerge. 
Low grid combined with strong group calls forth strict controls on 
bodily en--4. oyment and on the gateways to sensual pleasure. U0 
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The indifference to materialism of those experiencing not only low grid 
but also low group is much more joyful, unmarred by such hostility to 
sensual pleasure. It 
results from valuing human fellowship above material things. 0 Those who belong in this sector are usually aware of other 
ways of living, both more arduous and more richly 
re,:,,, arded in material wealth. Their culture is often seen 
as a choice, a preference for the simple life. 47 
Hunting and gathering bands who decide not to follow the mode of C- C) 
life of their agricultural nei. ghbours form a case in point. 
48 
Turning to consider the influence of group boundedness we find 
that 7. vhere this is low the ccsmos is seen as dominated by impersonal 
powers and principles. Anthropomorphism in religion is weak, as in the 
Ituri pygmies idea of the forest as a cosmic force. 
49 Nor do their 
religions act as moral regulators. "They hold out no system of rewards 
and punishment, neither in this world nor in the next". 
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Under high group the op-, -.: osite 
beliEfs and values prevail and the 
self is subordinated, not exalted as under conditions of low ggrid. 
Here we find: 
The powers that control the universe are modelled on human 
figures. Either they are the spirits of dead fathers 
and grandfathers, or culture heroes like big brothersq 
or a creator god, the most ancestral figure of them all. 
Or they are actualq real human beings, free men --,, ith 
powers to bless and curse, or witdhes and sorcerers 
with their own armoury of ill-doing. On this side, 
where group is strong, social control is built into the 
cosmos. These humans and humanlike powers are activated by 
moral situations. Ancestors punish and reward; curses 
avenge moral wrong; even , vitches only strike when provolted 
by neglect or rudeness. 
51 
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Whether witches or ancestors are invoked to explain misfortune 
and suffering depends upon tUlb-Anteract ion of high _, rroUp V14 ith grid. 
It is a function of the structure of internal roles and the openness 
and pey-meability of external barriers. Where group is high and grid 
is high also, , ýle have punishment by the ancestors, where group is h-igh 
and --Yiid is low witches prevail: 
By and laro-e witchcraft beliefs 
in small enclosed groups, where 
restricted, when interaction is 
where roles are undefined or so 
impossible to perforip 52 
are likely to flourish 
movement in and out is 
unavoida'oly close, and 
defined that they are 
These conditions provide the social condition promoting 
r- 
, 53 "intolerance of imzert"ections". They can )e foi. ind in tribal societies 
which have strong external boundaries and yet harbour internal competition 
as the result of conflicting role demands and ambiguous rules of succession 1 . 
54 
/ They also prevail in sectarian movements such as the Exclus-1-ve 
Brethren. 55 And they find more secular expression in support for the 
conspiracy theory of politics and the need to outcast evil-doers such 
56 
as sustained the -,, itch-hunt of McCarthy in , ',., Terica in the 1950's. 
Members of small competitive communities tend to believe that 
they are Zwelling in a dangerous universe as the result of the 
sinister power exercised by their fellows. Suffering is explained CD 
by reference to witchcraft. The cosmos is viewed as domin@ted by 
ill-will and envy. It seems not unreasonable to see in their image of 
the witch not only their anxiety about competitive neighbours, but also C) 
-17P ce -he., 3--lf and the temptations they a ý)rojection of the dark side of t 
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while witchunting servds , them not merely as a tool of political 
tition, but also as their breastplate of righteousness. c omp et C, 
Where high group prevails and such competition is removed, 
resulting in high : 7'rid as well, witchcraft beliefs give way to 
explanations Of Suffering in terms of punishing ancestors, as can be 
seen from thecyclical shift between ascribed and competitive social 
patterns to be seen in the development o-L Luobara lineages, a development 
accompanied by a parallel. shift from ancestor-dominated cosmologies to C 
witch accusation. 
57 
Witch dominated cosmologiesq common -v-here groups are penned up 0- 
together and isolated from others, are rare amongst pastoralists 0- 
and hunting and zathering bands: C) C) 
The witch fearing cosmology goes with a closely bounded 
unit. When association is free and escape from unwanted 
juestion of evil does not tU ties easy, the --, ke 'his 
particular for 
8 
The hazards for such groups are, fur-lulnermore, impersonalg they 
come more from climate and changes in other natural forces than 
fellow members of a cornpetitive group. 
', "V, iile Douglas develops her argument principally -,,,; ith the aid of 
cases drawn from pre-litergte societies, as she herself notes: 
"If we cannot bring the argument back from tribal ethnography to 
ourselves, there is little point in starting it at all t, - 
59 Her 
4 
argument can indeed be brought back to illuminate life Ln 
industrial 
societies. But beff'ore proceeding to examine this 
I wish to 
demonstrate the cogency of her argument and to amplify and extend 
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her analysis with the aid of some other studies which have concentrated 
upon the dynamics of morality in primitive and pre-industrial societies. 
III. The civilizing process 
It will by now be clear that it would not be inappropriate 
to borrow the term "closed society" to characterize societies high 
on grid and group. The closed nature of such societies can be seen 
in the restraints imposed by the prominence of ascribed statuses, 
in the insulation of their culture from alternative interpretations 
of the worldq and in the strong boundaries which separate them from 
other ggroups. 
The contrast which exists between open and closed societies, 
and the consequences of this contrast for the values and beliefs 
of their members, has been carefully examined by Robin Horton 
in his comparison of the traditional cultures of primitive societies 
and scientifically-orienteed culture. The central predicament of the 
closed societyq as he sees it, is the lack of awareness of alternative 
idea systems, in contrast with open societies where such wiareness 
is relatively hi-ghly developed. Absence of awareness of alternatives 
makes for an absolute acceptance of the established 
theoretical tenets, and removes any possibility of 
questioning them. In these circumstances, the estpblished 
tenets invest the believer with a compelling force. 
60 
Threats to the established paradigms are, in the absence of alternatives, 
threats of chaos and causes of anxiety. 
The belief in the magical efficacy of words to be encountered in 
cultures is born of such conditions. 
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Since he can imagine no 21ternative to his established 
system of concepts and words, the latter appear bound 
to reality in an absolute fashion. There is no -, 7iay 
at all in wl-Lich they c-n be seen as varying independently 
of the segments of reality they st-and for. Hence they 
appear so integrally involved with their referents that 
any E2., -Lnipulation of the one self-evidently affects the 
other. 61 
Closed systems also promote "taboo", a reaction of fear and 
loathing arounsed by certain events which are seen as monstrous and polluting. 
These, as Mary DouýTlas argued in Purity and Danger are events which 
seriously defy the established system of classification. 
62 
Perhaps the most important occasion of taboo reaction 
in tradional African cultures is the commission of incest. 
Incest is one of the most flagrant defiances of the 
established category - system: for he ivho commits 63 
it treats a mother, daughter, or sister like a wife. 
Any system of thought involves a system of classification and 
where the former is sacred and inviolable, so will be the latter. 
For those in open cultures, more used to the relative status of 
alternative definitions of reality, taboo reactions are less cormnon and 
passionate, while for the scientist the discovering of things which 
defy the established category system may well be sought after rather 
than repelled. 
Horton's analysis of the nature of closed belief s. -, Tstems offers 
a va-luable complement to Douglas's pnrtrait of the culture produced 
b. v tight social and cultural constraints, adding some additional 
details and filling in the way in which the elements of the system 
are intertwined and mutually supportive. He is surely wrong, however, 
in attributing such a world-view to all pre-literate societies. Those 
group will not 
be preoccupied with magic and pollution. low on grid and g 
Horton has probably been led to overgeneralize about traditional pr--- 
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literatEý '2o: 7, -. ý-in4t4es -from I ýs close concerti f' ull part- o t", "rica 
com-. unities are re-atývely c" osei. As Dcuglas says of Horton's 
of the . -. -ork of a ffello-, ý, i anthroý)ollo--4-s-,, -, on 'he savannah- d-ý, el I ing Dinka 
for failing to -ive proper prominence to the role of" magic in t, eir C) Zý C- 
lives: 
Robin Horton read the 'Dinka book from his perspective 
in the steamy mangrove s,,, ia., nps of the Niger Del'ta 
.. 
here local communities are closed Ln : Dn-a -,, -,, he--e milzic 
is indubitably majic. 3ut -I, ---, 7ic -,, ay be less C- important in open savannah lands. 0 
inka are - 'I ,. f=. oup and in comps-rLson . e-a,, ivel-7 free o- 
with their nei-::, hbours. 
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The impact of social constraint u-on attitudes C:: e 
to-! ards the body is not -m-ted. to pre-literat- societes. Similar forces 
can be seen at -., orly- in the history of European civilization as it emerged 
from the ", liddle Ages. ', 71ay is --t, for example, that people of that period 
felt free to discuss or mention bodily functi-= more o-cenly t1han 
Europeans of -n 1--a-11 Mg less need to conceal and -er a7e, as ,,,, e-11 as f9el4 -- 
rain these functions? 'Ll-o-v such inhibitions emerged, ho,,,, the threshold rest L 
of shame and embarrasse. -nent -: ias raised in the course of European hisbry, 
66 
is the subject of I-Torbert Elias's study o-. 'L"' the civilizing process. 
TT 
ý, sing as 'his principal source books on etiquette -ýiritten since the i3th 
. L. - eating, century, Elias demonstrýýtes 'hc,,,., the carnal side of human nature 
4 
evacuation, sleep, sex and violence - became increa-singly subdued and 
hidden behind thýý scenes of social life as the ý; arrior kný-ghtus of the 
"Tiddle Ages became transformed into the new aristocracy of the absolute 
courts. "'he changing social situation of the upper class was accompanied 
by an incre? sing su-)press'Lon 
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of bodily impulses. Spitting and yawning, for example, became stifled 
or concealed. The process and products of bodily secretion are 
increasingly shielded from public gaze until, finally, suppression 
reaches such an intensity that they ceased to be even mentionable 
and everything which recalls then is avoided. 
In numerous spheres of daily life parallel changes take place. 
Nakedness, a frequent sight in the Middle Ages, becomes a source of 
embarrassment. An invisible wall stats to form between one body and 
another, so that people become increasingly repelled by something that 
has been in contact -Nith the mouth or hand of another. Table manners 
change accordingly2nd eating by hand from common bowls fades away. 
Food must not be grabbed and due restraint must be exercised at table. 
As distaItte for handling food with one's fingers grows, the f ork makes 0 
its appearance. This new implement comes into fashion at about the 
same time as the handkershief and the nightshirt and is, like them, 
an invention called forth b., -T the same civilizing process. It is not 
lack of resources amongst the upper class which accounts for their 
earlier absence, but the lack of any felt need for such means of 
distancing man from his body. 
Sleep, like other bodily functions, is shifted behind the scenes 
of social life. It becomes limited to the nuclear family. -Medieval 
society had not felt the need for such compartmentalization and 
naked strangers sharing the same bed ý, ýlas neither uncommon nor 
embarrassing. There grows up an increasing reserve, an emotional 
barrier between one body and another. As Elias remarks of the new 
attitudes: "One repulses the body, isolates, feels ashamed of it, trieg 
to ignore it. 
1167 
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This applies whether the body is one's own or another's. Concern 
with cleanliness and bathing follow the same curve of civilization. 
Control of the sexual drive runs parallel -. v4-th the restraints 
imposed upon other sensual satisfactions. Relations between the 
I 
sexes, once openly discussed, become cloaked in silence and increasingly 
the target of moral condemnation. The extramarital relationships 
of men ahd their illegitimqte offspring become more unacceptable. 
In all these areas the increasing strength of self-control 
reýCi'ected the tightening of social control. The internal pacification 
of society brought about by the consolidation of the state resulted in 
the formerly independent members of the upper class being subject 
to an unprecedented extent to the pressure of others. The civilization 
of manners, the process of raising the threshold of shame and revulsion 
results from the "permanent interdependence of many people living together 
at the courts, the pressure exerted from above toward a stricter 
68 
regulation of impulses, and therefore toward greater restraint" . 
Greater repression is expected of subordinatesq for what is found 
distastful and disrespectUal in servants is often conduct which superiors 
are not ashamed of in themselves. Elias's survey of the h--', stori(-, al 
4 
development of advice concerning proper manners leads h;. M to the 
following conclusion: 
The masters find the sight of the bodily functions of 
their servants distasteful; they compel them, the 
social inferiors in their immediate surroundings, to 
control and restrain these-functions in a 1,, vay that 
they do not af, fir-, 4t, im-pose on themselves. 
69 
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Medieval knights continued to blow their noses with their hands 
after their servants were required to conceal their nose blowing behind 
a cloth. For the knight it was sufficient if he were dining that he should 
turn round so as to avoid anything falling onto the table. Later 09 
however, with the rise of absolutism and the court, the ruling class 
itýelf became a subservient and socially dependent class. As such it 
is itself subject to similar affective transformations: 
It is no accident that the first "geak of refinement" 
or "delicacy" in the manner of blowing the nose - 
and not only here - comes in the phase when the 
dependence and subservience of the aristocratic ýBper 
'I class is at its height, the period of Louis XIV. 
Conversley, shame is not felt before inferiors: 
In France, as late as the seventeenth century, king5 
and great lords receive epecially favored inferiors 
on occasions on which, a German saying was later to run, 
even the emperor should be alone. To receive inferiors 
when getting up and being dressed, or on going to bed, C) 
was for a whole Deriod a matter of course. And it 
shows exactly the same stege of the shame-feeling 
when Voltaire's mistress, 'L. 1arquise de Chatelet, shows 
herself naked to her sev2nt while bathing in a way that 
casts him into confusion, and then with total unconcern 
scolds him because he is not pouring in the hot water 
properly. 
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With increasing equality within society, however, shame and 
anxiety about of"fending the sensibility of others becomes more 
generalized. 
72 
Following the transformation of manners wrought by the rise of 
the absolutist courtq the next great stride forward in raising the 
threshold of shame, and embarrassment is taken by the bourgeoisie. 
Subject to, and ever reliant upon, the internal pacification achieved 
by the state, the mode of life of the bourgeoisie tightened the bonds 
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of social control still further. 
During the stage of the court aristocracy, the restraint 
imposed on ihclinations and emotions is based primarily 
on consideration and respect due to others and above 
all to social superiors. In the subsequent stage, 
renunciation and restraint of impulses is compe2led 
far less by particul----r persons; expressed provisionally 
and approxiamtely, -it is now, more directly than before, 
the less visible and more impersonal compulsions of 
social interdependence, the division of labour, the 
market, and competition that impose restraint and 
control on the iMpulses and emotions. 73 
Sensuality is further repressed: 
For many ! -: Ispects of the "emotional economy" bourgeois 
functions - above all, business life - demand and produce 
greater self-restraint than courtl. y functions... by 
the standard of bourgeois society the control of 
sexuality and the form Of maýýiage prevalent in coLirt. 
society appear ex-tmmely lP_x. 
nT 
-.. uch of 
Elias's portrayal of the association betviaen social 
constraint and attitudes towards the body is clearly consonant with 
Douglas's thesis. His interpretation of the psychological processes 
I TorgitIg this link, is, however, sig-nificantly different and leads him 
to posit the association of social constraint with further forms of 
self-restraint. For Elias sees the increasing suppression of the carnal 
side of human nature as part of a more general inhibition on all impulses. 
The individual's structure of affects is, he insists, a unity. You 
cannot breed circumspection and caution towards a whole range of pressing 
impulses and expect that the individuals thus socialized will display 
sp, ontaneity and lack inhibition in other areas. The feudal knight imposed 
few restraints upon the satisfaction of his bodily needs and desires 
because he imposed few checks on any of his impulses, which he was 
powerful and independent enougl. to S: Otisfy more or less when and where 
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they were felt. The civilizing process is one in which the entire 
pattern of effect becomes more subdued, moderated and cnlculating. 
Such emotional -repression was foreign to the warrior class of the 
Middle Ages. Not only were their impulses more openly and 
spontaneously expressed, but these were morelikely to oscillate betv,, een 
extremes. Ebctreme cruelty can easily r-+ive way to equally extreme pity, r=norse C. j m) 
and mercy. Prudential conern for maintaining the golden mean is 
out of place in such circles. Moods changed rapidly and dramatically 
in a , iay that in our own society is generally only observed in 
children as the result of the looser grip which socialzation has had 
a chance to place upon them. 
With the physical pacification of society however, c-., me 
the psycholooical pacification of affect. With the monopolization 
of force accomplished by the state the threshold of shame and revulsion 
induced by belligerence rises and surrounds the syTnbols, gestures and Cý 
instruments of menace with taboos - Elias remarks that at table 
for example: 
The knife, long a weapon and the on7y eating utensil, 
becomes a s7nnbol of danger and death. It generates a 
feeling of unease that leads to r,, -ýstricti6n and later 
to its suppression from use in society. 75 
In China, where the model-making upper class was formed by a hig'hly 
pacified strata of scholarly officials rather than a -7jariýcr class, the 
knife disappeared altogether from use at table. 
As with all other human drives, aggression is directly restrained 
by the increasing dependence that can arise out of the advance of social 
differentiation and integration. It is also similar to other emotions 
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in responding to such social pressure by being only able to find expression 
in more refined and sublimated forms, such as in dreams or spectator 
sports. 
76 
The central issue for Elias is, then, to find -1. -he social roots of 
the suppression of spontancity and impulsiveness. The parallels I 
he draws between the uninhibited nature of life in the I. iddle Ages and 
similar responses in children before the full force of socialization 
has run its course, might be taken to indicete that such impulses are 
inborn instincts, only held in check by sociý21-ly generated inhibitions. 
This im-clies that if social constraint is removed these instincts will 
resurface i-4ith all their -oristine vitality. But such an approach pays 
too little attention to the social origins of the drives themselves, 
Tfr most notably in the case of aggression. As can be seen from our ec-. Tie- 
discussion, social control- Over individuals in many hýlnting and 
, gathering 
bands is relatively Neak and their attitudes to-wards the body 
relatively relaxed and informal. , '%t the same time violence is unusual. 
"'obility and ready access to open resources serves to reduce aggression 
not by restraint, but by offering alternative: means of satisfying needs 
SOC4 
and avoiding the build-up of tension. Unlike mrtial A-eties which 
value the hot-tempered man as a fierce fighter, food-galuherers are much 
more likely to value those with a pleasant tem-perament who do not arouse 
quarrels-77 This 
is not so in those areas oý agrarian societies -, ihere the 
state has not achieved a successful monopolization of force. The effects 
I the eme-gence of such a failure can be seen from Anton 31ok's study o. 
-0 of -nafia in Western Sicily in response to the weakness o--LI the state. 
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Employing Elias's model o-f the relationship between control over the 
means of violence and the cbvelopment of moral inhibition agpinst its use, 
he notes: 
These conditions did not allow fo. - the development 
of a strong conscience with regard to the use of physical 
violence. A high sensitivity against using violence or 
witnessing it would have meant a serious social handicap... 
In fact, as noted eqrlier, pelmns who had a reputal,, -on for viclence and who eschewed recourse to public 
authori. ties commanded respect. 78 
Such an eschewing of recourse to public authorities is a central 
elernent of the code of honour known as omerta. This is)as "osca 
explains in his discussion of the mafia, is "that attitude which 
assumes that recourse to legal authority in cases of persecution by 
private enemies is a sympton of weakness, almost of coward 4 ce" 679 
Elias captues well the emotional quality and social origin of moral 
indignation, both in his discussion of socialization and in the contrast 
he draws between moral indignation and compassion. On the subject 
of socialization, he says: 
The more "natural" the standard of elelicacy and shame 
appears to adults and the more civilized restraint of 
instinctual urges is taken for granted, the more 
incomprehensible it becomes to adults that children 
do not have this delicacy and shame by "natiýre". The 
children necessarily touch again and again on the adult 0 
- yet delicacy, and - since they are not threshold of 
adapted - they infringe the taboos off society, cross the 
adult shame frontierg and penetrate emotional danger zones 
iff4CUlty. which the adult himself can only control with d 
In this situation the adult does not explain the denands 
he makes on behaviour. He is unable to do so adequately. 
He is so conditioned that he conforms to the social'. 
standard more or less automatical-ly. Any behaviour, 
any brea-ch of the prohibitions or restraints prevailing 
in his society mean danger, and a devaluation of the 
restraint imposed on himself. And the peculiarly emotional 
undertone so often associated , vith maral demands, the 
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aggressive and threatening severity with which they are 
frequently upheld, reflects the drjnger in which any breach 
of the prohibitions plý--ces the unstable balance of all 
those for whom the standard behaviour of society has become 
more or less "second nature". These attitudes are sy-mptons 
of the anxiety aroused in adults whenever the structure 
of their own instinctual life, and with it their own 
existence and the social ordpr in which it is anchored, 
is even remotely threatened. 0 
Elias's contrast between moral indignation and compassion is 
drawn in dýiscussing values in ancient Greece: 
Altogether the level of physical insecurity in the 
societies of antiquity was very much higher than it 
is in contemporary nation-states. That their poets 
showed more compassion than moral indignation is not 
uncharacteristic of this difference. Homer, already, 
disapproved of the fact that Achilles, in his grief 
and fury at the death of Patrocles, had not only sheep, 
cattle and horses but also tvelve young 9iojan nobles 
killed and burned on the funeral pyre of his friend as 
a sacrifice to his ghost. But agaJ-n, the poet did not sit 
in judgement and condemn his hero from the high throne 
of his own moral righteousness and superiority because 
he had committed the barbbrous atrocity of "human 
sac7. rif ice". The poet's criticism of Achilles did not 
have the emotional colour of moral indignation. It did 
not cast doubt on what we call the "character" of his 
hero, on his value as a human being. People do "bad 
things" -"kaka erga" - in their grief and fury. The 
bard shakes his head but he does not appeal to the 
conscience of his listeners; he does not ask them to 
regard Achilles as a moral reprobate, a "bad character". 
He appeals to their compassion, to their understanding 
of the passion which seizes even the best, even the 
heroes, in times of stress and which makes then do "bad 
tI. It 81 hings. 
IV. Technology and týie--Manal -oraer 
For further elaboration of the nature and sociogenesis of impulse 
control along similar lines to both Douglas and Elias, I turn to 
Gouldner and Peterson's notes on technology and the moral order. 
82 
245 
Employing factor analysis to explore the interrelationship of cultural 
tr,? its within pre-literate society, the,,,, - uncover one complex of traits 
which they term I'Apollonianism'ý, in recognition of Nietzsche's earlier 
discovery arld p. o-,,, Irayal of a cultural configuration strikingly 
similar to that subsequently unveiled by their mathematical analysis. 
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Apollcynim values stand in direct opposition to those which constitute 
the Dionysian outlook. Apollonianism differs from the latter in 
stressing, above all, impulse control in contr-? st to glorious transport 
and intoXication; rejection of all licence versus sexual promiscuity; 
stress on cognitive modes of experience, on reason, knowledge and 
science, rather than surrendering to "intuition" or instinct; individuation 
rather than surrendering oneself, evaporating ihto a vision of mystical 
oneness; empbasis on plastic arts rather than music; and a yýearning 
for an afterlife rather than accepting the dissolution of the self. 
Two traits which Gouldner and Peterson found to be prominent 
amongst those constituting Apollonian impulse control were elaborate 
supernaturally sanctioned ritual requirements and secular political 
power. These together restrain a person from immedi-te gratification of 
impulses. The role attributed to the former of these two forces is 
reminiscent of Douglas's treatment of the sociogenisis of ritual 
while the latter has clear affinities with Elias's theory of the role 
of the state in the process of civilization. 
Corinlating the level of technological development of the societies 
in their sample with the level of Apollodanism, Gouldner and 
Peterson 
conclude that the higher the level of technology the stronger is the 
control of impulses 
(a conclusion recalling Freud's hypothesis that 
civilization requires the renunciantion of instinctual gratification). 
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But what lies behind this association? Technological advance at 
this level of development brings increasing inequality. Social 
conflict between classes ensuns, too-ether with the intensification CD 
of the aggressive impulses of ambition, greed and envy. 
Since Apollonianism is associated with technology, 
and the latter with growing social tensions, it can 
scarcely be expected that Apollonianism will be 
associated with friction-free social relations. Indeed, 
to the extent that the impulse control required by 
Apollonianism induces cumulative frustrations, 
Apollonianism itself may be a source of aggression. 
Impulse control mechanisms may, therefore, create 
some work for themselves, heightening certain §f the 
impulses that it is their business to control. 4 
However, as we have seen, they accomplish this extra work quite 
readily and often to their own enhancement through the institution 
of disinterested punishment. 
How are people brought to take upon themselves the sacrifice 
of renouncing immediate gratification? Gouldner and Peterson suggest 
three main reasons: 
One, of course, has to do with the more efrective power 
system which can systematica"--y punish infractions. Another 
is the expectation of an attractive future life, which 
may be particularly important to those of heightened 
self-consciousness, insofar as the latter entails 
heightened anxieties about death. The priesthood may 
be able to manipulate such anxieties to strengthen conformity 
with the norms by giving assurances about the future life, 
as well as by providing or denying ritual preparation for 
it. Further, the growth of technology itself makes 
available, in some proportion to its development, a 
growing set of rewards which can here on earth, compensate 
for the costs of impulse control85 
In some circumstances these three are, to an extent, mutually 
substitutable. On this basis the correlation between technology 
and Apol onianism 
247 
need not and would not be expected to continue into 
later epochs in which technology could supply greatly 
increased rewards ... This line of analysis may also imply 
that a concentr2tion of Apollonianism, in various forms, 
may be especially needed as a "starting mechanism" 
at the beginning of a major technological spurt or re- 
organization, insofar as this entails a heightening of 
deprivation or an initial sacrifice of traditional 
gratifications. Under these conditions, a concentration 
of Apollonianism. may serve in effect as a form of 
'deficit-financing', providing social controls during 
a period when the new technology's rewards are not yet 
available to motivate the new demands for impulse 
control. When and insofar as the increased revIards 
of the technology are distributed it may be that 
Apollonianism is a less p9cessary source of impulse 
control and may slacken. 'o 
Gouldner has been taken to task for not realizing thýn-: t Dionysus 
often thrives in the same social conditions which nurture Apollo., 
37 
Yet this criticism is clearly unjust if Gouldner's subsequent work 
on the forces shaping social thought in ancient Greece is taken 
into account. There he makes quite clear his belief that Dionysianism 
can arise alongside Apollonianism in response to the same social 
., es. changes. 
He also completes -his earlier portrait of 
the two tyr 
Concerning their differences, Gouldner observes: 
The Apollonian draws boundaries which contain things in 
clear-cut forms; he seeks the individuation of persons 
and the specialization of social roles in a hierarchical 
organization. The Dionysian is disposed to flow over 
or through boundaries, seekihg the fusion of separate 
things and stressing the oneness of the universe; 
he is hostile to individuation, specialization, and 
hierarchy... Dionysian ideologies... stress the 
connectedness of all things, including the unity 
, of nature and society. The Dionysian seek 
mergence with others and with the universe by a relaxation 
of expressive discipline sometimes attained through 
orgiastic excitation; the Apollonian, in contrast, is 
.., 
ýateness through the exertion concerned to maintain se-rn 
of expressive discipline. 
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Dionysian man values solidarity and intimacy with his fellows, 
whereas the Apollonian holds himself aloof and is concerned to maintain 
his distictiveness and distance. 
The Apollonian values the ennobling differences in men, 
the differences that make some higher than others. He 
distinguishes men from the rest of nature, focusing 
on those common characteristics which he believes 
make them higher than other species. He values 
primarily those qu, -lities, such as reason, that set individuals and their species above &thiirs and not 
only apart. Conversely, those qualities which r-, ien go 
share with other species tend to be regarded as lowly. 
These two portraits are, of course, ideal types. Any concrete 
social movement, for example, will combine elements of both in varying 
degrees. But Iýrthagoreanism might be taken as one Greek movement of 
the period which was more imbued with Apollonian values: 
Pythagoreanism reveals itself as a revivalistic movement 
toward cultural revitalization in its call for renewed 
veneration of the gods, of ancestors, and of ancient 
codes of conduct. In this traditionalistic vein it 
emphasizes requital or retri, bution for evil, and it 
conceives of evil as a form of excess. Conversely, 
proper beh-1viour is regarded as that which is tempe-ate 
or restrained and which follows the principle of limit, 
measure and of "no , 2,, xcess". 
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And for an example of the dominance of an Apollonian outlook 
in the work of an individual, we can look to Plato's social 
theory: 
Clearly, what Plato seeks is not so much liberty but the 
elimiation of anomia and the establishment of social 
order and restraintg in political as in other matters 
"Anarchy, " he insists with the fervour of a Pythagorean, 
"must be extripated from the entire life of all Mankind 
and from all the breasts of men. " Linked to his distinction 
bet-, reen justice and injustice is a series of more or less 
explicit and corresponding dualisms: order versus disorder, 
temperance or restraint of the apDetities versus intemperance 
and emotional excess; lawfulness versus lawlessness, 
anarchyg or anomia. 
(These affect-laden polarities also 
resonate with our own previous distinction between the 
Apolloanian and Dionysian. Indeed, from the Platonic 
vievrpointg the very quintessence of vice is intemperance, 
a lack of emotionaI discipline, the concrete paradigm of 
which would seem to be the orgiastic ecstasy sought in 
the- Dionysian tradition. )92 
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By, way of providing an example of an individual opposed to such 
attitudes it is interesting to note that Gouldner cites Euripides, whom 
we hpve already encountered in Ranulf Is work as the Greek Enlightenment 
opponent of the savage moral indignation of traditional Athenian morality, 
as a champion of Dionysian values. 
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What, then, are the social conditions fostering the rise of 
Dionysianism? One of the best answers so far advanced by those 
,!,, ho have addressed themselves to this question has been provided by 
Frank Musgrove in his demonstntion of the links between values, 
the economic order and the open society. 
Gouldner and Peterson, it will be recalled, suggest that thrift, 
sobriety and steady application is called forth at the start of economic 
revolutions. Musgrove does not deny this, but emphasizes that conditions 
frequently associated with such revolutions also generate values 
and beliefs which are discordant with the mlf-discipline needed to 
promote economic growth. To demonstr? te this he examines five great 
economic revolutions: the neolithic revolution, the eleventh - 
century industrial revolutiong the commercial revolution of the sixteenth 
century, the classical industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, 
and the cybernetic revolution of today. And he concludes: "All 
appeared to have 'counter cultures' which were at least superficially 
discordant and 'unhelpful', especially in their support for non- 
rational, 'disorderly' and highly emotional modes of conduct. 
94 
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To examine why this should be sog Musgrove employs the 
Apollonian-Dionysian polarity. Also taking his lead from the work, 
of Nietzsche, he describes the contrast in terms consistent with 
those we have already encountered: 
Apollo is judicious (and judiciai) , caimý rational, circiLrispect, 
guarded and restrained. He makes laws and obeys them. He 
is an individualist, with a strong sense of boundaries 
and separateness - he is never "beside himself", he never 
loses himself. Even in anger decorum never deserts him: 
he is the perfect ambassador, the supreme bureaucrat. 
(And he is always meticulously and appropriately dressed 
for the part. He is a man to whom externals are important. ) .... Dionysus has no sense of boundaries. He bursts any that 
surround him, including the boundaries of self that mark 
him off from others 
- 
and the world. Dionysus is o-, -en. 
Apollo is closed. 9D 
The value of Apollonianism for economic ggrowth is clear, for 
"whatever the precise em. -, -, haisi within the complex of Apollonian 
characteristics, it is never self-indulgentg sleepyl lazy or 
erratic; it is invariably rationai , deliberate. and I future-oriented' . 
Its drunkeness is social and its sexuality diplomatic". 
96 
eeriods of great economic growth and change are thrust forward 
by those adhering to such values. Sixteenth century captiaiism 
10 ound. them amongst the Puritans and. the nineteenth century amongst 
the utilitarians and nonconformists. But what, is it about such 
f Dionysian counter cultures? ýýeriods which also favours the rise oi 
Musgrove sees the answer in demogra-phic changes: 
Successful econoraic &-evolutions are associated with population 
movement and growth. Ili is the consequent social dislocation 
and uncertainty and threat to established identities 
that most satisfactorily e=plain the conjunction of 
economic order and spectacular poetic excess. Social 
dislocation cails for experiments in new interact ional 
norms. Ecstasy is demographic. 
)7 
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Not only prosperity, but opennessIviith social bonds weakened and 
questioned as the result of increasing social and geoFraphic mobility, 
is needed for the emergence of Dionysianism. Fbrý "Dionysus is not the 
98 
child of deprivation but of unnerving opportunity" . 
The importance of population movement and growth in addition 
to economic prosperity -for the rise of 
Dionysian beliefs can be seen 
from their relative absence from llenanissance Italy: 
Italy in the fourteenth , '-nd fifteenth centuries -Nas highly 
. bureaucratic and capitalistic in its economic organizationg its populat -ion was stagnant and ',. poýlonian men conducted 
its af 'L--'-rS (and even painted its pictures and ex, -:: -cut6d its sculpture) with the calm assurance which come to men 
of prudence, assured position, nice calculation and 
foresight Q9 
It was, contrary to Burckhardt's romantic portrait of the era, 
a closed society with rigid hierarchies and severly limited , opportunities. 
Renaissance Italy, while prosperous, had a stationary economy and a 
population stable both in terms of size and movement. 'Nith such 
4. 
stability came social rigidity and exclusiveness, an absence of the CD U 
opennessneeded to promote the Dionypian temper. 
The combination of -economic growth and population movement 
promotes social dislocation, opportunity and uncertainty. It is 
such conditions thFit . ve 
find Durkheimean anomie, which, as -. -, ve have 
seen in discussingthe-11ork of Douglas, is -fostered 
by loosening CD 
-h, e social ties, slackening of ,, j-rid and group. 
These provide -1. 
opportunity for Dionysian ecstasy. 
The open society is the society of opportunity and anomie 
When there are no boundaries and goals are infinite - 
as -with 'Nietzsche's Dionysus and Spengler's 
Faust - 
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there is anomie, exhilar-ation and perhaps ecstasy. 
The certain cure for anomie and ecstasy is limited 
and specific goalls, la opportunity, hierarchy CD ýý'Oof 
and due subordination. 
Dionysian counter cultures celebrate openess. They are not --. ier--ly 
a product of lighter social constraints but also an affirmation of the 
value of such conditions. 
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CHAPTER 
THE PERILS OF PERMISISIVENESS: . 110'RAL INDIGNATION AND CO! T=", -'lPORA. RY TRENDS 
IN SOCIAL CONTROL 
I. Subterranean values and the ethos of productivity 
Does moral indignation continue to exercise any marked influence over 
morality and conduct, or is it now principally of historical interest? 
For Harold Lasswell, at least, moral indignation appears as a vanishing 
source of social control as the advent of advanced industrial society 
produces conditions which enable society to out,, ---roN such irrational 
sentiments. He sees such sentiments being elimiated by the growth 
of a tolerant and less punitive moral climate that is more in 
accord with the nature of the contemporary social order. 
I Certain 
contemporary developments in morality would certainly appear. to 
lend credence to such ideas. 
To illustrate this development we can take up f rom vihere we left 
off the last chapter, for Dionysianism in the form of the counter 
culture which emerged in the 1960's represents the antithesis of 
those b3liefs and values so dear to the hearts of the morally 
indigma rit. Since Musgrove completed his --: tudy of it in 1973, 
the counter culture, seerl in terms of groups committed to putting 
itsideals into practice, has experienced something of a decline. 
This is quite in accordance with that is known about the 
circumst. -ýnces propitious to the flowering of such movements, given 
the atmosphere off economic depression in the 1970's. Nevertheless, I 
numerically it is still far from extinct. Its members are to be 
found running rural co=unesq whole-food co-operatives and radical 
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bookstores, together with a variety of community proýects. Closest 
to its romantic inspiration the counter culture as a movement is 
even still to be found lingering in the dwellings of the tepee 
people in the depths of Wales. Most significantly, it provides the 
main stay of the current campaign against nuclear power. 
The development of the ideology of those movements concerned with 
combatting moral pollution, which are discussed later in this chapter, 
has reflected their recognition th: --t the emergence of the counter Cý 
culture represented a complete challenge to theirway of life, and 
and the values they uphold. Mary Whitehouse, for exaF-nple, giving 
vent to her feelings on the prosecution of the underground magazine 
OZ clearly identified the counter culture as one of the principal 
sources and examples of the moral degeneration facing the nation: CD 
In the OZ case, as in the case of the Little Red Schoolbook, 
millions were left wondering what it had all been about.. 
But thousands of parents who had seen their children's 
life style changed through the impact of the underground 
press were only too well avare of its significance. They 
knew Richard Neville not as some hard-do. ne-by humorist 
out as the author of the paperback Pla. ý,, hich Power 
became the handbook of the international dropouts 
and bemused pot-smoking youngsters persuaded to believe 
that society was rotteng life was too tough and the odds 
stacked toolBavily against them - the besttýiing to do CD -0 
was to drop out and bum around. The purpose of the 
underground press is "not so much to dissent as to disrupt" 
and its editorial policies explicitly and implicitly seek 
to overthrow society as we know it and of t'ý, is n -it 
no secret. 
2 
It is not, howeverg so much the counter culture seen as a 
social movement upon which I wish to focus at this point, but as a 
s, ystem of beliefs and values and it is in this sense that the 
term will be emploved from hereon. 
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These values and beliefs are the antithesis of the culture of the 
morally indignant and delineating them will help to throw the latter 
into sharp relief and help in the investiffation of conditions hostile u- 
to its development. As will be apparent, the portraits painted here 
will be in the nature of ideal types; encountering total commitment 
to every facet of the culture to which they refer is hardly to be 
expected, particularly as they include models of conduct which people 
seek to approach rather than expect to attain. Nevertheless, there 
is clear evidence, as we have seen, that certain social conditions 
will propel people closer towards such an outlook and away from the 
culture of the mora'lly indi, 7naPt. Contemporary counter culture, 
like its historical predec--, ssors, flourishes where group and grid 
are weak, where loose social networks and an open society prevail. 
The contradiction between the counter culture and the culture 
of the morally indignant does not, of course, embrace every opinJ-on. 
Nevertheless, it runs deep, and what at first sight appear to be 
areas of agreement often appear on closer examination to have little 
substance when isolated opinions are related to the broader system 
of values and beliefs from which they draw their meaning. 
In recent years, for example, the counter culture (in this 
case both as a movement and an ideolog)r) has been pervaded by the ideals 
of the women's liberation movement. Now both feminists and those 
contemporary movements which give voice to the system of values and 
-s such as the beliefs associated w-, th moral indignation, movement 
Festival of Light, The National Viewers' and Listeners' Association and 
the Responsible Societyq are opposed to commercial pornography. 
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They share not only the same enemy, but also couch some of their 
arguments against it in similar terms, such as attacking commercial 
pornography as a damaging assault upon the dignity of women. Closer C-- 
examination of their beliefs, however, reveals that agreement bet-Neen 
the two sides is superficial and th? t their understanding of what 
constitutes women's rights are fundamentally opposed and spring from 
mutually antipathetic views of the wOrld. 
3 
To underst-, md the nature of the counter culture in relation to 
the wider society in which it is located, it is useful to employ 
the theory of subterraean values. TMatza and Sykes, writing in 
1961, emphasized that attention needs to be paid not only to the 
contrasts which exist between the cultures of different groups 
and societies, but also to the inconsistencies which exist within 
these cultures. Within the value systems of all members of society 
there exists a tension between the overt, dominant values of society 
on the one hand and subterranean values on the other. Ilatza, and 
S4 Sykes see the subterranean values of society a J-ncl-, -, ding a desire 
for adventure, excitement and thrills. Such a desireoften exists 
side by side with such respectable -values as the desire for routine 
and security. "It is not a deviant value, in any full sense, 'Out 
it must be held in abeyance until the proper moment and circumstances 
for its expression arise 
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For 
the value of adventure certainly does not provide the 
major orgainzational principle of the dominant social 
order in modern, industrial society, This is especially 
true in the work-a-day world where so much activity 
is founded on bureaucratization and all that it implies 
with regard to routinization, stand-? rdization and so on. 
But this is not to say that the elemOnt of adventure is 
completely rejected by the society atlarge or hever 
appears in the motivational structure of the law- 
abiding. 
5 
Society tends to cope with the resulting tension through setting 
aside certain periods when subterranean values are allowed expression, 
periods such asholidays, festivals and sporting events. The saturnalia 
of the ancient world is ga particularly vivid example, incorporating the 
reversal of normal rules and relations. 
Matza and Sykes are particularly concerned to examine how juvenile 
delinquency appears in the light of this model. From this perspective 
juvenile delinquen. ts appear "not an alien in the body of society but 
7 
representing instead a disturbing reflection or caricature". For 
the dominant society 
exhibits a widespread taste for violence, since 
fantasies of violence in books, mugazines, moýýsq 
and television are everywhere at ftand. The delinquent 
simply translates into behaviour those values ýhat 
the majority are usually too timid to express. 
More respectable members of the community, careful to hold their 
subterranean impulses firmly in check are likely to adopt a more 
ambivalent attitude towards such fictional exploits. Rather than 
imitation on the part of such members of the cummunity, 
then , ve are 
likely to find an ambivalent attitude towards those 
overstepping the boundaries set upon the indulgence of subterranean 
desires, an ambivalence similar to that which we encountered amongst 
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the respectable citizens of Athens towards the heroes of their 
tragedies, a vicarious enjoyment of their hubristic and daring 
exploits mingled with a never tiring smugness at hearing of their CD 
eventual downfall at the hands of justice. 
Follmving upon the work of Jock Young, we can characterize 
the contrast between the dominant, official values of the --, iorld of 
viork with subterranean talues in the following way. 
9 The former 
emphasize deferred gratific7ýtion; planning future action-,, conformity 
to bureaucratic rules; fatalism, with high control over detail, 
4 but little over dir-ýýction; routine and predLctability; instrumental 
attitudes to Nork; and hard work seen as a virtue. The latter represent 
the antitheses of these respectable virtues. They enjoin short-term 
hedonism; spontaneity ; ego-expressivity; autonomy, with control over 
both the detail and direction of behaviour; new experience, excitement; 
the performance of activities as an end-in-themselves; and disdain 
for -, ý, ork. Relatively few members of society opt to accentuate 
subterranean values to the extent of denigrating the domiriant value 
system. For most, indulgence in the former is mediated by performance 
in accord -Nith the latter set of values as the result of the 
prevailing ethos of productivity which 
states that a man is justified in expressing subterranean 
values if, and only if, he has earned the right to do 
so by working hard and being productive. Pleasure can 10 
only be Legitmate17 puXchased by the credit card of work. 
This moral solution to the tension between the t,. 7jo competing 
value systems is not, however, flawless, for people can corr, ý- to 
doubt 
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both the sanity ofalienated work and the validity 
of their leisure. For they cannot compartmentalize 
their life inasatisfactory manner: their socialization 
for work inhibits their leisure, and their utopias of 
leisure belittle thEir --ýork. " 
Nevertheless, for the present the ethos of productivity remains 
strong, acting to keep within bounds the recent shift in emphasis 
away from the preoccupation with production to expanded possibilities 
in the field of consumption and I-eisure. As ýýTusgrove notes in 
attempting to accolint for the positive result of studies of job 
satisf! 7ction: "It is shameful in 71estern industrial societies for 
anyone to confess that he hates his work, dislikes his boss, and has 
often changed his job". 
12 The counter culture, unencumbered by the 
ethos of productivity, is untroubled by such shame: 
It is principally w]-thin the counter culture that an 
logetic "fun morality" is to be unequivocal and unapo . found: work is not only de-emphasized and displaced 
from the centre of life, but the obligation to 
4 
eng, age in "productive" , ý, ork is not recognized. The 
justification for ac-,, 'ývity is personal enrichment and 
extension of a-iareness, social service, or frf-a, nkly 
enjoyment. 13 
As a result of" such attitudes the counter culture is a prime 
target for moral indignation: "fascinating because they act out t-3 
in an uninhibited fashion the subterr-anean --oals which the rest of 
the population desires, immediately conqemnacie oecause -ýney do not 
leserve any of these re,, iards". 
14 As Paul Goodman notes of the 
-L t to hippies: treatment meted ouU 
Proportionatýý to its nuPibers, this group is by far the 
most harrassedg beat up, and jailed by the police.. with 
the hippies there is a gut reaction from the beginning - C: ) 
they are dirty, indecentq shiftless; they threaten the 
self jIstif ic- tion cf the system-. 
15 
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Young sees the ethos of productivity as shaping attitudes 
towards the young in general as the result of their removal from 
full -participation in the economy; "Restriction on youth's economic 
activities are reflected in the moratoriam placed upon their sexual 
habits. For the ethos of productivity dictates that only those 
who are economically self-sufficient are entitled to enjoy full 
sexual relationships". 
16 Similarly it is the use of marihuana to II 
express or facilitate the. pursuit of su`ýterranean goals unfettered by 
the ethos of productivity which calls forth repression against those 
enjoying unearned pleý, sure. As Alisdair NacIntyre observes: 
Yost of the 'hostility that I have met ,,; ith occurs from 
people who have never examined the facts at all. I 
- makes them dislike cannabis is not suspect that . -., ha-1. 
the belief that the effects of taking it are harmful 
but rather a horrifying suspicion that here is a source 
o -P , pure pleasure .,., hich is available for ose who 
have not earnedit, who do not deserve it. 
Clearly the counter-cultural view of the world is in many 
respects the antithesis of that entertained by the morally in. dignant. - 
It is in favour off uninhibited sexual relaticnships, ag-inst the 
work ethic and or(gamizational restraints, opposed to authority. 
The gross power of government, industrial, military 
( and educational) bureaucracies, as well as their 
infrastructure of rule-regulation, are seen as exploitative 
and dehumanizing... Deference is degradation, ambition 
is corruption, and rule-observation and bureaucratic 
routine a denial of human spontaneity and autonomy. 
18 
It is opposed to the hierarchical gr9ding of people in terms of 
race, sex or examination. Systems and processes of classification 
are suspect, hindering openness, mutability and flux. This extends 
beyond dereifying conventional social roles to atý, empts to ease the 
normal boundaries of sense impiession and perception through, for 
example, tihe use of, hallucinogens. C) 
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As Willian Braden ý, ý,, rites o-. F' the ef-l"ect cf L. E. D. 
Subject-object relationships dissolve, and thevr)rld 
no longer ends at one's fingertips: thewrld is sirnpýy 
an extension of the body, or the mind.., As for identity, 
it is not really lost. On the contrary, it is 
expanded to include all that is seen and all that is 
not seen. What occurs is simply depersonalization. 19 
Open and free communicationg untroubled bT the use of obscenities, 
is val ued. The nuclear family is rejected both on the grgunds, of 
I 
its sexual exclusiveness and its centralized exercise of power. 
Conceived of as a system of sentiments and beliefs the counter 
culturb can, then, be seen as in many respects a polar type to the 
system of sentiments and beliefs which we have seen as characterising 
the outlook o-11" the morally indignant. The counter culture is the 
product of diminishing social pressure, of a relatively open society. 
Moral indignation is quite the reverse. It is the product of social 
constraint, of impe-meable social boundaries and pressing obligations. 
Strong commitment to the central tenets of coi-,, nter-cultural 
philosophy is till limited to a small minority. Nevertheless, 
as will be il'. 1ustrated in the following section contemporary morality 
has moved away from a number of the traditional standards championed 
by the morally indignaiat towards a more permiss4ve stance. Certain 
sections of society are in thevanguard of this chý? nge- Examining 
who they are in addition to revieiling the general trend of development 
in m. orFlity Will shed light on the structural changes which have CD 
nourished this development. 
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II. Structural origins of contemporary develoTments in morf:, Iity 
The emergence of the counter culture in Britain in the 1960's 
represented the most extreme development of trends which . %, ere not 
limited to itself - The decline of deference, for exampleg has 
been more general. The working class has become les-ý deferential in 
its respect for the major social and political institutions of society, 
a change reflected in the decline in deferential Conserv--tive voting 
20 
amongst the vurking class. ., ý. rusgrove sees this particular change as 
largely the result of increasing ur-ýanization and the creation of an 
urban population living, in the main, in one-class districts. 0 
The extent of the surveillance and social control exercised by 
superiors declines: 
Cne-class residential areas are a powerful safeguard 
of human dignity. Deference is eroded in one-class 
e -ates, -where a man can walk his nei bourhood streets st 
without having to pull his forelock. 2 
" 'T 
-.,. usg. rove also notes 
that these is evidence from studies of the 
social and political a ttitudes of school children that the middle 
class is also declýn4ng in the deference they accord to our major CD - 
22 4 
social and polit4cal instj_tutions. 
Tt T 
., -usgrove vie,, -ý s. 
the changes in values amongst y6ung people 
which his study reveals as having taken place between 1963 and 
'1973 as representing a radical transition from an uncritical acceptance 
of the outlook of their elders to the elaboration of a new set 
of values in conflict N4-th traditional morality. His focus upon 
the counter culture means that this change appears more marked than 
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it was for the mass of the population. Nevertheless, there is 
clear evidence that there has been a significant change in moral 
standards over this period, a series of "' changes generally referred to 
as the emergence of a permissive society. The change has been 
particularly marked amongst the young, leading to an inevitable 
increase in inter-generational conflict. 
The extent of the chance is indicated by two surveys undertalzen CD 
by -'A'right and Cox. Repeating in 1970 a survey of sixth form students 
previ-ously undertaken amongst a similar sample-in 1963 they found 
that there had been a shift away from the unqualified condemnation 
of misdeeds. The most dramatic changes in the direction of greater 
tolerance occurred in relation to anti-ascetic actiong which are 
forms of individual self-indulgence the undesirable 
consequences of which, if any, are felt mainly by those 
who engage in them... Examples are forms of IýTzoral' 
sexual behaviour, drunkeness and drug-taking 
Nright sums up the changes revealed in this area as follows: 
As far as anti-ascetic actions are concerned there has 
been a considerable change in the direction of a position 
which holds that provided no one else is hurt, and in the 
case of sexual inlercourse provided the couple love each 
other and are responsible, it is no one's business 
to pass moral judgements on them24 
,i, iright goes on to note that surveys reveal that from "the middle 
twenties onivards, the trend is for moral beliefs to become 
progressively less flexible, and for people to grow less 
_, _s". 
25 Berl Kutchinsky, reviewing permissive in their Judgement 
research on knowle3pe and opinion about law and morality undertaken 
in a number of advanced industri@7 societies in recent years, 
4 
finds that they confirm the association between age and morality: 
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The general trends can be summarized as follows: Young 
pe-Isons tend to be more lenient, tolerant, reform- 
minded and liberal towards crime and criminals, while 
T 
older T2ýeople tend to be more severe, intolerant, 
oppressive and conservative with reg? rd to legal reforms. 
Young people also tend to exEress less respect for 
the law than older persons. 
2 
He challenges, however, psychological interpretations oil this association 
of the sort offered by Wright by pointing to two developmen-tsfor 
which they are unable to account: 
Firstly, in early stucYes (mainly before 1965) the age 
differences were less prominent than in the more recent 
studies. Secondly, the differences between older and 
younger women seem to be much more prominent than the 
differences between olGer and younger men. In other 
words, the findings suggest that the differences betineen CD 
young and old people are becoming more distinct, and this 
tendency towards polarization is more marked among women 
than among men. 27 
Rather than people growing more severe ývith age it is bettBr 
to conceive of them as becoming less flexible in terms of attitude 
change in general in comparison with the plasticity of youth. The 
re-f--son for the smaller age differences in the earlier studies - 
and the differences between the pre- and post - 1965 studies suggests C-- 
that the 1960's was a pivotal point in the development of morality 
in several advanced industrial societies - is that the pace of socio- 
cultural change has accelerated. As a result the polariz! Rtion betý-, een 
young and the old has inevitably increased. Similarly, the position 
and views of women have been changing more rapidly than those of men, 
but the rela-tive inflexibility of older people has meant that older 
women have been less likely to reflect the changed circumst2nces 
in their attitudes. 
In Britain the last twenty years have brought about a growth in 
the willingness to tolerate and indulge in sexual behaviour previously 
condemned. The surveys of 
Wright and Co-X clearly indicRte that the 
gre-9test change 
in the direction Of ýer, missive moral standards 
267 
amongst young people has taken place in relation to sexual conduct 
the change being most marked in the case of the attitudes olf rirls. 
28 
9 
Behaviour is moving in line with attitudes. Schofield's study of the 
sexual behaviour of young people shows an increase to have taken place 
in the proportion of girls experiencing pre-marital sexual intercourse 
between 1959 and 1964.29 There can be little doubt tha-t this continued to 
rise after that period. 
30 Improved methods of contraception - most 
notably the introduction of the contraceptive pill - have doubtless 
made a ma-jor contribution to this trend. Even withoull such improved 
methods, however, the changing climate of opinion hýs meant that 
illegitimate pregnancy is now met with less severe consequences Cý 
than formerly. Apart from the increased availability and safety of 
abortions, social sanctions against unmarried mothers have been relaxed. 
This is reflected in the declining number of babies available for 
adoption despite the increase in illegitimate births. 
31 
The growing tolerance and permissiveness of the British public 
over the last twenty years has been matched by changes in government 
and media policies. As Christie Damies summarizes the changes in 
this respect: 
The guardians of . societ, *'s morality 
have made little 
attempt to prevent or reverse these changes and indeed 
did much to encourage and accelerate them. Parliament 
freed homosexuals from prosecution, legalized abortion, 
made it easier to get a divorce or to lay a bet, and 
liberalized the law on censorship, The courts, 
the broadcasters, the publishers and other bodies 
relaxed their attitudes as to what books, plays, 
films and programmes could be sold or shown... Even 
inhere society continued to condemn an action as immoral, 
4tS 
-L relaxed 
its penalties and made punishment more 
lenient. Capital punishment was abolished and 
corporal punishment was ended in prison and curtailed 32 
in schools a 
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Seen in such terms, the permissive society clearly poses a direct 
affront to moral indignation. 
Such a rapid change towards permissive moral sentiments, with C 
an inevitable upswing in intergenerational conflict, as was witnessed 
in both Britain and America during the 1960's is not without 
precedent in this century. In both countries sections of the yqunger 
generation became rapidly more permissiVe in their outlook in both 
the 1920's and the 1960's, with a slower rate of change in the same 
direction continuing to unfold in the intervening decades. 
33 
C: ) 
In Britain, it is true, the change was less d-1 'amatic during the 
1920's than in America, being confined to the more prosperou s. 
34 
Affluence was more widespread in America at the time due to gre-ter 
economic expansion. This underwrote a more widespre! ýd change towards 
permissiveness in the way Ranulf Is analysis of the economic roots of 
morality would suggest. 
35 
C_- 
Do-vies argues that a common thread running through the changing 
moral attitudes in Britain over the last two decades has been the 
I 
replacement of "moralism" by "causalism". The former deals with 
issues of permitting or prohibiting an activity in terms of the 
intrin. -;, ic 
,, jickedness or goodness of 
the activity itself, ir-pespective 
of its consequences. The latter concerns itself solely with the 
balance of harm resulting from forbicding or allowing an activity. 
Even if the activity itself is considered immoral, such consideration 
will be outweighed in the mind of the causalist if it is demonstrated that 
forbidding an act fails to resolve conflict and increases suffering. 
36 
6.9 
This change can be seen most clearly in the changes introduced n 
by the 1967 Divorce Act. Bafore this Act came into operation 
the only grounds for divorce were to prove the commission of a 
"matrimonial offence" such as adultery, cruelty or desertion. 
The function of the court in such cases was to determine guilt 
and innocence in relation to an offence. By contrast, the new 
proceedings are not at all concerned to allocate responsibilitY 
for an offence, but to determine whether a marriage has 
irretrievably broken down. Under the neiv law, as Richards 
remarks, "it is not sufficient to show that the respondent has 
committed adultery; the petitioner must also satisfy the court 
it 37 
that he or she now finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. 
The debate upon the Divorce Bill was conducted overwhelmingly 
in causalist terms, with opponents phrasing their opposition in 
terms of the factual basis of the reformers' case. They argued, 
in effect, that the relative balance of consequences between the 
reformed and unreformed situation in terms of the reduction of 
human suffering was in favour of making no alteration in the 1,9wq 
rather than attacking divorce as wrong in itself. Yet there 0 
is reason to suspect that this was a somewhat spurious causalismg 
serving to defend momlist objections, givefithe high correlation 
of religious belief and views on this issued. Roman Catholics 
were particularly likely to be opp-osed to reform, as were the 
majority of Anglican M. P. 's. 
38 
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Similarly, the opponents of the Abortion Actq while giving 
clearer expression to moralist condemnation of abortion, did not 
press such arguments too hard within a predominantly causalist 
House of Commons in comparison with the use made of them in the 
campaign outside Parliament. The supporters of the Bill, arguing 
in causalist terms, did not couch their argument in terms of 
women's rightsq but simply stressed that legalized abortion was 
:ý 
39 the lesser of two evil.. 
The history of the attempts to abolish capital punishment in 
Britain since the war show a similar change. In the past both 
retentionists and abolitionists were more likely to stress the 
importance of moral arguments in assessing the death penalty. 
Retentionists, for example, were more likely in earlier debates 
to stress the death penalty as just retribution, 
while abolitionist sentiment condemned the taking of life by the 
State as inherently wrong irrespective of its value as a deterrent. 
Gradually, however, causalism has gained the upper hand, with the 
issue increasingly being argued in terms of the effectiveness of 
capital punishment as a deterrent. 
40 
The decline of moralism and the rise of causalism c--n, Davies 
ar-gues, also be seen to underpin the , g-,, rowing freedom of expression 
allowed in the media and increased sexaul permissiveness. 
41 But 
what accounts for the decline of moralism? 
Davies sees the rise of modern bureaucacy as the main answer 
to this question: 
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The causalist mode of tacAing questions is one that 
developed because it was thebes, t -nethod of governing 
the relationships between large bureaucratic organizations. 
The moralist way of looking at the world which had 
evolved in small communities and which sought to regulate 
relationships of individuals living in such communities 
proved unsuitable to this new context. One cannot 
describe ICI or Distillers or the Department of the 
Environment or the Prudential Assurance Company or the 
Transport and General Workers Union as Igo, od' or 'bad' 
'praiseworthylor 'blameworthy' in exactly the same 
sense as one can apply these terms to particular 
individuals. They are not persons and the relationships 
between them are more usefully seen in terms of cause 
and eff,: ýct than in terms of reward and punishment. 42 
The increasing tendency to think of society and to attempt to 0 
solve problems between institutions in causalist terms spills 
over into attemptzto regulate other areas of social life such as 
those issues of public policy and private morality touched upon 
above. 
Herbert Marcuse has noted a similar tendency for the growing 
p., e: rvasiveness of bureaucratic institutions to undermin, e moralism: 
With the rationalization of the productiveapparatusq 
with the multiplication of functions, all domination 
assumes the form of administration... Control is usually 
administered by offices in which the controllers are 
employers and the employed ... The sadistic principAl-9 
the c-pitalist exploiters, have been transforTed into 
salaried members of a bureaucracy, whom their subjects 
meet as members of another bureaucracy. The aggressive 
impulse plunges into a void - or rather encounters 
smiling colleagues, busy competitors, obedient officialsq 
helpful social Torkers who are all doing their duty and 
who are all innocent victims. 
43 
In at least one area, however, is has been the decline of a 
particular type of bureaucracy -hich has allowed one facet of the 
permissive society, namely male homosexuality, to gain greater 
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acceptance than formerly. Fluctuations in the moral condemnation 
accorded to homosexuality are closply related to the nature of the 
armed forces within our society. These have been, since the army 
reforms of the last century, essentially bureaucratic organizations. 
Not only are the formation of specific homosexual ties within 
primary groups within the forces frowned upon in favour of a more 
diffuse loyalty to the group as a whole in order to avoid jealousy C) 
and tension, but homosexual ties may be formed across the military 
hierarchy, eroding discipline. The importance of such considerations 
within the forces are reflected in the refusal to extend the 
legalization ol homosexual acts between consenting adults in 1966 
to those within the armed forces. 
During the period when Britan had a large overseas empire, CD 
the military and the all-male quast. -military burearcracies employed 
to administer it were a most important group and close attention was 
paid to cultivating the moral qualities necessary for them to fulfill 
their task. This is reflected in the tightening up of restrictions 
against homosexuality and an increasing concern with its possible 
development in public schools during the late nineteenth century. 
44 
With the decline of the Empire in recent years the importance of the 
military has declined and its interests no longer exercise the sway 
over public policy they once enjoyed. 
Not only must we take into account the changing balance offbrces 
between different types of bureaucracy in attempting to account for 
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changes in morality, but we must also keep in mind the sort of 
personnel which the tasks undertaken b. y modern organizations demand 
and cre? te. 
It is hard to generalize about the role of modern bureaucracies 
in shaping the moral outlook of their members, for, as we have seen 
in surveying Kohn's study of the impact of alienation upon conformity, 
this depends upon the nature of the individual's position within the 
hierarchy and the extent of self-direction his work entails. 
Certainly there are forces a-, work in bureaucracies which are 
favourable to the development of such traits as rigidity and 
overconformity, as Merton indicates in his discussion of bureaucratic 
structure and personality. 
45 But the picture must not be overdrqwn 
and there appear to be trends at work within modern bureaucracy 
which run counter to such forces. As Musgrove observes in reply to 
Meit: )nls argument: 
More recent investigations have shown modern 
bureaucracies obsessed not with rule-observ2tion 
but with flexibility, even to the extent of creating 
chaos, confusion and uncertainty about rule application, 
to the dismay of bemused clients who wish to know 
where they stand. Meticulous and unbending rule- 
observation is a sgrious disqualification in a 
modern bureaucrat. 
4 
Similarly, Crozier has argues that: "The modern organization 
can tolerate more devianceg restrict its requirements to a more 
specialized field-, and demand only temporary commitments. " 
47 
The hold of contemporary bureaucracies over their member is further 
loosened by the devolution off decision making down into the 
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orgz-: inization necessitated by the increasing complexity of the tasks 
undertaken. 
48 This increases the power of the technical intelligentsia. 0 
This group, together with intellectuals, constitute a class whose 
distinctive values deserve close attention. 
Gculdner has argued that :! 3 willingness to place the worth 
of any practice under the inspection of critical discussion and the 
refusal to justify assertions simply by appeals to authority, 
sentiments central to the causalist outlook, are values particularly 
characteristic of this New Class of intellectuals and technical 
intelligentsia whose distinctive class situation is determined 
by their possession of cultural capital in the -4"orm of expertise. 
The growth of this class in numbers and imprtance promotes : the 
spread of causalism at the expense of moralism. T'. -, is class comes 
to have an increasingly important role within society as the -o-rowing Cý 
size and complexity of the operations of contemporary bureaucracies 
lead to the devolution of pover down into the technostructure. As 
a result modern organizations are not characte-ized ', )y a unified 
bureaucratic temperament, but by different temperamen-ts according 
to the roles played -ithing the organization: 
The cadre of the old bureaucratic structure are an 
officialdom... the "bureaucrats" of legendary stigma, 
the "line" officials ., vhose position depends simpl.,, T 
on their rigorous conformity with organizational rules, 
obedience to their superiors orders, the legality 
of their appointment, and sheer mniority. Their 
principal function is control over the 'ýehaviour of 
those beneath them and those outside the organization. 
They are rooted in the elemental impulse of domination.... 
The old bureaucrats'skills are often little more than 
being able to read, write, file, and are limited to 
their employing bureaucracy. The ne-i intelligentsia's 
Freater cultural capital is, indeed, more productive 
of- ces and they are, therefore less 
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concerned to vaunt tl-. eir personal superiority or to 
extr? ct deference from those below them.. Bureaucrats 
employ a control apparatus based on "ordering and 
forbidding", threatening and punishing the disobedient 
or resistant. The intelligentsia of the New Class, 
capable of increasing services and production, 
typically seek to control by rewarding persons for 
conformity to their expectations, by providing material 
incentives and, also, by educational indoctrination... 
They are less over-bearing and less punishment-prone. 49 
Similar sources of strain within the ranks of the middle class can 
be observed from a consideration of middle calss radicalism. The 
Campaign for Nuclear D4 sarmanent, for example, was primarily a 
movement of middle class radicals opposed to such dominant values 
of British society as the monarchy, private property, religion, 
militarism and nationalism. 
50 It was not simply a middle class 
movement, however, but one which drew upon the sup-)ort of the better 
educated middle class. The exDansion of the educ2ted middle class, 
of what Gouldner calls the New Class of professional and scientific 
')taff introduces into the middle class a Erowing number less willing 
to accept -ý, ithout question traditional morality. For central to 
the mass production of the 'Tew Class, to the cre-ation of the cultural 
ca-oital on which it is based, is the extension of public education. 
As we have seen, increased education is associated with a decline 
in such supports of moral intolerance as rdjditýT, authoritarianism 
and dogmatism. For education influences morality through extending 
cosmopolitanism, free 4 ng pe6ple from a dependence upon a narrow 
range of F-ixed ide2-s and limited sources of opinion, as weil as 
facilitating PTeater freedom through the provision of resources 
in the form of cultur-. 1 capital. 
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Clearly th6ý exist differences vithin the New Classq despite 
commn foijnd--2uions upon cultural capital. Nevertheless, the 
differences between the technical intellig, 
.., entsia and the intellectuals, 
for example, fade ý, vhen both stand contrasted with certain other 
sectors of the middle class. 
By comparison 7,., ith the 1-ine bureaucr-3ts, the technical 
intelligentsia of the New Class -3re veritable pi-iiiosopliers. 
By comparison with the intellec-ýuais, the inteiligentsid 
may seen idiot savants. In contrýast to the bureaucrats, 
however, the int-iligentsia seek noth4ng for their own 
sake, give reasons without invol-ýzing au-thori-c, - 0y and regard 
noThin, c- as settled once for all ... nothing is sacred to 
tnem; their primary concern is 1: 7i-, h the technical 
effectiveness of their means ratner trian iis moral 
propriety. They are pragmatic nihilists. They are 
capable of emancipating men from old shibboleths but they 
are emancipators ýiho know no limits. Their emancipation 
has a side effect: cultural destructiveness, anomie. 
The cultural dissolution they bring is precisely that 
always entailed by the culture of critical discourse, 
which always alienates persons from tradition. 
51 
Moral indigmatim is thus , ý, eakened by the opposition of those 
liberatarian and humanitarian values to be found in the counter culture, 
f such "pragmatic nihilism". but also through the 9r-. -, vth o. 
Ranuif was clearly correct to see that the middle class as a 
whole does not share an aýiegiance to the same set of mora2 sentiments 
and beliefs, but is internally divided on this matter according to 
differences in the nature and extent of the resources they enjoy and 
the work they undertake. In considering the impact upon mcrality (D 
.L- 
be of such 4ivisions in contemporary Britain, such an approach must 
extended to include differences with regard to the crýýation and emplcyment 
of cultural capital. 
"Nhile new forces have been at vjork in loosening soci---l bonds, 
the grecter freedom from social pressure this allows has the 
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same consequences for morality as ,,,, e have l-, litnes-sed. elsev,, here. The 
open society encourages mobility, nct simply geographical and soc'al C) 
but also mental, a condition inimical to mo-ral indignation. Apart r_- 
from the transformation in class structure touched upon above, 
,,,,, hat other structural changes have contributed towards cr-eating a more 
open and permis S4 ve society? 
First we may note that, with the replacement of capitalism based 
upon individual enterprises by the dominance of economic life by large 
scale corporations, local communities have been opened up to penetration 
by the cosmopolitan values carried by the migratory elite serving C) 
national and multinationalenterprises. Growing geographical 
mobility weakens the collective conscience and in the context of r 
t4 
economic grc, ý, V, th encourages a lepning towards those values celebra -Lng 
openness and flux that we find in Dionysianism. 
Economic growth has underwritten the extension of education which in 
its turn increased the amount and significance of cultural capital 
together with its distinctive values and perspectives that incline 
towards moral tolerance. Looking at developments in this century 
in 3ritain it can also be seen as set off from the late Victorian 
era s-Lmply by -virtue of the greater economic surplus produced. The 
growth in affluence accounts for much of the difference in moral 
standards bet-ween the t, ý, o periods. As we saw above, the trend towards 
a more relaxed moral code was accelerated in both the 1920's and the 
1? 60's as the result of affluence. 
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An expanding economy favours openness. People feel freer to break n 
off relationships and start -fresh, thus T,, eakenin; cr social and moral 
boundaries. The values of an age of scarcity, the demand for hard- 
work, deferred gratification, asceticism and ýiscipline, inevitably 
come to have less meaning in an era concerned with generating 0 
ccnsumpticn as well as production. Technological developments and 
increased productivity have provided the opportunity for greater leisure 
and the resources to generate a concern with spending and enjoyment 
relative to a preoccupation with work and its values to the exclu-sion 
of all else. The balance between work values and subterranean values 
has shifted towards the latter. 
Throughout Europe in the post-war decades) - what one commentator 
has descitibed as "post-bourgeois" values have emerged amongst those CD 
who have not experienced the wars and scarcities of the preceeding 
era., 
52 
As economic and physical security come to be taken for granted 
amongst those who spent their formative years free from threats to 
these, other concerns have the opportunity to emerge, including a 
greater concern with the extension of democratic control and the 
defence o-I freedom of expression. This is what one would expect fi7om 
the theory of a value hierarchy advanced by Mlaslow, which predicts 
that it is only where basic survival and safety needs are met that 
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other priorities can be expected to emerge with any vigour. 
And as Inglehart demonstrates. ý it is amongst the children of the modern C) 9 
middle class who have experienced contemporary affluence and security 
to a greater extent than the less privileged that the concern with 
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advancing freedom of expression and extending democratic control 
is greatest. Increasing affluence viill, he argues, lead to the 0 
further grovith of this group, with its emphasis on humanitarian 
concerns and opportunities for self-expression and on de-emphasizing 
material success and adherence to conventional morality. 
The world of the educated middle class thus comes to take on a 
rosier hue as the result of economic prosperity and personal 
security. It comes to be experienced as less threatening and more 
controllable, resulting in less redirected hostility onto children 
1ý and less training for life in a host ileworld by stressing the 
need for conformity. 
A further consequence of the decline of entrepreneurial capitalism 
and its replacement by corporate capitalism is the declining importance 
of family entreprises and with them the power of the family. As 
l'-arcuse -,.,: rites, speaking of the change from "free" to "organized" 
capitalism and the subsequent decline in power of the head of the 
family: "His authority as transmitter of wealth, skills., experiences is 
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greatly reduced: ha has less to offer and less to prohibit". 
Gouldner notes a similar trend in the weakening of paternal control: 
As middle class women become more educated and emancipated, 
they may increasingly challenge paternal authority 
ahd side with their children in resisting it. With 
declining paternal authority and growing maternal 
ýnfluence, the autonomy strivings of children are now 
mcre difficult to repress; hostility and rebellion 
against paternal authority can become more overt. There 
is correspondingly, increasing difficulty experienced 
by paternal authority in imposing and reproducing its 55 
social values and political ideologies in their children. 
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Vie cýin surmise, given Piaget's theory of ' moral development, 
that the diminishing unilateral respect .,. this change entails will 
hinder the firm establishment of a morality of constraint. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the eradication of the family 
relationships which underpin the socialization practices producing 
authoritarianism. In addition, the declining influence of the family 
is met by the rising importance of the media and education as sources 
of more cosmopolitan 'interests, and values. 
The changing position of women, as Gculdner's remarks indicateý 
deserves attention as an important source of changes in morality. 
Randall Collins argues that the affinity ol the bourgeoisie and 
bourgeois society with sexual puritanism is largely the result of 
the changes they wrought in the condition of women. With the 
replacement of feudalism by a market economy under the aegis of a 
centralized state monopolizing the use of violence, women gained at C-- 
least potential freedom to negotiate their own sexual relationshipsq 
no longer being so reliant on the force of their sexual owners for 
protection. Their main resource, however, is limited at this stage 
of development to their sexualityq given the monopolization of the 
economy by males. Consequently, a certain strategy develops: 
The most favourable female strategy, where men control 
gaining the economic world, is to maximize her bara- 
'* 
power by appearing both as attractive and as inaccessible 
as possible. Thus develops theideal of femininity, 
in which sexuality is idealized and only indirectly 
hinted as an ultimate source of attraction, since 
sexuality must be reserved as a bargaining resource 
for the male wealth and income that can only be stably 
acquired through a marriage contract... A hierarchy 
of moral evaluation emerges among women, in which women 
- short-run rewards (prostitutes, who sell their favours foL 
Ilbose women') are dishonored; this moral code reflects 
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female interests in confining sexualit ý6 to use as a 
bargaining resource only for marriage. 
VVith the increased availability of occupational opportunities for 
women witnessed in this century the need for women to rely 
upon keeping the supply of sex firmly under control in order to 
enhance the value of the only resource available to them declines 
and the need to incur all the emotional costs and restraints involved 
in adopting the role which this strategy re JU4L res is removed. 
Social control has also lessened during the course of this century 
under the impact of urbanization, urban anonymity reducing the power 
of mutual surveillance amongst neighbours and the expectations of 
employers and clients for deferential and creditable- ccnduct outside 
working hoiirsý. The virtual elimination of the formerly large class C: ) 
of domestic servants has also reduced the direct influence exercised 
over a sizeable section of the working class by the bourgeoisie. 
The loosening' of the bonds of moral restraint in the twentieth 
century has, then, been rooted in changes that can in large measure 0 
be traced back to the technological innovations and economic 
developments which have marked this period. Cosmopolitanism and 
I 
freedom from local control, for example, have increased as people 
have gained access to 7jider -worlds using the means provided by the 
technological revolutions in the realms of transport and mass 
co=unication. 
III. Continence and accumulation: The Victorian background 
For the reasons outlined above, this century has witnessed a 
decline in the repressive force of the collective conscience in this 
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country. The morality of the late Victorian period was not, it is 
true, the highpoint of Victorian respectability. Nevertheless, 
the contrast with contemporary standards is most marked and nowhere 
more so than in the changes which have taken place in sexual morality. 
A closer look at the nature of late Victorian respectability in this 
sphere will clarify the extent and nature of the moral transformation 
that has occurred. 
For the Victorian bourgeoisie sexual restraint both before and 
within marriage was closely tied to hopes of social and economic 
advancement and fears of losing what privileges they possessed. So 
pressing nere these concerns thant t4L me and energy were not to be Cý 
expended upon sex w'thout endangering them. Ruin was feared to 
await those Nho squandered their time on sexual indulgence, letting 
their minds wander from production and accumulation. As Cominos 
remarks on the function of late Victorian resý3ectability in relation 
to the prevailing economic and social anxieties: 
Continence was good. Attained by sub-limat--*on through 
industry, it resulted in the accumulation of wealth. 
Incontinence was bad. The outcome of idleness and 
yielding to temptation, it resulted ir, pverty and early 
marriages. 57 
Sexual restraint was but one element, albeit a very strongly charged 
one, in tHe-; "Respectability" cultivated by the bourgeoisie: 
thrift; abstemiousness; diligence and hard work found equal 
favour. And, as one Would expect from Ranulf's theory, concern 
with maintaining respectabilitywas most marked amongst the lower 
0" shopkeepers middle class, both amongst 
the classic petty bourgeoisie of 
and small businessmen and the new white collar employees such as 
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clerks and commercial tr? vellers. These groups shared a sense of 
identity in feeling stridently conscious th7t they were emphatically 
not working class. 
58 
They also shared a position of marginality 
in relation to the richer sections of the bourgeoisie. The traditional 
petty bourgeoisie was already during the late Victorian period 
subject to the pressures arising from economic concentration and 
the threatening competitlon this entailed. The period 1870-1914 
also saw an increasing insecurity of emplo, , yment and 
deteriorating 
conditions of employ*ent for white kers. 
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'm -collar wor 
For both 
sections of the lower middle class, therefore, the traditional 
petty bourgeois fear of losing their precarious adv2ntages and CD 
ambition for individual advancement were exacerbated. As mobility 
became more difficult, concern with moral propriety increased. 
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I failing 
-Ped a craving 
for security and a feý::; r of the risky Fear o. 
and unconventional, bolstering- conformity. Speaking of the lower CD 
middle class support of temperance, McLeod notes that this 
could be stimulated by an obsession with work, or by 
a preference for everything that was clean, orderly, 
restrained, controlled. The cult of work was probably 
more characteristic of small businessmen, haunted by 
the fear of bankruptcy or allured by the hope of 
-" cleanliness arose more naturally riches; but a cult o. 
S4 -1hite collar worker, its from the Ltuation of the 
partic 91 ar advantages, and the qualities required 
of him. 
As noted earlier, the late Victorian period was not the highpoint 
of Victorian redpectability. 
The decade of the 1890s was a climateric to the 
'late-Victorian revolt'. The hegemonical values of 
mid-Victorian respectability were clearly on the 
defensiveg if not in steep decline... 'Nhat this 
challenge involvedq in its essentials, was the 
breakdown of the moral consensus that had emerged 
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out of the evangelical middle classes in the earlier 
part of the century. The verities of religious faith, 
if not the form of that faith, were not only being 
questioned but -ere undergoing ,, iholesale abandonment... Those sections of sodiety who were beginning to 
abandon traditional moral standards as guides to 
social and family behaviour can be more easily 
identi-fied than those who still retained a conviction 
of the importance of traditional respectability. 
But contemporary observers - who were very sensitive to shifts in popular moods - strongly imply that 
traditional morality was slowly and surely retreating 
into its strongholds among the burgeoning lower middle 
clasSes. 
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A cleavage appeared between the lower middle class and others, 
often the privileged children of more affluent sections of the 
community, who ridiculed the traditional standards of propriety. 
In one notable incident these proponents of the neT morality attacked 
a theatre where the Moral and Soc-fal Purity Union and the L. C. C. 
had insisted that a screen should divide the parad±ng prostitutes and 
the stalls. (Supposedly active in the crowd výýs the young 7, Tinston 
Churchill. )63 
If the late Victorian age savi the beginnings of the weakening 0 
of moral consensus within the bourgeoisie, differencesbetween 
bourgeois and working class morality had been evident throughout 0 
-PI the Victorian era. The material deprivation suffer-d by large 
sections of the working class, particularly the poor housing C, 
conditions and harsh conditions of employment in which many found 
themselves. were not at all conducive to the preoccupations with 
moral respectability --ultivated by the middle classes. They did, 
however, lend added point to the lower middle class fear of 
proletarianization. 
64 
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The respectf-ble morality established by bourgeois society in the 
Victorian era proved capable of enduringNell beyond the social rD 
conditions -, h. 'cl,, i were the cause of the success it then enjoyed. 
Its force isstill not scent and it does not lack defenders, particularly 
-F-rom amongst those who have been more sheltered than others from 
the forces which have been undermining traditional morality. It is 
to these defenders of traditional standards of purity and propriety 
to whom ive shall now turn our attention. 
IV. Three contemporary moral crusades 
If late Victorian society did not exhibit complete consensus 
concerning the dominant values of the entrepreneurial middle class. 
, -, ihat of the present? Have we really entered a period when, as 
Lassrell 
e it 9 -ion , Ena4 would hav society learns to play it cool and moral indi 
has d-ý, 14 ndied into intignificance? CD 
The answer must be no. This can be demonstrated most -clearly 
by examining current organized manifestations of moral indignation. C) 
4 Three contemporary moral crusades ,, jhich have emerged in the 
forefront 
0 
-Y aý 4 on,, vide of attempts to restore traditional moralit -e the --Tat- 
Festival of Light (ITFOL), the Responsible Societyq and the 
'NT 
-National 
Viewers' and Listeners' Association (National IIALA). 
The following discussion of the values and beliefs central to these 
-L movements is based upon a study of the publications and papers 
issued by the three movements, including their periodicals, the 
n- 
-Nationivide ý, estival 
of Light Bulletin (formerly the 3roadsheet)q 
Z and the 3ulle'in cf the Responsible jocieý the Vievver and Listener u 
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over a five year period. In addition, the autobiographical writings 
of ". '. rs. '. 'ary 'i'; hitehouse were consulted. 
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Further information 
concerning the movements was obtained by attending tý, -, o national 
conventions of National VALA, t7.,. lo annual general rre. etings of the Responsible 
Society -., and a meeting of the younger members of the Society, 
and the September 1976 rally of the NFOL in Trafalgar- Squgre. 
In addition interviews were conducted with th-ree members of tne 
e---; cecutive of the NFOL and fourteen regional organizers of the D 
movement were intervie-. ved by telephone. 
Central to the ideology shared by these movements is an opposition 
to the representation of explicitly sexual behaviour. Although such 
ig4 ep-resentations are regarded as distasteful or disgustin in th-emselves, 
the principal objections centre around the influence they are feared 
to exercise over personal sexual behaviour. For there is a great 
concern to confine the permissible -range of sexual oi,,. tlets to normal 
sexual intercourse bet,,, ieen husband and wife. Even here there 
remains a ! ingering desi-e to stress the function of sex as primarily C) 
a means of reproduction rather than as an end in itself. For to 
be too carnally-minded is thought of as wrong. Although careful 
to avoid the excesses of the Victorian era, masturbation, an 
alternative outlet for socual appetites and one irrelevant to 
reproduction, still dra,,, js condemnation. 
Apart from recalling the moral pollution and possibility of 
Divine displeasure entailed in sexual p-ermissiveness, they seek to 
frigghten people a-Nay from such a course by callin-g upon the aid C) 
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of what Alex Comfort, in a felicitous phrase, refers to as God's 
Little Allies - the danger of venereal disease and the risk of 
preo, nancy. In the case of venereal disease much is made of 0 
increases in the disease in recent years. The lesson drawn is that 
sexual misconduct should decrease - the need to invest in research 
to discover an effective vaccine as an alternative is quite simply 
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out of the question and is never mentioned. And !! here the risk 
of pregnancy has been reduced the argument has shi. Ited to stressing 
the dangers of the contraceptive pill and the , -/ic: -edness of abortion 01 
as viell as its detrimental effects upon health and the promotion of 
.0 further immorality. 
Purity is further protected by a belief that the sins of the 
parents -wi7-"L be visited upon the children. Yary 71hitehouse, 
for example, adopts the view that a mother ,, iho indulges in abnormal 
and i=or-R1 sexual practices during pregnancy runs the risk of her 
child subsequently developing into a homosexual as the rý? sult of 
her shame and anxiety communicatimg itself to the foetus . 
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Other dire consequences are postulated as very real threats to the 
children of those who succumb to pe-rýmissiveness. Increasing childhood 
delinquency is explained as the result of homes broken by increasing 
permissiveness which makes parental separation easier and te-7. ptls 
marital partners away from seeking their sole sexual satisfaction 
,,, vith one another. 
The ignominy of illegitimacy is appealed to as ! ýnother safeguard rD 
for virtue In a Responsible Society pamphlet children are asked to 
considerg as one of a series of questions designed to encourage 
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sexual restraint, "Ho,,, v would you feel if you were a bastard? " 
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Particular hostility is aroused by those who challenge the imlmrtance C) 
or desirabilit of confining the acceptable bearing and rearing y C) 
of children within wedlock. In an address to the 1976 National 
VALA convention, for example, Conservative M. P. Rhodes Boyson 
suggested that children should be taken away from unmarried mothers 
Twho deliberately set out to have children --,, ith no intention of 
providing them with a proper father. 
It is not so much the infraction of their sexual mores as the 
challen, --- to their legitimacy -which excites the strongest 
indignation from these movements. Homosexuals whose shame and 
clandestine conduct confirms the legitimacy of its condemnation 
as a vice can by pitied and treated: those who "come out" and argue 
for the open acceptance of homosexuality are the objects of bitter 
attacks. As the advance of permissive attitudes leads to greater 
tolerance, increasing rumbers are emboldened to openly challenge the 
values defended by these movements, leading to them adopt-ng coercive 
responses to deviants as the objects of their reformatory zeal 
no longer lend themselves to pity or treatment. 
4 To cope with an increasing trend in the deviance -,, ihich they concern 
themselves with, a certain picture of the world emerges. It is 
a world divided between the "normal" respectable members of society 
like themselves: the "sick" deviants who seek treatment or admit 
the moral reprehensibility of their conduct: a large number of 
"innocenlts" who are potentially normal and virtuous, but who are 
vulnerable to being misled; and a small number of the wicked who are C) 
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Out to cOrruPt them. 
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The innocents are believed by the normal 
to be less I-ble to control themselves or understýýnd what is best 
for them, justifying paternalist measures to protect them from 
themselves and the wicked who seek to manipulate them. This can 
become linked to expressions of middle class superiority. At the 
1979 National VALA convention, for example, Mary Whitehouse expressed 
the opinion that the children she had encountered in secondary 
modern schools were more vulnerable to corruption as they -,,.: ere more 
easily led than their more thoughtful counterparts in grammar s6, hools. 
Due to the important role played by according deference to 
the norms-and thus to those who uphold them - rather than actual 
infractions, who comes to be considered as the wicked soitrce of 
corruption -nill depend upon the relationships established between 
those concerned and the morally indignant. During the 1960's, 
for example, the B. B. C., under the liberal influence of Carleton 
Greene as Director-General, paid little deference to the leaders 
or alms of I-Tational VALA. As a result the B. B. C. drew strident 
condemnation as a major villain in undermining morality. Broadcasting 
authorities have now come to adopt a more deferential and 
accommodating tone in their dealings with the leaders of the 
-movement. 
As a result the leadership now sean- to regard those 
running broadcasting as themselves amongst the innocent, duped by 
wicked outsiders who take advantage of them being overitorked 
to gain an airing for their subversive ideas. Such, at least, -jas CD 
the defence advanced by the executive from the platforn on behalf of 
guest speakers from broadcasting at the 1979 VALA convention who 
ticised from the floor for promoting immorality. were being cri, 
All three movements are agreed in seeing the prevalence of 
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representations of explicitly sexual behaviour as a manifestation 
of a general decline in moral standards. It is also believed to be 
a major contributory force in bringing about such change; leading 
to rising rates of marital failure, increased promiscuity, crime 
and violence. As such it is a tool of ruthless profiteers or 
conspirators who wish to undermine the moral foundations of society 
in order to overthrow the social order. 
There are, indeed, as far as profiteering is concerned, large 
profits to be made in the British market from the sale of sexually 
explicit publications, reflecting the conditions of supply and 
demand in the field. Competition is reduced due to the dubious 
legal standing of some of the products, while demand has grown. 
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Increased demand for the favourable and explicit treatment of sexuality 
has even penetrated the market for women's magazines. As Winick 
notes, Cosmopolitan was facinD-bankruptcy when carrying articles on M 
homemaking, recipes and similar subjects but became an enormous 
success when it switched its focus of attention to the sexual 
pleasures of women. 
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In addition., to concern with commercial profiteering from sex, 
I 
there is a belief that an international communist conspiracy focused 
on education and entertainment is undermining morality. Not only 
the polity but also the economy can be undermined by moral 
sub-version, for national as well as personal success is seen as 
based upon moral restrýýint. In a ýý, jell-received address to the fifth 
annual general meeting of the Responsible Society, for example, 
the speaker attributed acceptance of compulsory sex education, 
the lifting of censorship and the availability of abortion-on- 
demand in Denmark to a communist conspiracy emanating from outside 
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the country aimed at attacking such moral virtues as "sobriety", 
"continence", and "ruggedness", as well as diverting energy and interest 
into sex, as a prelude to political conquest. As Mary Douglas's 
analysis would suggest, fear of outside threats to the body politic 
is here found hand-in-hand with a morality of severe bodily self- 
control, although the relationship is probably more two-way than 
she would allow, psychological projection mixing with the impact 
of social relationships on how the body and society are viewed 
and treated. 
Such conspiracy theories can easily fuel witch-hunts. And there 
is something of a contemporary version of witchcraft belief in the 
faith of the moral crusaders in the ability of the wicked to 
implant overwhelming and destructive urges C) into their victims 
through such mediums as pot and pornograp'ý, y. Attraction and 
repulsion are reconciled through proj: ýcting the source of temptation 
onto an outside force which threatens to possess and take over the 
person. For the two movements more inclined to give voice to their 
morality in terms drawn from fundamentalist Christianity, the 
NFOL and INIational VALA, such forces of evil are not seen*as limited 
to other human beings but may emanate from evil spi-rits. A 
striking instance of such anxiety emerged at the 1976 National 
VALA convention. The Secretary of the British Boa-rd of Film 
Censors, James Firman, took what turned out to be an unfor-tunate line 
of argument in attempting to placate those who vere criticising the 
Board from the floor fnr g-rantingThe Exorcist a certificate. CD 
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Taking a liberal position in attempting to understand the reasons 
-por his critics' anxiety over this film he stated that if it had 
been felt that the film would actually persuade people that 
possession by the forces of darkness was a rý? al threat to them, 
it would not have been allowed, his remarks bearing the clear 
impýication that such beliefs were, as vie all 11-rew, nonsense and 
good only for entertainment, albeit of an inferior sort. His 
denial that people could be possessed in such a fearsome way was 
met with howls of "But they are" from throughout the audience. 
vr 
. 1r, Fi=an was evidently nonplussed. 
All three movements regard education in terms of an authoritarian 
enterprise a-ired at instilling established values rather than 
stimulating creativity and criticism. Children need rigid guidelines, 
sound moral doctrine, rather than being left to make up their own 
minds. The National Union of School Students - highlighted 
by Musgrove as an expression of the decline in deference for moral 
authority 
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_ is attacked for challenging school discipline 
and the content of lessons and the "obscene presentation and 
subversive aims" of its publication Blot in a report distributed 
. 
73 by Nationa VALA This report, in keeping wLth the definition of 
young people as amongst the most vulnerable of innocents, flatly 
refuses to accept that Blot is produced by schoolchildren, claiming 
-empt to pass itself of as such when it is it as a deliberate at-11 
really produced by adults in an underhand attempt at corruption. 
(This is despite evidence of ,,, iidespread support 
for the aims of 
the N. U. S. S. amongst schoolchildren. )74 
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As noted above, the pnrtrayal of explicitly sexual material 
is considered dangerous for being likely to challenge traditional 
moral standards concerning sexuality. As a result, sex education C) 
in s-chDols is a major target for all three movements, particular 
a'-arm being raised by the suspicion that children are being told 
how to make love without b, eing told not to. Similar concern is 
felt concerning masturbation and homosexuality. Sex education 
should be concerned with emphasizing cha,, -)tity before marriage 0 
and the sanctity of sexual exclusiveness within marriage. In 
addition to fearing the concequences of sex education there is 
il 4 also a concern about the possib ity of schoolchildren being exposed 
to revealing and salacious material, a concern reflecting trad 4 itional 
notions of the impropriety of nudity and - re-presentat ions of sexual 
sub-4ects. I 
The movements all emphasize the importance of maintaining 
parental authorityg which they assume stands as a last bastion 
against challenges to tradition?! morality from other sources. 
School must support parents in this and where they are seen as 
introducing a more relativistic morality and- a more cosmopolitan 
outlook in opposition to the values and beliefs of the parents 
they are strongly attacked. Similarly, the mass media is resented 
as a competitor to parental authority, encouraging challenges to the 
respect wh*ch parents are -entitled to expect from their children 
towards them and their views. A survey of the content of girl's 0 
magazines published by the Responsible Society deqIs in a 
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condemnatory tone with their encouragement of the following vices: 
intergenerational. conflict and direspect for parents; V; ommenls 
Liberation; abortion; "ultra-sexyll fashions, "lurid" make-up 
and heavily sensual fantasies; anti-marriage sentiments; the 0 
at-'-e. m-pt to depict religion as a drug designed to instil subservience, 
providing information about the Campaign for Homosexual 14ýquality; and 
failing to admonish those who fornicate under the age of consent-75 
In the case of television, which is no longer to be trusted to uphold 0 
the values of respectable members of society, the challenge is 0 
particularly galling as it enters so immediately into their homesq 
the last refuge of their authority. The mass media is seen as 
manipulating the young, turning their thoughts prematurely to sex, C) 
arousing or implant4ng desires which put them into conflict with 
their parents, destroying the natural innocence of youth and 
C., Y. 
Scenes explicitly encouraging unfortunate displays of precocit 
depicting immoral or sexual behaviour are believed to offer either 
-C. X. offence or temptation and should therefore be removed through the 
exercise of more stringent censorship by those in positiors 
of authority. 
The three moral crusades share a general belief that many 
people, particularl. 7 the 7oung, are morally -.,, Ie-ýk and thct 4-t 
is 
the obligation of the stronger-willed to help them In this way, 
,. -jhat it -,,, ias formerly possible to condemn as wick-ed in itself 
beccm_cý3 
translated into a problem of personal inadequacy in order to . 
4oustify 
interfer-nce in activities ý, ihich do not harm others a prevaili-ng 
76 
climate of causalism. 
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Here it is employed in an attempt to control adolescents in the name 
of defending them from outside corruption, rather than ac. kno-11 CD 
that it is an attempt by adults to stifle what they see as "precocious" 
conduct on the part of the young. For what they view as attacks 
upon ''parental rights'' are often attempts to give greater -- 
freedom to adolescents to do as they wish, rather than as they 
are told. 
The conflict in which these moral crusaders are engaged ran 
by interpreted as part of a broader characterological strug----rle 
bet-., ieen cultural groups ý-,, ithin the middle class, as we shall discuss 
below. '-ITevertheless, a -most significant broader conflict in which 
the debate is set is one of intergenerational conflict founded CD 
upon a particular form of age stratification. Adolescence is the 
invention of adults, one of relatively recent origin in historical C) 
. 
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-1 terms The emperarnent, concerns and conduct which 4-t produces 
in young people are not at all, as is claimed, what comes naturally 
to them but are the product of elders who are careful to stamp 
out precocious conduct and the exercise of independence. As 
Musgrove remarks in relation to the creation of adolescence 
"Legislation ostensibly intended to protect h. Jm in fact segregated 
7c 4 -orally indignant are r belittled and enfeebled him" The rn, ght, 
-hem. the young are manipulated. They are manipulated by t 
Such a system was always open to challenge from amongst the 
young themselves, usually surreptiticusly, sometimesmore openly. 
At times of rapid changes in attitudes and a changing balance cf 
f the young in the 1960's, resources such as occurred in the favour of 
the strain between the gr, cups inevitably incre, --, ses as the envy 
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and moral indi, 7na. _on of CD 
t4f their elders is excited by the provocative 
conduct of the young ,.! ho begin to trespass further upon theJ r CD 
je@lousy guarded prerogatives, so flatter: -ng to their sense o-l" the 
relative imlortance of adulthood and parental preeminence. 
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The age structure of those involved with the movements lends 
support to an interpretation along the I-ines of age stratification 
and conflict. Those attending National VALA conventions for example, 
are over,,, ihelrrin,, c, 7)ly elderly and late middle-aged. Desp4 te the 
' Youth Representatives on the exec, -, 
tive corr--4; -ttee-. g presence o 
the annual c-eneral meetings of the Res-ocnsibly Societv dispi-ay (D - 1, 
a similar age structure. The national young members' meeting in 
October 197'7 was diminutive th 7-arely a dozen people a sseýýibled II 
to hear speeches delivered on abortion, the age of consent and 
alcoholism. The Society claims about fifty "young mernbers" out of 
a total membership of. over six hundr,: ý. -.. 3oth National VALA 
and the Responsible Society stand in marked contrast -ýiith an 
organ*za-luion -,, jli-. ch all three moral crusades regard as an adversaryg 
the National Council for Civil 11.. ib, ýrties, whose annual general 
meetings attract a much greater proportion of ycunE people. C) C: ) 
11 -ý- 1-) 4S The. -ý, FOL at 
first s-o-h-t appearz to ccntradict L- r_- u 
t 4, 
associa -on 
bet-Neen age and moral indiggnatuicn, for a survey by 
Roy Vallis of those attending the 1376 rally indicý)ted 
that almost R 
half of those present were under the age of 16.80 7his is not, 
however, so surprising when one takes into account internal divisions 
8.1 
-j i -I- 
h4n the ý"ý'TCL. The executive of the 
"ýTFOL is nc, 'w clearly 
ýU-I 
Committed to --41ving 
priority to a pro, 7a=e of coercive reform, 
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as is evident from their publications and the speeches from the 
platform, rather than the assimilative reform through attractinj- g 
peo-le to Jesus favoured by the mass of young supporters. The 
Wallis survey clearly indicated that most of those rho attended the 
rally had assimilative, evangelistic viev; s about transforming 0 
people from ýiithin rather than enforcing morality. A SýM4 lar 
tendency was revealed at the 17IJOL rally in Trafalgar "quare five 
years earlier, where a large proportion of the predominantly young CD 
audl-ence seemed uninterested in the coeir-iv-e 
4 
-oriented platLl ý'orm 
speeches ý! hich their elders had prepared fcr them, preferring 
to spend their time in singing and chanting unrelated to what r: ) 
was being said on the platform. 
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Both the content oL the INFOL CD 
publications and composition of the platform at the rallies were 
firmly in the hands of the executive. Those responsible for the 
running of the ITFOL at the time of the 1976 rally were predominantly 
middle-aged and elderly. The 'LTFOL having no membership C, 
4f 
to Ln--I. uence 
'the leade-r6hip th'ey- were free to mobilize a mass demonstration 
of Ch-ristian witness as a means of publicising aims which 7, ere no', 
those uppermost in the minds of those attending the rally. The 
latter served as a backdrop against which the leadership of the 
, -r-" I OL could address their message to the media. and the authorities. CD 
This is not to say, however, that there were --no displays Of MO-Lal 
indignation from amongst the audience. A small Sroup of men frcm the 
Gay Christian Ilovement distributing leaflets stressing the 
compatibility of homosexuality , -jith Christian 
faith and asking 
those present to love their homosexual brothers and s4isters, met 
with a most chilly reception from almost all they encountered as 
298 
they moved amongst the cru-., d and were instructed by the 
police to leave the Square following complaints from the rally. 
As renegades to the cause they could perhaps expect to elicit 
even more hos-ltility than those who had even less in common with 
the assembled Christians. 
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In the light of these considerations relating to age, opposition 
to counter-cultural ideals and beliefs on the part of the three 
moral crusades discussed above becomes more understandable. There 
is evidence of conflict between the crusaders and the co,; nter 
culture viewed as a group of people who drop out of society and 
behave in a radically different way - as can be seen, for example, 
in thq remarks of 1-1ary Whitehouse quoted earlier in this chapter 
and the protest staged by representatives of the underFround press n 
and street theatres at the 1971 NFCL rally. 
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Bull in considering 
the--'-- opposition to the counter culture here, what I have in mind 
is the counter culture vieved as a set of ideals and beliefs with 
which people can feel varying, degrees of sympathy. Musgrove 
has pointed out that his study of such values and beliefs 
indicates that support for them tends to divide at the age of 36, 
with the support for counter-cultural values in relation to work 
and po-! ý, er, the communal raising of children and opposition to the 0 
, position of rigid 
boundaries upon the world far less in evidence Jm 
amongst those over that age than those below it. 
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None of these 
values find acceptance by the moral crusades. Indeed, the very 
opposite views prevail. Stress is 1: ýid upon the need for respect 
for authorityý, marriage and parental rights are upheld, and short- 
pposed. There is an Appolonian regard for the term hedonism o- 
distinctions elevating humanity above other species and a tendency 
to regard those attributes %vhich they shre in common as "beastly" and 
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low. This contributes to the taboo on nudity and an attempt to 
disembody social intercourse. Conventional social roles and 
boundaries tend to be experienced in a reified form. There is a 
concern to avoid obscenity and a resort of euphemism which one would 
not expect to encounter amongst those , -,, ith a more open-minded 
Dionysian inclination to flow over and evaporate boundaries. 
One pamphlet distributed by National VALA, for exampi-e, decries 
as on a level with bl. aýsphemy "the wanton use of , Nords relating to immorality, 
fornication, homosexuality and the like, and to parts and functions 
of the body connected with the elimination of waste". 
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The 
development of tabooed subjects depends upon a desire for a clear-cut 
and unambiguous grid through which to interpret the world. As we 
have seen, such a desire varies in strength, being heightenEd by 
the experience of social pressure emanating from immersion in 
conditions where social md cultural bounda3ýees axe. ý%-eil established. 
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All three movements are movements of coercive reform in 
sharing a faith in the importance of employing the criminal law 
to reinforce morality. Both the NFOL and National VALA have 
expressed concern about the increased leniency of' the penalties 
em-Qloyed'to uphold discipline, morality, and law and order. 
In addition, they express support for the forces of law and order and 
faith in the police. The views of the Responsible Society on the 
r, In4 matter of punishment are somewhat more difficult to dete . -, ne, as 
the Society tends to avoid straying too far from its brief CD 
as a pressure group primarily concerned with sexual matters in its 
public pronouncements. Nevertheless, as the narne would suggest, ýD 
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views have been expressed by members that people should be prepared 
to take responsibility for their conduct and to suffer the consequences, 
rather than attempting to evade personal responsibility through 
blaming others or expecting to be relieved of the burdens their 
misconduct has brought down upon them. 
V. Middle class cleavages and the defence of righteousness 
While the norms of respectability and social propriety which 
the three moral crusades set out to defend were, as we, have seen, 
historically associated with the old middle classes, reflecting in 
particular the social situation and concerns of an entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie, these values have to some extent freed themselves 
from their -structural source. Once generated the culture of this 
class outlives the structual circumstances which gave birth to it. 
forMn The values laid down in the _t4 ve --years of childhood and 
perpetuated through family socialization form a barrier aoainst r: I 
cultural erosion in the face of more rapidly evolving structuirall 
change. We need not, therefore, expect to find too close a fit 
between present structural position and the championship of such 
values. 
Nevertheless, it remains clear that the three movements are 
over-whelmingly middle class in composition. This is reflected, CD 
for example, by the number of doctors and teachers within the 
Responsible Society. 7n 1975 out of a total of 635 members, 74 
, were teachers and 1'1(-', 'doctors. 
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Although such a finding is not 
sur-pr. ising given the middle class nature of most voluntary CD - 
associations other than trade unions, 
cq 
it does reflect the fact 
that the struggle in which these defenders o-L traditional morality 
are engaged is I-ar, --,, -ely one betý, ýeen different sections of the 
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contemporary middle class, a characterological strugEle bet,, veen C) 
the mores of consumption-oriented cosmopolitans and t1hose, roote4 in 
production-oriented and loc; ýalistic concerns. 
go 
In certain respects 
the activities of the morally indignant in this area can be seen 
as a demand for reassurance that traditional values are still 
dominant, a demand for gestures of deference towards tlelegitimacy CD 
of their morality from prestige-conferring national institutions in 
the face of challenges to their status which challenges to these 
standards entail. Particularly indignant responses are provoked 
when leading institutions such as the B. B. C. are seen as failing to 
defend such standards. Just as the issue of the Bamb c, --; r-ied a 
far heavier symbolic load for those involved in the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmanent than opposition to nucle-ýr weapons alone, so 
does the issue of p(rnography and sexual permissiveness for the 
morally indignant. 
91 Sex is chosen as the bAttlefront because it is 
the area of greatest change and challenge, but it is not in itself C) 
the reason for the war. 
This war is seen as stretching beyond the borders of this country 
and the movements are interested in, and involved with, counterparts 
and sympathisers in other advanced indu§trial societies of the 
'Western world such as Australia and America. The fi,, -, rht revolves 
around similar issues z9nd reflectssimilar concerns. 
Comparing 
divisions within the middle class between anti-pornography 
campai, c, ners and their opponents in two American cities, Birkelbach 
and Zurcher report that the former "were older, more often reared 
in smaller communities, less well-educated formally, less often 
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in professional occupations, more often associated with dog-matic 
religions (especially Catholic), more religiously activeg more CD 
f7mily and religiously oriented, more politically conservative 
more dogmatic, more authoritarian, and less politically tolerant". 
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ýNith regard to certain of the characteristics touched upon by 
Birkelbach and Zurcher, it is not certain that similar differences 
between anti--Qornogrpahy cc-mpaigners and their opponents exist in 
this country. The movements concerned have, for a variety of reasons, 
been unwilling to allow their membership and mailing lists to be 
used as a basis for conducting sample surveys of their members. 
The survey o. -1- thoEe attending the 1976 TITFOL rally conducted by Roy 
Wallis tended, as noted earlier, to capture principally those who 
were drawn to participate in the event with little concern for the 
aspects of coercive reform stressed by the platform. It seems 
-crobable that those who take an interest in the day-to-day 
work of the movement and receive ne, ý, s of this activity through being 
on the mailing list for the Broadsht2t, are more f3vourably disposed 
towards coercive reform and accordingly differ in other respects from 
those drawn to the ral-ly for more evangelistic reasons. Certainlý,, 
in the telephone interviews conducted with the local organizers 
of the NFOL for the purpose of the present study, while those 
interviewed tended to stress both coercive and assimilative aims 
as equally important and complementaryg there was greater emphasis 
given to coercive reform than was evident amongst the mass of 
younger participants at the 1976 rally -, iho were more intent upon 
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conversion than coercion, evangelism rather than legislation. 
They too, however, were over. vhel mingly middle class, with over 
78% of those present at the rally coming from the non-manual CD 
section of society, Within the rally there w2s a small number who 
saw it principally as an qpportunity to protest against the loss C) 
of deference tcivards those who lead a respectable life. These were 
found to be morelikely to have had less education and to be retired 
than those who dismissed such a reason as irrelevant. of those present 
at the rally, a greater percentage of thoge falling -ithin the 
categories of house-, -, ife, retired, or unemployed, than of thosewho 
were students or employed, gave priority to securing more effective 
legislation against immorality rather than evangelistic aims* 
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Although denied permission by National VALA to conduct a 
random sample of their membership, 'Morrison and Tracey were able 
to interview 100 members from different areas-,,! iithin England and 
Scotland. On the basis of these interviews they arrived at the 
conclusion that members of National VALA are "mainly micEe class 
female and elderly. It is also over-represented by thoý-e in rural 
areas, the older professions such as solicitors and tea--hers, 
94 , s-tall businessmen, traders and shopkeepers". - Ty own more limited 
observations conducted at the annual conventions of the Association 
Ouch a pattern of support would tend to confirm these conclusions. ' 
in large measure coincides with what might be expected from our 
earlier discussion, particularly with respect to the traditional 
-ý, etty bourgeoisie. The over-representation of the elderly is in 
part accounted for by recalling that the foundations ol- their moral 
sentiments were laid in less permissive age. This iýs reflected in the 
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remarks of Ernest Whitehouse, the husband of Mary and another 
prominent figure in National VALA, on the decline in moral 
certitude: 
It gets worse and v., orse as the time goes on and it 
becomes impossible to define what is obscene until we 
can come to accept'. the most extravagant obscenities 
as being for the -public good. Life , -., -s very much less complex 4-n those days... before the second world 
wa r when ,,., e were all =owing up - it was i7ery much less ccmplic. -'(-ed. 
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Care must be taken, ho,, vever, in such findings in the 
absence of -more representative samples and adequate comparison 
, roups. 
Nhile, for example, teachers and la,,,! yers appear to be 
over-represented in National VALA in comparison with society as 
a whole, attendance at the annual general rae-etings of the N4ational 
Council fbr Civil Liberties serves to convey a similar impression 
about that organization. While it is quite possible that the lawyers 
and teachers involved in the -National Council orCI'vil Liberties 
represent radical wings within their profession that are unrepresentative 
of the profession as a whole, similar considerations may well apply 
4 
to their colleagues involved in National VALA. Teachers in 
particular belong to an occupation in ,,, jhich can be found co=-derable 
political conflict over the nature of their task. 
As with the rural location of support for : Tational VALA, 
it is 4-hteresting to note from the lists oL those attending the 
annual general ---i-a-etings of the Responsible Society in London that those 
coming from large citiesq others than London Ibssel-jf, ,., ere barely 
represented, while a large number of those present came from small 
J. U towns. (The NFOL was fcr several 7ears its inception run from that 
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bastion of middle class surburbia, Vloodford. 
96 D., llary Whitehouse Is 
movement origina-ted in the "idlands, a part of the countr, -, r , vhich 
-1 lagc, ed behi, -Id, and was there-ore all the more shocked by, the trend C: ýý 
toviards less inhibited sezuality in London and the South-East. )97 
V, 
- Moral indignation and the rttardation of rationality 
. 
ally, the question occurs as to the political implications 
of such moral crusades. They concur ,,! ith the sexual radicals 
such as Reich and '. ýarcuse on the importance of conventional sexual 
morality for the perpetuation of the present social system, although 
their support for this system leads them to opposite conclusions 
about -, (. jhat ought to be done about it. The conservatism of si-ich CD 
move-ents is perhaps at its most marked in National VALrI, , -., h-Lch -has 
hosted as gruest speakers such leading Conservat-ive-', I. P. 's as Sir 
Keith Joseph, 71illiam Whitela-vj and Rhodes Boyson. Those leading 
this movement have 1-ittle doubt as to their influential -position 
_4C, - - ,hi ch in relation to deter7n--.. -n, 7 Conservative policy 
in the areas 
4nterest them and the 1"-, '0 conven t4 on address delivered by 
s. Whitehouse a few days before the election w2s devoted to an 
attack upon the iniquities of --. he Labour Party and praise for the 
sj, 7, pathetic treatment the Association enjoyed in its dealings ý.. -jith 
the Conservative Party. 
. he habit of takin. -- orders and -enouncý-ng 
desires stretches I rD 
b-ýck to the earliest years of family training and --s reinforced by the 
ý)rý: ctices of traditional education unt-l the Inabit is 
duty. Bertell 0111mang folloviing Reich, argues that tl, - 
. Ls CD 
.0 -lu povýerful barrier of irrationa'ity against the 
development 
lorms a mos L 
, sness. -lass consciou of . 
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Sop ov: erfu 19 inct9UU that attempts to politicize adult Arnericans 
are a j, 1,3s" Na te of time relative to , 'at can be achieved in the future 
by getting -`, ildren and ado'escents from the .,,, orking class "to 
question the existing order alonT , -; Jth a-11 "M C- -1 
it: 3 s-bols and leaders, 
to loose generalized habits of respect and obedience, to oppose 
whatever doesnl-',, ,., iake sense in terms of their needs as i-dividuals 
and as members of a group, to conceive of the enemy as the capitalist 
system and the small group of men who control it, to articulate their 
hopes for a better life, to participate in successful protest actions 
no matter '-, --ow -7=11 the i=ediate objectiveg and create a sense of 
community and brotherhood of all thoz, 7e in revolt". 
98 
Oilman, 
in an extensive and s, = ,, -pathetic 
discussion of .. ', arws conception of 
men in capitalist soc-, el, 7, discusses sexual repression and the 
resi; ltineg, of rationality, as the missing elementg the 
11) n 
blindspol in a-rx's vision ot -nt o-P c' the developm- -ass sonsciousness. 
Such a --elationship bet-,., een sex, re, -, ression and class consciousness 
is not likely to be conscously -formulated 'by conservatt-4vee moralists, 
and har7nony of 4ntereSte. Iheir ideology of national un-- 
-he sort of But the passarre 1---rom Ollman quoted above is precise"'Ly t 
analjýsis -ilnich distnarbs them. Could t1his be because tneir subconscious 
-Dolitical acumen has led them to just, such an assess-, -, ient of the 
sitiat ion? 
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CHAPTER 
CONCLUSIONS 
I. The toral a u-t-, horitarian: a portrait 
F drom the preced-Lig , chapters it is evident that moral indignation 
is pre-eminently a phenomenon c6LIling for sociological explanation. CD 
Not only is the action emanating from moral indignation social in 
terms of its object, it is also social in terms of its origins. 
This is not to deny that other forces make some contribUt 4L on to the 
-0 
1 
formation of those sentiments which constitute moral indignation. 
But those deep differences between groups in terms of mor--l toler? nce 
,,,., hich we have surveyed can only be adequately accounted for by social 
factors. The evidence indicates that moral indignation arises in 
reponse to the quality of social relations, that it is shaped by the 
process and products of social interaction. 
-he specific so6ial and cultural conditions conducive What are -11 
to the growth of moral intolerance? From the findings discussed in 
earlier chapters of this thesis it has clearly emerged that the 
experience of social constraint exercises a powerfdl influence 
over the formation of such moral sentiments. Such social constraint 
must not, "ho-ever, be conceived of as operat4no- purely along 
hierarchical lines. Without denying the great importance of different 
experiences in terms of giving or obeying orders as a source of 
those 
moral sentiments under investigation, the importance of 
"horizontal" 
sources of social constraint must also be taken into account. 
People 
s4-milar in terms of their hierarchical position may nevertheless 
differ 
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significantly in terms of the intensity and diversity of their 
social contacts, with important consequences for the development 
of differing moral outlooks. Social constraint involves the 
narrowing of freedom of thought and action by strengthening the 
social and cultural boundaries encompassing people. Not merely 
the powerful, but also one's peers can take a hand in such vior1kc. 
Before proceding to specify the social and cultural sources 
of moral indignation in more detail, however, it will be useful 
to have before us a portrait of the morally indignant individual. 
In listing the beliefs and values which characterise the outlook 
of the exteme or-'"ideal" morally indignant temperament, it must C, 
be acknowleg-ed that few individuals will correspond to this picture 
in every detail. The depend2nt variables involved are cornplex and 
shaped by several forces, some of which operate to varying degrees 
independent -ly of those with which we are primarily concerned. 
Nevertheless, the evidence which we ha-., e surveyed so f. --- clearly 
indicates that. the sentiments and beliefs outlined below constitute 
an emotionally coherent view of the world, the elements off -ihich 
are interlinked to form a character structure that emerges in response C) 
to specific social ex7periences. I shall refer to this particular 
structure of sentiments and beliefs as "moral aut-horitarianism" 
retaining moral indignation to refer to that particular disposition C) 
to punish immorality described in the introduction. 
Moral authoritaria(is are notable for their sup,, ýorlu for the strict 
restraint of impu-se by rules and sanctions, whether this is justified 
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in terms of social good or divine ordinance. Anomie, the absence of CD 
moral norms constraining conduct and thought within settled boundaries, 0 
is feared and rejected. Moral codes are regarded as sacred and 
inviolable, independent of changing human ., I, ishes. 
Such -ioral reification is part of a more general rer-list stance 0 
towards the process and products of human thought. Dogmatism prevails. 
No alternative view of reality seems possible or desirable. Contr--. ry 
definitions are repelled and anything .,., h4-ch is anomalous in terms C) 
of the accepted categories is met with extreme distaste. Such C) 
unreflect-In. c, veneration for the established verities natually does 
not favour their critical examination with either the instruments 
of reeson or humour. Intellectual CUlt4 vation is itself somewhpt 
suspect and associated !., ith licenttousness. 
Licentiousness is a prime target for moral condemnation. 
I- Jng them is morally Sensual appetites must be hld in che. ck, for indulgi 
reprehensible. The enjoyment o-. 9' sex, food, drugs and play for 
themselves alone, is frowned upon. The permissible outl-ýts for 
sensual appetites are strictly limited. 
Organic processes in general are screened out of social intercourse. C. ) 
The carnal side of human life is hidden -nd suppressed and re--ý'-e--ence 
to it censored. One's own body and those of others become sources 
of shame and embarrassment. The process of cast4ng off waste 
products is concealed. Other phs. 77iological processes such as eating, 
walking and breaýthing are performed in as subdued a manner as CD 
possib Ie- 
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Nakedness is hidden. 
Moral authoritarians are distanced from their bodies and those 
of others. They stress those characteristics o. -I-" humanit, ,. T which 
elevate it above other species and devalue those shared in common. 
t! oral r-gulation must be brou, 7ht to bear to eliminate any 
ncLination towards a self-induLo-ent, sleepy, lazy and impulsive CD 
way of life. 
In keeping with their distrust of unrestrained impulses, moral 
authoritarians arewary of relaxing conscious control. States of C) 
se'. If-al-. ý: -ndonment are vie, -, ed as dangerous. , ý, hether medicall.,, r, morally, 
spiritually or socially. The opposition of moral 7-nut, -horitarians 
to the use of certain drugs springs partly from this in 
addition to sus-picions concernin. 7 their potentiality for pure 
sensual -ileasure. 
Neither do moral authoritarians relax control over their manner 
and appear-nce. They are neither casual nor unkempt. To adopt some 
terms devised by their contemporary adverslý, ries which aptly capture 
this facet of life-style, moral authcritarians certainly do not 
fl-llet it all hang ou-t": on the contrary, their JnhJb-lted nature is 
a-opa. rent in ltheeir "u-ptight" bearing and -a-ppearance. They are, in -0 C) 
every sense of an older idiom, opposed tb "loose living". 
Such self-discipline is not merely praised and practiced: it 
needs to be enforced. Those -, Ilho violate or challenpýe the moral 
code are -net -7itlla condemnation And harsh penalties, not forbearance 
and understanding. "oral authoritarians display an inability or 
pathy 
-imvill-ingness 
to identify vith offenders in terms of sym 
or empathy. 
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Their enforcement of the law and morality is unbending. Reccgnition 
of mitigating, circumstancesis held to a minimum. Few restraints 
are placed in th-e .,,; ay of finding an accused person guilty. HýVil 
is viev,, ed as an excess which must be balanced or erased-by retribution. 
There is a strono, desire to see others suffer for their 
4LMra 
orall it-,, D 
Social problems elicit an extrapunitive reaction rather than 
an impunitive response. Zt-, hnocentrism prevail-, Unpatriotic and 
irreli, crious c-z)4nions are suppressed. Art and literature pandering 
to se-xual interests i-s censored. 
1ý T 
.., cral authoritarý-ns sh)! nre none of their adversaries belief 
in the -cu-rity and goodness of the human heart. TI. -. --y are more 
I SUSp4L -he-nselves ikell. -, r to vieT-., others viith cion 2nd distrust. They see t 
as d-, lielling in a dan; 7e7ous universe. The ,, 7orld is a place ý, jhere one 
is at the --r. ericy of malevolent or dangerous forces beyond one's control 
or even understandina. CD 
Immanent justice can be seen to be at ,., ork in the cosmos: 
retributive justice is ., ýoven ýnto it. 
Even if P'ý"le escape 
punish. mentq Misfortune will overtake as the result of th-eir 
i=crality. 
They are rel-4gious, 'ýut their religion is one of fear ýInd control, C'd -- 
j 
Supernatural forces punish immorality in +,., - not Joy and ecstasy. '-4s 
world or the ne: ct -ii-lith the same unsiverving severitýT as their devotees 
empl oy. ". 'oral authoritarians inha. bit a punishirc-. -7oral rniverse 
4 -; s'ortune is deserved and hence a sign of lax or i-=oral Ln , jhich m 
conduct. 
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Those ,,, vho are proud are-cast doim* Envy is ea-;: )ily provoked. 
Ease and comfort are believed to ho-,, e a demoraýizin7 and de'ýili'UF. ting 
'0 ef i ect. Hardships and self-denial, on the other hand, are beneficial 
and should be emploved in raisir-, the ýroi=. 
This purtrait h, -s, a-s mentioned' earier, been dra-in in deliberately 
bold lines to ýFerve the pu--pose of ?n ideal t77-Qe a7ainst which the 
Troral outlook c--' . 
ihdividuals can '-e assessed and compared. It is 
not 7easnt to im-cl-71 tor examplýe, that ----ýnifestations of 7, cral 
a, -zthoritarian--: s-, -. n ,ý I- I -, Jll never '- ound amongst those dsplayJng any 
degree of self-indulgence and sensuality. ', Vhpt is argued here is 
that those peopie who entertain a of the -,., orlýl --nt 
r4 ties closer to moral authorita A-anism as cut' Iove res; )cnsitili . --Lned a- 
than ct t- hers -.,,,, -4 11 be more likely to have experienced cert2in social 
4 -hips. The beliefs -nd sentimnents outlined condLtions and relations 
isin--f out of the above are those most central to avie,. -,, o ife ar C) 
experience of social constraint. The fol-71-owing sectionsdiscuss 
in turn, the nature of this approach to the 'A, or]-a in more detail, 
COM4 enlarging upon the outline sketched above; the short Ings of relying 0 
too heavily upon the presence of certair. social institutions as 
44- sm; ind. cators of the presence and intensity of moral authoritar an. 
and the social circumstance S4n,, j1hich they have their origin. 
II. An -1 na-1.77sis of-7 -nor,? -_-'L aull-, horitarianism 
One of the most interest Lng aspec-ts of moral indignat-cn seen as 
the desire to impose i-LIDulse restUrEint upon others is fts 
4S interestedness. 
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Where groýips or individuals stand to gain economically or in terms 
-P ot political po,,,,, er from the en-oreement of this r-norality, the presence 
o. such interests suggests strongly -'U U -hat theirs is but a spurious piety 
employed as a cover for cersonal advancement, although the presence 
of such attempts to secure support by appeals to m=-, I sentiments of 
a repre sive nature does point to the presence off a readily provoked 
moral indignaticn within the community at, laro-e. It is the moral c-_ 
indigna IU4 cn of this latter group, and not the spurious piety of the 
ý7-ellf-seekinc- vihich pcses the most interesting questions in searching C, 0 
for the sources of social control. Why do those -who stand to make no 
direct gain from the forceful imposition of morality nevertheless 
codye in their mutual inhibition? 
The exercise of such social control by the unofficial watchdogs 
-1 of morality cannot fully be explained with reference to the operation 
of env y. T his is most clearly so fin the case o-I' wh-ýat 7iestermarck 
referred to as "disinterested antipýathies", or victimless offences, 
but ý-Iso contributes to shaping the reaction to other offenders. 
Schoeck sees envy and m. oral indignation as the universal consequence 
2 
of 7,. en being chafed by their membership of hum-an grouýýs. In 
CUOS 4 fullill-ment arf-ument membership in s not seen 
ture, but is experienced as a diminution. The loss of ýi,,, -iman nat 
.. ecessit-te-ý ly -; 4-dualit,,,, conseý-, uent upon the compromi. ses 
membership is amelicrat-mld by depriving others, particularly ne, ý,, comers, 
luality. unused as yet to the norms of the jro, jps, of their in-livi, Jut to 
4 
such an argument concerning t-'r-, e u. njverS-'LJ-'L,, 7 Of -nvy and function as 
va- the f,: undation of social control must be added on account oý -iations 
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in the intensity of these factors between 7roups. Groups vary in 
terms of the relaxed or ticht control ,,,, hich they exercise over their 
memb ers Not all groups or social positions rob those ,,.,, ithin them of 
ý, Iieir liberty to the same extent. The extent to ,,., hich they can and do 
do so is determi-'Ied "by the relat -ionship O-L ' the Eroup to its eravironment 
and the nature of its internal structure. 
I As Adorno, building upon Freud's discussion of groi-ip --sycholoEZr, 
notes, a re-ý, ressive and malicious egalitarianism can arise on the 
basis of brotherhood born of humillation. 
3 The nature of such spurious 
ec. -al-. 
t2r----nism is envy . -,, 
hich aims at ensuring that no one enjo-,, -s C-- - 
himse'llf 4-n jreater measure than another. It is part and parcel c-f 
the moral authoritarian's temperament and should no'. -ed - be confus 
t4 ,,,, lith attempts to realize trLeequality through the transforma on of 
the sources oi- repression. 
4 Envy, the tendency to feel d.., 
-spleasure and 
ill-will at the success 
or joy of anotherg ca--ýJls "orth the desire to deprive him OJO those thinzs CD 
upon vhich his relative advantages restq regardless of -hether these 
then pass to the envious person. In this it shares -,,., ith mo--ral 
'ndig-nation he qualil-Y of disinterestedness. 7V'hen people are forced tLIL 
to adhere tc a moral code which imposes severe restraints upon the 
satisfaction 3-f th-eir impulses and sensual appetities it is not 
surprising that they are quick to condemn those whose conduct mocks 
such vralues. For if the -iicked are seen to thrive upon and enýoy 
forbidden fruitsq the deprivations endured by the righteous become all 
the more burdensome. If the social situation in ? ihich the morally 
indignant find themselves renders it 7ýostly, d-,:, ncyerous or impossible C, 
for them to indulge such desires, then the relative deprivation C: ) 
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to 
, 
-'r, 4 ch the unrestr, -a-ned indulgence of others exposes them can only C) 
be alleviated if the wicked are rendered uneviable by being made to 
suffer -For their sins. 
In this light moral indignation can be seen as part of the 
politics of social mobility, which is, o--F' course, a two-way affair 
encompasý--ing possibilities of social degradation as well as the 
pursuit of success. Social mobility is, further, something that can 
be accomplished in relative terms without moving one's own position 
in any absolute sense by comparison ýýith the fate of others. Others 
are held back or pulled down in order to relieve the relative deprivation 
, nhich arises from the inability tc emulate their ccndition. ?,,,! ora 11 
-es by demonstrating the superiority of the condemnation compensat 
righteous. Where the direct action of envy to remove fruit forbidden 
to them from out of the reach of others is not availa"ble, two courses 
of action present themselves. The first is to neutralize the pleasures 
of transgression by the pain of punishment. The second %, ay of rendering 
the sinful uneviable is particularly likely to emerge .,; here the first C) 
in unavailable or ineffective. It entails the elaboration of 
beliefs concerning the evil conse-ýuences likely to be. "'all the sinner 
regardless of any punishment by Ls fellows. To the individual 
forced to relinquish basic pleasures and to live under a system of 
Stra4 rigid re Lnts the notion that others are gettin. 7 away with something t-; -- 
is intolerable. IS-Domething must be done. 117he solution 
lies in a 
mechanism similar to Scheler's notion of ressentiment: those who 
` the are indulging in pleasures which it is not in the power ol. C, 
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morally- indignant to detect or punish are rendered uneviable in the C 
sight of the righteous bybeliefs concerning the misfcrtune , ih ý ch 
will befall the wicked. In pre-industrial societies such acts are 
ýikely to attraect ritual sanctions. beliefs that, despite the 
d4- 
_j -- 
' -I-" 4culty 
of their detection and punishment by human agents, such acts,, vill 
nevertheless attract the displeasure of supernatural spirits or the 
evil consequences of pollution. In mmore secul-ý--r settings this 
mechanism is more likely to be seen operating in terms of a 
wil'lingness to entertain beliefs concerning the ill-health attendant 
upon such victimless offences as certain forms of drug abuse or 
sexual licence. 
The paiticular tactics which are resorted to in dEal4-ng with 
deviants depend in part upon the willingness of the offender to 0 
co-o-perate in -DroducinE the experience in the righteous upholders C_- 
of rrora: 1ity that. someone else is not getting away with something. 0 
The repentant deviant who appears to feel remorse or to ha-, le 
undergone suffering as the result of his transgression not only C) 
commits a lesser offence than the unrepentant deviant i, &o revels in 
his immorality by not questioning, the -legtr-. a--y of" the sacred 
code: he also renders himself uneviable, the target for self- 0 
congratulatory pity rather than anger and repression. 
, 
`. 1oral author itar 4---ns, as we have seen, see themselves as 
inhabiting a dangerous .! jorldg threatened both by human and 
supernatural forces. 
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And their arxiety is not without foundation. As we shall see, 
their position renders them vulnerable to man7 pressures, 
exacerbated by the envy of their peers who are similarly constrained 
to keep a tight rein upon their impulses. felt to arise C. ) Threats are 
from human ndure, which is vie-ied as inherently evil and hence 
requiring forceful restraint. Fear rather than faith in hmanity and 
th the unknown alike arise as the result of thecpality of the soical 
relationships in which people are involved. Such anxiety also 
reflects a lack of self-confidence in one's ability to cope ., iith 
threats and obstacles. Such a lack, born of long dependence upon 
others, renders the protective shelter o., - an unquestioned system of 
moral beliefs all the more alluring and makes the Euppre--sicn of those 
who question it by their deviance all the more pressing. Anomie 
entails facing ambiguity and the unknown, an unwelcame prospect for 
those unequipped with the necessary social and cultural resources to 
successfully negotiate such challenges. Instead they cling to the Cý 
belief that to arrange the world to suit men's needs is impossible C) 
and illegitimate. Their morality serves to protect themselves 
of safe -le to a set from facing their -, vealknesses by reducing li-L 
rituals and routines. Flaunting these boundaries leads to 
rected against the deviant, especia', ly repressive sancticns teeing di 
IP-bere he challenges the legitimacy of the bcundaries themselves. C> I 
Punitiveness is the natural accompaniment of the other elements 
of mcral authoritarianism. There is first the operation of redirection, 
the finding of an acceptable outlet for accumulated frustration 
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of desire. Then, as indicated above, there is the need to neutralize 
the gain from immorality, to render the viicked unenvia'ble. And both 
coercive asceticism and punitiveness reflect an indifference to the 
suffering imposed upon individuals when their desires are 
subordinated to the demands of authority. Compassion for the 
condemned can only begin to emerge when the off"ended party is no longer C) C; ý 
so much -lore powerful and prestigeous than the offender. 71here the 
moral order is elevated to an absolute and sacred status, where the 
collective conscience is firmly established, the distance between 
the offender and the offended increases and gives rise to harsher 
penalties. 
As Durkheim noted, harshness toviards one's fellows is not an 
innate human trait, but the product of strong moral sentiments 
produced by specific --"'orms of group life. Where the individual 
subordinates himself completely to the will of the g-roupý breaches 
.0 Of collective moral sentiments and affronts to the will att--4, -',, uted 
to 
symbols ol the collectivity elicit especially violent respon-les. 
The gap between the offender and the off"ended is too great to permit 
of much syrmpal-1hy for the offender. Furthermore, the moral sentiments 
instilled by a strong collective conscience are not weak and 
vacillating, but strong and decisive. No doubts or qualms arise 
to 
CZ) 
stay the hand retribution. 
At this point it is . iorth pointing out that attempts 
to explain 
CD 
ff ere d the emergence of disinterested indignation at the wrongs su. 
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by unrelated members o. '0 the community by reference to increasin, 7 
social solidarity often misinterpret the meaning of this r, =ýlationship. 
It is true that an increase in social solidarity, where this is taken to 
mean the individual subordinating his own and others interests and 
inclinations to those of the group, is associated with the emergence 0 
ýD-- I 
of moral indignation. But this is not because individuals feel 
an incren-se"' s, -, 7T: pathy with each other, for such s.!., -mpathy should 
also extend to the offender, who is also a member of the community. 
Compassion, in Elias's sense, rather than moral indignation mio,. -ht 
be expected. Indeed, the very notion of punishment as a sanction 
empý loyed against another iýember o. f the community often implies the 
recognition that he has rights not accorded to outsiders which limit 
the available forms of redress. It is the greater respect paid to 
Uhe authority of -'-I. -. e group and its norms, -iideening the distance CD 
between the individual and the sacred order offended, vihich sharpens 
the punitiveness of the reaction to deviance, and not the extension of 
sýrm. pathy for individuals. 
The use of religious beliefs as a means of understanding the D 
fr=s and hopes of their adherents in the search for the roots of 
4nd _, 7 
4- it Will P. oral . nation cannot 
be underestimated. It was 
be recalled, the fact that when the Greek gods acquired a ne,, vfound 
zeal for justice they also developed other new sentiments and coneTns 
which gave Ranulf his initial clue as to the mea-ing Of -Crn-I ind--gnation. 
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Knowledze of supernatural beliefs illuminates the orientation towards 
the world upon which moral indignation rests. In some supBrratural 
forms of enticing people into sin, for example, ,, I, e see the view 
that some men are doomed, impelled to sin by unalterable forces 
beyond human control rather than responding to alterable circumstances. 
Such a view also underpins the use by human agencies of agent provocateurs 
to lure people into crimes th--: j might otherwise not have committed 
on the '-, asis that such immorality is inherent in the fallen 
character of deviants rather than the product of circumstances. 
In making use of religious beliefs to study mora 14 ndic-nation CD - C) 
it should be noted, particularly in the case of contemporary society, 
that the fears and hopes which such religious sentiments and beliefs CD 
express can equally find expression in secularized form. As was 
noted above, when it is regarded as important that people suffer 
as the result of their loose morals, it is as nne for the purpose 
of the study of -oral indignation whether such suffering is believed t: ) 
to result -from supernf-7: tural retribution or natural processes. Thus 
V4 
-ce can 
be visited by supernatural punishment or believed to result 
in disease or diaability as the result of purely natural processes. 
Similar parallels of supernatural beliefs expressive of moral 
authoritarianism can be flound in other areas. When what matters, 
-0 for example, is the longing 
for an overwhelmingly strong power ýa 0 
-, ýihich Jjrn-; ts human free, -- om, determines their life independently 
of the 4r interests and -! iishes and administers salutarv lessons 
concerning their h; --lplessness, 
it makes little difference if the 
source is envisaged as 
God, Fate, Necessity, or Nature. Likewise Cý 
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the feý-r of possession by spirits ccnsidered capable of corrupting 
and destroying people recurs in contemporary 8, uise in the form of 
beliefs concernin-cr the qualities of some drugýý. 
To point to the way in ,, ihich such beliefs perform functions 
to those previously served by religious ides is notq Of 
course, to deny týi-! -:: t they may be true. It may , vell be the case, 
for example, 'hat pride does come before a fall even tI--ough it is 
no longer believed that the gods take a hand --n ens-f-ing that this 
is so, or sexual licence ma, -7 have unfortunate psychological and physical 
consequences. What is argued here is that, in the absence of any 
conc" US4 vp evidence in these areas, d4fferences in the,., 7i! 7, ngness 
to accept such beliefs or to emphasise the in,! cIved result 
from variations in terms of moral aut'roritaria-ism. 
-o be made of the To conclude this section, some mention needs 41 
role of censorship f-s an expression of moral authoritarianism. 
As Elias noted, ', --'-. e banishment of references -'I-c the carnal side of 
human nature from conversation, ' or explicit representation of this 
aspect of human life in art or literature, is a sign of the increasing 
strength of sociall bonds which fetter human impulses and subdue C- - 
I. 
sensualitv. Pru-rient material is the partjcullaýr target for censorship 
by t'-'-. e morally indignant as it not only af-. '-"ords sensual pleasure 
in itself, but is believed to promote the ýi-alue of sexual indulgence. 
CIe., nsorship of - such m2terJal - 
is also a means of cutting off painful 
! ý-. -iareeness of the presence of forbidden fruit. 
(Such "--ut-off" 
-nechanisms in the face of extremely tempting obýects mrade 
unobtainable by social restrzints are so basic that they can also 
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be observed. arnongst other primatesý4 OrSh4 CD Cens _p is also the 
inevitable ý,,.! eapon resorted to by those seeking to safejuard their, c:; 
rei-fied vie, -- of the i,., orld and mlloralit. ý,., f rom the inrodds of If relativism 
and to suppress those who have the temerity to insult the sacred 
order by daring to question it. ýD 
Hepressive institutions and repressive sentiments : ý7 
In studying the extent 2nd intensity of those sentiments and 
14 be 
-Leffs , ýihh--', ch consititute moral autl---crit; ar4 anism we are not a---, )Ie 
to 
'I t4 rel I -presence of certain ins lutions as of the .y upon 
'he 
stre--th of moral 4-ndi-c-nation wi-11-hin a society even . %, hen these E5 C, 
ý- 'r r exam: Dla, -sl sýght seern ýtc--- n-lu-r-I emboclliý7ent. Fo --, -ht at -14- 
u--ý I- I- 
the -'--r7nal ýrs+4+utJon of 3unishment, seen 
in Durkheim's zense 
of the term as repressive sanctions emanating from a turibunal 
independent of both accuser and accused, is not t. he si-sle- -e-"-ex 
on the institutional Levell of a deep!. -, entrenched cc-ncensus of values 
4 et-,,. fte-sres-ve sanctions are not sim,. -ýTy the result throu-cphout soc 
of relDresý34-ve sentiments. 
. -story of --, n,, T, social 
institution such as is revealed "'he I- - 
in the introduction and develojýment of criminal Ilaýý.,, is the result 
of a diverse range of pressures and ', '---e end result, both in terms 
off' its inception and operationg is li'-, -elýr to represent a cc-. qprom. ise 
be-u,,,,, een -41.1hese. In ýhe case of the motives behind the development 
of the crimnal for exa, -. -, ple, not on", -, 7- the 
ýisinterested tendency 
pol 4 tý Cal to -nfýict punishment but also the -Qursuitu of economic fand -L. L - 
nt role. to ex-pand I-e state seek IU ? dvantage played a sign fica v 
the criminal law not merely as a response to moral senti7ents I 
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d-veloping 
.,: ithin society, but allso for such considerations as the 
desi--e for revenuee -nd to , -. leaken local, clan and tribal loyalties. 
The sentiments of the general population are not, ho, ý, ever, 
7.1ithout imiDortance f Lcrc ` just or developments in the en' cement of ice. 
,Ir 
Yet even here the DOSSil-41i+y C-I-' more interested tendencies 
.o inflict -punishment . -;? oý-, ld '-, ave to be taken into ccncl-ider2t-cn --n 
any full account of t1he development cl, forr-ial mecnanisms for the 
j.. -he settI ement of discutes. a certa--n stage of developrrient, -hen t 
-he 'or lu ,, ode off production renders 4. - -i of dispii e avo4dance and 
- im it i-,, e set tlement -, sed f oodg2 th-arers. in opera ble , fo-r-s- of -, ). 
, -ýst4ce maj -, -je" 
devel-z -i, -cli pose dangers and ý-, nc--rta-n', 4---s CD 
4 'ýes m ,, ý 
4L 
ýnh-ich cc-, nrr, -in_, - - --ay well sh to 
be rid of by the introduction 
"t !- -1 "' - of -': 'orce -_*nd eependent o- _e 
disý, utants an'. -p-pa'--- c -' athi. IL- 
` ng the ,,: ee--- peace 
For :; hLatever reason the formal sanc-", ions aree inturoducedg ,,, Ihether 
for 
is the . 7jealmess of 
informal social controls, the 
greater from mut-ual aid groups or the independent 
1ý u- I-L U- u bhe---- very activity of t', --e slate a'me' at s--engthen4ng 4ts position, t 
--stence Itends 
to cre2te a public d---,, ---nd for t1--eir continuation as 
the resu-t of the d- ssou-,. -* on of --n-l"ormal soc' -31 control s ich their 
introduction fosters. 
Justice On the point of popular support or the enforcement of li 
it -, s niot Ooss--blLe to sh-re the assumption of Ranulf that interested I 
and Ut4 
14 1--ar4an con S4 de-ations on 'he psrt of +'-ose to protect .Lýý- I- uII---- C-- 
themselves may be -', ----a,, -, ed as constant and therefore as incapablee 
-C, ", a 4, Iions 
in support for penal policies. o exp -ning 
variau-- 
-L - CD 
328 
/ 
'ifferent -ec--, --, ons of socielk-. Zý differ in terms of --hei- vulnerabilit. 7 
to the -predation of crimmals. SU'--". L fears ý! re `ý', -ely to make their 
mark upon -: )iýblic policy in accordance .,.? --th 
the nlimbers, c. 
I- ý on cro P_ ni za: ý u- 
and resotirces of thiose threatened. 
71here vvide di-Cferences of povier exist -iithin socie-'-J, 
_T 
further 
?en th- cri-nal d-L. 'ficulties are introduced for an.,,., atte-pt to S- -1 ý* 
la-j-., s-Ln. D'-y tL C4 -he re-flection of -nterests and sen+-i: rents common throughout 
Is intereý--, ts and scc-t7, - in an e---, all-Y --. -I+U--nse -for-n, as some -; Deool-- 
concerns-D -villl manifest themselves as more press-n--ý, th: m those of 'D 
control -rance of unanimity may be M--njac-', -,, -ed ')y 
4- 
o. L-ers. Some a-, -7, e 
of the means o. L ideoloo, '-cal and emotional -., roduction "by the po,. -ier- 
and =. -'; -ý., i7eged. 
5 4 4' -17' 4 t. classes This renders it, dL C) hi -L-CUl. 
for oU 
to for-, ulate and e7press their idea-: ) and interests in a coherent 
., -, -Ieoiogy. 
The -potentiality flor conflict4ng -., 4 --,,, s of the ýiorld 
It of differin-, y conditions and however, remains latent as t', ',. e resu 0 
4--4 
Lý -pendence e-. cperien, --s, --nd-*no, expression -herever. a 
degree of inde- CD 
from spiritual subservience is --? in-ld. c; 
It cannot tlnerefore be --ssumed that the exrerience of moral 
, 
it is -1-11a 4- indignation -iill allv,, ys find unequivocal ee-pr3ssion nor 1, 
4 -: ' -* -,, 
t4 -1 icies. mt force sh, --pin:,, ia ý)c the onlýr e, u- c_-- 
in the -development of crime -nd shment other, often more 
interested, 7,. otives are a, ,., ork. It lias not been the intention 
V, ý? r4 OIIS here to jive any full account fo the forcas shaping the Cp 
history of penal pollicies and insti, tlý', -Lons, re--, -e--1y to indicate some 
of the forces strong enough to c07-, lement or counteract the operation 
of ýoral indignation in such areas. 
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IV. 
-', ýoral indiEnation: tovj, ý7, -rds a sociological explanat t ion 
l, f-, v- enc, untered the central ele eu ments of the outloo7 of the 
=ra'-l,,, --ndi, mant under a n,. --ýber of =uises in the previous cha-c-, ý, -ers: 
as the 7noral realist; tune authoritarian; the dogmatist; the Apollonýqr; 
t h- -- ýI -- -oersc-. ý-ose life is i-bued tnrcughou-1- by a still v4gorous 
co'llec'----ve conscience. This is not to sa,,, T that these terms refer to 
iýen-',, icýRll characters -'n every res-pect. They all, ho-iever, particularly 
in the studies .,: 
hich have been r-ýiade use of here, share much in ccmnmon 
"s ., ihich constitute moral and encompass senti-ments and belief 
ind J+ tion. '-Tiven their comron origin in a specific type of social 
experience, this is not at all surprising. From these studies 
and f-rom the difficulties Ranulf encount--ýýred -, -,, I-ien faced 'ýy the 
emergence of -,, ihat he -rezarded as a lo,,,, er middle class mentality in 
the absence cL any t-raditional petty boýýrgeoisie, it bec, f: ýme 
that the tendency of the petty boureoisie to develop such -Values 
-, -,, as oni. 7 a case of a -cree general tendency governing 0 
-the relati 4ndignation and the social u onship bet-. -ieen moral - 
s'L, ructl,, re. Having surveyed a considerabjýe amount off evidence CD 
concerning the sociology and social ps. -, Tcholoý7y, of moral i. nd-i-c-nation, 
-L 
-: -, re novy 
in a position to advance a mo-rez, c: ),, eneral exclanau- ion of 
the social sources of this phenomemon than R--nulIL proposedg an 
explanation which is ca-pab-Ile Y embracing differences other then 
, --e contrast 
'between upper middle c-ass and lo-er rimiddle class th 
-sychcloýg-j -'-ýiich was Ranulf 's starting point and principal interest. 
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From the , evidence before us it is clear that moral repr-ýssiveness 
-,. s tle result of the experience of inescapable soci-I pressure, of 
having no cho4L--- but to -, T-Leld to the demands of other people due 
to the nature : )f the social relationships in -.,, lhlch one is enmeshed. 
To the extent th---t they are independent of the mnti-nuing good-,,, jill 0 
I of those . -,, ith , -,, hcm t'-ey interact, individluals T. -iill be less likely 
to develop a morally indignant temperament. The social forces 
vihich. --rive --ise to the experience of social pressure that underlLes 
'n=ý'l authoritarianism bear upon the individual from a number of 
directions. Let us look more clocely at Gome of these. 
Lm-U.,. e unequal distribution. "ne "--st vihich rre--its ccnsideration is 11 
or po,,, 7er. Di---"e-r--. ng expeliences of giving and taking orders have 
been held to be the main determinant of variations in individual 
6 
outlooks. Is this so with -noral authoritarianism? It would 
certainly appear so. As early as childhood, as Piaget demonstrates, 
the morality of Constraint is the direct outgrowth of unilateral 
respect of the child for its parents. The child's lack of resources 
11 
and the activities of its pirents render it incapable of crýticis'rg 
I. them. Only -, ihen parental constraint zives wa, r before cc-operation 
bet-, -leen equalls and self-government by peers does unilateral respect 
-ýive way to mutual respect and a morality based upon sympathy 
for 
-her than adherence to the codes and com7ands of one's equals ra-11 
rity. "s -. ve savi in our discussion of Piaget, ,,! ith this 'change authoL 
in relationships the mode of thought ! jhl-ch he terms "-oral realism" 
begins to -fade. r_- 
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Similarly ývith respect to early socializ---tion ,,! e see in the 
authoritarian personality studies that those Imught up under the 
burden of repressive family relationships, -ýihere discipline is harsh 
and exercised -,,, ithin cle, rly defined and unquestionable relationshiDs 
of dominance -nd s,.:, ', -'. --, ss4Lon, ar- likely to develop the menta'ýty 
of a 7,,. oral authoritarian and to adopt equally harsh Tneans of 
disciuýining others when ýziven the opportunit. 7T. ---ucli emotions are 
fostered by severe parental discipline whilch both stimulates a. 7--e; sion I_- - 
as tl. --e result o--F' ffruslur--ýtion and f: -, t the sa-, e time deniýýs it e. -4,, pression 
4 against the authorities wh, _ch are 
its source. It then becomes 
harnessed to the service of social order in the form of prosocial 
aggression. 
Such patterns of alithority can be repeated in adulthood , -! th 
similar conpequences for moral consciouness. In neither case need 
it be assumed that +1'-ose subject to such control consC'ously resent U- 
* t. Consciously they are quite likely to reyo, --rd this as j-ist and 
the checks -wT---ich they impose upon themselves by limiting and restraining 
their exploration and enjo. ym. -ent ol 
the extre-ely diverse r-Dnge of 
.Ly 
or inev-ta'-le. behaviour of -! ih-; ch they are capable as volunta-r- 5- 
"'he exý)lanations which people O-Lffer to account for their conduct are 
not necessarily correct. A strong argument can be made out. that CD u 
everyday consciousness in the realm of human af fairs is in large 
measure composed of 'Lies, mysti-fications and diso-uises ai-ned et 
deceivin. g:, oneself and others in the face of fear, ignor-mce and 
ccnfllý ct. 
7 
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The explanations advanced by those .,! Ihose mentalities h-ve been shaped 
by authoritarian relationships are particularly suspect for t,,,! o reasons. 
First, -. -e have evidence of deep. ly ambivalent attitudes to,,,,,, --rds 
t'nemselves and towards those in authority, indicators of smouldering 
hatred beneath the facade of self-accept2nce. and uncritical submission 
to authority . --ihich usually domin2tes their conscious thought. Second, 
as -, -ýe have seen in the work of Rokeach, the function of belief s. -Tstems 
OV4 as pr -ding an accurate account of 
themrld is easily suppressed 
for those with the closed minds typical of -, norgl authcritarians by 
their function as filters to masr- and distort evidence threatening 
to the ego. 
T,,,., o further Points need to be noted about the conditions influencing 
the formation of moral intolerance in childhood. The first is that 
repressive family relationships reflect concerns vith social IýBrarchy 
and status qeneratýýd by the e-rperience of parents of relationships of 
inequality -2nd competition in the -! iider society. This contri'Dutes 
to the formation of moral authoritarianism not only as the result 
of parental redirection of aggression as a consequence of their 
j--, mply 
from the fate within oppressive social structures, but also sJ 
parents desire to prepare their children to be able to cope Wit)a 
what they perceive as a threetening and uncontrollable world. 
The 
second point is that, in reviewing the influence of parents upon 
the formation of 'their children's morality, attention should not be 
--rents 
beliefs ý3nd v9lues ? nd the success they 
. 
ited to the p 
have in duplicating these in their children. 
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Peo-ýD'Ie vihose childhood w-s spent in a home untroubled by econom4l- c 
insecurity are 1-4'--e-, -y 
to develop attitudes et variance ý-dth thoge of 
parents ., ihose own childhood . vas spent unde-L such conditions. For 
their children economic security may be taken for g-, r2nted, in 
a way which is impossible for the - parents ! iho, despite present 
affluence, passed their for-native years under more straigh-U-ened C 
circumstances. Concentration on too narrow a notion of socialization 
can obscure such sources of attitude formation. 
The influence and po, mer of one's elders c-an, of course)extend 
,!., ell beyond childhood under favourable conditions. Gerontocracy 
as a --form of social inequality has important consequences for the 
development of, moral authoritarianismi which is often couched in 
terms of respect for tradition. Such respect diminishes where people 
ýire able to esca-pe from the continued superv'sion of those who viere 
S4 
)- their formati respon ý. ble for them during ve years. 3ecoming freer 
in their dealings with their elders they become freer --n their at titude 
to,. vards the morality nhich these elders represent. 
The fear and c---ution of moral authoritarians in dealing ý,,, iththe,.,, orlld 
beyond the safe confines of ýýhat has been rendered predict-ý--bl-e b., T I 
moral regulation are inimical to the pride and sal-ff'--assur2nce oif t-'-. ose 
enjoying greý--ter power, pr4-vilege and independence. The 1-tte-r are 
-o sat]-§' better able, by virtue of the resources at t-he-Jr ccrm-ýand, 1, Ly 
their desires, to overcome opposition and obstacles, and freer to 
/ 
give vent to their frustration. escaping the -tLamperamentally souring 
influence of long endured resentment from having their 
desires 
th, Narted and denied expriýýssion- The nearer to the top of the social 
hierarchy the greater the opportunity of shaping events and exercisinz CD 
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thought, judgement and iný-ti. -t: ive. Incret:! sýng occupational ý-. lienation 
2s one descends the soci! ýl sc--le breeds susceptibility to moral 
authorit2ri-r--nism, as does the incre3sed dependence upon others 
resulting from slender resources. 
At the very bottom of the social hier-rchy, ho,. -,, ever, other forces 
enter into account 1-vhich check this trend. Prominent amongst 
these is the fact that - the loviest class achieves a measure of 
'L. -. d-ependence from others by the very fact that its members have so 
little to '. o, ---e. Threats to t-ke away valuable statuses in the event 
of nonconformity hold little menace for those with no status to lose. 
'. 7h! at keeps most people from acting upon their deviant i7,. pulF; es is 
in large mea sure theý ex tent t: ) which they have become cornmit ted to 
conventional society through having, -or expecting to cbtain, a favoured 
position within 4t. Detected deviance , -jould have -,., ide reachin: ýr 
repercussions for such people, threatening their liveýihoods and n 
reputation. 
9 Seen in this light, moral restraint and the resulting 
,. ndignation at the , I! ickedness of others c-n be seen as a "middle class" 4 
phenomenon in the broadest possible sense of the term, the tendency 
4 towards moral indignation as one reaches the lo,, ver I. evelS 
of the middle class until the lack of a stake in the ssýrstem of 
stratification weakens the preszure it exerts as individuals find 
t'l-jemselves -Nith little to lose by deviance. (The appeal of moral 
tion to those sections of the community -.., 711aich as-Are to gain i nd i,, -4 na 
or ret--in a hold, however prec-3rious, upon the status lad, ýer above 
the lowest level is nicely illustrated by the social characterisitcs 
335 
of those who choose to become professional guardians of morality. 
For the police are drawn principally from themnks of the asptring 
and reý--pectable upper working class and from the lo,, -ie-j levels o. ' the 
middle cýass who are anxious to retain their claim to social 
superiority), 
10 
In general we may expect those whose economic achievements are C) 
I most precarious, Who are more likely to be tumbled from th-eir position 
of economic advantage, to be more anxious to cling to the dictates of z:: ) 
moral rectitude. Economic depressions ivil-I increase thý-s tendency 
and fuel their zeal to mete out Justice to the --iicked. Li!,: e,,, i is e, 
Cý-, -hreatenin--, - competition leads to 
further Jncreasýnglv intenFe and t C) 
-ion. Proszerity and prestLge, on the other desperzte impulse renunciat 
hand, will dilute such an outlook, although the comp2ete effect of 
such improved conditions may not be fully realized until the second 
generaticn. 
So far -.,, 7e have been concerned -,.,! --th ou. tlininý- the social 
pressures vhich allow little freedom of thought and action which 
emanate from s-/stems of social inequality . Such conditions provide 
14--'-tle reason to feel in control of fate and -, n,? ke conformity seem 
both necessar,. -T and appropriate. '3ut social pressure, the experience 
'ions of of havin-- no choice but to yield to the demands and expec+,, --, C. D 
other people, can also bear upon one from one's equ-n1s. This is not 
entirely the product of redirected hostility aroused by soci--l inequality. 
The remov-, l of inequality is not in itself sufficient to secure the 
elimination of moral intolerance and repression. People continue 
to -l-eel 
that they have no option but to compl,, T if the nature of their 
social relaU-ionships is such that moral- standards are reified into I 
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absolutes and where escape from the ,,, D-roup appears ou, t of the question. 
The greater the commitment to societ. 7, the tighter the moral bonds C-) 
limiting the individual pdr'suit of sensual satis-faction --nd the more 
the body -ýnd its functions are veilled from public vie-. 
At this point it needs to be empý, asiz; ed that in discussing sociý: -, l 
.. sclid2rity as a source of morality -hat we have in mind is loyalty 
I ent lo the ---roup as a whole and not sim-, I-.,, some sort of sum of independ 
affecticns and ave. r-sions for the indi-,,, --duý--Is com-posing it. To borro,., I, 
ý. rart * -:, -f- :, ' 4, st4nction, Iývhat .,., e sho, -ý. Id focus upon 
is the "social", 
-In Bubj- r ý. -I- 
the s`tuation where loyalty to thq group takes precedence over I-oy? lty 
to any one individual, rather th-n the "inter-human", thý::? t is to 
concrete friends'. --, ips. 
11 The former has no necessary relations, -ip 
,,!; -'th respect 
for 4 -C. 4-ividual r-ghts and freedom. Despite e-uality i--- I-I 
'n ', -he ; ý-z-roup the 4-portance of the ---zoc: bl cýln 
be raised to -,,, ch th-: 
res-pect over and above a point as to provide an object of ; Ini 
the indiv` dui', s -.,., ho comprý ý7e the ý7rmip, ., iith a! I that unilateral 
respect -neans -by of --noral realism, restr, 3int ý, nd Mtolerance. 
Individual members -ho affront the absolute authoiýty of the group's 
code of conduct in such cases are likely to, meet -7! ith morall 
L 4 -dignation than svm. pathy. 1-Here -ie see again the oý)eration 
4n distance bet-.,, leen the offender of the pr ciple that the greater the socL 
and the o`fended, the h-rshe- the reaction. 
The group is elev-sted 
above all-, the individual counts as nought in comparison. 
The 
may -! ell be -"--a. red a-, pos4ng a 
th-reat 
,. eve-opment off 
individuality r CD 
its cohesion and loyalt, -7 to its collective values and beliefs. U 
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', ', 'h! -tever weakens such unilat-2r-] respect, subordination a-. -. d 
ýncorporation 4nto the ý2-roup relaxes soci!: ý! pressure -nd h, ýnce 11 
bod4-'-,. -,, control, as -ell -ýs ozening uý) the possibilitv ot' E-r-e-ater 
ccmpas7ion to-ards Offenders as people become less ready to sacrit"ice 
t4 
the individual in the name off collectJive -Lden-1s. 
The lengthier and C-) 
more -, ermanent the involve-ent in a particul-ar j--oup, the --r-eater 
4- 
,. ends to be the attacýimo-rt lo its traditional values ; ýnd 
tl-, -. -4--- 
enforce: 7ent. Conversel-r, the more fluid social boundar-4-es ere as the 
result, for examp'e, cf practisin, c- an itinerant mode of -procluction 
the 7-ess are tc encounter morall --,. )th(Dr4-, tar4- - n4 s-n The 
ea-erness o-C. to i-n-, I, ose bc, 7nclaries upon e-r-: ýerience 
and c I- I nduct --c-t s th ýý- i-per--ieabJ- Ii ty of t", -- -, oc ial bound-! - rie s -ý, h ich 
encase " . 7he---. -oeo--'--- feemýl Free to breýkof f re I at J-- on ships 
4 
and start affresh, as under condLt--, --ns a-. "'-Forýed an expar., din. -I 
economy, b(71-, nda-4-, --s -, -, ea! 7--n --nd e-/a, --oorate. Access 
to nlternative 
scurces of social exch-amqe and alleo-J-nce form one of the -ost 
12 
tant conditions of soc4al and fnlel7ectua' 4ndependence. im. porl - 11 
The abilit,. -T of a group to induce th, ý experience in its 
Jnd jV4 dual members tý, at -1,1, ey have no option bjl-ýt to cc-ý-form to 7, TouP i- 
*ts authority depends standard's and -to subordinate t, -.! -mse, vec- to - 
4n partýcular upon t-,, o conditions: ml, tuýl surveillance and 
1 -Z 
cosmo-politanism. " To take rnutu! ml sur, ýei-"---rce firstug it can 
be 
o bs e rv edth ýý toupsf --* f -1 -- rin 
th, ee-, r tentto -4, hichmem', ) ersca --,, 
out their 7ctivities in the presence cf e? ch other. 
338 
, ', f here it is impcssi'ýle to evade such surveil, anc, -ý, social ccntrol is 
td Lghtenea, unreflecting acceptance o" group values and beliefs reinforced C; 
and expectati6yis of con-Lorm-ity --, -LL others r! ---. isea. 
Cos mopcl it an T, I! exposure to a diversity of perspectý--,,; s as 
result of cc-, tacus 7! 
4L th 
people --f"-. O-L a var--e+,, -,, of groups --nd 
ý; ituations, intro-cluces a degree of r-elativism, in place of real ism --n 
moral. beliefs as others. It also provides the confidence 3nd knoý,,,; --, Ieýge 
necessary to d spel ' .,, 4 ;' -1--eNorld outside the safe confines t1he -Ls-cn o. - 
471 
of a closed community as 'alien and uncontrollable. Conversely, 
", i 
. 7. -a 41_V 4 . ted social relationshi-ps foster un Ideed attention to each 
o4ther's conduct and involvements nind -, rovide t. -. e social conditions 
necessary for intense gossip to flourish. Through such ---ossip CD <- - 
-L. -., crmat--cn 
is pooled, suspicions created ý--nd ccnfi-r: -.,. -af, and reý)utalulcns 
attacked. e- rs, 
4 ty of attention '-, rought about by diverse involver. -Lents 
4 ---07 4 c, u +s 's affairs and dilutes the -de the =cu-p d strý; cts C) -L UU 
4m-port-nce -,, cccrde, -! tQ ft, and 
its val-, -ýes and belieff's 
by more 
cosmopolitan members. 
a el igicn The more activities such as , vork, leiSU-Lý: --, ýýolitl-cs and r- 
become sepR: --ra-Ied from one another, carried out ýjy -epar---v'Ee groups 0 
seý, arae territories, the llc,,, ýýer tl----- de, ýree of -!, tual surveillance 
and +. '--e er the degree of cosmo-o! 4 tan4 sm. "--s '-is'orical ýh tl --L. -, _u 
trend has inevitably ,,,,, eakened t-'-e 
forcefulniess of co! 7ective 
bel ief's and fleelings. Large cities exerc-ise a -e nceoer C__ 0 
formattion of moralityg -, nutualsarveil7-,, -ýc, -- a' he se 
-'-- J , sary t-c stiýn,, -ýIate 
it, Cosm 
- 
1-tanis, 
time as er--,. si-nco: ý- the 
involvernent neceE 70-Do T, 
also incre--lses as diverse cultures ý-ntermingle. Decreasing mutual 
surveillance and 4 ncreasinj, cosmopolit-: nis- ease social =essure, 
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inak-in, g slip ing over social anc" r-. 1oral bound., 7-. ries eas4cr to contei-, lte V 
and to achieve. 
.., ral doubt an, ý sceptýcjsm - t, -rcd, -ý, c. t o-P beLng 
--o %A - ia I are not ni, -- e 11 L 
introduced to alternative real--*ti--s entertalned 'Iýr ot--ers. Ca U 
4 1- tastrophes 
,., jh--ch disrupt the taken-for-, c.., -ranted routines and sunder relations'-fpsg 
. vhel ther such c-stastrophes are natural or man-m--de, sha-lke unrefflect i ng 
vene---! tion cý the tradit tional verit --es The social dis'-=ýtuion b-rou--rht 
about the combi I-I -nation o- -conomic grc.,,,. tl--- and popula'-J-on e-pansion 
aand taobility, identified by i.. usFrcve as the source ---' -Diony-, 4L 
4- SM 
C, - 
I ike, -74. se leads to the --., eaken-Ln, -, =Y, cf the col'ective cons-cience and the C) 
a -P anomie. , rcwth o- 
V. Ranulf revisited: an appreciation 
It is quite understandable that Ranulf should have concentrated 
upon the 1-c,.,; er m*. ddle class as the murce of mior5ll --nd-LEnation within C; 
society. The psychology of this class was evident at the time in its I 
attraction to Naticnal Socialism with its advocacy of law and order 
14 and manipulation of moral indi, ý-mtion. There was a'-so an est! ýib _shed 
" knowledge conc. erning the outlook t, -,, fpi-c-1 to the -petty body of 
I--. er , bourgeoisie, present in thework of such -. r. iter- as Sombart and 
4L- -rayed this claass as ascetic, movf-:: Iist4A-c and severely self wh ch port 
SOý4 disciplined as -,:, consequence of the----L position within 
the ial 
stru. cture and the peculiar mode of lifle. whi-ch it diC'L, -te,... 
It is evident frcm studies such as these that the lo,.,! e-r rrid'olle 
class lead a life dominated by the notion of :, carcity. On the-rne 
hand this distinguishes them, from the upper-, r-, idILe- and upper-class. 
,1 
C) 
,I more On the otherg 1? ihile , n. ater-L- sc: --Ircity also impinges st-J-'- 
4 
heavily upon the , -,, orking class, the lf-'ope of gaining- or retaining a C) 
hold, albeit precarious, on the 1-o,,, -er run. gs of" the ladder cl CD - 
pri-vilege and prestige, 
lead the loT7,,, er middle class to adopt C) 
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a different respcnse. For much of the working clas-,,, the ind*vidual C) 
mobility held out as a possibility by bureaucratic carýýe-, -, oi? the 
p: ul,, --uit of success over competitors in business is not read'Lly available. 
Long term -planning and deferred gratification m--, ke I-eýýs sense in such 6 Cl 
c-rcumstances and scarcity is therefore dealt with by seizing the 
4 opportunity to en-ýioy oneself . -, hl_le the opportunity presents itself. 
For the lower middle class, and for its downwardly-mobile 
represent at ives %vithin -Porking class, the "sunken middle class", 
. L. strugglilrl, ý7 to retain their -middle class position or seeking to ensure C) - 
such a position for their children, scarcity takes on a different 
meaning as -Lhe result off the d4ifferent: constraints and opportunities 
14 
IM their sociaL situation presents to the . 7-. --e-; -r -mentality is pervaded 
by the not-4on of thriftiness, as much in emotional as in economic affai: t-rs,, 
Deferred gratification is, however, something ol a 'V-o-edged 1,,., eapon 
TWI ; 
. -th which to 
fight their way to economic and social advantage, for 
those 1,,,, ho have cultiv2-ted emotional inhibition withLn themselves cannot 
readily cest it Off again ! jh. en the Iong- deferred enjoyment - actually 
presents itself. Som'--)art's contrýýst between the man able to enjoy 
I-r. 
--Le to the full and the m=,., iJ-th 
the calculating and cold nature of 
a Mb 4, one dedicated solely to business and economic _tion captures 
this 
,,,, e 11 : 
A good householder ... that is a good burgher and a 
lover, 
CD 
of whatever rank, ar=- irreconc4lable antitheses. 
Either economic interests, in the broadebt sense, 
4 -'s or love interests form the central part of all 1. -'. e 
importance. One lives either to Work or else to 15 
love. 'Nork implies saving, love ir-plies spending. 
341 
The trý-, ditional petty bourgeoisie of small business and 4 ndependent 
artisans have, due to their meagre resources, and the size of their 
business, been constrained to adopt behaviour that is creditable in 
every sense of the term. The need is for conspicuous production, not 
the conspicuous corlsuuýption employed by those in more f avourable 
circumstances. 
The marginal position occupied by lower middle class employees 
p, rcduces similar contrasts betý-ieen their --norality and that entertained 
b-, T the more powerful and privileged. Subject to closer superivison CD 
Id-iey lack much of the inde-cendence and initiative enjoyed by their 
superiors, while their contact -4-th new and alternative perspectives is 
more limited as the result of the requirements and regulation of their 
,! iork and the nature of their educ--+ion. 
St4111 more impressive, ho-, ý., ever, than Ranulf's contrast bet,., ieen 
the morality of the lo-er middle class and that of their superiors, is 
the boldness of his general approach to solving the problem of the CD 
origin of mornal indignation. While it cannot be denied that interested 
motives play a part in shaping responses to immorality, these ar,, 
s Ily -nuch more obvious and un-, crolýlematical than the contr4, bution 
Lor the ste-mming from more disinterested sources. 
Ranulf searched n 
cause oJi" the difference bet-,, een groups 3nd classes in terms Of moral 
of such 
indignation through carefully enquiring 
into the meanin L -1 
sentiments for those entertaining them by relating them to their whole 
view of lifeg tracing such views to their origin in social exieriences. 
"s we liave, seen., ex-periqnces 
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conducive to the development of moral indignation are not the monopoly 
of the lo,. ver middle class as he was led to believe. Nevertheless, the 
evidence which we have revie'Ned amply bears out the value of -ursuinz 
the line of enquiry into the origin of moral ind, -gnat. Cý -ion which he 
com-menced, seeking its source in Ithe 'imilu, -ýtions 4Lm. posed upon people 
by virtue of the social position ,- 41-nd tl. e,, rselves. *- which they Ih 
VI. Breaking the bonds 
Attitudes towards moral authoritarianism by those have 
studied it have varied. Mary Douglas argues for sensitivity llo,. -ý---rds 
those whose -. 1. crality and modes of thought and expression are dominated CD 
by high grid and group. Elias regards civilization and its psychologic. -1 r_- 
impact as an advance, a fragile defence against man's predatory C) 
nature, although he acknowledges th-2t the civilizing process h-: s the C) C) 
unfortunate consecuence of promoting a morally indignant condemnation 
of offenders rather than allowing the development of compassion. Ranulf, 
while clearly feeling distatte for the sentiments of the morally indignantý 
nevertheless feels impelled by his desire to claim academic neutrality 
to point out the li':, ýely dysfunctions of ceasing to i-LpOse strict. moral u 
rep-rulation. - of conduct 
in terms of the distress of those unable to 
"Denefit from new found freedoms. 
In generalg howeverg the approach to moral authoritarianism 
has been hostile. This is clearly so in the aull', --oritarian personality 
studies of Adorno and ,., is colleagues. It also finds expression 
Piaget's opposition to hierarchical relationships with their morality 
of unilateral respect in favour of egalitarian relýýtionships and 
the 
0- 
mora, ity of mutual respect which a±ises 
from them. 
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71 grove makes abundantly clea- -. 
Iu s his ccntempt for Apollonians. 
Such critiques of moral repressiveness partake of a long tradition 
within soc4-o! oFj that stretches back to the EnlighterLment. 
16 It 
expresses a faith in the possibility of human improvement through people 
freeing themselves from existing institutions which are seen as the 
cause of human impoverishment and their failure to achieve their full 
stature. It is týiis belief which has inspired the present enquiry 
into some of the hidden costs of closed and inegalitarian relationships 
! and ccri-, -7unities. The intolerance and repression emanating from moral 
indignation clearly cannot be .,,, ished away. To some extent it has been 
reduced lby contemporary de-/elop, -nents sketched in the previous chapter. 
Its radical reduction, however, depends upon the realization of truly 
open and egalitarian societies which do not provide such fertile soil 
for moral --'n-di-m-ation by stunting the -, rrowth and fulfillment of so many C- - 
of their members and filling them with anxiety and frustration. Such 
a radical transformation will not be achieved by piecemeal appeals for 
civil li. bertiesq nor yielded li., c:,! htly by those committed to the perpetuation 
of the present social order. 
NOTES 
1 Eysenck, for example, has argued that dif'ferencesbet-,, een 
individuals in terms of moral attitudes towards sensual pleasures 
are associated with differences between extrover-', sand introvetts, 
U, -t-! o dist4nctive personality types which he regards as determined 
principally by genetic factors (Eysenck, 1972, pp. -54-35 and 236ff). 
2. Schoeck (1969), PP-87ff 
3. Adorno (1973), p. 96 
4- Russell and Russell (1968), pp. 121-123 
5- The term "means of emotional production" is taken from Randall 
Collins' discussion of the manipulation of materials and techniques 
used to stage rituals producing strong emotional bonds. This 
typically entails the emotional contagion which results from gathering CD together a significant number of people focusing upon a common object 
and participating in a co-ordinated sequence of gestures. Religious 
ceremonies provide typical examples. (Coll-ins, 19759 PP- 58-59) 
6. Ibid., P-73 
7- Harris (1077)9 PP- 12-13 and passim. 
8. See, for example, the study of Skid Row by Wallace 
(1965). He 
ari7ues that such areas are attractive to many of their inhal-litants 
precisely because of the absence of middle class morality, despite 
the hardships involved. 
0. For a discussion of the process of increasing commitment 
to respectable society and its consequences for confo-mityq see 
Becker (1963)9 pp. 26-28 
10. For a review of theevidence concerning the social background 
of the police, see 3ox (1971)9 PP- 183-190 
11. Buber ý1965)9 pp. 7? -73 
12. Cf. -31au (1967)9 PP- 118f-L" 
13- For further discussion of these factors, see Collins (Ic, 75), pp. 75ff 
14. For a discussion of the role of the sunken middle class as the 
mainstay of tý3 "respectable" working class, see Parkin 
(10,72) 
pp. 53ff 
15- Werner Sombartq quoted in 3ramsted 
(1? 64)9 p. 61 
16. See Zeitlin (1968)9 and Dawe 
(1070). 
3-± 
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